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Introduction
This thesis deals with the phenomenon of attitude reporting. More specifi-
cally, it provides a unified semantics of de re and de se belief reports. After
arguing that de se belief is best thought of as a special case of de re belief,
I examine whether we can extend this unification to the realm of belief re-
ports. I show how, despite very promising first steps, previous attempts in
this direction ultimately fail with respect to some relatively recent linguistic
data involving quantified and infinitival reports, logophoric constructions,
and monstrously shifted indexicals. Formalizing my idea of a contextual
resolution of acquaintance relations in a dynamic framework, I arrive at an
alternative analysis that handles all these data.
What follows is an outline of the organization of the thesis. Very briefly,
the first chapter deals with attitudes, focusing on the de re and de se modes
of the attitude of belief. The second chapter deals with the way natural lan-
guages can be used to report someone’s attitudes and describes the classical
semantic analyses of these linguistic constructions called attitude reports.
Finally, the third chapter is devoted to my own proposal for a report seman-
tics, one that tries to unify de re and de se by combining some of the classical
ideas with a truly dynamic account of context dependence.
Chapter 1 starts off by introducing such foundational concepts as se-
mantics and pragmatics, logical form, and compositionality, right up to the
analysis of propositional attitudes in possible worlds semantics and its main
problems. From there I define the modes of attitude, de dicto, de re, and de
se. Then I review the logical apparatus that has been used to characterize
these classes formally. De dicto is the basic mode, characterized by the so-
called disquotational principle: if you are disposed to assent to a sentence ϕ,
then you believe the proposition expressed by that ϕ. Trying to pin down de
re brings us from acquaintance, singular propositions and rigidity to vivid
names and belief under a description. The perspectival, non-propositional
distinctions underlying de se belief are captured by going from propositions
to properties and from worlds to contexts. I finish this introduction to atti-
tude semantics by comparing two well-known unified analyses of de re and de
xi
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se: the relational attitude account that combines self-scribed properties with
vivid names and acquaintance relations, and a two-dimensional character
semantics.
Chapter 2 is about attitude reports, i.e. (English) sentences typically of
the form x believes that such and such that are meant to convey that some-
one believes something. The first observation is that we cannot always see
from the linguistic surface form of the report what mode of attitude it re-
ports, i.e. many reports are ambiguous (or underspecified) with respect to
the mode of the reported attitude. Then I introduce some classic accounts of
report semantics, focusing on those that deal with the de re/de se interface.
First, I consider a version of the relational analysis adapted to reports, and
discuss two defects and possible enhancements (context dependent acquain-
tance relations and structured propositions). When we do the same with
the two-dimensional Kaplanian alternative we discover that the Kaplan-style
report semantics is fatally flawed. Next, we widen our data set by adding
reports with logophoric pronouns, infinitival complements, quantified reports
and monstrously shifted indexicals in various languages. Most of these data
have been used to argue against the total unification of de re and de se (rela-
tional or otherwise). These data have also given rise to a host of alternative
proposals that tease de re and de se reports apart. Comparing them and
the relational analysis, I conclude that all have theoretical and/or empirical
disadvantages, thus clearing the way for a new proposal.
Chapter 3 presents my own account, based on the relational one, but
set in a dynamic framework to properly implement the idea of a contextu-
ally determined acquaintance relation. I start by developing and defending
the general dynamic framework that seems most suitable. I start with a
standard DRT, adding quantification, intensionality and presupposition (“as
anaphora”). To capture the de re/de se distinction we also need a semantics
of directly referential terms, I in particular. For this purpose I use a novel
DRT extension: Layered DRT, a framework for representing different types
of informational content on separate yet interconnected layers within a single
DRS. Combining this layering and its two-dimensional semantics with pre-
supposition theory leads to a very promising new semantics of indexicals and
proper names, combining insights from Russellian descriptivism with Kripke-
Kaplanian direct reference. Then we return to the original issue: to devise a
sound, unified semantics of de re/de se reports, based on relational attitudes,
where the acquaintance relation is contextually determined. My proposal is
called Acquaintance Resolution. The key ingredient is an underspecified ac-
quaintance relation that gets bound by a salient relation from the context.
This process of binding is formalized as a generalization of regular presuppo-
sition binding, using higher-order unification. Two subsequent extensions are
Introduction xiii
added to this simple analysis in view of the previous chapter’s problematic
data: quantified reports, logophors, infinitives and shifted indexicals. The
end results is a unified semantics of de re and de se belief reports, formalized
in a dynamic framework, and able to handle the wide variety of otherwise
problematic data that has accumulated in the literature on the subject.
xiv Introduction
Chapter 1
Attitudes
1.1 Introduction: semantics and the atti-
tudes
This section introduces some of the basics of the study of attitudes, imme-
diately narrowing it down to the attitude of belief. In 1.1.1 I review some
terminology and background for the kind of semantics we’ll be dealing with.
Then, in 1.1.2, we turn to the subject of attitudes and discuss the traditional
analysis in terms of modal logic and possible worlds semantics. In 1.1.3, the
distinctions between the three classical modes of attitude, de dicto, de re,
and de se, are discussed from a pre-theoretical point of view.
1.1.1 Propositions, possible worlds, contexts, and at-
titudes
Human beings can have various attitudes towards all kinds of information.
Philosophers traditionally take propositions as the unit of information, es-
pecially of information conveyable by means of language. More specifically,
the informational content of an utterance is called the proposition expressed
by that utterance. On a standard correspondence theory of truth we define
true as in correspondence with the facts (states of affairs in the actual world).
The notion of a proposition expressed by an utterance can now be further
explicated as the set of all possible states of affairs that would make it true,
i.e. the proposition expressed by an utterance is the set of worlds in which
that utterance is true. The intersection of linguistics, logic and philosophy
concerned with propositions is called (truth-conditional) semantics. The cur-
rent section is meant to introduce the key notions of the type of semantic
study exemplified by the rest of this work.
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1.1.1.1 Syntax, semantics, and pragmatics
On the linguistic dimension, semantics is often situated between two other
disciplines: syntax and pragmatics. Roughly speaking, syntax deals with
(well-formedness of) sentences, semantics deals with (truth conditions of)
utterances and pragmatics is concerned with what people do with language
in the real world. Syntax is interested in sentences as formal, structured
objects and tries to characterize the set of well-formed (grammatical, inter-
pretable) sentences of a given natural language. Pragmatics, among other
things, is interested in in the way language depends on the external context in
which an utterance takes place, and in speech acts other than assertion that
arguably are not meant merely to convey a certain amount of information
(e.g. questions and promises). Bluntly put, syntax asks whether a sentence
is well-formed, semantics whether an utterance (i.e. a sentence a uttered in
a context) is true, pragmatics whether it’s felicitous/acceptable in a given
situation or discourse.
To be a bit more precise then, the current work may be provisionally
situated within the syntax-semantics interface, studying how to determine
systematically from the surface structure of a particular class of sentences
(viz. attitude reports) what propositions they express. Many, but certainly
not all, authors studying attitude reports would indeed consider themselves
to work at that interface. My own proposal, laid out in chapter 3, and some
of its predecessors to be encountered in chapter 2, however, essentially in-
volve presuppositions and other varieties of context dependence, phenomena
often classified as pragmatic or pragmasemantic.1 In so far as presupposition
resolution is governed by pragmatic felicity constraints, the label pragmat-
ics is evidently justified. However, we refrain from trivializing semantics by
the once popular definition of pragmatics as ‘everything involving context-
dependence’. It is after all utterances (sentences uttered in context) that
carry truth conditions and express propositions, not mere sentences. For,
when is “She never did.” taken in isolation true? Indeed, most if not all
sentences are context-dependent in the sense that they require some fea-
tures of the utterance situation to make them express any, let alone a single
identifiable meaning. A case in point are anaphoric pronouns (in the broad
sense of the word, covering both inter- and intrasentential anaphora) that
require a previous discourse context to give them an antecedent to link up
to. Other typical examples involving context dependence are the reference
determination of demonstratives and other forms of indexicality (deixis), and
the disambiguation of lexical items.
1In fact, one of the contributions of this work is to shift the focus of the study of
attitude reports from syntax to pragmatics.
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The above considerations concerning context dependence, be it termed
semantic or pragmatic, also show the need for a very broad notion of context.
Contexts will need to span several dimensions, among which the (informa-
tion conveyed by) preceding discourse, world knowledge, encyclopedic knowl-
edge, and also the real physical context surrounding the utterance situation
in space-time. Earlier theories often focus only on one aspect of context. Ka-
plan’s (1989) famous logic of demonstratives for instance construes contexts
as centered possible worlds, modeling external utterance situations, whereas
a more recent trend called dynamic semantics takes contexts to be the in-
formation conveyed by previous discourse and moreover shifts the primary
focus of semantics from the proposition expressed by a sentence to the effect
it has on such a context. This chapter and the next will be concerned entirely
with so-called static, i.e. truth-conditional, semantics.
1.1.1.2 Logical form
This thesis is about interpreting natural language sentences that report some-
one’s beliefs. As a semanticist, the data I am concerned with consist of truth
value judgments of sentences in (hypothetical) contexts. The main theoret-
ical questions then are, first, how to represent the truth conditions of such
sentences, and second, how to get to the truth conditions of these sentences
in a systematic way.
As for the first question, truth conditions must be represented in some for-
mal language which has an exact model-theoretic truth definition. Examples
of formal systems that have been used for this task are first-order predi-
cate logic (e.g. Russell, Quine), or something more powerful like λ-categorial
grammar interpreted in an intensional theory of types (Montague). Following
Russell, these formal representations of truth conditions have been termed
logical forms.2In most systems the logical form of a sentence differs from its
realization in a natural language speech act, the so-called surface structure.
In fact, a single surface structure often admits various logical forms, viz. in
the case of a structurally ambiguous sentence. A case in point is (1), which
also introduces my notation  to mark a sentence’s logical form (usually
2Be careful not to confuse this Russellian notion of logical form with the Chomskyan
Logical Form (LF). Terminology with respect to ‘lf vs. LF’ is generally a mess in the lit-
erature. I will talk about logical formulas representing truth conditions as logical forms
and reserve the capitalized expression for a distinct level of syntactic representation. The
interested reader can find more on this distinction in most semantics textbooks, e.g. Chier-
chia & McConnell-Ginet (1990:144-5) or Gamut (1991:214-5). Note, however, that in some
semantic frameworks no such distinction is made and objects called LF fulfill both roles,
or it is claimed that there is only one level of syntactic structure, viz. phrase structure
trees, and that is isomorphic to logical form (Montague).
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written in some kind of predicate logical formalism):
(1) Every student speaks a certain language
a.  ∀x[student(x)→ ∃y[language(y) ∧ speak(x, y)]]
b.  ∃y[language(y) ∧ ∀x[student(x)→ speak(x, y)]]
The two predicate logical formulas in (1) represent the distinct truth condi-
tions for the two readings of the allegedly ambiguous English sentence. The
first represents the reading in which for every student there is a language she
speaks, where this language may differ from student to student. The second
formula is only true in case every student speaks the same language. This
reading can be made more salient by adding “But I don’t know which one”.
This particular type of structural ambiguity is called scope ambiguity: the
different readings correspond to the two ways the quantifiers of the logical
form can take scope. Note that the converse is also true: a single logical form
can be expressed in various ways:
(2)  kiss(c,l)
a. Colby kisses Ligia
b. Ligia was kissed by Colby
From the examples above it will have become clear that despite some
similarities, natural language sentences and their logical representations are
quite far apart. Frege, the inventor of predicate logic with its variables and
quantifiers, was the first to note that superficially similar expressions of nat-
ural language like Colby and everybody, or exists and walks have completely
different functions from a logical point of view. Syntactically, both Colby
and everybody are noun phrases (NP),
while exists and walks are both verb phrases (VP), meaning that they
have the same distribution (replacing one with the other within an English
sentence will preserve well-formedness). But logically, Colby is a simple re-
ferring expression (c), everybody involves quantification (∀x[person(x)→ ]),
as does exists (∃x[ ]), and finally walks is a predicate (walk).
The conclusion Frege draws from the observed divergence between logical
and natural language was quite moderate; he compares the distinction to
that between the microscope and the eye, the first very—but exclusively—
useful for scientific explorations, the other for everyday life (Frege 1879:xi).
Russell (1905) and Wittgenstein (1921), and in their wake the Vienna Circle,
take this a step further, to the point where, under the header Misleading
Form Thesis, they blame natural language for being full of ambiguities and
other imperfections. Their program was to replace natural language with
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something based on predicate logic, especially in the areas of scientific and
philosophical discourse.
To sum up, there is a prima facie distinction between a sentence as used
by speakers of a natural language, and the logical form encoding its truth
conditions in a formal language. Now that we have established this discrep-
ancy, let’s turn to the second question, which concerns the relation between
surface and logical form: How can we systematically derive logical forms from
surface structures?
1.1.1.3 Compositionality
Notice the previous sentence’s use of systematically, presupposing that there
are systematic connections between surface and logical forms. Thus, in con-
trast to the Misleading Form Thesis, we’ll assume that there is a correspon-
dence between the logical operators, predicates, quantifiers etc. that make
up a logical form and the grammatical categories that make up the syntactic
structure. In fact, I take it that one of the main desiderata for syntactic the-
ory should be that its output structures can be systematically mapped on a
logical form representing the sentence’s truth conditions. Other syntax inter-
nal constraints on syntactic theory, involving such notions as grammaticality
and constituent structure, will not concern us in this work.
The notion of systematicity alluded to above is often explicated as com-
positionality, i.e. the principle that the meaning of a compound expression
is determined solely by the meanings of its parts and the way these are put
together. This notion of compositionality derives from Frege who argues as
follows:
It is astonishing what language can do. With a few syllables it
can express an incalculable number of thoughts, so that even a
thought grasped by a terrestrial being for the first time can be
put into a form of words which will be understood by someone to
whom the thought is entirely new. This would be impossible, were
we not able to distinguish parts in the thoughts corresponding to
the parts of a sentence, so that the structure of the sentence serves
as the image of the structure of the thoughts.
[
(Frege 1923:1)
]
This argument is often referred to as the argument from productivity: on
the basis of a finite lexicon we can produce and understand infinitely many
novel sentences. In a compositional language system it indeed suffices to
learn some basic words plus the ways in which to compound them and we
can produce an infinite number of sentences. If, in addition, we also know
the meanings of the basic words, plus the way the meaning of a compound
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depends on the meanings of its parts, we’re done. A slightly different way
to characterize this type of compositionality is to say there’s a rule-by-rule
correspondence between syntax and semantics: each grammar rule that tells
us how to combine a number of well-formed strings into a new well-formed
string, is accompanied by a semantic rule determining the interpretation of
the new string from the interpretations of the parts. We can illustrate the
principle of compositionality with the language of the propositional calculus
and its interpretation. In the syntax we have a rule that says you can combine
two formulas into a new one by concatenating them with a ‘wedge’ sign in
between:
(3) If ϕ and ψ are well-formed formulas, then ϕ ∧ ψ is a well-formed
formula
This rule corresponds to the following semantic rule, wherein JϕK denotes the
interpretation, i.e. the truth-value, of ϕ relative to some fixed model:
(4) Jϕ ∧ ψK = JϕK · JψK
This rule pair is all there is to the formalization of the connective ∧ in
propositional calculus.
All interpreted formal languages we will encounter have their syntax and
semantics set up in this way. It is still heavily debated however whether it’s
necessary and desirable to demand that descriptions of natural language be
compositional in the same way. Montague was the first to express his con-
viction that there is no real difference between natural and formal language
in this respect, and that therefore the semanticist’s endeavor consists in giv-
ing a compositional syntax/semantics for (significant fragments of) natural
language. His formal descriptions cover an impressive fragment of English,
using a fairly straightforward (categorial) grammar coupled with an inten-
sional, typed semantic framework, a generalization of first-order predicate
logic making heavy use of lambda abstraction. This type of semantics with
its emphasis on compositionality has been very influential to this day and it’s
clear that a good deal of semantics at least can be done in a compositional
manner. For this reason I take compositionality to be one major (theory
internal) desideratum for semantics.
That said, I take it as equally well-established that there are aspects of
natural language interpretation that are decidedly non-compositional. Un-
controversial examples of this are dictionary meanings of words and stock
phrases, but more relevantly, certain context-dependent and pragmatic as-
pects of meaning. Presupposition is a prime example of a non-compositional
aspect of meaning. Consider (5) a sentence with a definite description, ar-
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guably triggering the presupposition that there is a unique donkey owned by
Ligia:
(5) Ligia beats her donkey
Assuming a very direct form of compositionality we would expect that the
interpretation of (5) depends only on the interpretations of its constituents,
say Ligia, beats, her, and donkey. The predicate logical representation tradi-
tionally assigned to such sentences in isolation, may well be derived compo-
sitionally, as demonstrated by Montague:
 ∃x[donkey(x) ∧ own(l, x) ∧ ∀y[donkey(y) ∧ own(l, y)→ y = x]
∧beat(l, x)]
But, it turns out that the linguistic context may play a crucial role as well,
as brought out by the example in (6), which contains (5) as a constituent
while having a logical form totally disjoint from (5):
(6) [I’m not sure if Ligia currently has any pets, but the fact is:]
If she owns a donkey, Ligia beats her donkey ∀x[(donkey(x) ∧ own(l, x))→ beat(l, x)]
Note that from a purely technical point of view it may not be impossible to
give a compositional account of these data, the point is that it would be a
rather complicated and ad hoc account. More specifically, it would have less
redeeming value for the study of natural language than some alternative anal-
yses that violate strict rule-by-rule correspondence between surface structure
and logical form while adhering to some kind of systematicity in deriving lf.
These alternatives often resort to movements and other transformations in
the syntactic module, or to non-meaning-preserving operations on the se-
mantic end. I tentatively conclude that compositionality is an important
consideration, though I’d immediately give up the strict Montagovian imple-
mentation of it if a phenomenon is better described in a non-compositional
yet systematic fashion. Chapter 2 contains some in depth discussion of these
compositionality issues in a concrete example featuring belief reports.
1.1.2 Propositional attitudes
With these musings on general semantic methodology in place, let us return
to the key observation introducing the object of this study—that we can have
attitudes towards propositions and that propositions can be understood as
sets of possible worlds. For example, take an utterance of (7).
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(7) Ligia is a philosopher
This is a meaningful statement and as such it expresses a proposition, viz.
the proposition that Ligia is a philosopher. This proposition can be identified
with the set of possible worlds in which Ligia is a philosopher. In this case
that proposition, call it p, is a proper, non-empty subset of the set of all
possible worlds W :3
(8) p ⊆ W
= the proposition expressed by (7)
= the proposition that Ligia is a philosopher
= {w ∈ W Ligia is a philosopher in w}
= JLigia is a philosopherK
I can bear an attitude of belief to proposition p, but I can also doubt or even
fear it. This work is almost exclusively concerned with the attitude of belief
and reports thereof, so let’s focus on that from now on.
The kind of semantics we envisage concerns itself with propositions as
the basic units of interpretation of formulas, rather than just truth-values,
and relativizes truth to truth at a possible world. In other words, we’ll
be concerned solely with intensional systems, starting with modal predicate
logic below.
But before we go on, a quick note to clarify some notational conventions
used throughout. Propositions and sentences/utterances are distinguished
typographically: I use quotation marking (italics, single or double quotation
marks, or bracketed example numbers) for mentioning sentences and utter-
ances; and I use that-clauses to mention propositions, as in (7) expresses the
proposition that Ligia is a philosopher. If I need to abstract away from any
particular sentence and use variables over expressions, I use Greek letters,
like σ for natural language sentences, ϕ for formulas (never for propositions),
and α for variables. I use a typewriter font for expressions of formally defined
object languages (beat(x, l)), and, finally, italics and calligraphic letters to
refer to model-theoretic entities like (sets of) individuals a ∈ D, possible
worlds w ∈ W , and propositions p ⊆ W . This typography parallels the lo-
gician’s strict division between (model-theoretically) ‘real’ and mere formal
objects.
3It is important not to confuse the sentence (7), “Ligia is a philosopher”, with the
proposition that its utterance expresses, viz. that Ligia is a philosopher, p.
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1.1.2.1 Doxastic logic
The notion of believing a proposition can be fleshed out in modal logical terms
by taking as a primitive model-theoretic notion a relation, R, of doxastic
accessibility between possible worlds: wRv, pronounced “v is doxastically
accessible from w”, meaning that in w the subject cannot distinguish v from
(her conception of) the real world.
(9) a believes proposition p at w iff for all v with wRv, v ∈ p
For example, Colby believes a proposition iff at all worlds doxastically acces-
sible to him, that proposition is true.
A slightly different setup is one where we equate a person’s belief state
with a set of possible worlds, her so-called doxastic alternatives, which we
then take as the primitive notion, i.e. given by the model. If we denote a
subject’s belief set at world w as Bel(w), we can define belief as:
(10) a believes proposition p at w iff Bel(w) ⊆ p
Instead of saying that Colby believes that Ligia is a philosopher iff in every
accessible world Ligia has the property of being a philosopher, we now define
it by requiring that in every world of his belief set Ligia is a philosopher.
Of course both definitions of belief, in terms of doxastic accessibility, (9), or
belief sets, (10), are inter-definable: wRv ≡ v ∈ Bel(w).
One of the first tasks of doxastic logicians has been to lay down axiomatic
or semantic restrictions on R (or, equivalently, on Bel) in order to refine the
logical entailment relation to one that does justice to our intuitions about
the logic of beliefs (Hintikka 1962). Other such accessibility restrictions can
then be given for modalities other than belief. Epistemic logic, for example,
models an agent’s knowledge and can be characterized by adding to doxastic
logic an axiom to the effect that every proposition known is actually true.
Some further generalizations of this general framework are multi-modal sys-
tems, for describing, say, the attitudes of both knowledge and belief in the
same logical system, capturing their interrelatedness (e.g. knowledge implies
belief), and multi-agent systems, for modeling interactions between multiple
agents with different beliefs.
1.1.2.2 Possible worlds and representation
Let’s try to be a little more explicit on what it means for a world to be
accessible or, as we will prefer to put it from now on, to be in the subject’s
belief set. Haas-Spohn’s (1994:32) test offers some clarification:
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Imagine the actual epistemic state of a person as fixed and then
place him in a world w which he may investigate in each and
every detail. If he then finds no clues that w is not the actual
world—if, in other words, he can in no way distinguish w from
the real world as he knows it—then, and only then, will w be an
element of his belief set.
This characterization of doxastic alternatives thus relies on the observation
that human beings’ limited knowledge of the world can be captured by saying
that we are not always able to tell two different possible worlds apart. In
one extreme we have the omniscient whose belief set is a singleton containing
only the actual world, so the omniscient creature thereby would believe all
and only those propositions containing the real world, i.e. all true proposi-
tions. Other extremes are Bel(w) = ∅, the inconsistent believer who believes
absolutely everything, and Bel(w) = W , the skeptic who believes only tau-
tologies.
A belief set, like a proposition, is a set of possible worlds and as such can
be seen as a representation of the world, and, consequently, as a model of the
mental state of an individual representing the world as she perceives it. To
clarify this, believing a proposition has been likened to dividing logical space
(the set of all possible worlds) into those possible states of affairs the believer
deems in accordance with how the world appears to her, and those she doesn’t
believe to be possible, given her current cognitive state. For example, I wake
up, the curtains are drawn, so I have no idea what the weather is like. In this
case my belief set contains worlds in which it is raining (at this particular
point in space-time) as well as worlds in which it isn’t raining but sunny, or
snowing. By opening the curtains and looking outside I quickly conclude that
it is in fact raining. My coming to believe the proposition that it’s raining
amounts to repartitioning logical space so as to keep all rainy worlds in my
belief set while discarding the sunny and the snowy worlds. This, basically,
forms the intuitive basis of doxastic logic as a model for describing attitudes.
Simple and attractive though this picture may seem, it is not the only way
to formalize a philosophy of attitudes. There are roughly speaking two trends
in the philosophical literature on attitudes: possible worlds and proposition-
alism in the one corner, versus strong representationalism and mentalism in
the other. The doxastic logic approach advocated so far falls squarely within
the first. One of the main proponents of this view on attitudes, and cog-
nition generally, is Stalnaker (e.g. 1984; 1999). Stalnaker claims that the
explanation of human behavior and cognition must be sought at the abstract
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level of information, as captured by possible worlds semantics.4 On such
a view, meaning and mental states are not concrete, let alone structured
entities, but rather abstract partitions of logical space, i.e. propositions, in
the intensional logic jargon. This is what sets apart Stalnaker and his anti-
mentalist company from so-called strong representationalists, among which
we might group oldschool mentalists like Fodor (1975), but also semanticists
like Asher (1986) and Kamp (1990), who claim that the objects of belief are
highly structured entities, rather than abstract intensional objects.
Below, I briefly go into what I consider the chief argument against possible
worlds approaches and in favor of (strong) representationalism. Nonetheless,
I will eventually conclude that for the purposes of this work possible worlds
will do just fine.
1.1.2.3 Logical omniscience and Frege’s puzzle
A possible worlds analysis of attitudes predicts that, if an agent believes a
proposition p, she also believes every logical consequence of it, that is, any
proposition q that is less informative (q contains all the worlds of p and
perhaps more). This defect of possible worlds semantics is often called the
problem of logical omniscience and can be formulated as:
(11) If a believes p and p ⊆ q, then a believes q
In particular, it follows from (11) that nobody can believe Falsum (a common
name for the empty set of worlds) and everybody automatically believes
Verum (that is, the ‘always true’ propositionW ). Actually, these things only
become problematic when combined with the (usually implicit) assumption
that, if an agent believes a proposition p, she is disposed to assent to any, or
at least some, utterance expressing that proposition. A bi-conditional version
of this principle is made explicit and named ‘the strengthened disquotational
principle’ by Kripke (1979):
A normal English speaker who is not reticent will be disposed to
sincerely reflectively assent to ‘p’ if and only if he believes that
p.
[
(Kripke 1979:411)
]
In 1.2.1 we return to Kripke’s disquotational principles in connection with
de dicto belief reports. For now, note that if we take the strengthened prin-
ciple to mean that one believes a proposition iff one is disposed to assent
4Note that Stalnaker talks about fruitful ways of explaining human behavior; he does
not say that the actual attitudes occur independently of processes in the brain, described
biologically or symbolically.
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to an utterance expressing it, we get from believing Verum to necessarily
assenting to every expression of it, e.g. everybody who assents to something
believes some proposition and therefore must believe its superset Verum.
This proposition Verum is in turn expressed by a mathematical truth such
as 102,334,155 is the 40th Fibonacci number5 to which perhaps not every-
body would assent, given that even “sincere reflection” cannot always prevent
miscalculations.
Another immediate and equally unwanted consequence of (11) in com-
bination with the strengthened disquotational principle is the fact that co-
intensional terms are predicted to be always substitutable salva veritate.
This problem is often referred to as Frege’s puzzle but I will argue that the
common formulation of Frege’s puzzle—like logical omniscience—is actually
a puzzle about attitude reports. What I mean here is brought out by consid-
ering the pair of sentences in (12):
(12) a. The 40th Fibonacci number is greater than 108
b. 102,334,155 is greater than 108
I leave it to the reader to check that the 40th Fibonacci number is indeed
102,334,155, but assuming it is, it is necessarily so, since trivial truths of
arithmetic like this are not contingent, i.e. if it’s true, it’s true in all possible
worlds. In yet other words, the definite description in (12a) and the first
number in (12b) are co-intensional terms, meaning they refer to the same
mathematical object in all possible worlds.6
In possible worlds semantics then, we must conclude that utterances of
(12a) and (12b) express the same proposition, by an appeal to composition-
ality (semantic values of the parts, and their modes of combination are the
same, so the sentences themselves are equivalent). Believing the proposition
that the 40th Fibonacci number is greater than 108 is then the exact same
thing as believing the proposition that 102,334,155 is greater than 108, a
highly counter-intuitive prediction especially since, by the strengthened dis-
quotational principle, we predict that everybody who assents to (12a) will
immediately assent to (12b) as well. Note that the derivation of this unwel-
come result does not appeal to logical omniscience or its logical cause (10).
The problematic immediacy is due to the fact that the disquotational princi-
pal as it stands does not take into account the process of determining what
proposition is expressed by a given sentence in a context. In fact, this defect
5A Fibonacci number is the sum of the previous two Fibonacci numbers, given the
starting values 0 and 1, i.e. F (n+ 2) = F (n+ 1) + F (n), F (0) = 0, F (1) = 1.
6Cf. appendix 1.A for formal definitions of intension and extension in terms of reference
and possible worlds.
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has been argued by many to be exactly the reason modal logic breaks down
with respect to attitudes.
By placing more structure on the objects of belief, e.g. by considering sen-
tential objects or structured propositions (Lewis 1972; Cresswell 1985; Soames
1985; Salmon 1986) we can block some unwanted omniscience and equivalence
predictions. For example, simple intensional predicate logic cannot distin-
guish the propositions expressed by the sentences in (13): both are true in
exactly the same possible worlds, viz. those where Ligia is a philosopher.
(13) a. Ligia is a philosopher
b. 37 is prime and Ligia is not not a philosopher
Obviously, the sentences themselves are very different, so pure sententialism
that says that belief is a relation between an individual and a sentence of her
language has no trouble explaining this. The real challenge for such na¨ıve
sententialism is explaining how less articulate beings, like animals, can have
attitudes and how people who speak different languages can nevertheless
express the same beliefs.
Between these extremes of sententialism and propositionalism we have
structured propositions. The idea behind it is that there’s a structural differ-
ence between the sentences in (13) and this may serve to tease apart attitudes
towards their content. Structured propositions can successfully counter a lot
of logical omniscience predictions, without suffering the sententialist defects:
recognizing structure is something we may impute to most attitude holders,
and language specific differences are neutralized because literal translation
presumably preserves logical structure. The amount of structure put into
propositions differs per theory, but we could imagine that the structured
propositions expressed by the sentences in (13) are (14a) and (14b) respec-
tively:
(14) a. 〈JLigiaK , JphilosopherK〉
b. 〈〈J37K , JprimeK〉, JandK , 〈JnotK , 〈JnotK , 〈JLigiaK , JphilosopherK〉〉〉〉
With standard tools from type theory, it’s quite straightforward to retrieve
also the classical propositions from these structured ones as well, so we could
still make sense of the fact that, in some sense, these two sentences do mean
the same thing.
Other strategies that have been pursued for endowing propositions with
more structure involve tinkering with possible worlds, making them more
fine-grained and/or allowing ‘impossible’ worlds (Montague 1970b; Cresswell
1972; Hintikka 1975; Rantala 1975). An alternative solution is called ‘aware-
ness logic’ (Levesque 1984; Fagin & Halpern 1985), which divides a person’s
14 Chapter 1. Attitudes
beliefs into explicit and implicit ones. The basic idea there is to allow a small
(syntactically characterized) set of explicit beliefs while relegating all their
infinitely many logical consequences to implicit belief. An overview of these
semantic tweaks to classical modal logic can be found in Fagin et al. (1995).
But even within straightforward propositionalism, Stalnaker (1978) has
devised a powerful way of exorcising logical omniscience. He maintains that
belief objects are propositions and that propositions are just sets of possible
worlds, but these propositions are not always just about objects having prop-
erties in the outside world but rather can be about the utterance or other
linguistic structures that were used to convey them. This is formalized by
means of the operation of diagonalization which turns the proposition that
37 is prime into the proposition that 37 is prime expresses a truth. We’ll
return to discuss this operation in detail later, but note already that it could
be useful for explaining the difference between Ligia saying “I am smart”
and “That woman is smart” while pointing at a picture of herself. The
same proposition is expressed, but there are many counterfactual situations
in which uttering “I am smart” would express a truth while “Ligia is smart”
would still be false.
What I hope to have shown in this subsection is that, although far from
solved, the challenges posed by logical omniscience and Frege’s puzzle have
been met with a wide variety of (partial) remedies. I will refrain from pick-
ing and implementing any of them in the following, in favor of a simpler,
more elegant semantics. Though primarily a logico-philosophical problem,
note that, due to the disquotational principle, omniscience problems have
repercussions in the empirical linguistic domain concerned with the seman-
tics of attitude reports. So, although in general, I try to separate these
two fields of study as much as possible, here we see a case where a prob-
lem of belief logic infects the semantics of belief reporting. My view on the
belief-report-interface is thus in line with the philosophy of mind position (as
championed e.g. by Kamp (1990)) that holds that a study of the semantics
of attitude reports presupposes an analysis of what attitudes themselves are.
This contrasts with the opposite trend, common in analytic philosophy (cf.
e.g. Dummett (1973)), according to which we can only learn anything about
mental states and attitudes by first studying how natural language is used
to talk about a person’s attitudes. My justification for using vanilla possi-
ble worlds semantics anyway is that the main issue I’m concerned with (the
semantics of de re/de se reporting) is independent of logical omniscience in
the sense that once an adequate omniscience free logic of belief is discovered,
we should be able to just plug that into the semantic analyses described in
the later chapters of this thesis.
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1.1.3 Modes of attitude: de dicto, de re, de se
The philosophical literature since medieval times distinguishes at least two
distinct modes of attitudes, de re and de dicto. Briefly, a de re attitude
is an attitude a person has towards some external object she is somehow
already acquainted with. A de dicto belief is just an attitude toward some
general proposition. A little more recently, philosophical theories and ob-
servations about irreducible first person perspective (or essential indexicals)
by Castan˜eda (1966), Perry (1977) and Lewis (1979a) among others, has led
to the recognition of a third kind of attitudes, de se, paradigmatically com-
prising the beliefs a person has about herself based on her own unique first
person point of view.
This subsection will discuss these three modes of belief in a little more
detail, but on a pre-theoretical level, describing the phenomena and giving
examples to highlight the differences between them. Theoretical accounts of
the modes of attitude will be given in 1.2.
1.1.3.1 De dicto
Janell Ventress, who has a somewhat naive trust in academic justice, sincerely
utters, “The best abstracts will be accepted”, thereby expressing that she
believes the proposition that the best abstracts will be accepted. Let’s assume
she hasn’t seen any of the abstracts. She did not mean to refer to some
abstracts in particular, she was merely trying to convince her audience of
the justness of the reviewing process, in other words, she meant that the
acceptation of abstracts for this conference will be based on quality. On
the basis of such a story we say that Janell believes de dicto that the best
abstracts will be accepted.
De dicto or ‘notional’ (Quine 1956) belief is the paradigm mode of believ-
ing; it occurs when people believe a so-called general proposition. Typically
we notice that someone has such a belief if they assent to, or themselves utter,
a quantified statement expressing a generality. Typical general statements in
this sense would contain quantifiers like every or a in some cases combined
with ‘indefiniteness enhancers’ like whoever they may be which are typically
used by semanticists to exclude de re readings. In the above anecdote, we can
bring out this generality by following the Russellian treatments of definite
descriptions, taking the definite article to be some kind of quantifier, but the
important thing is that in this context it’s obvious that the statement does
not predicate a property of some particular entity.
The term notional belief points to an alternative characterization: a belief
‘about concepts’ (notions) is de dicto, one that is about actual entities is de
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re. In the above scenario Janell’s utterance is not about particular entities,
but can be analyzed as relating the concepts of acceptance and best abstract,
stating that the second is subsumed under the first.
1.1.3.2 De re
As a member of the program committee, Janell has now been reviewing a
number of abstracts. She thinks #037 is particularly insightful, and she’s
convinced that the other reviewers will agree and that it will be accepted
for presentation. In such a case we say that Janell has a de re belief: she
believes de re of abstract #037 that it will be accepted.
The first defining characteristic of a de re belief is that it is about a par-
ticular object (res), not just a general belief about concepts. Furthermore
it must be a particular object with which the believer has come into a rea-
sonably direct contact, i.e. she must be acquainted with the res of her belief.
Can we still analyze this as a propositional belief? Can we say that Janell
believes the proposition that abstract #037 will be accepted? If so, note that
this would impose some restrictions on the notion of proposition, viz. they
must construed so that they can be said to be about things. But then, in
what sense are mere sets of worlds about particular things? Can we model
the object of Janell’s belief by the proposition that the thing called ‘abstract
#037’ belongs to the set of things that will be accepted? What if in some
worlds Janell’s abstract had been numbered #042?
The answer to these questions may be found by holding on to our starting
point that in de re belief it is the object that counts, not its current look or
the name it is endowed with in this particular world. If we wish to construe
the object of Janell’s de re belief as a proposition, it must be a proposition
about the abstract, not it’s name or the typeface or line spacing in which
it is set at this or that world. This leads to the introduction of singular
or Russellian propositions, i.e. propositions ‘containing’ objects themselves,
in abstraction of their accidental properties. With the notion of a singular
proposition (to be explicated in 1.2.2), presumably, the intentionality of de
re belief is accounted for, but pondering the consequences the question soon
rises, haven’t we gone a bit too far? Do human beings actually have beliefs
about bare objects in abstraction of their modes of presentation?
A definitive negative answer to this question was provided by Quine
(1956) who argues along the following lines: Imagine Janell’s hero is pro-
fessor Ortcutt, she has read most of his articles and has even met him at
conferences. Unbeknownst to Janell, Ortcutt submitted an abstract tenta-
tively exploring his latest ideas. Janell is given this abstract for review, finds
the author’s claims rather wild and unfounded, and consequently writes a
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devastating report. It appears that Janell has two very different de re beliefs,
which happen to be about the same person, even though she herself doesn’t
realize that. Of course, from the story it follows that Janell believes de re
of Ortcutt that he’s a genius, but, intuitively independent of that, through
reviewing his abstract she has formed another belief that is arguably also
de re about Ortcutt, viz. that he is incompetent. The question of course
is how to reconcile these two beliefs without ascribing her an inconsistent
belief set, i.e. the logical analogon of total insanity, because that’s too harsh,
she is merely confused about a factual identity of two personas, not insane.7
Many solutions have been proposed and most if not all of them are based
on individuating de re beliefs more finely, somehow taking into account the
way the res is presented to the believer on the occasion leading to the de re
belief: in Janell’s first belief as Professor Ortcutt, the esteemed professor who
wrote “Towards a Theory of Binding”, in the second as the guy who wrote
this here lousy abstract. Note already that in doing so we appear to abandon
the simple, binary, singular proposition approach.
Inspired by Quine’s analysis of Janell’s predicament we can extend the
defining characteristics of the de re mode of believing: First, a belief can only
be de re about an external object if the believer has somehow come in contact
with that object. In the terminology I will be using: we require the believer
to be acquainted with the res of her de re belief. Second, a de re belief always
takes place under a description, viz. the believer’s relation of acquaintance
with her res. Whether this leads to an analysis of belief as essentially a
≥3-ary relation (believer, res, description/acquaintance relation, content of
belief) remains to be seen. We will return to these issues of aboutness,
singular propositions, modes of representation and acquaintance in a more
theoretical discussion in 1.2.2.
1.1.3.3 De se
In order to introduce de se attitudes we must contrast them with mere de
re belief, and for that purpose we complicate the story somewhat. As it
turns out, the conference at Janell’s department is not exactly the best orga-
nized workshop ever, and not that fair either, since members of the program
committee were allowed to send in abstracts of their own. In fact, Janell
7In Quine’s original, Ralph suspects a certain mysterious figure “glimpsed under ques-
tionable circumstances” of being a spy. At another occasion Ralph saw a gray-haired man
at the beach “vaguely known to Ralph as rather a pillar of the community”. Both per-
sonas are in fact the same Ortcutt, so Ralph appears to have two conflicting beliefs about
the same individual (Quine 1956:179). In the following I will often refer to the Janell
paraphrase as Quine’s scenario.
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herself had done just that. Furthermore, and this is crucial and typical of
scenarios used to explain the de se mode, she forgot what her abstract was
about—she sent it in really early, she’s been extremely prolific lately, she has
very bad memory, she carelessly submitted a random old abstract without
looking at it—and didn’t even recognize it as her own when she, by mistake
or sloppiness of the organization, got it on her desk for review. The number
used to identify this anonymous abstract of Janell’s was . . .#037. The rest
is history: she likes it a lot, gives it high marks, and trusts that it will be
accepted for presentation. Thus we conclude that Janell believes de re of her
own abstract that it will be accepted, and about herself that she will get to
present.
A week after turning in the report, Janell is browsing through her old ∼/
Documents folder when she comes across an abstract which looks surprisingly
similar to the one she has just reviewed. Realizing her mistake, she decides
that it’s too late to bother the rest of the program committee now, and
anyway, it was hardly her fault, was it? And her review was totally fair . . . In
short, she doesn’t change her belief that the abstract should be accepted, so
she still believes de re of herself that she should be accepted. Something
essential however has changed in this belief: we give this difference a name
by saying that the belief is no longer merely de re, it is now de se.8
In 1.2.3 we will try to pin down these differences between de re and de
se formally, but there are a few things we can point out here already. As
discussed above de re belief requires a causal and cognitively effective con-
nection between the believer and the res, the relation of x reviewing y for
instance definitely counted as such an acquaintance relation between Janell
and her abstract. Before realizing her mistake, Janell might have uttered
something like “Abstract #037 is great” and would nod her head in agree-
ment if she’d overhear someone say: “That abstract Janell’s reviewing will
surely be accepted,” but of course she would never use the term my abstract9
to refer to her abstract until after her realization that the abstract was indeed
hers. The de se modes requires a more particular kind of acquaintance, viz.
of a first person type. In other words, in the final (de se) scene she is not
only acquainted with her abstract as the abstract labeled #037, but as my
abstract; same believer (Janell), same res (Janell’s abstract, aka #037), same
belief content (that it will be accepted), but different descriptive presentation
of the res.
Approaching this distinction from a slightly different angle, note that the
my in the de se description of acquaintance cannot be substituted by a more
8This use of terminology is common, but later we need to refine it.
9Ignoring the reading of my abstract as the abstract I’m reviewing.
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objective external description such as Janell’s, because only first person in-
dexicals can immediately and unmistakably refer to the speaker qua speaker,
or to the believer as believer. It is, after all, conceivable that Janell forgets
her name and sincerely assents to: “Janell’s abstract is good,” without real-
izing the statement concerns herself and therefore not thinking “my abstract
is good.” The indexical my however cannot be so misunderstood: being a
competent speaker of the English language Janell knows that my refers to it’s
utterer so upon uttering: “my abstract’s worthless,” Janell implies that she’s
knowingly acquainted with her abstract as her own abstract (and deems it
unworthy).
To sum up: we can construct scenarios in which Janell—consistently
and in full command of the language—mistakenly thinks “This is not my ab-
stract,” “#037 is not my abstract,” or “Janell’s abstract is not my abstract,”
in each case acquainted with her abstract under a different third person point
of view, enabling her to have de re non-de se beliefs about her abstract. Not
until she realizes what we already know, viz. that this abstract, #037, is
hers, or that she is called Janell, can we call these beliefs truly de se with
respect to the writer of the abstract.
1.2 Modes of attitude
In the previous section we have looked at propositional attitudes, reports,
and the modes of attitude (de dicto, de re and de se) on a level as pre-
theoretical as possible. In this section we discuss some classic attempts at
formally representing attitudes, capturing the distinctions between the three
modes of attitude encountered in 1.1.3. For this purpose we’ll use first order
modal predicate logic, with a possible worlds semantics, as defined properly
in 1.A.
As promised before, I have tried to tease apart theories of attitudes and
attitude reports: The current section explores what I classify as theories of
attitudes, while chapter 2 deals with reports. Our present concern comprises
philosophical theories about when a belief can be said to be de re about
some some external object, or, say, the role played by perspective or point
of view in beliefs about oneself, and how to formalize it all. The study of
the semantics of attitude reports on the other hand aims at capturing the
truth conditions of a certain class of natural language sentences, viz. those
sentences that say that someone has some attitude to some information, or
for the sake of the current work, sentences of the form NP believes that NP
VP. However clear if presented in this fashion, the philosophical literature
almost systematically fails to acknowledge this distinction. The connections
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and mutual dependencies between the two being quite obvious indeed: the
report “Colby believes the winner will be famous” is true under the de dicto
reading iff Colby believes de dicto the proposition that the winner will be
famous. It seems that first of all the semantics of belief reports depends on an
analysis of beliefs, in the sense that we know the truth conditions of reports
if we know how to represent what it is to believe a proposition. In 1.1.2.3
this was identified as a typical philosophy of mind position, diametrically
opposed to the common analytical philosophy position. What I’m advocating
is to minimize the amount of philosophical analysis about cognition and
the intentionality of mind in order to focus entirely on giving linguistically
satisfactory logical representations of belief reporting sentences in a given
empirical domain. In order to define the important issues of de re/de se
reporting we will have to lay some philosophical foundations in this chapter,
and then, I contend, many linguistically interesting issues in report semantics
can be investigated independently of pressing issues in belief logic, like logical
omniscience.
1.2.1 De dicto attitudes: the disquotational principle
In the current section we take a closer look at de dicto attitudes, in search of
a definition of this type of belief. As a first approximation we noted in 1.1.3
that de dicto is the basic mode of simply bearing the attitude of belief to a
proposition, in contrast with believing something about some external object
(de re), or about oneself from a first person point of view (de se).10 De dicto
belief is the paradigm propositional attitude; it is the belief mode that is most
straightforwardly described in simple modal logics of belief in possible worlds
semantics. In fact, we will see it has been argued that, the other modes, de re
and de se, are strictly speaking not even propositional attitudes. De re belief,
for example, has been construed as relating a believer, an object, a property
or open proposition, and a mode of presentation, whereas de se belief is often
explicated in terms of a relation between a person and property.
Only the de dicto mode of believing then is adequately captured by defi-
nitions like (10), p. 9, which we now adapt to a definition of de dicto belief:
(15) a believesde dicto p at w iff Bel(w) ⊆ p
10A well-known definition of the de re/de dicto distinction is based on a substitution
principle: in de re belief substitution of co-referential terms is OK, but in de dicto it fails.
However, this is a definition of de dicto belief reports, at best. Moreover, as we will see
in chapter 2, substitution of co-referential terms fails even in de re reports.
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Now, we would like a more naturalistic, theory neutral explanation of the
phenomenon of de dicto belief. The key to such an explication, perhaps, lies
in Kripke’s disquotational principle (cf. 1.1.2.3). Haas-Spohn (1994) uses
the disquotational principle as a definition of de dicto belief ascriptions:
We will call a belief ascription de dicto if it can be reduced to
an application of the disquotational principle or its extension: a
statement of the form “a believes that ϕ” is a de dicto belief as-
cription if and only if it says that a would assent to ϕ (or an utter-
ance of a translation of ϕ into a’s language).
[
(Haas-Spohn 1994:33)
]
Observing the self-imposed constraint of strictly separating belief from belief
reports I propose to take the principle as primarily a definition of de dicto
belief, not de dicto reporting. Of course, de dicto reporting will be defined
later in terms of de dicto belief, but this extra step counts and is relevant, es-
pecially in connection with de re and de se, where the linguistic surface forms
of reports do not clearly match the corresponding belief modes. Moreover,
I think my order of explanation is more compatible with Kripke’s original
formulation:
If a normal English speaker, on reflection, sincerely assents to ‘p’,
then he believes that p.
[
(Kripke 1979:411)
]
First note that as is, this seems rather wild, for Quine (1953:117) already
points out, such use of quotation marks does not make sense: who would
assent to an utterance of the 16th letter of the roman alphabet? The best
paraphrase I can come up with in our notation is:11
(16) If a is disposed to assent to an utterance of σ, then she believes the
proposition expressed by σ
The type of belief that we can characterize thus, is precisely de dicto believ-
ing.
One thing worth noting here is that (16) only tells us what it means to
believe a proposition de dicto if that proposition is expressible in a sentence
of a’s language. This is no serious limitation for us however, because in the
end, we are not studying the attitude of believing generally; all this is to be
applied to the analysis of belief reports later on, and more often than not
we will only report a person’s belief if that person has, on occasion, put her
thoughts into words (or would do so, when prompted). On the other hand
it may be argued that it is common practice to ascribe some forms of belief
11Kripke (1979:248) himself adds that “’p’ is to be replaced, inside and outside all
quotation marks, by any appropriate standard English sentence”
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to animals that clearly have no real language, and it is well-known that we
often talk about the behavior of machines and computer programs as if they
have beliefs, goals and intentions, if we want to describe their behavior. So
perhaps we really should be able to cover those non-linguistic beliefs as well,
especially when it comes to reporting. This view of belief is championed by
e.g. Stalnaker (1984), who would consequently denounce any explications of
de dicto or other belief in terms of the attitude holder’s linguistic abilities.
In the following I will ignore this issue and restrict attention to believers that
can put their beliefs into (English) words.
So, assuming you are willing to accept this restriction on the scope of
our belief analysis, let’s return to defining de dicto in terms of a disquo-
tational principle. Given the above discussion, we might want to include
the expressibility clause, which would get us Kripke’s so-called strengthened
biconditional version, which reads more like a real definition:
(17) a believesde dicto p at w iff in w there is a sentence σ of a’s language
s.t. σ expresses the proposition p and a is disposed to assent to an
utterance of σ
In any case, the disquotational principle is really the only positive, non-
circular characterization of de dicto believing. The de re mode, to which we
turn next, has been given far more attention, leaving de dicto with a purely
negative characterization as the mode of attitude that is not de re.
1.2.2 De re attitudes: singular vs. descriptive content
Whereas we analyzed de dicto belief in terms of a person standing in a certain
relation to a proposition, the first thing to note about de re belief is that it
seems, at first sight, to be more like a triadic relation, relating a believer,
the object she’s acquainted with and which the belief is about (the res), and
the actual content of the belief. Quine (1956:180) was the first to take this
suggestion seriously and propose to analyze de dicto belief as dyadic and de re
as triadic. Many others have wanted to avoid such a strict logical separation,
especially since it leads to ambiguity in the analysis of some reports that can
be read de dicto as well as de re (cf. 2.2 and (2) p. 72). The Ortcutt example
of 1.1.3 shows we need to take into account yet another factor: the way the
res is presented to the believer. In any case, the crucial role played by the
res has prompted us to speak of someone believing something de re about
something. This ‘aboutness’ or intentionality, in the sense of ‘being about a
particular external object’, is the prime characteristic of de re belief.
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1.2.2.1 Singular propositions
Singular propositions, we said, are proposition about actual individuals.
Let’s take a closer look at their formalization in modal predicate logic. We
assume a very simple ontology in which there are just objects, and these
objects may have different attributes in different possible worlds. In such
a framework we can formally distinguish objects and their accidental prop-
erties, among which the object’s name and shape. This is all we need to
capture the notion of a singular or object-dependent proposition: a proposi-
tion about an object.12 Very literally, a singular proposition could be defined
formally as a pair consisting of an object and a property, yielding in effect a
structured proposition. We have seen those before (1.1.2.3), so recall that, for
instance, the pair 〈P, a〉, with a an object and P a property (set of objects),
would represent the singular proposition which states of object a that it has
property P . This seems to be more or less what Russell13 had in mind, as
witness for example his famous remark that Mont Blanc itself could well be a
constituent of a singular thought, in the passage denounced by Frege (cf. cor-
respondence with Russell (1904:169)); hence the term Russellian proposition
for structured singular proposition. Using structured lfs for de re belief, as
demonstrated in (18b),14 gets us essentially Quine’s aforementioned triadic
de re analysis, (18a):
(18) Janell believesde re of abstract #037 that it will be accepted
a.  bel(j, a, accepted)
b.  bel(j, 〈a, accepted〉)
We will not go any deeper into the theory of triadic belief or structured
propositions here, since for our purposes it’s not necessary to change the
basic setup of modal logic and possible worlds semantics. In the following
I will try to show that we can simply stick with the by now familiar notion
of a proposition as a set of worlds and a first-order language where belief is
simply a modal operator (parametrized for believer, notation: beljϕ instead
12Cf. (Neale 1990:49-50, note 1) for a discussion about the term singular proposition
and the way it has been formalized by Russell. My above attempt at a theory neutral
characterization of singular in terms of aboutness deviates slightly from Neale’s definition
as a proposition expressed by a sentence containing a referential term. I merely attempted
to abstract away from Neale’s (and others’) reliance on the level of linguistic/logical se-
mantics. The reason being that his definition runs a significant risk of circularity if at
some point we want to characterize a certain class of linguistic constructions by saying
that they express singular propositions.
13Cf. Russell (1904:169, 1905, 1918/1919:245,275)
14The link between structured lfs and the structured propositions encountered in (14),
p. 13, is, of course: J〈α, β〉K = 〈JαK , JβK〉
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of bel(j, ϕ)).
At first sight, it seems this gives nothing but a new notation of the dyadic,
de dicto, belief relation. And indeed it does that, as shown below:
(19) Janell believes? abstract #037 will be accepted
 beljaccepted(a)q
(19)
y
w
= 1
iff in all w′ ∈ Bel(JjKw , w): Jaccepted(a)Kw′ = 1
iff in all belief alternatives w′ (of Janell in w), the abstract #037 of
w′ gets accepted in w′
Crucially this is not a belief about abstract #037, the actual object, but
about the abstract numbered #037 whatever it may turn out to be. The
difference becomes apparent, for instance, if we assume that there is actually
no abstract #037, but, before the call for papers, Janell has already formed
the opinion that every abstract will be accepted, because there aren’t going to
be enough submissions anyway and the department will agree that refereeing
is just too much work. The disquotational principle would yield that Janell
holds a de dicto belief towards the proposition that abstract #037 will be
accepted, and sure enough, in a model based on such a case (19) would
be true. On the other hand there’s no acquaintance with actual abstracts,
so no de re belief. The other way around, imagine that Janell has mixed
up #037 and #042, i.e., in her belief worlds the term abstract #037 refers
to the actual #042, and vice versa. In fact, she read #037 and found it
excellent, but, in her confusion, has told the committee, sincerely, that “#042
should be accepted, #037 is awful.” Obviously this does not constitute a
positive de dicto opinion about (what she considers to be) abstract #037,
and, accordingly, (19) comes out false, but there is an actual acquaintance
relation between her and #037 on the basis of which she forms her opinion,
so that we’re entitled to say that she believes de re of abstract #037 that it
will be accepted (even though she mistakenly thinks it’s labeled #042).
So much for de dicto in modal logic. Let’s see how this framework is able
to formalize the idea of a singular proposition as well. This can be done in
two ways: wide scope and directly referential constants, to be discussed in
succession. The scopal analysis of de re belief depends on something called
‘quantifying into’ a modal operator to represent de re belief:
(20) Janell believesde re of abstract #037 that it will be accepted
[
=(18)
]
 ∃x[x = a ∧ beljaccepted(x)]q
(20)
y
w
= 1
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iff in all w′ ∈ Bel(JjKw , w): Jaccepted(x)Kx 7→JaKww′ = 1
iff in all belief alternatives w′ (of Janell in w), the abstract #037 of
w gets accepted in w′
The truth conditions computed above have given us something comparable
to (19), but now the res-denoting term, abstract #037, or a, is evaluated
in the actual world w, not one of the belief worlds w′. This is enforced
representationally by the fact that the res is represented by a variable whose
value is fixed by the x = a clause outside the modal context. Technically,
the computation thus relies on assignment functions (x 7→ JaKw), which are
defined properly in 1.A. The crucial feature of the whole thing is that the
predicate may have varying extensions across Janell’s belief world, but in the
course of the semantic derivation the res represented by the bound variable
x stays mapped to the actual abstract #037 irrespective of Janell’s beliefs
about for instance its quality, author, number, or even existence.
The direct reference approach takes its cue from the above to present a
shortcut: the res of a de re belief may simply be represented by an individual
constant in situ so the logical form for Janell’s de re belief is simply 2, but to
get the truth conditions of (20) we add the stipulation that constants have
rigid intensions, i.e. for all w,w′ ∈ W : JaKw = JaKw′ . Assuming beforehand
that abstract #037, a, refers to the actual #037 in every possible world
there is of course no longer any truth conditional difference between (19)
and (20), so this works fine. At this point however it may seem a bit far-
fetched to stipulate rigidity for all constants. Therefore, we’ll stick with
the more conservative ‘quantifying in’ solution so that the de re nature of
a report is immediately apparent from the lf. We return to rigidity later
when we can give actual linguistic/semantic evidence for direct referentiality
of many terms logically represented as constants (indexicals, proper names,
natural kind terms, (some) definite descriptions). The term direct reference,
which we will formalize as rigidity, points to the fact that, as was shown by
Kripke (1972) and Kaplan (1989), these terms simply refer, not because their
content singles out a unique individual in the world, but more like tags or
labels attached to an individual.15
1.2.2.2 Substitution
All in all, it seems that having singular propositions (formalized in terms
of structured propositions, wide scope, or rigid designators) as objects of de
re attitudes is the way to reconcile the intentionality of de re belief with
15In addition we’ll be able to define Kaplan’s operator dthat, which rigidifies a given
descriptive term so we don’t have to stipulate rigidity for all constants.
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the traditional notion of attitudes as dyadic relations between persons and
propositions. On such a construal we naturally obtain compatibility with the
traditional definition of de re modality as that for which we have substitutio
salva veritate of co-referential terms.16 With that definition, a belief report
about abstract #037 would only count as de re if the report remains true
if we replace the res denoting expression abstract #037 with a co-referential
expression, like Janell’s abstract or the abstract Janell is reviewing. A dubious
prediction for sure, but one concerning linguistic intuitions about reports, not
the theory of attitudes.
However, taking predicate logic as a formal language to describe truth
conditions we can mimic this result within the theory of attitudes proper,
viz. by applying substitutio at the level of logical form. Thus, a logical formula
with a modal operator is de re with respect to a certain term iff replacing that
term with a co-referring one does not alter the truth value. Our definition
of de re belief as involving wide-scope (or rigid) res representations verifies
this result, since:
(21) For any terms α and β with JαKw =JβKw: J∃x[x = α ∧ beljaccepted(x)]Kw =J∃x[x = β ∧ beljaccepted(x)]Kw
Even without dragging truth value judgments of belief reports into the
discussion at this point, it is obvious that we are going to run into prob-
lems with this substitution result. To see this, consider again the example
where Janell has two de re beliefs about the same Ortcutt, under two dif-
ferent guises, viz. the famous professor Ortcutt and the guy who submitted
abstract #042. In predicate logic, we could try to model this situation by
positing two individual constants, say f(amous professor) and g(uy who sub-
mitted abstract #042). These constants represent individual concepts, i.e.
they are not rigid per definition but may have rich descriptive contents: JfK
is something like the concept mapping each world to the famous professor
admired by Janell in that world. This is to say that f and g are semanti-
cally equivalent to definite descriptions, and in fact we might as well replace
all occurrences of these individual constants below with the corresponding
ι-terms ιz[famous prof(z)] and ιw[submit abstr 42(w)].
Getting back to the Ortcutt case, the following facts are immediately
obvious and uncontroversially true in the scenario:
16Although that definition is most straightforwardly read as a definition of de re belief
reports, I mention it here because, as I’ve said before, the distinction between beliefs and
reports has not always been drawn so sharply and this is a case in point, classic authors
claiming substitutability as definition—or problematic result—for de re belief.
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(22) a. Janell believesde dicto that the famous professor Ortcutt is a ge-
nius beljgenius(f)
b. Janell believesde dicto that the guy who wrote abstract #042 is a
nincompoop beljnincompoop(g)
c. The famous professor Ortcutt = the guy who wrote abstract
#042 = Ortcutt f = g = o
Moreover, as we—along with Quine (1956), Kaplan (1969) and others—have
assumed before, the story justifies a strengthening of (22a) and (22b) to the
corresponding de re beliefs (23a) and (23b), respectively:
(23) a. Janell believesde re of the famous professor Ortcutt that he is a
genius ∃x[x = f ∧ beljgenius(x)]
b. Janell believesde re of the guy who wrote abstract #042 that he
is a nincompoop ∃y[y = g ∧ beljnincompoop(y)]
These two together with (22c) entail (24a-b), which in turn make it impossible
to block the inference to the inconsistent (24c), that is, in modal logic as we
know it: (23a),(23b),(22c)|=(24a)∧(24b)|=(24c)
(24) a. Janell believesde re of Ortcutt that he is a genius ∃x[x = o ∧ beljgenius(x)]
b. Janell believesde re of Ortcutt that he is a nincompoop ∃y[y = o ∧ beljnincompoop(y)]
c. Janell believesde re of Ortcutt that he is a genius and a nincom-
poop ∃x[x = o ∧ belj[genius(x) ∧ nincompoop(x)]]
In other words, the wide scope analysis cannot account for the fact that
Janell’s beliefs are both de re and, in a sense, about two subjectively dis-
tinct, but actually and contingently co-referential concepts, without thereby
discarding Janell’s belief set as internally inconsistent. In the rest of this
section we’ll try to come up with a way to block the problematic inference
to an inconsistent belief state without denying that Janell’s beliefs are de re.
For completeness, note that a rigid designator-based theory is even less
suited to model the situation, since the assumed de re nature of the beliefs
would require the representations of the res, f and g, to be rigid and therefore
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co-referential not only in the actual, but in all worlds, thus entirely missing
the point of the two descriptions that seem to play a role in the story. The
structured propositions theory in the simple form discussed above suffers
from the same defect: by definition, it neglects modes of presentation of the
res, thus eventually predicting inconsistent beliefs for Janell. It seems then
that singular propositions, in all three forms discussed, are insufficient as
objects of de re belief, we need modes of representation, and moreover, we
need them to play a role inside the belief (as opposed to their place in the
wide scope analysis).
1.2.2.3 Belief under a description and the shortest spy problem
We start by extending our predicate logical analysis to take modes of presen-
tation into account, and then test the apparatus by applying it to our Ortcutt
example. What we need is not simply x believesde re of y that so-and-so, but x
believesde re of y under description z that so-and-so. The descriptions are in-
tended to differentiate subjectively distinct de re beliefs, since a de re belief’s
aboutness (formalized above in terms of singular propositions) only distin-
guishes beliefs with externally distinct objects. In short we add a fourth
argument to the belief relation:
(25) bel(j, a, accepted, d)
In predicate logic we can use ι-terms or constants denoting individual con-
cepts to represent these descriptions. Let’s do the latter, and let’s distin-
guish these intensional constants/variables from simple referential ones at lf
by making them just a bit more curly, typographically. Holding on to the
wide scope analysis of intentionality, we posit the following official notation:
(26) a believesde re of b, under description d, that it is P
 ∃x[x = b ∧ beldaP(x)]
Eventually we will formally reduce this fourth argument slot of the belief
relation to more primitive machinery, but, leaving it as a primitive for now,
let’s see how it would help us in the Ortcutt case.
Above we already speculated on what would be the appropriate descrip-
tion: the first belief involves Ortcutt under the description the famous pro-
fessor Ortcutt (f), the second takes place under the guy who wrote abstract
#042 (g). The beliefs we had at the near final stage in (24) now come out
as follows:
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(27)  ∃x[x = o ∧ belfjgenius(x) ∧ belgjloser(x)]
The intensional difference between these descriptions can perhaps serve to
block the inference to an inconsistent de re belief. Note that this seems
plausible since intuitively there really is no single description of Ortcutt under
which we can say that Janell believes he’s both a genius and a nincompoop.
To be sure, we need to say a bit more about what belief under a description
is, and how it relates to de re belief as such.
The most straightforward interpretation of descriptions in belief that
comes to mind is the following: First, one way to define belief under a de-
scription is to literally take descriptions into the belief, turning the de re
complements into truly de dicto or general beliefs by replacing res with their
intensional descriptions. A slight complication: for ‘type reasons’ we need a ∨
operator to collapse the intensional object to whatever reference it currently
has (J∨dKw = JdKw (w)). The result:
(28) beldaP(x) ; belaP(∨d)
In words, Janell believes de re of Ortcutt that he is a genius under the
description the famous professor iff she believes de dicto that the famous sci-
entist known as ‘Prof. Ortcutt’ is a genius (beljgenius(
∨f)). This seems to
work fine for the current scenario where the so-derived de dicto belief is in-
deed appropriate and true, as witness (22a). Secondly, we still have to define
de re belief. The most straightforward solution is existential quantification,
i.e., a believesde re of b that it’s P iff there is some description d of b such
that a believesde re of b under d that it’s P . Obviously, an individual concept
‘describes an individual b’ in w iff d(w) = b. Combining these insights with
(28) gives:
(29) a believesde re of b that it is P
iff there is a concept d describing b such that a believesde dicto that
d is P ∃d[∨d = b ∧ belaP(∨d)]
We’ll refer to (29) as the de re analysis by unrestricted quantification over
concepts. At first sight, it seems to work: Janell’s de re beliefs about Ortcutt
come down to two perfectly consistent de dicto beliefs, viz., under f, that the
famous professor is a genius; and, with g, that the author of abstract #042
is a nitwit. In addition, we have successfully blocked the counterintuitive
inference that Janell believes of Ortcutt that he is both, for no d satifies
contradictory predicates.
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It turns out that this theory is a bit too liberal in assigning de re beliefs.
This is shown by Kaplan’s (1969) so-called ‘shortest spy problem’ which
received its name from a scenario where someone sincerely assents to the
tautology: “The shortest spy is a spy.” As it happens, the shortest spy
is actually Ligia, but nobody knows this, moreover, the speaker above has
never even met or heard about Ligia. On the current theory, though, this
person is predicted to have a de re belief about Ligia to the effect that
she is a spy, taking the shortest spy as description of Ligia. Now, this is
absurd, de re beliefs were supposed to be beliefs about specific individuals
with which one is vividly acquainted. We conclude that the analysis based
on unrestricted quantification over concepts, is defective: we need to take
the acquaintance/intentionality aspect into account.
1.2.2.4 Acquaintance relations
A de re belief, we said, is a belief about a particular object in the outside
world. Repeating the argument in 1.1.3, it follows that, in the case of a belief
de re about an object, the believer must be en rapport with that object.17
This is where the notion of acquaintance comes in. Following Lewis’s (1979a)
terminology, we say that de re believing requires the believer to stand in a
proper relation of acquaintance to the res. This terminology is reminiscent
of (and derived from) Russell’s knowledge by acquaintance, but our notion
of acquaintance is not nearly as strict as the one he envisaged. In fact,
according to Russell (at least in 1912:57), the only thing one has knowledge
by acquaintance of is oneself, which is way too strong a restriction for a
characterization of de re attitudes.
What then do we count as valid relations of acquaintance? Apart from
the fact that they are two-place relations between individuals and other ex-
ternal objects there are, as far as I know, no hard and fast rules. Moreover, it
really is a matter of considerable philosophical debate, since an answer would
be intimately connected with metaphysical and epistemological issues, that
is, what is the external world made of and how can we know anything about
it? I certainly won’t draw the line, so let’s assume that we’re dealing with a
vague notion here. This is not to say that there isn’t an identifiable subclass
of prototypical acquaintance relations, and another of obvious no-gos. Typ-
ically, such direct perceptual relations as seeing, hearing, touching, etc. are
in, while having heard that someone once claimed that x existed, or knowing
only its name, are out. In between are indirect perception cases like reading
17Cf. Evans’ Russell’s Principle, which states that “in order to have a thought about a
particular object, you must know which object it is about which you are thinking” (Evans
1982:74).
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an email from someone addressed to you, seeing someone on TV, in a mirror,
while on drugs, or all at once. In most cases I would still count these as
proper relations of acquaintance, but note that especially in these cases error
is possible, in the sense that what we actually bear an acquaintance relation
to does not necessarily coincide with the object we think we bear the relation
to: we are not always aware of the actual objects of our acquaintance. This
will turn out to be a crucial feature of acquaintance relations.
One interesting consequence of the vagueness of what counts as an ac-
quaintance relation is that we seem to end up with a corresponding vagueness
in the de re/de dicto distinction. The more direct and vivid the relation, the
more justified we are in calling a belief based on it de re about the so-
acquainted res. On the other hand, a distant, indirect relation to a res will
merely give rise to a de dicto attitude. Since I deem a strict division of de re
and de dicto attitudes highly implausible, I consider this vagueness, inher-
ited from the notion of acquaintance, not a bug, but a feature of the analysis.
One could even go one step further and give up the whole de dicto/de re dis-
tinction by allowing any relation to count as acquaintance. For example, we
would then count in an acquaintance with someone as whoever will win the
race, which traditionally would only give you a de dicto belief, since know-
ing that, by the rules of the game, there will be a unique winner does not
qualify as the knowing who needed for de re-aboutness. This could perhaps
be put to use in a unified account of de dicto as de re, a suggestion briefly
taken up in chapter 3, p. 231. On further reflection, it becomes apparent
that something extra is need or we’d end up with the previously dismissed
unrestricted quantification over concepts (p. 30), in which there is a belief
about something as soon as there exists some description so that the belief
holds of the description. Something along the lines of a restriction to con-
textually salient or vivid concepts must be added to avoid the shortest spy
problem. For now, we’re just interested in de re, so we’ll add restrictions like
vividness and (perceptual) acquaintance.
To sum up, a necessary prerequisite for de re believing is a relation of ac-
quaintance between believer and res. Furthermore, relations of acquaintance
can play the role of a mode of presentation of the res for the believer, so it
seems we have found a candidate descriptive content to be incorporated into
the belief. This proposal comes down to analyzing de re belief as a belief
about an external object under the description given by the relation of ac-
quaintance that constitutes the link between the believer and that external
res. We still have to make precise what belief under a description means, but
the idea will be clear from an example, so let’s briefly return to Janell and
professor Ortcutt’s abstract #042. The thing to note is that there are two
acquaintance relations at work, firstly, Janell is acquainted with Ortcutt as
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the guy she saw on book covers and conferences, and it is this acquaintance
relation that gives rise to the belief about Ortcutt being a genius. The other
salient relation of acquaintance between Janell and Ortcutt here consists in
her knowing the guy merely as the author of this lousy abstract. In short,
it’s exactly these two ways of knowing the actual Ortcutt that give rise to
the two distinct beliefs, that is, two beliefs about the same object, under two
different guises. Taking for each belief the particular acquaintance relations
that gave rise to, or is salient in, that belief as the description for it, should
give the right result.
1.2.2.5 Kaplan (1969): reducing de re to de dicto
In a reaction to Quine’s (1956) postulation of an essentially triadic analysis of
de re, comparable to the analysis in terms of structured propositions, Kaplan
(1969) tries to reduce de re to a kind of de dicto. Where Quine needed a strict
ambiguity between two belief operators, a so-called notional one (de dicto)
and a relational (de re), Kaplan argues we need only one, the good old dyadic
propositional attitude operator, relating an individual to a (non-singular)
proposition.18 In this sense Kaplan’s analysis is correctly characterized as a
reduction of de re to de dicto. It is especially suited for our purposes, since
in addition to being a conceptual reduction (as was unrestricted concept
quantification), it is one that incorporates neatly the insights having to do
with the importance of acquaintance and their relation to res descriptions,
as discussed in the previous subsections. So, let us now look at the details of
Kaplan’s analysis by applying it to our Ortcutt example. We have already
outlined our strategy: take mode of presentation into account, but not just
any mode of presentation, just the ones that derive from a genuine relation
of acquaintance.
Kaplan follows the unrestricted concept quantification account in reduc-
ing de re belief under a description to de dicto belief, i.e. beldaP(x) :=
belaP(
∨d) [=(28)]. The thrust of his theory of belief under a description
however lies in the way the quantification over descriptions is restricted: a
de re belief requires a way of being acquainted with the res, and this ac-
quaintance relation has to provide the mode of presentation for the belief. In
Kaplan’s (1969) terminology a de re belief implies a vivid name of the object
for the believer. To represent this, he posits a 3-place relation R(α,b,a), “α
18Actually, in the cited paper, Kaplan favors a sententialist rather than propositional
view of attitudes, but the difference is an issue orthogonal to the one at hand (recall the
discussion of logical omniscience), and since we have already decided to go with the well-
studied standard view of attitudes as propositional, and of propositions as sets of possible
worlds, I will simply translate Kaplan’s proposal into that framework.
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represents b to a”. The a and b denote believer and res, respectively, and his
α ranges over names, but may in our more semantic framework (cf. footnote
18) be taken to range over individual concepts, d. According to Kaplan, R
really abbreviates 3 conditions:
(30) R(d,b,a) iff
(i) d denotes b
(ii) d is a name of b for a
(iii) d is (sufficiently) vivid
Clause (i) says that d in the actual world describes the object b. Clauses
(ii) and (iii) require some extra attention. As for (ii), a name is of b for a
iff b is causally linked to the name, by dubbing, and consequently to a, by
usage of that name. In other words b was present as target of the so-called
initial baptism or dubbing event, after which a causal chain of events got
started, which ultimately ends up connecting b to a. Names in the Kapla-
nian sense however are not restricted to the linguistic class of proper names,
descriptions like our the famous professor and the guy who wrote abstract
#042 can serve as names of Ortcutt for Janell. In these cases there is no
institutionalized baptism, but there Janell presumably uses that description
as a mental or verbal tag for a specific individual she knows. Note further
that on our more semantic interpretation, these ‘names’ and ‘descriptions’
we keep talking about are actually formalized as the intensions associated
with such linguistic items. Clause (iii) says that the description should be
vivid, which means that it should be associated, in the subject’s mind, with
a halo of detailed information, descriptions, mental pictures, of the so named
individual. As a rule of thumb, Kaplan offers the criterion ‘the more detailed,
the more vivid’.
The full definition of de re belief, extending (29), then comes out as
follows:19
(31) a believesde re of b that it is P
iff there is an individual concept d s.t. R(d,b,a) and a believesde re
of b that it is P under description d ∃d[R(d, b, a) ∧ ∃x[x = b ∧ beldaP(x)]]
iff there is a d s.t. R(d,b,a) and a believesde dicto that (the) d is P ∃d[R(d, b, a) ∧ belaP(∨d)]
19R denotes Kaplan’s R, which in turn should be spelled out along the lines of (30).
Whether this can be done within a first-order system is irrelevant since the quantification
over individual concepts (α) already gets us beyond beyond first-order.
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In words: a de re belief about b is defined as the de dicto belief in the general
proposition that d has this or that property, for some appropriate descriptive
name d that the subject uses to identify b.
For example, Janell believes de re of Ortcutt that he’s a genius because
(i) there is a name the famous professor Ortcutt which names Ortcutt for
Janell, which actually denotes Ortcutt, and which is vivid for Janell, and (ii)
Janell believes de dicto that the famous professor Ortcutt is a genius. On the
other hand she also believes de re of Ortcutt that he is a nincompoop, which
is shown by taking the name to be the guy who wrote abstract #042. Lastly,
note that there is no vivid name α of Ortcutt or anybody else s.t. she believes
de dicto that α is a genius and a nincompoop at the same time. The only
plausible candidate α, ≈ the person who is either the famous professor or
the author of the abstract (cf. footnote 18), is not at all vivid, nor, arguably,
a name of Ortcutt for Janell. This ‘frankly inegalitarian attitude toward
various ways of specifying [an individual]’ (Kaplan 1969:222 & note 17),
is the key feature in Kaplan’s solution to the Ortcutt problem with which
we conclude the discussion of de re belief and its representation in modal
predicate logic.
Hoping to have convinced you of the soundness of Kaplan’s de re reduc-
tion with acquaintance, on which the rest of the thesis will build, let me also
raise a point of concern that, perhaps, need not bother us here already, but
that will inevitably rear its head once we want to expand our analysis to
attitudes beyond belief. Consider what happens if we just copy the entire
analysis to an analysis of the propositional attitude of hoping:
(32) a hopesde re of b that it is P
iff there is an individual concept d s.t. R(d,b,a) and a hopesde dicto
that P (d) ∃d[R(d, b, a) ∧ hopeaP(∨d)]
The problem arises when the person you believe falls under description d dif-
fers from the person you hope falls under d. Say, Janell knows that Ortcutt,
the famous professor, is head of Department X, but that she’s expecting him
to retire soon. Her favorite candidate for Ortcutt’s succession is her good
friend Ligia Faust. As before, she’s still a big fan of Ortcutt’s work and
obviously hopes that Ortcutt’s abstract gets accepted. Because Ligia hasn’t
submitted anything (or submitted something terrible), Janell does not hope
that Ligia is accepted. In such a scenario, we are surely entitled to say
that Janell hopesde re of Ortcutt that he is accepted, under the description
my esteemed colleague and head of Department X. Under Kaplan’s criteria,
such a description would most likely count as a vivid name of Ortcutt for
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Janell. However, having a de dicto hope that her esteemed colleague etc.
gets accepted, means that in all worlds compatible with Janell’s hopes, the
colleague that is head of Dept. X in that world gets accepted. And unfor-
tunately that is false, since, according to the above story, in all of Janell’s
hope-alternatives Ligia is head of Dept. X and, moreover, we assumed that
Janell does not hope that Ligia gets accepted.
Apparently, the generalization to other attitudes than belief requires more
than just a copy of (31) replacing each ‘believes’ with the attitude under
consideration. What is needed is a way to account for the fact that attitudes
like hope asymmetrically depend on belief in the sense that the de dicto hope
in the definiens of (32) does not concern the individual hoped to be d, but
rather the one believed to be d. To put it another way, belief is the basic
attitude on which all the others depend, for example, hoping that Janelll is
home implies a belief set with a person named Janell, and, on top of that,
the hope that that person in the belief worlds is home. Trying to make this
idea formally precise, we quickly run into serious trouble, which is the main
reason we’ll be almost exclusively concerned with the attitude of belief for
the remainder of this work (but occasionally we will come back to the other
attitudes). The aim is a theory of belief that is readily extendable to the
other attitude, pending an analysis of this asymmetric belief dependence.
I refer the interested reader to the works of Kamp and Asher that explore
these interdependencies between attitudes in some detail (Asher 1987; Kamp
1990).
1.2.3 De se attitudes: indexical belief as self-
ascription of properties
Since Castan˜eda (1966), and later Kaplan (1989), Lewis (1979a) and Perry
(1977; 1979) it is generally granted that there is a third mode of believing;
besides de dicto and de re there is also de se. The motivating examples
for this mode are cases like Kaplan’s pants-on-fire, Perry’s lost amnesiac
Lingens, Lewis’ propositionally omniscient gods, or our Janell who does not
realize she’s reviewing her own abstract (p.17). The main argument is this:
the defeatist belief expressed by my abstract is no good is different from
any de dicto belief in a proposition that the such and such abstract is bad
(because she may fail to realize that the such and such abstract is hers),
or from merely a de re belief about Janell’s abstract to the effect that it’s
no good (because she has that de re belief already on the basis of holding
the abstract and looking at it, saying that it’s unacceptable, even when she
hasn’t yet recognized it as her own).
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In this section we take a closer look at these de se examples, terminology
and arguments, and we shall review the discussion about whether we really
need 3 primitive modes, or whether we cannot reduce one to another. We’ll
end up extending the basic possible worlds framework somewhat by saying
that belief in general relates individuals to properties, not propositions, or
equivalently, that belief alternatives are contexts rather than worlds (Lewis
1979a). Then we use Kaplan’s (1969) acquaintance relations (1.2.2) to reduce
de re to (generalized) de dicto, and finally we’ll argue that de se is just a
subclass of de re (Lewis 1979a; Boe¨r & Lycan 1980; von Stechow 1982). The
debate between de se reductionists and separatists becomes more heated
when we enter into the semantics of belief reports, but that will have to wait
until chapter 2.
1.2.3.1 The essential indexical
Lewis (1979a) invented the term de se in analogy with de dicto and de re
beliefs, and we will use his terminology for what is also often called indexi-
cal belief. The latter term being perhaps more apt since de se may suggest
too strong a connection with strictly first person, or ‘self’, belief, i.e. beliefs
one would typically express with the help of the first person pronoun I,20
although at first sight there seems to be no good reason to set apart I from
other indexicals. So how do we characterize the de se mode? Answer: a belief
is de se iff the believer could not have expressed it without indexicals.21 In
Perry’s (1977; 1979; 1997) terminology: iff its direct expression in language
(of thought) contains essential indexicals. Essential here means exactly that
the indexical cannot be replaced by a non-indexical description or other re-
ferring device, without changing the meaning of the belief expressed.22
To avoid a terminological confusion sometimes found in the literature,
note that we’re not talking about indexicals in reports; it is still a matter
of debate whether essential indexicals in direct speech or in thought need to
be reported with essential indexicals in a belief report’s complement. This
confusion is perhaps further fed by the Latin (third person reflexive) se which
unfortunately seems to derive from the discussion about reports that ascribe
a first person belief to a third person—a misnomer even for that class of
20We focus on English throughout, but especially in these philosophical sections.
21This is the second place where our discussion crucially depends on beliefs being ex-
pressible in a language. As said before, when discussing the disquotational principle in
1.2.1, it may be a significant omission, but I will restrict attention to this class of beliefs.
22And meaning here should be taken as a primitive, pre-theoretical notion, not nec-
essarily reducible to propositions construed as sets of worlds or whatever. In Perry’s
own writings this notion of meaning is measured in terms of behavioristically explanatory
power, reminiscent of Stalnaker (1984; 1999).
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reports, which naturally should, and in most discussions does, include second
and first person reports of first person beliefs or even, as I take the term, any
reports of essentially indexical beliefs.
Consider:
(33) My abstract is awful
If Janell utters (33) she thereby expresses a de se belief, because the first
person indexical possessive my is essential: for every description or (other)
referential term τ not containing any indexical, it is easy to construct a
scenario where Janell does not believe herself to be τ , so that she would
never believe or say τ ’s abstract is no good. So the indexical my in Janell’s
statement of her belief is essential. For example, take the proper name Janell
for τ :
(34) Janell’s abstract is awful
Assuming Janell has been struck with amnesia and doesn’t remember her own
name suffices to show the non-equivalence of (34) and (33): not knowing her
name, she might say (33), but she would not utter (34). In fact, for the first
person case it doesn’t even help if we’d allow indexicals in our τ , so we could
try things like:
(35) The abstract written by

the person you are talking to
the person I see in the mirror
the person whose nose I’m now touching

is awful
I leave it to the reader to come up with examples about people who are
mistaken about whose nose they’re touching, but it’s obvious how any such
example can easily be adjusted so that Janell would be disposed to utter (33)
but not the sentences in (35). So indeed, the belief Janell expressed with (33)
is essentially indexical, or de se.
Note that the discussion of this example does not rely on reports. As I’ve
said before, the terminology unfortunately derives from reports, i.e. sentences
I would use to describe Janell’s belief to you (3rd person report, (36a)), or
that someone would use to remind Janell of what is going on (2nd, (36b)),
or that Janell herself would use, reflecting on what’s happening:
(36) a. Janell believes her abstract is awful
b. You believe your abstract is awful
c. I believe my abstract is awful
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All of these are in this case reports of a first person de se belief, viz. the
belief expressed originally with the essentially indexical (33). Note also that,
in the current terminology, (36a) does not even contain an indexical; this her
is an anaphoric pronoun.23
So much then for first person de se. Other indexical beliefs include beliefs
about the place where one is (expressed with here) or the present time (now).
Proof: how to paraphrase now (together with the present tense in is) in “It
is now 8:15PM” without smuggling in another essential indexical? The name
of the time of now’s utterance won’t do: neither “8:15PM is 8:15PM” nor, if
my watch were in fact 3 minutes fast, “8:12PM is 8:15PM” seems to carry the
exact same truth conditions as the indexical belief. Other descriptions either
rely on the indexicality of the present tense, or carry much more content
than does now (e.g. the time Neon Genesis is supposed to start, according to
the TV guide).
Just like with I, it is quite hard to come up with any synonymous term
for now, even allowing indexicals to be used. Perhaps the time at which this
is said would work (taking this to be self-referential)? This has in fact been
proposed, by Reichenbach (1947), who takes it as a starting point for his
token-reflexive analysis of the semantics of indexicals.24 We will ignore this
account in favor of the more standard Kaplanian semantics to be discussed
at length in 1.2.4.2.25 The important feature there is that all indexicals are
23This is not your typical Binding Theoretic usage of the term anaphor. Based on
(discourse) function, we classify person pronouns as follows: bound (or ‘donkey’) occur-
rences of he, her etc. are called anaphoric; referential I, you, he [+pointing] etc. deictic
(or indexical); and herself, yourself etc. reflexive pronouns.
24More recently, Perry (1997) successfully revived the token-reflexive analysis of in-
dexicals attributed to Reichenbach (1947) and Burks (1949), by introducing a range of
different levels of content/meaning, reminiscent of Kaplan’s (1989) split of Fregean Sinn
into Character and Content (cf. 1.2.4.2), but more radical.
25 Apart from problems posed by the semantics of self-reference, the main problem I
see with the token-reflexive account involves the standard argument for direct reference
(=non-descriptivity) of indexicals. This argument, which originated with Kripke (1972)
and was adapted for indexicals by Kaplan (1989), was meant to show that referential
terms like indexicals and proper names (and perhaps others) cannot be paraphrased in
descriptive terms. Applied to the Reichenbach analysis it runs as follows: Say, now means
the time of this utterance. Then these terms should be substitutable for each other without
changing the meanings of the utterances they occur in. But that’s false, because Someone
is speaking now is true when someone says it, but only contingently: it is true or false in a
possible world of evaluation depending on whether or not there are people speaking in that
world on October 8, 2006, 14:44 CET, so for instance it’s false in a possible world where the
entire human race was wiped out the day before (cf. the truth of the counterfactual If the
human race had been wiped out yesterday, nobody would be uttering anything right now).
But the Reichenbachian paraphrase Someone is speaking at the time of this utterance, with
explicit reference to the speech act, becomes necessarily true.
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interpreted in a manner that sets them apart from descriptive terms. His
system achieves this by having two orthogonal dimensions of interpretation:
contexts for indexicals, and indices for descriptive terms. Further, the class
of indexicals is spanned by now, actually and I, i.e. those three get a direct
interpretation built into the model, while the meaning of other indexicals is
defined in terms of them, but in such a way that the definition determines
the complex indexical’s referent fully in the context dimension so as to avoid
putting any descriptive meaning in the intensional part. In 1.B and 1.2.4.2 we
see how this actually helps us get around the Kripke-Kaplan non-synonymy
arguments, to which we now turn.
Taking a closer look at our definition of de se, we may observe that the es-
sentiality of indexicals in belief has actually been received wisdom in disguise
since Kripke and Kaplan introduced their famous arguments establishing a
fundamental difference between directly referential terms and their partly
descriptive paraphrases in the 70’s.26 For example, you, an indexical, seems
to mean something like the addressee, but actually they are not synonymous.
We can tease apart the subtle semantic difference between indexicals and
their descriptive counterparts by contrasting the sentences in (37):
(37) a. You are the addressee
b. The addressee is the addressee
c. You are you
My utterances of (37a) are usually true,27 but only contingently so, since
instead of speaking to you I might have decided to talk to someone else:
you are not necessarily the addressee of my speech act. Substituting the
addressee for you (37b), or the other way around (37c), may not change the
actual truth value, but the meaning is not preserved, because both are now
necessarily, and logically, true.
This argument is often reformulated by putting the appeal to necessity
into the language, presumably to turn the necessity judgments into truth
value judgments:
(38) a. #You are necessarily the addressee
b.#?The addressee is necessarily the addressee
c. ?You are necessarily you
26Kripke’s (1972) examples primarily target the alleged synonymy between proper
names (Aristotle) and their proposed descriptive paraphrases (the Stagira born philosopher
and teacher of Alexander the Great, who . . . , or simply the individual called ‘Aristotle’).
27Unless there is no, or no single, identifiable, salient, addressee, in which case the
utterance would suffer from presupposition failure and be uninterpretable rather than
false.
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However, scope ambiguities with respect to the overt operator of necessity
actually cause these judgments to be indecisive (as indicated by the question
marks in (38)). We return to these observations when discussing Kaplan
(1989) and when setting up our own framework in chapter 3. For now, just
remember how substitution can be used to bring out the semantic distinction
between indexicals and descriptive terms.
Lewis and Perry merely reformulated this type of argument and called
it the problem of the essential indexical. The prime exemplification of this
problem is Perry’s (1977) Lingens, an amnesiac who doesn’t know where
or who he is, but who, by reading an extremely detailed and up-to-date
biography,28 comes to believe the proposition that Lingens is in the Stanford
Library. We can imagine that this doesn’t help him if he still lacks the
belief that he himself is Lingens. The missing belief is irreducibly indexical,
expressible with I am Lingens and Perry’s point was to show the importance,
‘essentiality’, of indexicals in belief for explaining behavior. So it seems we
are justified in coining a new term, de se, to refer to this important and
sufficiently well-defined class of beliefs.
So far we have only considered what Perry (1997) termed automatic index-
icals (e.g. I, now, yesterday,. . . ), which automatically succeed in designating
their actual referent, regardless of the speaker’s intention. Saying I, I always
refer to me, Emar, even if I’m struck with amnesia or multiple personality
syndrome, or say, think and have convinced you that I am Napoleon; the
reference of an utterance of I is unaffected by the user’s mental state (as long
as she can be said to speak English properly). Kaplan (1989) uses the term
pure indexical for the same class, and opposes it with true demonstratives (e.g.
this, there, that red car, you,. . . ), indexicals that require something extra to
secure successful reference. This extra is primarily the speaker’s intention—
what does she want to refer to—which, for successful communication, can be
clarified by, say, a nod of the head or even a genuine pointing; hence Perry’s
term intentional indexicals. When combined with a properly recognized in-
tention, these demonstratives are often no less essential then the automatic
indexicals.
The uniform definition of de se in terms of essential indexicality notwith-
standing, there are clear differences between pure and demonstrative indexi-
cals, and many authors have (sometimes inconsistently and mostly implicitly)
adopted a more restrictive notion of de se belief and especially de se reports,
referring only to beliefs expressible essentially with pure indexicals. Witness
for instance such definitions of de se belief and the de se/de re distinction
28He might for instance have consulted his Wikipedia entry at http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Rudolf Lingens
1.2 Modes of attitude 41
as:
the access we have to ourselves is qualitatively different
from the access (however direct) we have towards a certain
‘res’.
[
(Chierchia 1989:3)
]
We shall call this subset of de se belief, those expressible only with automatic
indexicals, pure de se belief, following a suggestion by von Stechow (1982).
Other de se belief is often simply called de re. We shall stick to our original
definition of de se however, calling those beliefs requiring intentional indexi-
cals for their direct expression, intentional de se. It remains to be seen what
will be the consequences of this way of dividing the cake for the de re/de se
distinction, but first we need to focus on the de se/de dicto distinction.
1.2.3.2 De se vs. de dicto: properties vs. propositions
Now, on a more theoretical level, do we need special formal machinery to
capture the semantics of the class of belief singled out above? Or can we
perhaps reduce it to the familiar modal logic analysis of belief as a propo-
sitional attitude, that is, belief as a relation between a person and a set
of worlds, as we did for de dicto (1.2.1), and ultimately, with the help of
Kaplan’s (1969) acquaintance relations, with de re (1.2.2). The answer is
almost unanimously no, propositions won’t do, and even singular proposi-
tions (propositions about objects, for instance structured propositions, cf.
1.2.2.1) won’t help. The most influential argument for this position was
Lewis’ (1979a), which, moreover, came with a proper logic for the de se.29
29Lewis also added some thought examples of his own, the most famous being his “two
gods” who are propositionally omniscient, i.e. they everything there is to know about the
world they inhabit. The first, Zeus, lives on the highest mountain and occasionally throws
down thunderbolts; the second, Jahweh, lives on the coldest mountain and throws down
manna. And of course they each know that, that is, they know they’re in a world where
Zeus lives on the highest and Jahweh on the coldest mountain. Despite all that, Lewis
argues, it is still conceivable that they each not know who they are, i.e. that Zeus does not
know whether he inhabits the coldest or the highest mountain. Lewis’ story can be seen
as a more radical variation on Lingens’ predicament, for Lingens also knows all (relevant)
propositions, but fails to realize who he is. Interestingly, there is a TV show called John
Doe based on this very concept:
The series is about the life of John Doe, a mysterious man who rises from
the primordial waters of an isolated island, possessing knowledge of literally
everything in the world, yet having no memory of who—or even what—he
is.
[
http://www.tv.com/john-doe/show/9049/summary.html
]
(show canceled after one season in 2002)
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Lewis’ argument starts with the above mentioned case of Lingens: With
mere propositions, singular or general, there is no difference between what is
expressed by Lingens uttering “Lingens is in Stanford” and “I am in Stan-
ford”. Both express the proposition that this person, Lingens, has the prop-
erty of being in Stanford. With structured propositions this is formalized as
a pair consisting of the individual Lingens and the predicated property; in
more traditional terms it is simply the set of worlds in which Lingens is in
the extension of the predicate at that world:
(39) JI am in StanfordK
= {w ∈ W Lingens is in Stanford in w}
= JLingens is in StanfordK
The problem is that both utterances express propositions about Lingens, and
that is ultimately because we agree with Kripke/Kaplan that it doesn’t make
sense to interpret I descriptively, as the speaker, or Lingens as the so-and-so
individual who is called ‘Lingens’—that would change the meaning: by using
proper names or indexicals the speaker makes a claim about an individual
directly, viz. about that individual she happens to refer to, whether she knows
exactly who that is or not. On the propositional account of belief, then, this
is the only plausible candidate for the object of the so-expressed belief of
Lingens. From a given utterance of Lingens, we can, on the assumption that
he’s sincere, conclude that he believes the proposition he expressed with that
utterance. Ergo, both utterances express the same content, so the underlying
belief is the same. But that can’t be right: because he’s lost, Lingens’ belief
state only allows him to say “Lingens is in Stanford” (given his encyclopedic
knowledge), obviously, the belief expressed with the indexical variant must
be different. Next question: what is this difference in informational content,
if not propositional?
Lewis’ answer is to shift from propositions to a slightly more fine-grained
unit of information, properties, and, consequently, from belief (bel) as the
primitive doxastic operator to self-ascription, and from worlds (in a Belief
set) to contexts. Let me explain these moves. First of all, Lewis’ description
of Lingens’ predicament in terms of properties and their self-ascription. Say-
ing and believing: “Lingens is in Stanford” is Lingens’ way of locating himself
in logical space, for which the traditional propositional account is suited per-
fectly (cf. the standard locution that propositions are ways of partitioning the
space of possibilities, 1.1.1). In Lewis’ terms this is formulated—rather awk-
wardly, yet equivalently—as Lingens self-ascribing the property of inhabiting
a possible world in which Lingens is indeed in Stanford. The propositionally
equivalent eureka-moment “I am in Stanford”, however corresponds to Lin-
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gens self-ascribing the property of being in Stanford. A different property
altogether, one in which Lingens locates himself not (only) in logical space,
but rather within a world, in real 3-dimensional space, viz. in the Stanford
Library, or even in the body of one ‘Rudolf Lingens’. So, with self-ascription
of properties we can do all that we can do with propositional belief, but we
can also make some subtle distinctions that are actually needed.
Another example, also from Perry (1977): Heimson is mad. He thinks he
is Hume. In terms of propositions, the belief he expresses when he says “I
am Hume” is a contradiction,30 viz. the proposition that Heimson is Hume,
so Heimson’s belief set is predicted to be empty too, i.e. he cannot distin-
guish any two worlds, he believes literally everything. This prediction is
obviously too strong, moreover, in a way Heimson believes the same thing
as Hume believed, viz. that they themselves are Hume, though, while each
can confidently say “I am Hume”, the propositions so-expressed and there-
fore believed could not differ more: Hume expressed a tautology, Heimson
a contradiction. In terms of properties this problem disappears completely:
Heimson and Hume both self-ascribe the (non-trivial and non-empty) prop-
erty of being Hume.
Now a bit more formal, what is a property, really? Basically, a property
determines the extension of a predicate relative to a world of evaluation, i.e.
it’s the intension of a predicate. In every possible world, a predicate like
walks (walk) has an extension, the set of individuals that walk; the intension
of walk, i.e. the property of walking, is the function from possible worlds to
the predicate’s extension at that possible world. The set of properties is thus
(℘D)W , the functions from worlds to sets of individuals. This set of course is
in one-one correspondence with e.g. (℘W )D, and the form we will use from
now on: ℘(W ×D), the set of 〈w, a〉 pairs where a is an individual that has
the given property in the world w.31
For example, recall lost Lingens and the proposition he believed on the
classical account, (39). The properties he self-ascribes as evidenced by his
utterances are:
(40) a. Lingens is in Stanford; {〈w, a〉 Lingens is in Stanford in w}
b. I am in Stanford; {〈w, a〉 a is in Stanford in w}
30Remember, names just designate their actual bearers, so if the referents are distinct,
the names are necessarily non-co-referential, so Heimson is Hume expresses a necessary
falsehood equivalent to 0=1.
31Trivial proof of the 2nd correspondence: map f ∈ (℘D)W to the set of 〈w, a〉 pairs
for which a ∈ f(w).
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One proposition, two distinct properties; self-ascribing (40a) is equivalent to
believing a proposition (the a is really a dummy there), but (40b) amounts
to a real de se belief. The opposite—two propositions, one property—we
find in the Heimson vs. Hume scenario that has them both self-ascribe the
property below:
(41) I am Hume
; {〈w, a〉 a = Hume (in w)}
With the move to properties and self-ascription, we announced a third
Lewisian shift: from worlds to contexts. Lewis himself already notes that
we can describe the self-ascribed properties equivalently as sets of centered
worlds, or contexts. For this purpose, think of contexts as worlds from a par-
ticular point of view, a notion we may formalize as an ordered pair consisting
of a world and its ‘center’, an individual.32 We need contexts like this any-
way if we want to treat indexicality (=context-dependence) semantically.33
If we want to give a semantics of indexicals, we will have to say what is
the semantic value (reference) of I, evaluated at a context. The answer is of
course that the reference of I at a context 〈w, a〉 is the center (agent, subject,
speaker, point of view,. . . ) a of that context. A semantics that builds on this
and does justice to indexicals’ direct reference is Kaplan’s (1989), detailed in
1.B. The main point for now is that contexts are worlds with extra structure,
comprising at least a parameter specifying the center as we shall call it from
now on. It’s easy to see that, formally, sets of contexts are the same as, or at
least in one-to-one correspondence with, properties. The set of contexts in
which “I am in Stanford” is true is the set of 〈w, a〉’s whose a is in Stanford
in w, and that’s exactly the property of being in Stanford as represented in
(40b).
If we now turn to other indexicals we see that our properties are still not
fine-grained enough, that we need more parameters in our contexts. Take
now. An example belief de se about now is the one I express when I say “It’s
now October 8, 2006”. What property do I self-ascribe? Obviously not being
October 8, 2006, nor being (in existence) at October 8, 2006. What set of
contexts make the sentence true? Thinking in terms of context it is obvious
that for the interpretation of now we need an extra context parameter for
32The center terminology, which I will use throughout, derives from centered world,
which Lewis (1979a) ascribes to Quine (1969).
33The same idea, extending possible worlds with other parameters of evaluation, is
familiar from the semantics of modal logics that combine different modalities, such as
tense and deontic modality, which necessitates the use of time/world pairs as evaluation
points. Often these multi-parameterized intensional evaluation points are called indices.
See 1.A.5 for tense logic and 1.B.2 for a full definition of contexts.
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time. If contexts are triples containing a world, a person, and a time point, we
can define the semantic value of now at a context 〈w, a, t〉, as the context’s
temporal center t. Intuitively, the third context parameter is the time at
which the center had the thought or utterance under consideration. Applied
to the example:
(42) It’s now October 8, 2006
; {〈w, a, t〉 t ∈ October 8, 2006, in world w}
Not that this is no longer a property of individuals as such, but rather of
individuals at specific times in their lives. Note that self-ascription is not an
entirely accurate term anymore; in the above example I ascribe to myself at
my ‘inner now’, or subjective temporal reference point, the property of being
temporally located in October 8, 2006.
How about other indexicals, like here or that? One option is to add yet
other contextual dimensions, like a place parameter representing the spatial
location of the utterance situation (for here), and a parameter specifying the
salient objects pointed to or intended by the subject (for that). Nothing stops
us from going down this road, and indeed it has been done (Lewis 1972)—and
criticized (Cresswell 1973). We will take an easier route, defended by Lewis
(1981), and define the other dimensions of context in terms of the three we
already have. The interpretation of here at context 〈w, a, t〉 is the place where
a is located at t in w; and that refers to the object intended/pointed to by a
at t in w.34 This is all I’ll give as argument, the unconvinced reader should
check e.g. the systematic defense of this context reduction by Haas-Spohn
(1994).35
Thinking of Lewis’ analysis of de se as simply a shift from sets of possible
worlds to sets of contexts as objects of attitude, we may try to retain the
rest of the logic developed for propositional attitudes. By this I mean the
definition of belief in terms of worlds and belief sets in 1.1.1 (details in 1.A),
which we then later used as a semantics of de dicto belief in 1.2.1. What we
34It would go too far to go into the treatment of the presupposed proximity contrast
between this and that, or the treatment of extra descriptive material to form so-called
complex demonstratives like that woman, a much debated subject. The issue is further
complicated by the very common discourse deictic or anaphoric uses of these demonstrative
forms.
35Note that Reichenbach’s (1947) token-reflexive analysis discussed above can be con-
strued as a 1-dimensional reduction of the context. In his account, all indexical parameters
derive from the utterance. It suffices to assume that each utterance is a particular entity,
occurs only in one world, has a unique speaker, and occurs at a single time interval. A
similar 1-dimensional account is proposed by Lewis (1986:230), who admits world-bound
time-slices of individuals to his ontology.
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did was equip every individual at a world with a belief set, Bel(w) ⊆ W—
better yet, Bel(a, w, t) since different people have beliefs changing over time—
defined as the set of worlds that that individual a cannot distinguish from
(her conception of) the real world. Every proposition that is a superset
of these so-called doxastic alternatives corresponds to a proposition that is,
sloppily speaking, true in her representation of the world, i.e. she believes that
proposition. To adapt that story to the property self-ascription account, just
replace all worlds with contexts. Haas-Spohn (1994) provides an analogous
test to the one cited on p. 9 to clarify what it means for a person to have a
context as belief alternative: a context c is a belief alternative for a subject, if,
were we to place that person in the world of that context, in the body/mind
of the center of c, at the time of c, she would, upon careful investigation of her
surroundings, agree that it is in fact the world as she knows it, from her own
familiar point of view, at the time she thought was the time when the whole
thing started. Summing up: with properties (43b) and an individual’s belief
sets (43c) defined as sets of contexts (43a), the basic definition of doxastic
logic, (10), p. 9, will be replaced by (43d):
(43) Let W be a set of worlds, D the domain of individuals, and T the
set of times.
a. contexts: c ∈ C ⊆ W ×D × T
b. properties: P ⊆ C
c. belief sets: Bel : D ×W × T → ℘C
d. a self-ascribes property P at t in w iff Bel(a, w, t) ⊆ P
In conclusion, note that we have merely generalized the propositional
account: contexts are more fine-grained objects than worlds, so from a set of
self-ascribed contexts we can reconstruct the believed proposition as follows.
(44) a believes proposition p in w at t
iff a self-ascribes property {〈w′, a′, t′〉 ∈ C w′ ∈ p} at t in w
So, for completeness, assuming that de se belief complements are already
given as properties, that mode can be cashed out as in (45b), and de dicto,
(15), becomes (45b).36
36The real problems lie in the natural language semantics of reports: What utterances
or report complements correspond to properties? How to compute what property is self-
ascribed? For example, Colby believes that men are evil seems to ascribe to Colby a de dicto
belief, whereas Colby believes that that man is evil may or may not report an essentially
indexical belief of Colby’s, requiring, in the first case, the property of seeing/knowing
a certain specific evil man. In other words, don’t confuse the operators believesde se or
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(45) a. a believesde se P at t in w
iff Bel(a, w, t) ⊆ P
b. a believesde dicto p at t in w
iff Bel(a, w, t) ⊆ {〈w′, a′, t′〉 ∈ C w′ ∈ p}
From now on, we will mostly use this heavier mechanism of contexts as modal
parameters, since that allows a uniform treatment of de se and de dicto. In
the next section we’ll ponder the consequences of this generalization for our
account of de re in 1.2.2. The main question there, leading up to the leading
question of this work, will be: given the de se inspired generalization to
contexts for all belief, do we still need a distinction between de se and de re?
1.2.3.3 De se vs. de re: more terminological remarks
Above, we saw how essential indexicals in belief necessitate a move to prop-
erties. This should strengthen our case for choosing essential indexicality as
such, rather than just the so-called pure subclass, as the defining characteris-
tic for the third mode of believing. But, as said before, many would classify
the intentional de se beliefs such as the one expressed with that’s Ligia over
there as de re, so let us now try and disentangle these notions properly.
Recall our definition of de re in 1.2.2: A belief is de re if it is about
something external, which is only possible if the believer is sufficiently well
acquainted with the object in question. The first thing to note is that de
se beliefs are always de re. This is because on our definition de se belief
requires that the believer can (or, is disposed to) state her belief with an
indexical, and indexicals are the way of picking out things in our immediate
surroundings (context), with which we are ipso facto pretty well acquainted.
We can restate the same argument starting out from Kaplan’s Principle 2:
Indexicals are directly referential (Kaplan 1989:492), which means they have
no descriptive content but simply designate their actual referents from the
context. Therefore, felicitous utterances of sentences containing essential
indexicals express singular propositions (proposition about actual objects
one is acquainted with), and finally, believing singular propositions amounts
to de re belief. Ergo: all de se belief is de re belief. As far as I know, this
is almost universally recognized, although it is sometimes obscured by the
tendency to shrink the application of the term de re to refer only to the subset
of de re beliefs that are not de se. A more correct term for that complement
class would be something like mere de re (the deprecative mere licensed by
the fact that de re is the more inclusive and therefore weaker notion).
believesde dicto with the English ‘believes’.
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The obvious converse of this question has not gotten enough serious at-
tention from philosophers, in my opinion: Is it perhaps not also the case that
de se subsumes de re? Are there any mere de re beliefs at all? In short, is
there really a de re/de se distinction? Given our definitions it’s easy to see
what would constitute a good answer: we have to provide a de re non-de se
belief, or show that every de re belief really does require indexicals if we want
to state it directly. To answer this question, we must carefully reconsider the
notions de se and indexicality. First, our liberality with respect to de se,
comprising pure and intentional de se, may lead us to suspect that perhaps
all de re is de se, contrary to received wisdom. This suspicion is further
fed by the increasingly popular view that many referential terms are in fact
hidden indexicals, i.e. semantically they are context-dependent and directly
referential in exactly the same way as you and me.
Take proper names. After Kaplan’s semantics of indexicals had become
mainstream, it became almost trivial to take Kripke’s arguments and ob-
servations to show that proper names are indexicals, since they are prime
examples of rigid designators whose reference is grounded in the actual con-
text, i.e. in the baptism that actually took place in the utterance’s world.
More needs to be (and has been) said, for instance about the additional role
played by the referring intentions of the speaker in disambiguating in case
of multiply borne names or incorrect usage, but treating names as (inten-
tional) indexicals has proved a rather successful starting point for describing
these issues in a formal semantic framework (see Burge 1973; Recanati 1993;
Haas-Spohn 1994; Pelczar & Rainsbury 1998).
And there’s more: Haas-Spohn (1994) uses the arguments put forth by
Kripke (1972), Putnam (1975) and Burge (1977), to argue for and outline a
treatment of natural kind denoting terms (water, arthritis,. . . ) as indexical.
These treatments do require a gradual departure from the immediacy of the
context-dependence involved, we shift from mere visible surroundings and
speaker intentions to dependence on intentions of the language community
as a whole or even more remote concepts. In short, it has been convincingly
argued that proper names and natural kind terms share the characteristic
features of semantic indexicality with Kaplan’s traditional list of indexical
expressions, viz. context-dependence (Principle 1 (Kaplan 1989:492)) and
direct reference (or, rigidity: Principle 2). Are beliefs about water then per
definition de se? Are they even necessarily de re? Here, terminology diverges,
and I am not convinced for instance that the argument that all de se is de
re (de se = indexical reference, requires an intimate contextual acquaintance
= de re) above still goes through if we take hidden indexical de se with its
broad notion of context on board. If, however, we do decide that these are
proper indexicals and therefore not counterexamples to the thesis that all
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de re is de se, what possible de re non-de se candidates do we have left?
What springs to mind are beliefs expressed with referentially used definite
descriptions (Donnellan 1966). But the original discussion by Donnellan
already shows a dependence on speaker’s intentions, which suggests that such
descriptions as the man holding a Martini glass (referentially used) are also
context-dependent yet rigid, i.e. indexical—perhaps semantically equivalent
even to complex demonstratives, a subject briefly touched upon above in
footnote 34 but beyond the scope of this work.
To conclude, it turns out to be remarkably hard to come up with a de re
belief, i.e. about a thing with which you are properly acquainted, expressible
in direct speech (or thought) without any kind of indexical (pure, intentional,
or hidden). And with good reason, I believe, since that is exactly what in-
dexicals are for: referring directly to objects in your immediate surroundings.
However, I refrain from making any definite claims, and remain open for any-
one’s suggestion of a proper counterexample. This is mainly because below
I give a unified treatment of de re and de se, claiming that both traditional
de re and traditional de se, however widely or narrowly construed, fall un-
der a generalized notion of de re, independent of the outcome of the above
debate, which is more of a terminological nature. Deviant terminology is
thus the reason the thesis just defended—every de re belief is de se—may
sound preposterous, since what philosophers often have in mind when talking
about indexicals, are pure indexicals, and de se is often equated with pure,
or even just first person, de se (Lewis himself being a case in point). From
this point on, I will consistently use pure indexicals and pure de se, to refer
to the smaller class, which indeed has some special properties when it comes
to reporting, see 2.4.
1.2.4 Unifying de re and de se
1.2.4.1 Relational attitudes
Now, for a proper attempt at a unifying de re and de se, let us begin by
simply generalizing the acquaintance-style analysis of de re (Kaplan 1969) to
self-ascription of properties (Lewis 1979a), as proposed by Cresswell & von
Stechow (1982) and von Stechow (1982). The idea is to make the general de
re definition, repeated below, fit in with the property framework.
(46) a believesde re of b that it is P
iff there is a concept d s.t. R(d,b,a) and a believesde re of b that it
is P under description d
[
=(31), p. 33
]
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We want to generalize the last part, which we had already reduced one step
further, to:
(47) . . . and a believesde dicto that P (d)
[≈(31), p. 33]
Of course we could just fill in the definition of de dicto as a world-locating
property, (45b), without changing anything substantial to the Kaplanian
story:
(48) . . . and a self-ascribes the property of inhabiting a world where d is
P
Cresswell & von Stechow take a different course; they allow for the possibility
that the acquaintance relation underlying the description α has essential
indexical features, that is, the way of being acquainted with a res may lead
the subject to have a de re belief that she herself could not express without
indexicals. As argued above, this is quite often, if not universally, the case:
almost all de re beliefs require indexical expressing and thus a real property
analysis, not merely the de dicto border case. The question now is, how to
modify (47), constituting the crucial part of the definition of de re in (46),
so that it subsumes de se.
First of all, we take the indexicality of the acquaintance-based description
into account, so we will replace the description α with the acquaintance
relation itself, relating the res to the ‘self’ at her ‘now’ in the complement of
the belief. By so relating the res to the center, we essentially get a property-
type complement: the set of contexts whose center is related to a res . . .
(instead of the set of worlds in which α . . . ). Now, technically, α, meant to
‘represent’ an object descriptively, was a variable over individual concepts.
In the same vein, acquaintance relations are really variables ranging over
two-place predicates, i.e. over functions from worlds to pairs of individuals
R-acquainted.
So, following Cresswell & von Stechow (1982), we replace Kaplan’s ex-
istential quantification over descriptive names d in (46) with a quantifica-
tion over acquaintance relations R, and then the occurrence of d in the de
dicto complement in (47) becomes the person or object that the center is R-
acquainted with. The self-ascribed property in full becomes the property of
being R-related to a unique object that has P .37
37The uniqueness is justified by the plausible assumption that suitable acquaintance
relations can only relate you to one specific individual per world. In fact this uniqueness
of the second argument, for all x there is exactly one y with R(x, y), is an important part
of the definition of acquaintance relations. Without it, we would make wrong predictions:
Tami is R-acquainted with Delbert, and then he says: “that Delbert guy (that I am R-
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(49) a believesde re of b under acquaintance relation R that it has P
iff a self-ascribes {〈w′, a′, t′〉 the b′ with R(a′, b′), has P , in w′ at t′}
Bringing it all together and spelling out the essential conditions making up
R according to (30), we arrive at the following generalization of (31), to be
known hereafter as the relational account of de re belief:
(50) a believesde re of b that it is P
iff there is a 2-place relation R s.t.
(i) R is a suitably vivid acquaintance relation38
(ii) R(a, b)
(iii) a self-ascribes the property of being R-related to a unique
b′ that is P
Let’s evaluate what we have here, first with Ortcutt. From the story
on p. 16, and the reasoning in 1.2.2 it follows that Janell believes de re of
Ortcutt that he is a genius under the acquaintance relation knowing . . . as
a famous professor called ‘Ortcutt’. Proof: take R1 to be that relation, i.e.
R1(x, y) = xread y’s books and y is a famous professor called ‘Ortcutt’. In the
story it’s true that Janell self-ascribed the property of being acquainted with
a unique y called ‘Ortcutt’ and famous, and that y being a genius, so clause
(iii) in (50) is verified with R1 as relation and being a genius as property.
The other two clauses are also verified, as was shown in 1.2.2 already. On
the other hand, Janell self-ascribes the property of being R2-acquainted with
a loser, for R2(x, y) = x reviewed y’s abstract. If we assume, as before, that
both R1 and R2 are suitably vivid, we get that Janell has the two de re
beliefs Quine predicts, without having to assume a logical contradiction in
her belief set.39
acquainted with) is a dork”. If unbeknownst to him, this R is non-unique and also holds
between him and Merle, does he believe de re of Merle that he is a dork? It seems to me
that if R does not even pick out a single individual, it is too general to count as a proper
relation of acquaintance, it means the belief is de dicto, or the context should really allow
a more restrictive formulation of an R.
38In fact, because of uniqueness of the second argument, as described above in foot-
note 37, R can be viewed as a function, mapping an individual to the person she’s ac-
quainted with at t a certain time and world.
39An interesting observation that will become important later, is that these verifying
acquaintance relations, R1 and R2, are derived from the background story about Ortcutt,
i.e. the (discourse) context in which the beliefs and their expression are situated. In fact,
this is the crucial observation on which my own account of de re report semantics is built
in chapter 3. Although this context dependence is a much neglected aspect of de re belief
and reports, I am not the first to base a pragmatic account of attitudes or reports on it,
cf. e.g. Aloni (2000), to be discussed in chapter 2.
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Thing is, with our enhanced definition of de re we can adequately capture
(pure) de se belief as well. Take a traditional de se vs. de re scenario used
to motivate the de se mode in 1.1.3.3: Janell has a de re belief expressed
by abstract #037 should be accepted. Whether this is mere de re, hidden
indexical, or intentional de se doesn’t matter now, but at least it’s not a pure
de se. We model this by taking as acquaintance relation: R(x, y) = x reviewed
y and y has number #037. The self-ascribed property is that of having
reviewed an abstract numbered #037, which is so good it should be accepted.
Then she learns it was actually her own abstract, that is, she adjusts her
belief set so that only contexts remain whose center wrote abstract #037,
leaving untouched the belief that that #037 should be accepted. It follows
that then she self-ascribes the property of having written an abstract that
should be accepted, viz. #037. That self-ascription obviously amounts to a
pure de se belief, one she would express (when asked) with something like:
“Remember that brilliant abstract we talked about, #037? Turns out it’s
mine, so yes, I’m sure my abstract will be accepted,” featuring the egocentric
indexical my (or something equivalent). This de se belief also falls under the
generalized de re definition provided by the relational account, it’s just that
the acquaintance relation under which the de re belief about the abstract is
held has changed; the new acquaintance relation would be: R(x, y) = y is
x’s abstract.
So we see again that pure de se falls under general relational belief. To
be sure, consider the paradigmatic examples of Lingens and Heimson. First,
Lingens has a de re belief about himself under the relation R(x, y) = x is
reading y’s biography, with content P (x) = x is in Stanford. This changes to
a pure de se belief about himself when he realizes I am Lingens. This belief
corresponds to the set of contexts {〈w, a, t〉 a is Lingens}, or, in other words,
to a relational belief with content being Lingens under the acquaintance re-
lation x = y. The acquaintance relation of equality is needed here to fit this
pure, egocentric de se belief into the de re format, where in general the self-
ascribed property is of the form {〈w, a, t〉 in w at t:Lingens = ιy[R(a, y)]},
given in (50). Combining these two de re beliefs (by intersection) gives Lin-
gens’ final (pure de se) belief, that he is in Stanford. As for Heimson, there’s
nothing new to be said, he believes something purely de se about himself,
a belief he shares with Hume, viz. that he is Hume. According to the new
de re definition this very belief is a de re belief of Heimson about Heimson
himself, with content being Hume and acquaintance relation equality.
We conclude that, on the relational account, first person pure de se beliefs
are simply de re beliefs under equality. This is exactly the result Lewis
describes when he claimed de se falls under de re, a thesis ascribed to him,
and elaborated upon by von Stechow (1982), based on the following passage:
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Self-ascription of properties is ascription of properties to oneself
under the relation of identity. Certainly identity is a relation of
acquaintance par excellence. So belief de se falls under belief de
re.
[
(Lewis 1979a:156)
]40
The same ideas apply to de se beliefs involving other context parameters.
First let’s look at a temporal pure de se belief. The belief expressed by
“It is now October 8, 2006” corresponds, as we saw, to a property of the
form {〈w, a, t〉 t ∈ October 8, 2006}. In relational terms, that should be a
de re belief about the current time, under acquaintance the time currently
experienced. In other words, take R such that at time t, R(x, y) iff t =
y, then we get the right result if we fill it in in the self-ascribed property
{〈w, a, t〉 in w at t: ιy[R(a, y)] ∈ October 8, 2006}. 41 The same goes for
indexical beliefs featuring non-egocentric indexicals (that, there). To see that
the belief expressed with “That man is crazy” is analyzable as de re, take
R(x, y) to be x points at (or otherwise directs his audience’s attention to) y
and y is a man.
It should be clear from these examples that the de se truth conditions, as
modeled by property self-ascriptions, are properly captured by the enhanced
definition of de re belief, as are classic de re cases like Ortcutt. In fact, we
can precisely characterize the pure and other types of de se as subclasses of
generalized de re by the type of acquaintance relation involved: pure de se for
instance corresponds to de re belief under an egocentric acquaintance relation,
i.e. relating x to y in w at t depending on certain non-intentional (‘automatic’)
conditions on x, y, t and w (irreducibly depending on at least one of the
context parameters x, t, w otherwise the property is just a proposition in
disguise and the belief not purely de se). If, on the other hand x’s intention
is relevant for determining whether R(x, y), the corresponding belief is either
not indexical at all, or else then at least not pure, but hidden or intentional.
So we arrive at the characterization of different subclasses of relational beliefs
in figure 1.1, which sums up the above discussion. It further introduces some
shorthands invented by von Stechow (1982) for referring to some common
types of de se belief, like the first person de se, de me, and the intentional
belief expressible with that . . . , de hoc. Conclusion: all classic examples of de
se and de re are uniformly captured by a Kaplan (1969) inspired definition of
40In this passage, terminology deviates significantly, and tellingly, from ours: read first
person de se belief, i.e. belief expressed with first person pronouns in direct speech for this
occurrence of self-ascription of properties.
41A perhaps more insightful way to accomplish the same would be to extend the arity
of acquaintance relations explicitly, i.e. R(w, t, a, y) as the relation of acquaintance holding
between a and y in w at t, so that we could take for R the relation relating every quadruple
to its second component.
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type subtype direct d. in w at t: R(x, y) iff
pure de
se
de me I y = x
de nunc now y = t
yesterday y = t− 1
de hic here y = the location of x at t in w
inten-
tional
de se
de hoc that x is pointing at y in w at t
de hoc that guy x is pointing at y and y is a guy in w at t
de te you x is addressing y in w at t
she+point x is pointing at y and y is female and not
directly addressed in w at t
there x is pointing at a location y not close to x
in w at t
hidden
de se
or mere
de re
Ligia in w, x is causally connected to a ‘baptism’
of y with the name Ligia
the man
holding a
Martini
glass
x intends to refer to y by means of the man
holding a Martini glass in w at t
Table 1.1: A classification of relational attitudes
de re under a description/acquaintance relation, enhanced with the Lewisian
notion of belief as property self-ascription. The idea of de se being but a
subclass of de re in general can be traced back to Lewis (1979a), and was
worked out in detail by von Stechow (1982).
Boe¨r & Lycan (1980) actually proposed a stronger de se reductionist ac-
count, claiming that we don’t even need the second ingredient, the property
ascription. They argue that de se is just traditional (say, structured proposi-
tion style) de re. The paradigm case of a first person de se belief (= de me)
they analyze as follows:
(51) x believes de me to be on fire iff x believesde re of x that she’s on fire
Such an account of course has trouble with the de se puzzles of Castan˜eda,
Perry and Kaplan which were meant to show that x can believe de re of x
that she’s on fire, without realizing it is her (in the mirror), and therefore not
yet believing de se from the first person perspective that she’s on fire. Boe¨r &
Lycan’s (1980) ‘solution’ is not that interesting, they simply discard such data
as mere pragmatic acceptability issues, maintaining there isn’t any semantic
distinction. More importantly then, it raises the question how other Lewisian
de se reductionists like von Stechow avoid this pitfall. In the version of his
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account described in some detail above, the use of acquaintance relations
and properties in (50) allows indexical descriptions/acquaintance relations,
i.e. ones leading to an underlying de se belief. De se beliefs of every variety
are easily definable, using the classification in figure 1.1. For example:
(52) a. x believes de me to be on fire iff x believesde re of x that she’s on
fire under the purely egocentric acquaintance relation equality
b. x believes de nunc at t0 that it is nice weather iff x believesde re
of t0 that it is nice weather, under the purely egocentric acquain-
tance relation R, given by: in w at t R(x, y) iff y = t
This concludes my exposition of a viable unifying account of de se and de re
attitudes. The last part of this section explores a slightly different but very
influential analysis of de se belief, in a framework based on a new semantic
distinction: Kaplan’s two-dimensional semantics.
1.2.4.2 Kaplan: character vs. content
In this section we explore Kaplan’s (1989) Logic of Demonstratives, focusing
on the theory of de re and de se attitudes it engenders. The motivation for
this new logic however lies in the semantics of indexicals, so we’ll start out
there.
In the first part of his paper, Kaplan sets out to defend and accommodate
theoretically his aforementioned two principles governing the semantics of
indexical expressions (p.492):
Principle 1 The reference of indexicals depends on the context (in a sys-
tematic way)
Principle 2 Indexicals are directly referential
Principle 1 is indeed obvious, for “if you and I both say ‘I’ we refer to different
persons.” (p.492). Note that Kaplan’s notion of context is something like
the (external) situation in which the utterance took place, i.e. the notion we
have tried to capture formally as centered worlds, triples 〈w, a, t〉. Although
Kaplan is not so clear at this point, we can derive all needed dimensions of
context, from speaker to intended demonstrations, from such context triples
(cf. 1.2.3.1-1.2.3.2). The systematic way is the clearly statable descriptive
meaning which lets us determine the referent of an indexical from its context
of use, e.g. I refers to the speaker of its utterance, or that refers to the object
pointed to. So much then for Principle 1, Principle 2 on the other hand does
require some defense.
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Principle 2 seems to deny indexicals all descriptive content other than
their referent, which may come as a surprise, since we just saw that an
indexical (unlike perhaps a proper name, the paradigm of direct reference)
does have a clearly statable descriptive meaning. Kaplan maintains that this
meaning, whatever its status, can not be part of the propositional/intensional
content or what is said. To show this, Kaplan first considers embeddings
under modals: in It is possible that tomorrow I’ll be here the indexicals I
and here are unaffected by the operators that shift the possible world and
timepoint of evaluation, they refer to the actual utterer and the location of
her utterance respectively. If indexical content were part of the propositional
content, we’d expect the possibility of a ‘narrow scope’ reading it is possible
that tomorrow, a person will be speaking and that that person would then
be at the place where she then is, but of course indexicals have no such
readings. A prima facie alternative way to handle this would be to stipulate
that indexicals always take widest scope with respect to any operator. This
weaker consequence of Principle 2 is called the Fixity Thesis by Schlenker
(2003), which may serve as a workable substitute for Principle 2 in most
cases.42
However, as we have seen a couple times before,43 the Kripkean argument
against descriptivity of names applies mutatis mutandi to indexicals: if I
were not directly referential, its meaning (the speaker) would contribute to
the propositional content, so I am speaking would mean the same thing as the
speaker is speaking, but that’s nonsense since the first expresses a contingency,
while the second is necessarily true (under one reading at least). The crucial
point in this argument is that there are no operators, so scope can be of no
help whatsoever. We are forced to accept Principle 2 (or the Fixity Thesis):
indexicals are directly referential, in the sense that once the context has fixed
a reference for the indexical, the descriptive meaning referred to in Principle
1 plays no role in determining the proposition expressed; it’s the individual
actually picked out from the context that ‘goes into’ the proposition.44
The tension between the two principles, descriptive meaning governing
systematic context-dependence vs. direct reference (no meaning, just refer-
42Perhaps this formulation is more palatable to those who dislike direct reference, for
the Fixity Thesis allows one to cash out scope differently, say in terms of the independently
motivated presupposition projection of definites. Such a maneuver will be explored further
in chapter 3.
43 Pp. 25, 39 and footnotes 25, 26.
44On Kaplan’s strict and literal account of direct reference, singular propositions are
structured, they literally contain individuals as component parts. Formally, we will model
direct reference in terms of rigidity in 1.B, as did Kaplan in his formal system. This means
that instead of objects in propositions we represent these objects with a rigid designator
that has no content but the object it refers to. Cf. 1.2.2.1.
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ence), is resolved by acknowledging two kinds of meaning, called character
and content, to replace the unitary Fregean notion of a Sinn or proposition.
This distinction is intimately tied up with that between contexts of utter-
ance and circumstances of evaluation, or context and world, for short. The
two-dimensional semantics proposed by Kaplan goes something like this: A
sentence or other expression in a language, only expresses (or contributes to)
truth conditional content (= proposition = intension = what is said) if it is
uttered in a certain context. Content is modeled as intensions, as in modal
predicate logic. The content of my utterance of I am stressed, for example,
is the set of worlds (or, in general, indices, if we take interpretive dimensions
for tense into account, as we do in 1.B) in which I, that is, Emar, is stressed.
This is the level of meaning in which indexicals are directly referential, the
truth conditions depend on whether or not I am stressed in this or that world,
not on other possible speakers and the fact that I am speaking is irrelevant as
well. Accordingly, embedding under intensional operators, Perhaps yesterday
Colby believed that I was stressed, doesn’t change this rigid reference of I to
me, because, semantically, these operators operate at the level of content.
Principle 1, then, is accounted for in the second level of meaning, character.
The character of an expression is supposed to model the expression’s linguis-
tic meaning, the rule that allows us to determine the content of an expression
in each possible occasion of use, e.g. rules like I refers to the speaker of the
context in which it was uttered. Summarizing: intensions are function from
worlds to extensions; characters are functions from contexts to intensions.
For a term like I, the content in the current context where I’m writing
this, is (rigidly) the extension, i.e. Emar, and the character is the function
mapping each context to its center (speaker, writer, thinker). This character
can be visualized in a diagram, plotting contexts on the y-axis, and worlds
on the x-axis
(53)
I w0 w1 w2
c0 Emar Emar Emar
c1 Hume Hume Hume
c2 Lingens Lingens Lingens
where:
- c0 = 〈w0; Emar;October 8, 2006〉, w0 is the actual world
- c1 = 〈w1; Hume;May 31, 1750〉, w1 is very much like our actual
world w0
- c2 = 〈w2; Lingens;October 8, 2006〉, w2 is the fictional world of
the Heimson and Lingens thought experiments
Note that in such character diagrams, the cells are extensions, while the
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intension of an expression in a context is easily read off from the row headed
by that context. In the case of a sentence, extensions are truth values,
intensions are functions from worlds to truth values, or equivalently sets of
worlds (classical propositions), and characters are functions from contexts to
sets of possible worlds, viz. those functions that, when applied to a context,
yield the proposition expressed in that context.
(54)
I am in Stanford w0 w1 w2
c0 0 0 1
c1 0 0 0
c2 1 0 1
added:
- in w0 Lingens is in Stanford
- in w2 I (Emar) and Lingens are both in Stanford
Kaplan argues that knowing a language implies, or rather consists in,
knowing the characters of its expressions (in addition to knowing its syntax,
and the modes of semantic composition). From this it does not follow that
everybody knows the content of what they or their friends are saying, for
often we don’t know exactly what context we are in. Lingens is an extreme
case in point, he doesn’t even know the content of his utterance of I or here,
i.e. he does not know what context he inhabits, one with Lingens as center
located in Stanford, or one with Dingens as center. This corresponds ex-
actly to the discussion of Lewis’ property theory, where we also said that a
person’s belief set contains various contexts, indistinguishable as far as the
believer is concerned, cf. 1.2.3.2. What is believed, or rather self-ascribed, on
that account were the properties described by supersets of these belief sets.
Kaplan has a different solution to the problems of essential indexicality. Ka-
plan agrees that Perry’s and Lewis’ examples convincingly show that belief
objects are not mere propositions. On his own theory that corresponds to the
fact that the Kaplanian content actually expressed may be something else
than expected when someone like Heimson sincerely says I am Hume, viz.
the (empty) set of worlds in which Heimson equals Hume. What Heimson
believes in the narrow, psychological sense—that which guides his actions—is
the character of his utterance, the function mapping each context onto the
proposition that the center of that context is Hume. In this sense, Heim-
son believes the same thing as Hume himself, the character of I am Hume
even though the objective content expressed by their thoughts are completely
disjunct, a result paralleled by the property analysis.
Can Kaplan also handle the dual case, distinguishing pure de se and
mere de re as in the Lingens example, or Janell’s abstract? The answer
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is yes, and in fact, Kaplan comes with his own example which has become
paradigmatic of what is often (not always consistently, cf. p. 41) called the
de re/de se distinction: Imagine Kaplan looking in a mirror; he sees the
person in the mirror’s pants are on fire, but, not realizing he’s looking at
himself, he utters: “That guy’s pants are on fire!” The content he thereby
expresses is that Kaplan’s pants are on fire, because the meaning/character
of that guy makes it refer to the object actually pointed at, i.e. Kaplan. The
content is thus the same as when Kaplan 3 seconds later realizes it’s himself
he’s looking at, screaming: “Oh f***! It’s my pants that are on fire”. The
characters expressed are quite different however, because the characters of
that guy(’s) and my are quite different, even though both are indexical, and
both happen to refer (directly) to Kaplan in the two (rapidly succeeding)
contexts considered. So it seems Kaplan’s characters come in handy for
taking into account the indexical distinctions relevant to belief semantics.
Belief objects then are characters.45 We would like to reduce this a little
further, as done in classical doxastic logic with the definition in terms of
belief sets or accessibility relations. This is not necessary however, nothing
stops us from defining belief sets as simply sets of characters and leave it
at that, so that x believes a character C iff C ∈ BelChar(x). But then, how
about the observation above that (e.g. Lingens’) uncertainty can be modeled
as not being able to distinguish among contexts, which is also the crucial
observation in Lewisian property theory, leading to the idea that belief set
is a useful notion that should be modeled as sets of contexts. Haas-Spohn’s
(1994) test further fleshes out this notion of a context set, inspired among
others by the work of Stalnaker (1984; 1999), which reinforces our idea that
belief sets construed as sets of contexts are indeed relevant to a semantics
of attitudes. The next section presents a way of translating the Kaplanian
character theory to the context/belief set/property framework of 1.2.3.2.
1.2.4.3 Diagonals: from characters to properties
To synthesize the broadly Lewisian ideas about attitudes with Kaplanian
characters, we must introduce a key notion in attitude semantics developed
most extensively by Stalnaker (1978): diagonals. A diagonal is an intension-
like object collapsing the cognitively relevant information from a character
into one dimension, taking only the information on the character’s top-left-
to-bottom-right diagonal (in terms of character diagrams as exemplified in
45Or, perhaps closer to Kaplan’s way of speaking, belief objects are propositions under
a certain character as mode of presentation. But in the end such a proposal doesn’t
really add anything since the proposition actually believed is easily reconstructed from
the character by applying it to the actual context.
60 Chapter 1. Attitudes
(54)). Technically, the diagonal of a character maps each context c to the
extension expressed in c and evaluated at the world of c. Kaplan himself
uses diagonals implicitly to define truth of a sentence in a context given
the character: a sentence is true in a context iff it is actually true when
uttered at that context (i.e. true in c at the world of c). The significance
of the diagonal of a sentence character is therefore paraphrasable as the set
of contexts in which the sentence could be uttered truly, just like a classical
proposition was the set of worlds in which a sentence would be true (cf. 1.1.1),
or rather, taking the 2-dimensional treatment of indexicality into account,
the propositional content of a sentence uttered in a context is the set of
counterfactual circumstances in which that utterance would be evaluated as
true.
The diagonal unfortunately falls short of a reasonable explication of the
linguistic meaning of a sentence, for knowing an expression’s meaning, es-
pecially as considered from a production perspective, consists not only in
knowing in what contexts it would express something true, but also involves
a knowledge of what would happen if the evaluation parameter were shifted
to a counterfactual circumstance, by, say, a temporal operator.46 For cogni-
tive significance, the other area where Kaplan wants to employ characters, it
turns out that we can safely collapse the dependence on characters to their
diagonals, a huge theoretical gain, mostly because it allows us to connect the
Kaplanian theory with the property analysis.
To see why diagonals suffice for attitudes, first of all consider your favorite
de se puzzle, say Lingens, as setup for a proof by example. Let’s add a context
c3, one which Lingens cannot distinguish from his actual context c2, to the
diagrams in (53) and (54) to make it more interesting:
(55)
I am in Stanford w0 w1 w2
c0 0 0 1
c1 0 0 0
c2 1 0 1
c3 0 0 0
added:
- c3 = 〈w2; Dingens;October 8, 2006〉, and in w2 Dingens is at a
library in Santa Cruz
The thought experiment has it that Lingens doesn’t know who or where he
is, even though he knows from his encyclopedic knowledge that he inhabits
46In classical semantics such a question never arose, because these functions, meaning
as truth conditions and meaning as behavior under intensional operators, are not and
cannot be distinguished.
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none other than w2, in particular he knows that Lingens is in Stanford and
Dingens in Santa Cruz. All this is captured by stipulating that his belief
set contains (in a somewhat idealized case) two contexts c2 and c3 sharing
w2: Bel(Lingens,t,w2)={c2, c3}. Does Lingens believe what he would ex-
press with I am in Stanford? The traditional account would predict that he
believes the proposition that he actually expressed, the third row in (55),
{w0, w2}, because that is a superset of his classical belief set which would be
{w2} (he knows which world he inhabits). But this is inadequate, for when
asked “Where are you?”, he would never reply: “I am in Stanford.” On
the diagonal version of Kaplanian character theory he would be predicted
to answer thus iff the diagonal of the character in (55) were a superset of
his enhanced (context) belief set. This is not the case since the diagonal
contains only one context, c2, in the other contexts, what he would have
expressed would have been false, evaluated at the then actual world. In
other words, the (characteristic function of the) diagonal is read off from
the “coordinates” (c0, w0), (c1, w1), (c2, w2), and (c3, w2) in (55). It follows
then that once he finds out he’s not Dingens, thereby discarding c3 from his
belief set, he is in a position to believe the character/sentence/diagonal of
(55). To make the comparison with Lewisian self-ascription complete, note
that the believed (or not) diagonals correspond exactly to the self-ascribed
(or not) properties. For instance, the crucial property not self-ascribed
by Lingens when he’s lost, describing his knowledge who and where he is,
was the property of being Lingens in Stanford (cf. (40b), p. 43), formally
{〈w, a, t〉 a = Lingens and a is, in w at t, in Stanford}. Restricting atten-
tion to the 4 contexts considered, this property is indeed the same as our
diagonal: {c2}.
What we showed here (admittedly, by way of an example) was that weak-
ening Kaplan by looking at diagonals instead of whole characters, we get
exactly the Lewisian property theory with its clean formalism, great ex-
planatory power, and the link with classical notions like a person’s belief
set. Note that this is not meant to suggest that Kaplan’s and Lewis’ frame-
works are mutually reducible to each other, merely that the main theoretical
assumptions and basic machinery are the same, and that this facilitates a
decent comparison (cf. 1.2.4.4). In fact, skipping ahead somewhat to men-
tion one tentative pro of Kaplanian character semantics, focus for example
on the issue of compositionality with respect to the way we determine a self-
ascribed property from an utterance or report (cf. discussion in and around
footnote 36). Thorough discussion of compositionality however will have to
wait until we’ve started on natural language semantics properly in chapter 2.
Finally, for those unconvinced by the example, let’s look at the general
argument in favor of diagonals, in a formulation borrowed from von Stechow
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& Zimmermann (2004:13-14), who in turn paraphrase the general ideas of
Stalnaker (1978) as passed through by Zimmermann (1991) and Haas-Spohn
(1994): Imagine characters C and C ′ with diagonals δC and δC ′, and imagine
someone has a belief with cognitive significance C. This implies that there
is a sentence σ whose character is C (JσK = C) and that that person would
be disposed to utter47 when prompted to describe her belief.48 From that
disposition it follows that she considers herself to inhabit a context where
that sentence, σ, would be uttered truly. This of course is exactly what’s
captured by saying that her belief set is a subset of σ’s diagonal, i.e. δC. But
then, by the same token she considers herself to inhabit a world where σ′
(a sentence with character C ′ that she’d be disposed to utter as description
of her belief that C ′) expresses a truth. Finally, from uttering σ′ (or the
disposition. . . ) we conclude she believes Jσ′K, i.e. she believes C ′. In less
positive words, we’ve shown there are no two characterially distinct beliefs
that coincide on the diagonal, so the cognitive significance of thought is justly
reduced to diagonals. QED.
Let’s round off the discussion by summing up the advantages of restricting
attention to the believed character’s diagonals: we get (i) the same represen-
tational power vis-a-vis purely indexical distinctions, (ii) an account of belief
fully compatible with Lewisian self-ascribed properties, including (iii) com-
patibility with doxastic logic’s belief sets/accessibility given the refinement
that belief alternatives are contexts rather than mere worlds.
1.2.4.4 Character theory vs. relational attitudes
In the remainder of this section we compare the two accounts of the full de
re/de se class of beliefs from table 1.1, to wit, Kaplan’s character theory with
diagonals, and the relational account of de re/de se developed in 1.2.4.1.
Are there crucial differences, or can we use Kaplan as an unified analysis
of de re/de se on a par with the relational attitude account? In order to
answer such a question we must straighten out some apparent differences in
vocabulary.
Discussing de re in 1.2.2, and continuing into the relational analysis in
1.2.4.1, we arrived at a notion of someone believing de re some property of
47Not “assent to” (von Stechow & Zimmermann 2004:13) since the intrinsic speaker
change in assenting doesn’t preserve the perspective, i.e. the indexical mode of presentation
formalized as character.
48This is another case where we are forced to restrict ourselves to beliefs that can be
put into language by the believer (cf. discussion about the disquotational principle on p.
22, and the definition of essential indexicals in 1.2.3.1, footnote 21). Again, I acknowledge
that this constitutes a weakness in the argument, which may or may not be remedied, but
one that will have to await another occasion.
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something under some description. On the Kaplanian attitude semantics so
far we only have belief as a 2-place relation, between a believer and a char-
acter (or in the simpler case, believer and diagonal). Interestingly, Kaplan
himself speaks of believing a proposition under a mode of presentation given
by the character. We’ve already noted however that in the Kaplanian frame-
work the mode of presentation part, a character, is so rich that it renders
the believed content part redundant, since we can decompose the simple a
believes character C, in w at t into a believes proposition C(〈w, a, t〉) under
mode of presentation C (or δC), in w at t
So, in the character system, belief objects exhibit both aspects of the
general Kaplanian theory of meaning: an objective, truth conditional (‘wide’)
content, and a subjective, indexical (‘narrow’) character. Wide content, here,
is the content actually expressed in virtue of the context you happen to be in.
Recall that people are often confused about exactly which world or context
they inhabit, so it often happens that we are unaware of, or mistaken about,
which propositions are expressed by our utterances. Wide content is useful
for giving actual realistic truth-conditions for sentences that express facts
about the world, but cannot be used to explain behavior on the basis of our
belief. The kind of content that’s ‘in the head’ and guides our actions, is
called narrow content, and in Kaplan’s system this is successfully equated
with characters. Applied to the Heimson vs. Hume case, the wide contents
are the propositions that Heimson is Hume and the proposition that Hume
is Hume: one false, one true, though Heimson is totally unaware of any such
discrepancy and in fact thinks he expresses the second, true, proposition. The
narrow contents are the same, viz. the character/diagonal of I am Hume,
which accounts for the intuition that in this respect they share the same
psychological state and are thus wont to act similarly (e.g. uttering “I wrote
A Treatise of Human Nature” and preaching empiricism).
Turning to the relational account, we can see these same two aspects.
In the central definition, (50) on p. 51, the first part—clauses (i), R is a
vivid relation of acquaintance, and (ii), R(a, b)—relates the believer a to an
actual object b in the actual world. This corresponds, loosely speaking, to
the belief’s wide content, since it is not required that the believer be aware
what exactly this object b really is. For example, Janell believes de re of
Ortcutt that he should be rejected, but she is totally unaware that she has
such a belief about the individual she knows as ‘Professor Ortcutt’. The
narrow part of the relational definition comes in clause (iii), the de dicto
belief involving the mode of presentation rather than the actual individual.
This de dicto belief, modeled as a property self-ascription, is what’s in the
head. Moreover, as shown in the previous subsection, it actually coincides
with the diagonal of the believed character on the Kaplanian analysis, so the
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analogy makes perfect sense. To finish the example, in the Ortcutt case, this
narrowly believed content is the property of being acquainted with someone
who wrote an abstract labeled #042, and who is apparently some nitwit.
Conclusion: both unified analyses of de re/de se encode a wide and a
narrow aspect of belief. The main difference lies in their accounts of the
wide content: in the character theory it’s a full proposition, in the relational
account it’s just the fact that a certain relation holds between believer and
res in the real world. There is also a significant difference in the narrow parts,
and that is the fact that believed character is a single homogeneous entity
containing both (the subjective mode of presentation of) the res and the
content predicated of it, while the relational account cleanly separates the (R-
based description of) the res from the believed predicate P . One consequence
of this will be that Kaplan’s analysis allows a nice compositional semantics of
belief reports, but on the other hand it’ll be impossible to contextualize such
a semantics, as we will do for the relational semantics, viz. by requiring that
the acquaintance relation (which is the basis of the narrow description of the
res) be determined from the context. These consequences for the semantics
of reports will be discussed at length in the next chapter.
1.A Modal predicate logic
1.A.1 Syntax
A few preliminary words about notation: I use a courier-like font for expres-
sions in the predicate logical object language, Greek letters as meta-variables
over object language expressions (ξ for variables, α for constants, Π for pred-
icates, ϕ for formulas), and calligraphic and italic symbols to denote set-
theoretical entities in the meta-language.
(56) a. Primitive symbols
(i) Variables: x, y, x1, x2, . . .
(ii) Constants: a, b, a1, a2, . . .
(iii) For each n a set of n-place predicate symbols: walk, loser,
love, =
b. Atomic formulas
(i) If Π is an n-place predicate and τ1, . . . , τn are terms (vari-
ables or constants), then Π(τ1, . . . , τn) is a formula.
c. Complex formulas
(i) If ϕ and ψ are formulas and ξ a variable, then ¬ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ,2ϕ and ∃ξϕ are formulas.
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1.A.2 Models
(57) Model: M = 〈D,W,R, I〉
a. D is the domain of individuals
b. W is the set of possible worlds
c. R ⊆ W ×W is an accessibility relation between worlds
d. I is the interpretation function:
(i) If α is a constant, I(α) : W → D (individual concept)
(ii) If Π is an n-place predicate, I(Π) : W → ℘(Dn) (property)
All semantic values below are to be thought of as relative to a model, but
this will be left implicit in the notation, i.e. JϕKfw instead of JϕKM,fw .
1.A.3 Free variables and assignments
(58) a. Atomic formulas
(i) FV (Π(τ1, . . . , τn)) is the subset of all variables among the
τi’s
b. Complex formulas
(i) FV (ϕ ∧ ψ) = FV (ϕ) ∪ FV (ψ)
(ii) FV (¬ϕ) = FV (2ϕ) = FV (ϕ)
(iii) FV (∃ξϕ) = FV (ϕ)\{ξ}
A formula ϕ with FV (ϕ) = ∅ is called a sentence of the language.
Formulas with free variables can only be interpreted with respect to a
model and an assignment which maps at least the free variables to individ-
uals. These will be called proper assignments for a formula:
(59) A partial function f :⊆ V ar → D is called a proper assignment for
a formula ϕ iff FV (ϕ) ⊆ Dom(f)
1.A.4 Semantics
A useful auxiliary notation:
(60) g ⊇A f iff g ⊇ f and Dom(g) ⊇ Dom(f) ∪ A
Now, the full Tarskian, recursive definition of truth, or rather of semantic
values. I assume that every formula below is interpreted w.r.t. a proper
assignment for it, so we don’t have to worry about undefinedness of semantic
values, for instance, the semantic value of a formula is always either 0 or 1.
(61) a. Semantic values of primitive symbols
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(i) JξKf = JξKfw = f(ξ) ∈ D
(ii) JαKf = I(α) : W → D, JαKfw = JαKf (w)
(iii) JΠKf = I(Π) : W → ℘(Dn), JΠKfw = JΠKf (w)
b. Semantic values of atomic formula
(i) JΠ(τ1, . . . , τn)Kfw = 1 iff 〈Jτ1Kfw , . . . , JτnKfw〉 ∈ JΠKfw.
c. Semantic values of complex formula f
(i) J¬ϕKfw = 1− JϕKfwJϕ ∧ ψKfw = JϕKfw · JψKfwJ2ϕKfw = 1 iff for all v ∈ W with wRv it holds that JϕKfv =
1J∃ξϕKfw = 1 iff there is a g ⊇{ξ} f with JϕKgw = 1
(ii) JϕKf = {w ∈ W | JϕKfw = 1}, and if ϕ is a sentence, JϕK =JϕK∅
The last clause, (61cii), defines what is pronounced as ‘the proposition ex-
pressed by ϕ’. Open formulas also express propositions, but only with respect
to a proper assignment f .
One can easily verify that e.g. the semantics of conjunction boils down to
intersection of propositions, Jϕ ∧ ψK = JϕK∩ JψK, and negation is just taking
the complement in W , and so on. Also, we can extend the syntax and define
the semantics of all the usual logical constants (→, ∨, ∀, 3) in terms of the
ones we already have.
In effect, the semantics in (61) provides us with an surjective mapping,J K, of the sentences of the formal language onto the set of propositions, ℘W .
Although the mapping is not one-to-one, we often conflate talk about propo-
sitions and the formulas expressing them, saying things like the proposition
(that) 2ϕ ∧ ψ. This is harmless enough because the real issues for a seman-
ticist of course lie in the alleged correspondence between natural and formal
language, the correspondence between logical formulas and their semantic
values being given by a simple truth definition like (61).
Some additional semantic key notions:
(62) a. M |=fw ϕ iff JϕKfw = 1
b. M |=f ϕ iff JϕKf = W
c. |= ϕ iff for all models M: M |=∅ ϕ
d. ϕ |= ψ iff for all models M: if M |=∅ ϕ then M |=∅ ψ
And then some final notation we will occasionally use:
(63) a. Syntax: if  is an intension-denoting expression, then ∨ is an
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expression that denotes the corresponding extension
b. Semantics: J∨Kfw = JKfw (w)
1.A.5 Extra modalities: belief and tense
(64) a. Syntax: If τ is a term and ϕ a formula, belτϕ is a formula
b. Model: Bel : D ×W → ℘(W )
c. Semantics: JbelτϕKfw = 1 iff JϕKfw ⊇ Bel(JτKfw , w)
(65) a. Syntax: If ϕ is a formula, then so are:
(i) pϕ (sometime in the past, ϕ was the case)
(ii) fϕ (sometime in the future, ϕ)
(iii) hϕ = ¬p¬ϕ (ϕ has always been the case)
(iv) gϕ = ¬f¬ϕ (ϕ is always going to be the case)
b. Model:
(i) T is a set of times
(ii) <⊆ T × T denotes temporal precedence
(iii) 〈T,<〉 is a linear ordering
c. Semantics:
(i) JpϕKft = 1 iff there exists a t′ < t in T with JϕKft′ = 1
(ii) JfϕKft = 1 iff there exists a t′ > t in T with JϕKft′ = 1
1.B Kaplan’s 2-dimensional semantics
Kaplan’s (1989) ‘Logic of Demonstratives’ is an extension of the semantics
of modal predicate logic. It essentially adds a new parameter for evaluation,
the context, which is kept separate from the modal/tense dimension called
circumstances of evaluation, or simply indices. The main motivation comes
from the semantics of indexicals (I, here, now, tomorrow) and demonstra-
tives (this, that book). A correct semantics of indexicals, he argues, requires
meaning to be split up into truth conditional/referential content and descrip-
tive/linguistic meaning. Kaplan also offers an indirect speech operator say,
which has since then been adapted in the literature to an analysis of attitude
reports.
1.B.1 Syntax
The syntax is that of predicate logic with metaphysical modality 2, 3, tense
operators p, f, h, g, (we will add belief bel below) as discussed in 1.A. In
addition, Kaplan adds a few special, indexical constants, and operators:
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(66) Indexicals
a. Constants: i, here
b. Operators: a(ctually) , n(ow), y(esterday)
1.B.2 2D models
(67) Model: M = 〈D,T,<,W,R, I〉
a. Contexts: C = W ×D × T 3 c = 〈wc, ac, tc〉
b. Indices: I = W × T 3 i = 〈wi, ti〉
1.B.3 Semantics
The definitions of free variables, assignment functions, and proper assign-
ments for a given formula are the same as before. The truth definition is an
extension of (61) and it runs like this (again, everything relative to proper
assignments):
(68) a. Semantic values of primitive symbols
(i) JξKf = JξKf,ci = f(ξ) ∈ D
(ii) JαKf = I(α) : C → [I → D], JαKf,ci = JαKf,c (i) = JαK (c)(i)JIKf,ci = acJhereKf,ci = the place at which ac is at tc in wc
(iii) JΠKf = I(Π) : C → [I → ℘(Dn)], JΠKf,ci = JΠKf,c (i) =JΠKf (c)(i)
b. Semantic values of atomic formula
(i) JΠ(τ1, . . . , τn)Kf,ci = 1 iff 〈Jτ1Kf,ci , . . . , JτnKf,ci 〉 ∈ JΠKf,ci .
c. Semantic values of complex formula
(i) J¬ϕKf,ci = 1− JϕKf,ciJϕ ∧ ψKf,ci = JϕKf,ci · JψKf,ciJ∃ξϕKf,ci = 1 iff there is a g ⊇{ξ} f s.t. JϕKg,ci = 1
(ii) JpϕKf,ci = 1 iff there is a t < ti s.t. JϕKf,c〈wi,t〉 = 1JnϕKf,ci = 1 iff JϕKf,c〈wi,tc〉 = 1JyϕKf,ci = 1 iff for t, the day before tc: JϕKf,c〈wi,t〉 = 1
(iii) J2ϕKf,ci = 1 iff for all w with wiRw: JϕKf,c〈w,ti〉 = 1JaϕKf,ci = 1 iff JϕKf,c〈wc,tc〉 = 1
(iv) JϕKf,c ⊆ I, JϕKf : C → ℘I and, if ϕ is a sentence, JϕK =JϕK∅
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The basic semantic unit, J. . .K, defined in (68) is called the character of a
term or formula. It is a function from contexts to ordinary one-dimensional
intensions (i.e. individual concepts or propositions). Only in a context, does a
sentence have real truth conditional content (intension): JϕKc, the proposition
expressed by ϕ in c.
The system also allows for finer distinctions regarding notions like truth,
truth in a model, and logical truth:
(69) a. M |=f,ci ϕ iff JϕKf,ci = 1
b. M |=f,c ϕ iff JϕKf,c〈wc,tc〉 = 1
c. M |=f ϕ iff for all c: M |=f,c ϕ
d. |=f ϕ iff for all models M: M |=f ϕ
e. ϕ |=f ψ iff for all modelsM and all c: ifM |=f,c ϕ thenM |=f,c ψ
The logic is usually enriched with operators, for rigidification and diago-
nalization:
(70) a. Rigidification: Jdthat Kf,ci = JKf,c〈wc,tc〉
b. Diagonal: \\ϕ\\f =
{
c ∈ C JϕKf,c〈wc,tc〉 = 1}
A purely semantic diagonal operator, working on character directly, will be
useful too:
(71) For every character C ∈ {0, 1}IC : δC = {c ∈ C C(c)(〈wc, tc〉) = 1}
Note: \\ϕ\\f = δ JϕKf
1.B.4 Adding ‘says’ and ‘believes’
Believing or saying something relates an individual to a character:
(72) Direct speech and (cognitive significance of) belief
a. Syntax: If τ is a term and ϕ a formula, sayτϕ and belτϕ are
formulas
b. Model: Say,BelChar : D × I → ℘[C → [I → {0, 1}]]
c. Semantics: JbelτϕKf,ci = 1 iff JϕKf ∈ BelChar(JτKf,ci , i) (idem for
say)
When it comes to report semantics, Kaplan focuses more on indirect
speech then on belief reports, but since we are currently interested in the
latter, we follow the natural extensions to Kaplan’s notoriously sketchy anal-
ysis of attitudes and reports.
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(73) a. Model: BelC : D × I → ℘C
b. Semantics: JbelτϕKf,ci = 1 iff \\ϕ\\f ⊇ BelC(JτKf,ci , i)
To make the formulations in (72) and (73) compatible, we relate the defini-
tions of BelC and BelChar as follows:49
(74) For every character C, a ∈ D and i ∈ I: C ∈ BelChar(a, i) iff
δC ⊇ BelC(a, i)
Kaplan’s semantics of reports is discussed at length in 2.3.4, but for com-
pleteness, here’s the central definitions:
(75) Indirect speech and belief reports
a. Syntax: If τ is a term and ϕ a formula, saythatτ ϕ and bel
that
τ ϕ
are formulas
b. Semantics:
(i) Jsaythatτ ϕKf,ci = 1 iff there is a character C ∈ Say(JτKf,ci , i)
s.t. JϕKf,c = C(〈wi, JτKf,ci , ti〉)
(ii) Jbelthatτ ϕKf,ci = 1 iff there is a character C s.t. δC ⊇
BelC(JτKf,ci , i) and JϕKf,c = C(〈JτKf,ci , ti, wi〉)
49This requires that BelChar be closed under logical consequence as defined (indirectly,
only for expressible characters) in (69e). This diagonal closure condition is also part and
parcel of the reconstruction of ‘Adding “Says”’ by von Stechow (2001:3) and von Stechow
& Zimmermann (2004:8), who credit Haas-Spohn (1994) with the idea that believing a
character is self-ascription of its diagonal, from which the closure immediately follows.
This particular closure presumably does not hold of speech reporting, because arguably, a
diagonal carries the cognitive significance, but not the full linguistic meaning of a sentence.
Chapter 2
Attitude reports
In this chapter we shift the focus from logico-philosophical explorations to
their application in natural language semantics.
2.1 De dicto, de re, and de se reports?
The leading question is in what way the intuitive threefold distinction in
attitude modes that we started out with in 1.1.3 applies to attitude reports.
As has been stressed above, attitudes are mental states while attitude reports
are natural language sentences. To be precise, we will consider sentences
of the form NP believes (that) S meant to convey that the subject bears
the attitude of belief towards the proposition expressed by the complement
sentence. As we saw (p. 14), it is a matter of some debate whether a theory
of attitudes should yields a theory of the truth conditions of their reports,
or vice versa, but in any case, we must take care not two confuse these two
distinct fields of study.
Nevertheless, given the traditional threefold distinction1 in modes of at-
titude we may follow common terminological practice and posit a parallel
subcategorization of the linguistic class of attitude reports, i.e. a distinction
in mode of reporting, based on whether the ascribed attitude is de se, de
re or de dicto. A de re report, for example, will be defined as a sentence
that ascribes someone a de re belief. Of course, a first complication is the
fact that report classes so-defined will inherit the (essentially terminological)
difficulties we already encountered in dividing up the class of attitudes in this
way, moreover, the theoretical reductions and unifications we were eventually
led to (e.g. the reduction of de re to de dicto in 1.2.2.5, and the unification
1Note the traditional here, since as I argued in chapter 1, a consistent rethinking of
the definitions of de re and de se may reduce these two to a single class.
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of de re and de se as relational attitudes in 1.2.4.1), will automatically carry
over to reports. Apart from those preliminary complications, the interesting
question is, does a de dicto/de re/de se division along these lines correspond
to any interesting, independent linguistic categorization?
At first sight, there indeed appear to be some straightforward correspon-
dences between the sentence structure of the report and the mode of the
reported belief. For instance, quantifiers like every and a, or bare plurals
(1a) generally correlate with ascriptions of de dicto beliefs, referential ex-
pressions like proper names (1b) and indexicals with de re (i.e. anything
ranging from mere de re, to intentional and even pure de se), and finally
subjectless infinitival complements (1c) with pure de se:
(1) a. Ellsworth Kimmel believes pretty girls always win
b. Ellsworth believes of Arata Suggs that she’ll win
c. Ellsworth believes to be on the winning side
These examples exemplify unambiguous de dicto, de re and de se reports
respectively, though admittedly (1b) (and for some even (1c)) is not very
natural English. The sentence in (1a) is true iff Ellsworth Kimmel would
assent to something like “Pretty girls always win”; (1b) iff she knows this
person, Arata Suggs (under whatever guise), and thinks of that person that
she is bound to win; finally, (1c) iff she could express her belief with a pure
indexical, first person subject: “I am winning.” The truth conditions of these
three examples thus support the above mentioned heuristics for recovering
report mode from surface clues. Our goal now is to investigate whether it is
possible to turn these rough heuristics into a purely linguistic categorization
of belief reports, so that the mode of the reported belief can be derived
directly, preferably compositionally, from the reporting sentence’s surface
structure.
Note however that many reports are ambiguous2 with respect to the at-
titude mode, (2) for example is ambiguous between de dicto and de re:
(2) Ellsworth believes the prettiest girl will win
The de dicto reading is the one that reports an attitude Ellsworth has about
very pretty people in general. The de dicto truth conditions thus resemble
those of (1a). But there is also a different reading, de re, on which (2)
reports an attitude Ellsworth has towards a certain specific individual she
is acquainted with. If we assume that this person is in fact Arata, then
the truth conditions of the de re reading correspond to those of (1b). The
2Let’s settle on the term ambiguous for now, later we will make this more precise and
discuss whether it’s a case of syntactic ambiguity or rather pragmatic underspecification.
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crucial difference with the de dicto reading is that it need not be part of the
content of Ellsworth’s thought that this person is pretty, it may simply be
the reporter’s own preferred way of picking out Arata. Therefore, only on
the de re reading does the report remain true under (some) substitutions of
co-referential terms such as in this scenario Arata, or That girl over there
[pointing at Arata] for the prettiest girl. On the other hand, the de dicto
reading can be true even if Ellsworth is not in any way acquainted with Arata,
who is in fact the prettiest girl. I will consider the de dicto/de re ambiguity
from a more formal semantic perspective in 2.2, where, in particular, we take
a closer look at a scopal account of this ambiguity.
Another infamous family of ambiguous reports is exemplified by (3),
which has been argued to be ambiguous between a de re and de se read-
ing:
(3) Ellsworth believes she’s going to win
Taking the pronoun to be anaphoric (i.e. not deictic) and referring back to
Ellsworth, we can presumably read this sentence de re about Ellsworth, i.e.
true iff Ellsworth believes de re of Ellsworth that she’s going to win. On
this reading (3) would be true if Ellsworth were to point at a TV screen,
saying: “Whoa, that girl is going to win” provided she’s actually pointing
at her own image on TV, but irrespective of whether or not she recognizes
herself. The pure de se reading on the other hand is a report of the first
person attitude she would verbalize as “I’m going to win.” We take up the
de re/de se distinction, and especially the contrast between (3) and (1c), in
2.3.
Let us summarize our initial observations on modes of attitude reporting
by bringing together the 5 sentences discussed above: (1a), (1b), (1c), (2),
and (3). To show that the observed linguistic differences in reporting modes
are real, semantic differences, let’s assume that actually, Arata is just a
nickname for Ellsworth that she is not aware of, and that Ellsworth is really
the prettiest. Such a setup might lead an unsuspecting reader to believe
that given these additional assumptions surely all five must have the same
truth conditions. A closer look reveals that she’d be wrong, for consider the
following situations:
A. Ellsworth believes that the prettiest always win, it’s just part of the
system in her eyes. She does not believe that she is the prettiest, so
she’s a little disappointed. She herself describes her belief as: “Un-
fortunately, the prettiest always win, so I have no chance.”
Scene A is obviously one where Ellsworth’s belief is de dicto. And I’m sure
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your intuitions will agree that, if I have to choose one of the 5 reports above,
I best choose (1a) to describe this situation, though (1b) would be true too.
B. Now, Ellsworth is not convinced that being pretty is any guarantee for
winning. Instead, at a party, drunk, hearing people talk about Arata
Suggs while watching Ms. Suggs speech on TV, she says: “That girl,
Arata, that everyone’s talking about, she’s really smart. I’m sure
she’ll win” In fact this Arata Suggs is none other than herself, she
just didn’t recognize the image on the TV, nor did she know of this
nickname the others use to refer to her.
In B, Ellsworth arguably has a de re belief, for she’s quite vividly acquainted
with someone referred to as Arata Suggs, through watching the TV broadcast
and overhearing the talk of the people in the room. Assuming that’s enough
to establish a proper acquaintance relation, we should expect that (1b) is the
optimal way of reporting on the goings on in B, and I believe it is indeed
by far the best (of the five possibilities given). It’s equally clear that (1a)
and (1c) are completely out, but intuitions are somewhat muddy with the
the ambiguous forms (2) and (3). Certainly these are suboptimal, but if we
assume that it is salient common knowledge among speaker and intended
audience (though Ellsworth herself remains oblivious) that in fact Ellsworth
Kimmel = the prettiest = Arata Suggs, we can perhaps assign a true reading
to these as well.
C. As in B, Ellsworth does not think looks matter, but she is very con-
fident and would tell anyone: “I am going to win.”
Finally, in C the belief is purely de se, de me to be precise, and anybody
will agree that both (3) and (1c) would describe this situation. And again,
after a bit of philosophical exercise, and stressing that the audience and the
speaker have just been informed about the various guises of Ms. Kimmel, I
trust you’ll be able to squeeze out the true readings of (2) and (1b).
To summarize these basic intuitions for future reference, table 2.1 con-
tains the basic truth value judgments that will keep us busy for most of this
chapter. We can conclude somewhat preliminarily that in English, the de
dicto - de re - (pure) de se division of attitude modes is not straightfor-
wardly grammaticalized in the language of attitude reports. In other words,
a belief’s linguistic realization in a report is often un(der)specified with re-
spect to mode of ascribed attitude. This is not to say that every report can
report any mode of attitude: on the edges of the gray areas we can single out
some unambiguous prototypical examples, as witness (1). It remains to be
seen what kind of ambiguity or underspecification we are dealing with here.
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A. B. C.
(1a) 1 0 0
(2) 1 ?1 ?1
(1b) 0 1 ?1
(3) 0 ?1 1
(1c) 0 0 1
Table 2.1: Intuitions
Is it perhaps just another case of context-dependence? If so, what kind? And
how to account for its contextual resolution in a formal semantic framework?
These are among the main themes of the current work.
2.2 De dicto and de re reports
In this section we take a look at the de dicto/de re distinction for reports. We
will use predicate logical formulas, as introduced in chapter 1, to represent
adequate truth conditions (logical forms, lf’s) for belief reports that ascribe
de dicto or de re attitudes. An important theme is that, as we just saw
in 2.1, many sentences admit both de dicto and de re interpretations. The
traditional view has it that this should be thought of as a scope ambiguity
at the level of logical form, i.e. a syntax/semantics ambiguity. In 2.2.1 we
elaborate on this traditional account a little, ending with a brief note on a
more recent, dynamic, pragmasemantic reincarnation of the scope idea. It
must be noted that mere scopal accounts (syntactic or pragmatic) fail to
take into account the modes of presentation for de re readings, which, as the
Ortcutt example (pp. 16-17, 27ff) convinced us, are essential ingredients of de
re believing. In 2.2.2 I implement the Kaplanian solution with acquaintance
relations in a report semantics, fully in accordance with the corresponding
belief account of 1.2.2.
2.2.1 Scope ambiguity
Our goal is a semantics for belief reports, i.e. we need a way of mapping
sentences of English to their truth conditions. For now, we look at sentences
of the form NP believes that S and represent truth conditions as formulas
in modal predicate logic with belief (cf. 1.A). In this section we want to be
able to correctly predict the judgments of (1a), (1b) and (2) as plotted out
in table 2.1.
A simplified translation of (1a) into modal predicate logic would look
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something like (4) (ignoring all manner of sophistication with respect to bare
plurals and adverbial quantification):
(4) Ellsworth Kimmel believes pretty girls always win
[
=(1a)
]
 bele∀x[pretty(x)→ win(x)]
This representation squares with the account of de dicto belief as proposi-
tional belief, cf. 1.2.1.
For (1b) we can posit a wide scope representation to give the de re truth
conditions. This is in accordance with 1.2.2.1, where scoping the res outside
of an intensional operator was shown to be one of the possibilities for repre-
senting singular propositions, the traditional way of modeling de re belief.3
(5) Ellsworth believes of Arata Suggs that she’ll win
[
=(1b)
]
 ∃x[x = a ∧ belewin(x)]
According to the traditional scope account, sentences like (2), with a
definite description as embedded subject, have two logical forms: one where
the description takes narrow scope, the other wide:4
(6) Ellsworth believes the prettiest girl will win
[
=(2)
]
a.  belewin( ιy[prettiest(y)])
b.  ∃x[x = ιy[prettiest(y)] ∧ belewin(x)]
The truth conditions are thus reasonably well taken care of, i.e. as well as
singular proposition can capture de re belief—which is not at all perfect, cf.
1.2.2.3 and 2.2.2. In fact, the above distribution of logical forms does cor-
rectly capture our semantic judgments, as seen by comparing our predictions
in table 2.2 with the original intuitions of table 2.1.
The debate can now concentrate on what kind of embedded NPs should
give rise to such a narrow/wide ambiguity, e.g. are there wide (de re) read-
ings for embedded indefinites? de dicto readings for proper names? Answers
to such questions will be relevant to the matter of compositionality for these
3 The logically equivalent alternative puts a as the argument of win in the scope of bel,
while assuming that constants like a are rigid designators that therefore in a sense take
wide-scope semantically, though not at the representational level (cf. 1.2.2.1): belewin(a)
4A truly Russellian treatment of definite descriptions would claim that (proto-
)representations like in (6) in fact already abbreviate the two readings (narrow and wide)
intended here. This is because, on such an account, a formula with a ι-term is really an
abbreviation that can to be expanded to a real predicate logical formula in different ways.
The definition of ι-terms we use here makes them of the same type as individual constants:J ιx.win(x)Kw = the winner in w. Cf. 1.A.
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lf A. B. C.
(1a) (4) 1 0 0
(1b) (5) 0 1 1
(2) (6a)+(6b) 1 1 1
Table 2.2: Predictions of the scopal account of de dicto/de re
sentences, e.g. can we build these representations with a word-by-word trans-
lation mechanism? Note in this connection that we are essentially postulating
a syntactic ambiguity here: on one derivation the (potential) res is interpreted
in situ (de dicto), on the other it’s moved outside the attitude verb, leaving
a singular proposition as belief object (de re). With the advent of dynamic,
or rather, underspecified, semantics it has become possible to abandon the
syntactic ambiguity in favor of a pragmatic one. In such a theory, only a
single, underspecified LF is generated, and it is left to contextual, pragmatic
factors to determine whether we end up with wide or narrow scope truth
conditions. We will study this and other applications of dynamic semantics,
underspecification and context-dependence in detail in chapter 3.
2.2.2 Kaplan (1969) revisited: vivid names and de re
as de dicto
Unfortunately, scopal accounts in themselves are still deficient with respect
to the logical form of the de re readings, as shown by Kaplan’s (1969) Ort-
cutt example. In 1.2.2 we reconstructed Kaplan’s argument and saw that
simple singular propositions will not do. Even for a de re belief the mode
of presentation, a description of the res, should be taken into account in the
belief complement. Kaplan (1969), as we saw, took vivid names relating the
believer to her res to provide such descriptions in such a way that the direct,
wide scope, object dependence is actually removed from the complements of
de re beliefs. In this sense he reduced de re belief to a subclass of de dicto
belief, viz. those where the description of the subject of the belief is given
by a believer’s vivid name for an actual res. In this section we incorporate
these insights of Kaplan (1969) into the semantics of de re reports.
The Kaplanian definition of de re belief can be straightforwardly turned
into a semantics of de re reports (and de re readings of ambiguous reports),
as in (7). The d is, again, a variable over descriptions of individuals (i.e.
individual concepts), and R is a fixed abbreviation (its interpretation should
be part of the model) of the fact that, in this case, d is a vivid name, of b
and for a. A new shorthand is ‘NPa’, which is, roughly, a placeholder for an
78 Chapter 2. Attitude reports
NP referring to the object a (and logically represented as a), in other words:JNPaKw = JaKw = a.
(7) JNPa believes of NPb that it is VPP Kw = 1
iff there is an individual concept d s.t. R(d,b,a) and a believesde dicto
that whatever is d is P ∃d[R(d, b, a) ∧ belaP(∨d)] [≈(31), p. 33]
On the basis of this semantics, Kaplan would assign the following lf to our
de re report (1b):
(8) Ellsworth believes of Arata that she will win
[
=(1b)
]
 ∃d[R(d, e, a) ∧ belewin(∨d)]
If we assume that the de dicto lf’s of (1a) and (2) remain the same as before,
the de dicto/de re ambiguity takes on the following form:
(9) Ellsworth believes the prettiest girl will win
[
=(2)
]
a. belewin(
ιy[prettiest(y)])
b. ∃d[R(d, e, ιx.prettiest(x)) ∧ belewin(∨d)]
What, semantically speaking, are the predictions of this account with
respect to the pattern described by table 2.1? The logical form of the de
dicto sentence (1a) and of the de dicto reading of (2) remain untouched, but
the de re logical forms are as in (9b), i.e. true iff there is some suitable, vivid
name d under which Ellsworth holds the belief about herself (=Arata=the
prettiest). For (8) in B we could take the girl seen on TV that everyone talks
about, named ‘Arata Suggs’ as d; in C we could takemyself, Ellsworth Kimmel
(or a more elaborate description picking out Ellsworth for Ellsworth). And
of course, for the de re reading (9b), we could take the same ds. One problem
is that, arguably, seeing a person on TV giving a speech while being drunk
does not quite qualify as constituting a vivid name. However, as discussed
in 1.2.2, we assume that indirect perception can count as de re and take it
from there. Summing up, the predictions of this ‘singular-proposition-less’
Kaplanian alternative to the scopal account discussed above, then completely
match those of the classical account, as shown in table (9).
Note also that with this machinery we can do justice to reports in Ortcutt
scenarios like 1.1.3.2’s Janell who believes of Ortcutt, under different guises,
that he is brilliant and that he’s an embarrassment. Both sentences Janell
believes Ortcutt is brilliant and Janell believes Ortcutt is dumb can be true
at the same time because we’re dealing with distinct vivid names of Ortcutt
for Janell. Also, the report Janell believes Ortcutt is brilliant and dumb is
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lf A. B. C.
(1a) (4) 1 0 0
(1b) (8) 0 1 1
(2) (9a)+(9b) 1 1 1
Table 2.3: Predictions of Kaplan’s vivid name analysis
predicted to be false (unless Janell is logically insane) for there is no vivid
name that would verify it, cf. 1.2.2.
There have been substantial refinements and fundamental criticisms of
the Kaplanian account of de re belief. One such refinement is the incorpora-
tion of the context-dependence of vivid names, which is shown to have some
advantages over the current existential quantification. The hardest critique
has to do with the alleged non-compositionality of the approach. Both mat-
ters have direct parallels in the more general relational account that can be
seen as an extension of the vivid names analysis covering the whole class of de
re and de se belief reports. Therefore, we will take up the issues of context-
dependence and compositionality after introducing the relational semantics,
in 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, respectively
2.3 De se and de re
This section extends the two unifying accounts of de re/de se belief described
in 1.2.3, in order to provide a working semantics of belief reports. These are,
respectively, the semantics of relational attitudes (Lewis 1979a; von Stechow
1982) developed for belief in 1.2.4.1; and Kaplan’s (1989) theory of belief
as a characterial operator developed in 1.2.4.2 and 1.B. For both resulting
types of reductionist semantic frameworks, we consider some pros and cons,
and possible amendments. Section 2.4 will then discuss some recent, data-
driven criticism against the unification of de re and (pure) de se as such. My
aim in the end (chapter 3) is to revive the reductionist thesis—that de re
and de se reports form one homogeneous class—by using a novel pragmase-
mantic framework that allows a treatment of the problematic scenarios and
counterexamples that we will encounter in the current chapter.
2.3.1 The semantics of relational attitude
In 2.2.2 we turned Kaplan’s (1969) analysis of de re belief into an analysis
of de re belief reports. Synthesizing Kaplan’s vivid names and Lewis’ prop-
erties, we got what we termed the relational theory of de re and de se belief.
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Now, we’ll look at the predictions of that theory, when construed as a the-
ory of belief reports, as was first done by Cresswell & von Stechow (1982) in
Cresswell’s (1973) framework of λ-categorial LFs including structured propo-
sitions. The theory has later been modified and applied to a wide range of de
re phenomena such as sequence of tense (Abusch 1997) and ellipsis of belief
reports (Reinhart 1990).
Postponing everything related to compositional derivation of LF (c.q. lf)
to 2.3.3, the basic definition in relational belief semantics is the following
adaptation of chapter 1’s (50):
(10) JNPa believes of NPb that it is VPP Kw = 1
iff there is a 2-place relation R s.t.
(i) R is a suitably vivid acquaintance relation
(ii) R(a, b)
(iii) a self-ascribes the property of being R-related to a unique
b′ that is P
[≈(50), p. 51]
As with the vivid name semantics we want to capture these truth conditions
in a formula. With respect to the third clause that means we need a way
to talk about non-atomic properties. For this purpose we can use the well-
known apparatus of lambda abstraction, introduced properly in appendix
2.B. With the help of a λ, a new property-taking bel-operator called bel∗
(denoting self-ascription), and leaving clause (10i) implicit, a relational lf
looks as follows:
(11) NPa believes of NPb that it is VPP
 ∃R[R(a, b) ∧ bel∗aλx[P( ιy[R(x, y)])]]
For the de re readings considered in the previous section nothing changes
compared to the vivid name truth conditions of 2.2.2. For completeness’
sake:
(12) Ellsworth believes of Arata that she’ll win
[
=(1b)
]
 ∃R[R(e, a) ∧ bel∗eλx[win( ιy.R(x, y))]]
(13) Ellsworth believes the prettiest girl will win
[
=(2)
]
a. belewin(
ιy[prettiest(y)])
[
=(9a)
]
b. ∃R[R(e, ιx[prettiest(x)]) ∧ bel∗eλx[win( ιy[R(x, y)])]]
For current purposes, the de re lfs in (12) and (13b) are fully equivalent to
those in (8) and (9), and in fact have the same truth values in A-C, since
a and ιx[prettiest(x)] are co-referential. For both we can take the exact
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same verifying acquaintance relations in B and C as we did on p. 79, viz. in
B, R(x, y) holds iff x sees y on TV and y is called ‘Arata Suggs’, and for C,
R(x, y) iff x = y. We’ve left the de dicto readings as they were, as witness
(13a), so that in fact all our predictions so far match those of the previous
section.
The point of the Lewisian extension however was to account for the some-
what subtler de re/de se distinction, in particular the difference between
scenarios B and C, and consequently between their observationally most op-
timal reports (1b) and (1c), and then the ambiguous (3). So let us apply the
relational analysis to these examples. As stated above, (1b) is true in both
B and C with R’s as described earlier. But what is the logical form of the
infinitive construction (1c), and how do we interpret the anaphoric pronoun
in (3)?
We start with the latter, (3), since it’s trivial on the current account: the
pronoun is simply a bound variable, i.e. bound by the antecedent Ellsworth.
To represent this in predicate logic we’ll just copy the constant e:5
(14) Ellsworth believes she’s going to win
[
=(3)
]
 ∃R[R(e, e) ∧ bel∗eλx[win( ιy[R(x, y)])]]
Note that the pronoun that seems to be in the syntactic scope of believes,
has wide scope in the logical form, i.e. outside the intensional bel∗ operator,
at the same level as its antecedent, Ellsworth. The fact that the syntac-
tically embedded subject has wide scope at lf, is one of the most striking
features of the relational analysis and its Kaplanian (1969) predecessor, and
has been a source of considerable and ongoing debate. On the one hand,
syntacticians have argued that such ‘long movement’ is totally ad hoc and
‘unprecedented’, and semanticists have complained about, or obscured, the
obstacles such movement causes for compositional semantics. We discuss
this matter further in 2.3.3. But before that, and throughout the rest of this
work, I will point out the advantages of the wide scope account as such over
the various in situ analyses, like the quantified character analysis of 2.3.4, or
the anti-reductionist systems of 2.4.
The first such advantage we encounter right here, with (3)’s lf (14): this
single logical form accounts for what are sometimes referred to as the sen-
tence’s de re and de se readings, meaning that it’s true in both B and C.
This is easily verified by taking the same R’s we’ve been using above, x sees
5We could have added a quantified variable x and set x = e, or instead, represent
proper names like Ellsworth as properties (as in some versions of DRT) or as quantifiers
(as in Montague grammar). In fact our simplification only works because all e’s occur
unembedded, otherwise we’d have to assume at least rigidity of these constants.
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y on TV and y is called ‘Arata Suggs’ for B, and x=y for C. A big advantage
is that we need not postulate any ambiguity, the relational lf existentially
quantifies over the acquaintance relation under which the belief holds. The
lf is therefore compatible with any kind of relational attitude summed up
in table 1.1 p. 54, to wit, pure de se (as in C), intentional de se (as in B),
hidden de se, or even mere de re.
The unification of de re and de se described in 1.2.4.1 and exploited
here in the semantic representation of (3) is thus not only a nice and sound
theoretical reduction unifying two modes of attitudes, it also helps to get
the correct predictions for sentences like (3) in an elegant way that avoids
ambiguity or special treatments of embedded pronouns. As noted, compo-
sitionality remains an issue, and we will return to it shortly, but not before
we take a look at the flip side of de re/de se unification: if the logical form
of a report like (3) is compatible with both pure and other de re and de se
scenarios, how do we account for pure de se reports like the infinitival one in
(1c)?
This was the puzzle posed first by Chierchia (1989) who takes the ob-
served contrast between (3) and (1c) as a starting point to argue against a
unified treatment of pure and other de re/de se belief reports. Let’s dwell on
those judgments a bit, since they’re crucial, and these particular examples
may not be the most convincing. First of all, this may be due to the fact
that the English believes to be construction is not unanimously accepted as
grammatical, though it is attested on the web (of course): The author be-
lieves to be aware of related intellectual property rights [. . . ]6 or He believes
to have found dung and paw prints that resemble a human double fist.7
Fortunately, even if you don’t want to accept these sentences as grammat-
ical, note that the same acceptability contrast can be observed with other
attitude verbs in English, and, secondly, with belief reports in other lan-
guages. An example of the first type is the following hope report:8
(15) Essie Beard is to appear on a game show on TV. After the make-up
artists are through with her, and being quite stressed out, she doesn’t
even recognize herself when she sees herself in a mirror. Thinking
she’s seeing her opponent, she mutters: “I hope you lose.”
6From www.ietf.org/ietf/IPR/infineon ietf ipr.pdf Note: I have been unsuc-
cessful in filtering out examples where believes to be/have has come about as the result of
raising plus extraction, as in e.g. the stuff that he believes to be true. Since examples of
this type are ubiquitous on the web, I can’t give any estimate of the relative frequency of
the construction we’re interested in.
7http://home.fuse.net/rschaffner/panther.htm
8In the literature, many resort to hopes to + infinitive as the paradigm example of a
pure de se report, cf. e.g. (Schlenker 2003; Percus & Sauerland 2003a).
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a. Essie hopes that she’ll lose.
b. #Essie hopes to lose.
In the direct expression of her hope Essie uses an irreducible, intentional
indexical pronoun you,9 so this scenario exemplifies an intentional but not
pure de se hope of Essie. The hope is also de re in the general sense, viz. de
re about Essie herself, for that is the referent of you. To get a true reading
of (15a) we need to bear in mind that it is a report made by an informed
speaker (say, me), to an audience that shares the knowledge about Essie’s
peculiar predicament of not recognizing her own mirror image. In such a
setup it is conceivable that I felicitously utter (15a), to highlight the irony
of the situation. Verbalizing some of the above meta-remarks in the actual
discourse surrounding the report will make the contrast even clearer:
(16) So, apparently, Essie hopes that she’ll lose, though she doesn’t realize
that herself.
While such an addition may or may not increase the acceptability of the that
+ third person pronoun report, it definitely decreases the acceptability of the
infinitival report, which becomes truly incoherent/ungrammatical, regardless
of further context:
(17) *So, apparently, Essie hopes to lose, though she doesn’t realize that
herself.
Unfortunately, the semantics of the attitude hope poses a couple of indepen-
dent technical difficulties—having to do with the asymmetric dependence
of hope on belief discussed on p. 34—which is why I want to stick with be-
lief, to keep things manageable when getting our hands dirty formalizing in
chapter 3.
Another way out is to admit that, perhaps believes to be is not perfect
English, but then view it as a word-by-word translation gloss of a similar
report in one of the languages where these constructions are undeniably un-
marked. For simplicity I stick with my (Pseudo-)English example, but as
a matter of fact nothing hinges on English, as is recognized especially by
linguists. In fact, Chierchia’s original examples were in Italian where crede
di essere [believes to be] is the standard way of ascribing pure de se beliefs,
9This is a bit sloppy. One true direct discourse version would be for instance the
imperative “Lose!” with implicit deixis to the addressee. Meta-note: reporting such
imperatives while retaining the imperative mood (in what might be called an ‘imperative
report’) happens to raise a related issue, viz. that of 2nd person pure de se reports, cf.
footnotes 34 and 119.
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and I can confirm that in Dutch the analogous constructions denkt te and
meent te + infinitive are OK, as corroborated by a quick glance at the first
page of (the more than 10,000) Google hits on "denkt te".10
So let us conclude that there are infinitival reports that are incompatible
with de re attitudes about oneself that are not pure de se (e.g. mirror or
TV scenarios like above), but true if the belief is pure de se. To be a bit
more precise, read 1st person de se for pure de se. In fact, let us agree
to focus on the domain of person from here on, since it makes for clear
examples and e.g. tense is a much more complicated subject, where many
independent difficulties (even fundamental questions like, is tense anaphoric
or deictic?) would distract us from the de re/de se issues that concern us
here. Before continuing Chierchia’s argument against the kind of unified
treatment provided by the relational analysis, first we need some syntactic
theory.
Since the relational analysis can only be applied to sentences that give us
two individuals: a believer, a (the denotation of the matrix subject), and a
res, b (denotation of embedded subject).11 The infinitival complement in (1c)
however has no subject, at least not on the surface. However, it has been
argued on syntactic grounds that such clauses have to have a grammatical
subject. Following common syntactic practice, we call the invisible subject
of an embedded infinitival or gerundial clause PRO:
(18) Ellsworth believes PRO to be on the winning side
[≈(1c)]
It seems reasonable to assume, if we want to apply the relational analysis,
that this PRO refers to Ellsworth (e), so we’d get the following logical form:
(19) ∃R[R(e, e) ∧ bel∗eλx[win( ιy[R(x, y)])]]
This, unfortunately, is the logical form of an unspecified de re/de se belief,
exactly what we got in (14). In other words, we have failed to do justice to
the fact that language can specify, to a certain degree, what type of de se
attitude is reported. This argument led Chierchia to conclude that infinitival
(and gerundial) attitude complements have different logical forms, one not
captured by the relational account, but compatible only with first person
attitudes (or 2nd for command reports, cf. footnotes 34 and 35, p. 119). We
will detail Chierchia’s “de se separatist” counterproposal, and the positive
10Luckily, Dutch does not allow the raising construction (she believes him to be crazy)
that complicated the Google search for English examples, cf. footnote 6. In particular,
counting Ghits gives: #hij denkt te:#hij denkt dat hij≈1:3
11Easily generalized to reports about n res: put them all in a single n-tuple. Cf. 2.3.3.
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arguments for it, in 2.4 below, but first we’ll delve a bit deeper into the
relational account and discuss some other arguable weaknesses and ways in
which to fix those.
lf A. B. C.
(1a) (13a) 1 0 0
(1b) (12) 0 1 1
(2) (13a)+(13b) 1 1 1
(3) (14) 0 1 1
(1c) (19) 0 1 1
Table 2.4: Predictions of the relational analysis of de re/de se
2.3.2 The pragmatics of acquaintance
As an alternative to de re analyses in terms of unrestricted quantification over
concepts (cf. discussion on pp. 30-31), Aloni (2000) proposes a pragmatic
analysis where the res description is to be determined in the context. To
this end the essentially Kaplanian definition, (7), p. 78, is modified to select
vivid names from a context set C that represents salient information from
the previous discourse, common ground, and external surroundings:12
The sentence ‘a believes b to be ϕ’ uttered in context C is true
iff there is a description α suitable in C such that α is actually b
and a believes that α is ϕ.
[
(Aloni 2000:61)
]
Aloni discusses a number of logicians and philosophers (Kraut 1983; Ger-
brandy 2000) who similarly emphasize the role of the context in analyzing
de re belief under a description, eventually tracing the idea of quantification
over contextually selected concepts back to Hintikka (1967; 1969).13 Seem-
ingly independently, linguists working in the Lewis-Cresswell-Von Stechow
tradition have come up with the same ideas within the relational attitude
framework. In the current section we explore a couple of ways to formalize,
and benefit from, this pragmatic aspect of de re (and de se) belief.
12A closer look at our reconstruction of the vivid name account reveals that the context
dependence of res descriptions was already, though less explicitly, captured in the vividness
and acquaintance criteria within our earlier definition of R, (30), p. 33.
13(Aloni 2000:fn.2 p.35 & fn.34 p.57)
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2.3.2.1 Contextualized acquaintance
Let’s heap together the concept quantification, vivid names and relational
analyses, and discuss some of the ways in which they have been contextual-
ized and why. First up is an extension of the relational framework by Abusch
(1997) who argues that the acquaintance variable R should be determined by
the context rather than existentially quantified over as in (11). Her motiva-
tion is twofold: (i) a contextually determined R can be kept constant through
a sequence of belief reports. For instance, if in the context of a particular
discourse, Ortcutt is presented to Colby as the philosopher with the blue hat
over there, then every de re ascription about Ortcutt to Colby will pick up
that description. This comes closer to what actually happens when we in-
terpret such a discourse than looking for the existence of some acquaintance
relation in each sentence anew. However, I doubt that this will make a truth
conditional difference, because the quantification over acquaintance or de-
scriptions in the original proposals (Kaplan 1969; Cresswell & von Stechow
1982) is restricted to suitable, vivid ones, and as such already anticipates
that the relation must be salient in the context.
Second, Abusch claims her analysis allows the possibility of judging a
report true in one context, yet false in another. For instance, if I had cut
short the Ortcutt story halfway, only telling the audience that Janell admires
Professor Ortcutt, then the report “Janell believes Ortcutt is a genius” could
be true, whereas “Janell believes Ortcutt is a loser” would be false. If I were
to focus entirely on the second half, about how Janell hates the abstract
that is actually written by a professor Ortcutt, these judgments would be
reversed. Related to Abusch’ second point I see another potentially big
advantage of contextualizing acquaintance in the fact that the whole de re/de
se distinction is now a matter of pragmatic ambiguity. A given ‘coreferential’
report, i.e. of the form NPa believes NPa VPP , is pure de se iff the context’s
most salient acquaintance relation is equality (a = a), otherwise it can be
intentional de se, mere de re, or infelicitous, depending on what relations the
context has to offer (from those enumerated in table 1.1, p. 54).
In short, I agree wholeheartedly with Abusch’ motivations for going con-
textual. In fact, I think the contextual/pragmatic aspect of de re belief
should be stressed even more, as will become apparent in the remainder of
this chapter and the next. Playing devil’s advocate though, I might again
just point to Kaplan’s suitability/vividness clause and say that this contex-
tuality aspect of de re was already well taken care of in the sixties. Now,
rather than these implicit allusions to contextuality inherent in vague notions
like vividness, what we want is a theory about the nature of this context de-
pendence, and how to represent and resolve it. Unfortunately Abusch offers
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nothing in the way of a formal account of an underlying pragmatics, she
merely leaves room for one by dispensing with the whole ∃R[R(a, b)∧ ] that
we saw in relational lfs. Her contextualized relational analysis thus captures
the semantics of de re as follows (Abusch 1997:ex.13):
(20) NPa believes of NPb that it is VPP
 bel∗aλx[P( ιy[R(x, y)])] [cf. (11), p. 80]
The description under which the belief is held is represented by a free re-
lation variable, R, which an independent and as yet unspecified pragmatic
module is supposed to bind to a contextually salient relation. An important
restriction on the process of identifying a suitable R is obviously the fact
that R should hold between the ascribee and the res, which was hardwired
into the original account but is invisible in the new lf, presumably relegated
to the aforementioned pragmatic module. Pending a formalization of such a
module this could be a pro or a con. What the Abusch treatment does not
accomplish however, is making the definition of de re more compositional: it
merely throws the arguably problematic wide scope acquaintance quantifier
into the ‘pragmatic wastebasket’,14 which never solves anything. More on de
re compositionality issues in 2.3.3.
Let’s zoom out and consider how this free variable trick, which is ubiqui-
tous in a certain cluster of syntax-semantic interface theories, actually works.
To interpret a formula like (20), we have two options: besides seeing R as a free
variable that has yet to be bound by a quantifier ‘in the discourse context’,
we can interpret R as an indexical constant, receiving an interpretation from
the context parameter of a two-dimensional semantics with separate context
and index parameters.15 The first option seems ill-fitting in a static frame-
work like Abusch’s because it presupposes a pragmasemantic theory where
contextual information is stored in formulas that are expanded when new
sentences are interpreted, thus allowing existential quantifiers in the context
representation to bind free variables in subsequent utterance representations.
14(Bar-Hillel 1971)
15A third option, mixing the open formula account with the indexicality aspect, is to
stipulate that free variables should get an interpretation directly from the assignment func-
tion, which in turn is determined by the context. This is how for instance Schlenker (2003)
handles demonstratives. To make it work, a new aspect of interpretation is introduced,
the “compatibility condition”, which states that a logical form should be interpreted w.r.t.
a proper assignment determined by the context, i.e. the assignment should map the for-
mula’s free variables to appropriate individuals from the context, in accordance with the
speaker’s referential intentions in that context. The insider may note the strong similarity
with the standard DRT treatment of rigidity, in terms of external anchors (to be discussed
in 3.3.2.3).
88 Chapter 2. Attitude reports
All this has a much more natural formulation in dynamic semantics, perhaps
with the aid of a presuppositional mechanism for binding the free R to an ap-
propriate contextual relation . . . (yes, this is my analysis in a nutshell, details
in chapter 3)
The second option, where R is an indexical constant, seems to be in accor-
dance with Aloni (2000), who clarifies the pragmatic account of de re belief
thus:
The idea behind the pragmatic analysis is that de re belief reports
express different contents in different contexts, in the same way
(or in a similar way) as sentences containing indexical expressions.[
(Aloni 2000:61)
]
Apart from the fact that Aloni wants to contextualize descriptions/guises in-
stead of 2-place relations of acquaintance, she seems to be aiming at the same
kind of result as Abusch. The main difference would be that Aloni’s view re-
quires a two-dimensional semantics that allows one to evaluate R on a context
parameter (provided by the model), rather than a (semi-)dynamic semantics
where context representations are ‘updated’ with incoming sentences.16
Besides the advantages of de re contextualism already mentioned, both
Abusch and Aloni-style implementations of it share one important and distin-
guishing prediction: the vivid acquaintance relations holding between matrix
and embedded subjects are interpreted wide scope with respect to further op-
erators embedding the belief report. Consider a quantified belief report like
Every student believes she’ll win. Cresswell & von Stechow’s (1982) defini-
tion, our (11), would assign it a reading where the acquaintance quantifi-
cation is built into the semantics of believe, so that it is outscoped by the
universal quantifier. The resulting reading is paraphrasable as for each stu-
dent there exists an acquaintance relation R between that student and herself,
and that student believes under that R that. . . . The context dependent ex-
tensions described above (whether employing pragmatic discourse binding,
free variables, or indexical R’s)17 predict a truth-conditionally distinct read-
16In fact, Aloni’s technique is still slightly different: instead of making the description
itself an indexical, she has a contextually determined set of concepts, which the lf then
quantifies over. One difference with analyzing R as an indexical constant is that it then
carries a kind of built-in uniqueness presupposition, whereas Aloni’s contexts need only
determine a set of concepts. It remains to be seen if anything hinges on this superficial
difference. Note that with an Aloni-style definition, Abusch would no longer be able to
sweep the above mentioned non-compositionality under the carpet, since the existential
quantifier must remain visible at lf.
17I’m not sure how well Aloni’s (2000) version (footnote 16) works. Perhaps the flexi-
bility in choosing the contextual set will allow her to derive both wide and narrow scope
readings in principle.
2.3 De se and de re 89
ing: there is a contextually determined acquaintance relation R s.t. each of
the students bears it to herself and believes under R that. . . 18 We return to
this matter in 2.4.2, where we take a closer look at belief reports embedded
under quantifiers (esp. every and only). I show there that neither existen-
tial closure nor simple (rigidly wide scope) context dependence will do, thus
clearing the way for a more sophisticated, truly pragmasemantic treatment
of acquaintance relations.
2.3.3 Compositionality?
Some recent authors have expressed their dislike of the relational analysis
and its Kaplanian predecessor on the grounds of its apparently obvious non-
compositionality. For instance, Schlenker (2003) talks about “the notorious
difficulty of giving a compositional treatment of Kaplan’s suggestions” (p.94),
while von Stechow & Zimmermann (2004) describe that account as “Kaplan
(1969)’s classical but non-compositional de re account” (p.15). Although
both remarks are overtly aimed at Kaplan, not at the relational generalization
we’ve ascribed to Cresswell & von Stechow (1982), these qualms immediately
extend to that account (and its contextualizations).
The source of the non-compositionality lies in the fact that res and as-
cribed predicate must be kept apart throughout the semantic derivation. For
instance, say we want to interpret Colby believes that Ligia is smart compo-
sitionally, i.e. computing the meaning of the whole sentence as a function of
the meanings of the constituents, and the meanings of those constituents in
terms of their constituents, and so on, down to the lexical items (cf. 1.1.1.3).19
This means that we must be able to compute the semantic value of the com-
plement clause (a constituent on all accounts) first, as if it were a sentence
on its own. This would give us the proposition that Ligia is smart. Note
that from this proposition, a plain set of worlds, we can no longer recover
the individual Ligia or the property of being smart. But then how do we
continue our computation? Well, in the next steps the values of Colby (an
individual) and believes (an operator) must combine with this proposition,
which leads to a de dicto interpretation at best. The de re truth conditions,
∃R[R(c, l) ∧ bel∗cλx[smart( ιy[R(x, y)])]], are unattainable since they feature
both Colby and Ligia in the main, unembedded context, implying that Ligia
18This is the most charitable reading I can imagine on a wide scope analysis. I’m not
sure how Abusch in particular could derive the requirement that R holds between the
student and herself in narrow scope, while R itself takes wide scope.
19Common enhancements to this principle of compositionality include adherence to
a particular independent syntactically motivated tree structure that the semantics must
follow, or a restriction to functional application as the only mode of semantic composition.
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was available at some point after the computation of the complement had
been completed. As if by “magic” (Schlenker 2004b), the res must have
‘moved’, from the embedded to the main clause, a phenomenon referred to
as res movement by von Stechow & Zimmermann (2004). In any case, the
above should suffice as a proof that we cannot derive relational lfs by purely
compositional means.
In order to evaluate these recent attacks based on non-compositionality,
let us take a look at how that same Arnim von Stechow, in collaboration
with Max Cresswell, had worked out the relation between surface structure
and the relational logical form in the eighties, for it is at that interface that
compositionality appears to be problematic. The alternatives proposed by
von Stechow & Zimmermann (2004) and Schlenker (2003; 2004b) on the basis
of their criticism of the relational analysis will be taken up later, in 2.3.4 and
2.4.3.
2.3.3.1 Structured propositions in logical forms
Cresswell & von Stechow (1982) use a framework in which the LF, generated
by a categorial syntax a` la (Cresswell 1973), of a de re belief complement is
a structured proposition. For example:
(21) Ellsworth believes of Arata Suggs that she’ll win [=(1b)]
 bele〈a, win〉
This is in accordance with the remarks about structured proposition we made
when talking about the semantics of de re believing in 1.2.2.1. There we ob-
served that de re belief calls for singular propositions, and the most straight-
forward way to formalize the aboutness of singular propositions was in terms
of structured propositions that keep res and predicate separate. Hence this
idea of modeling de re in terms of structured propositions, especially when
the aboutness is as explicit as in the x believes P of y construction.
The same analysis can be applied to the de re reading of our ambiguous
report, which is now ambiguous in the sense of admitting the lfs in (22a,b).
(22) Ellsworth believes the prettiest girl will win
[
=(2)
]
a. belewin(
ιx.prettiest(x))
[
=(13a)
]
b. bele〈 ιx.prettiest(x), win〉
Cresswell & von Stechow (1982) in fact derive this ambiguity from a
lexical ambiguity in the (sometimes invisible) complementizer that, which
on their account can select for complements of various logical types, which
include propositions and 〈subject,predicate〉 structured propositions as in
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(22a) and (22b), respectively. The choice of a particular member of the that
family determines whether, and in what way, the structure of the complement
is relevant for interpretation, in other words, which terms are to be read de
re: in (22b), only the subject term is de re, in (22a) nothing is. In the
following I will not follow Cresswell’s that-centrism, but locate the ambiguity
in the bel operator.
In general, a belief complement’s lf has the form 〈〈α1, . . . , αn〉, β〉, where
the α’s are the terms (of arbitrary type, so we will allow reports that are
de re about, say, properties) read de re, and β is the property believed to
hold of these objects. The logical types of the α’s and β are restricted by
the requirement that applying the predicate β to the α’s yields a (normal)
proposition:
(23) 〈〈α1, . . . , αn〉, β〉 is a structured proposition iff β(α1, . . . , αn) is a well-
formed formula
Given the notational convention that we may leave out superfluous an-
gled brackets, i.e. 〈α〉 = α, it’s easily seen that this holds in exam-
ple (22), where we had the limiting cases of n = 0 (de dicto) and
n = 1 (〈〈 ιx[prettiest(x)]〉, win〉 is a structured proposition because
win( ιx[prettiest(x)]) expresses a regular proposition).
As I showed at the start of 2.3.3, a separation of res and predicate is
necessary even though it has the effect of making things non-compositional.
We now see how structured propositions come in handy for implementing this
res separation. The term res movement is especially apt when we turn to
slightly more complex cases like (24). Consider for instance the reading where
it’s the transitive verb’s object that is read de re, in fact, to demonstrate the
power of the system, let me show you three such readings, for in addition to
the object we can ‘res-move’ the other embedded constituents as well:
(24) Ellsworth thinks the prettiest girl might beat Arata
a. bele〈〈a〉, λy[3[beat( ιx[prettiest(x)], y)]]〉
b. bele〈〈a, ιx[prettiest(x)]〉, λyλz[3[beat(z, y)]]〉
c. bele〈〈a, ιx[prettiest(x)], beat〉, λyλzλX[3[X(z, y)]]〉
Already in the simplest lf, (24a), in which the belief is de re only with respect
to the individual called Arata, it’s clear that the res has been “move[d] to the
left edge” of (the LF of) the embedded clause “thereby creating a λ-abstract”
(von Stechow & Zimmermann 2004:3). And if it wasn’t already, it should
now become obvious that there’s no way to get from the prettiest girl will
beat Arata to 〈〈a〉, λy[3[beat( ιx[prettiest(x)], y)]]〉 in a compositional, non
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ad hoc fashion.20
This then is the compositionality problem for the relational account. A
counterargument might take the following form: If movement makes a syn-
tactic/semantic theory uncompositional, then apparently your notion of com-
positionality is way too strict, for there is ample evidence in syntactic theory
that movement is indispensable. The hard-core Montagovian standpoint re-
garding compositionality is really untenable in light of the actual syntactic
complexity of natural language. Besides, movements occur in syntax, not
semantics. It comes as no surprise that compositionality doesn’t apply to
the relation between the surface form and the interpretation, what matters
is that it applies between the LF (after the movements) and its model theo-
retic interpretation. This should be an acceptable solution, since indeed it is
(or certainly was) uncontroversial among the majority of syntacticians that
movements are needed. The remaining questions are then whether this par-
ticular movement is well-motivated on independent syntactic grounds, and
whether a structured LF can indeed be interpreted compositionally according
to the relational attitude analysis. As for the first question I remain agnostic,
deferring to von Stechow & Zimmermann (2004) who note there has been
some controversy about res movement, but, in their eyes, it’s safe, since the
syntax/semantics of focus requires the same “long” movement.
To answer the second question, whether we can compositionally interpret
structured LFs, we have to look a bit deeper into the theory. Consider
again the examples in (24). Strictly speaking, since the lf complements of
those beliefs are all of different types, the operators must be different as
well, which would be in accordance with the idea that the complementizer,
or, as we prefer it, the belief operator itself, is multiply ambiguous. We
should really distinguish all these bel’s, e.g. by superscripting the types of
its complements: bele×et in (24a) and bel(e×e)×eet in (24b). We have not
really introduced syntactic LFs, but we assume that their derivation involves
res movements so that they are isomorphic to these structured formulas.
To show how such LFs are compositionally interpretable as having relational
truth conditions, let me simply define the new structure sensitive bel items in
such a way that formulas containing them are just abbreviations of relational
lfs:
(25) If τ0 and τ1 are types s.t. τ0×τ1 is the type of a structured proposition
(cf. (23) and 2.B), then:
20Interestingly, although nowadays von Stechow (with Zimmermann in 2004) talks
about this old theory (Cresswell & von Stechow 1982; von Stechow 1982) in terms of
movement, the original ’82 papers avoid all mention of the words compositional and move-
ment (except for wh-movement).
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belτ0×τ1a ≡ λpτ×τ∃Reτt[R(a, (p)) ∧ bel∗aλx[((p))( ιyτ [R(x, y)])]]
More concretely, take (24a):
(26) Ellsworth thinks the prettiest girl might beat Arata
 bele×ete 〈a, λy[3[beat( ιx[prettiest(x)], y)]]〉 [≈(24a)]
≡ (λpe×et∃Reet[R(e, (p)) ∧ bel∗eλz[((p))( ιwe[R(z, w)])]])
〈a, λye[3[beat( ιxe[prettiest(x)], y)]]〉
≡ ∃Reet[R(e, a) ∧ bel∗eλze[(λye[3[beat( ιxe[prettiest(x)], y)]])
( ιwe[R(z, w)])]
≡ ∃Reet[R(e, a) ∧ bel∗eλze[3[beat( ιxe[prettiest(x)],
ιwe[R(z, w)])]]]
Simply applying the definition of bele×et from (25) we thus derive the result
that structured belief lfs (or LFs) can be seen as abbreviations of relational
truth conditions. This concludes the proof that the non-compositionality
is real, but can be relegated to syntax (res movements at LF): once we
have structured complements separating res and ascribed predicates we can
proceed compositionally, with just functional application. A disadvantage of
the approach may be the necessity of an infinitely ambiguous belief operator,
but accepting that, everything goes rather smoothly.
Of course, a new dimension of non-compositionality will be introduced
if we allow pragmatic binding of free variables in the context, as proposed
in 2.3.2. This really can’t be helped, but, as we have attempted to push
res movement into syntax, so we might also say that this new form of non-
compositionality belongs to pragmatics. Compositional semantics is saved by
two wastebaskets. In the next section we’ll first explore whether we can get
around the syntax/semantics compositionality issues. The pragmatic aspects
will investigated later.
2.3.4 Kaplan’s compositional alternative
Discussing the relational analysis just described, von Stechow & Zimmer-
mann (2004) conclude that, although such an account can give accurate
enough predictions, it is semantically and syntactically “much more com-
plicated” (p.3), requiring ad hoc transformations, which are at the root of
the “non-compositional” (p.15) nature of the analysis, further remarking
that “[l]inguists could object that ‘res movement’, i.e., the movement of
[the embedded subject] from the specifier position to the left boundary of
the sentence violates well-established locality restrictions and is not attested
elsewhere in syntax.” (p.3). For these reasons, they consider it time to in-
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vestigate the merits of an alternative account, one that has been circulating
in philosophical circles for decades, but has not been very popular in linguis-
tics, which is remarkable perhaps, for it certainly seems to beat the relational
analysis on compositionality by interpreting all res in situ. This section in-
troduces the compositional alternative, Kaplan’s (1989) so-called ‘Adding
“Says”’ analysis, as a further development of the Kaplanian two-dimensional
semantics.
In the final subsections of chapter 1 we compared the relational analy-
sis of belief to Kaplan’s (1989) two-dimensional analysis, according to which
the object of belief is (the diagonal of) a character. In 1.2.4.2 and 1.B we
followed Kaplan (1989:ch.XVII) in explicating belief as a relation between
individuals and characters, where characters were two-dimensional general-
izations of the notion of a proposition: a sentence’s character maps every
context of utterance to the proposition expressed in that context. Formally,
contexts function as a second semantic parameter, so that every expression
gets a denotation only with respect to a certain context and a possible world.
The idea behind Kaplan’s attitude semantics was that a character encodes
all the semantically relevant information carried by a sentence, and is thus
finegrained enough to analyze purely indexical distinctions. And that is
what’s needed for an analysis of mental content, because even if he’s skinny
and I’m skinny express the same proposition (in other words, if the distinction
is merely indexical, not truth-conditional, as when the first is uttered in a
mistaken self-identity scenario), the underlying (narrow) attitudes are quite
far apart. As for belief, it was shown in 1.2.4.3 that we can improve upon
Kaplan’s characterial belief, following common post-Kaplanian practice, by
restricting attention to diagonals. From appendix 1.B we now repeat the
diagonal version of Kaplan’s semantics of belief reports:
(27) Belief (diagonal version of Kaplan (1989:ch.XVII))
[≈(72), p. 69]
a. Syntax: If τ is a term and ϕ a formula, belτϕ is a formula
b. Model: BelC : D × I → ℘C
c. Semantics:
(i) \\ϕ\\f = δ JϕKf = {c ∈ C JϕKf,c〈wc,tc〉 = 1} [≈(70b), p. 69]
(ii) JbelτϕKf,ci = 1 iff \\ϕ\\f ⊇ BelC(JτKf,ci , i)
What would happen if we took this simple belief semantics as a semantics
for belief reports? Recall that for the relational framework such a move
worked reasonably well, the semantics of belief could be used immediately
as a semantics of belief reports. In 1.2.4.4 we examined how that framework
and Kaplan’s relate to each other with regard to belief and we concluded that
they had about the same empirical adequacy, so let’s follow the relational
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analysis’ lead and try to interpret (27) as a semantics of reports.
To see what happens, consider a report with an embedded indexical, like
me in (28) (represented as i in the lf):
(28) Arata thinks the dumbest girl can beat me
 belacan beat( ιx.dumbest(x), i)
Note the nicely compositional (in situ) interpretation of me, which contrasts
with the relational account that has to move it to the front of the embedded
clause first, as in (24). Following (27), we interpret the lf in (28) as in (30),
for which we first need to compute a diagonal, (29):
(29) \\can beat( ιx.dumbest(x), i)\\f
=
{
c ∈ C Jcan beat( ιx.dumbest(x), i)Kf,c〈wc,tc〉 = 1}
=
{
c ∈ C
〈J ιx.dumbest(x)Kf,c〈wc,tc〉 , JiKf,c〈wc,tc〉〉 ∈ Jcan beatKf,c〈wc,tc〉 = 1}
= the set of contexts whose agent can be beaten by the dumbest
girl of that context’s world and time
(30) J(28)Kf,ci = 1
iff \\can beat( ιx.dumbest(x), i)\\f ⊇ BelC(JaKf,ci , i)
iff in all of Arata’s belief alternatives the center can be beaten by
the dumbest girl
iff Arata believes: “I can be beaten by the dumbest girl”
This is definitely not a reading the sentence actually has, because in real life
me refers to the actual utterer, not to Arata (or the person she believes to
be, i.e. an agent of one of her belief alternatives). Moreover, this system-
atically incorrect prediction with respect to indexicals is not a result of the
post-Kaplanian shift from characters to diagonals, as the hardcore Kapla-
nian skeptic could verify, e.g. by replacing bel in (29)-(30) with say, the
strictly Kaplanian operator defined in (75bi), p. 70. It’s really the in situ
interpretation of belief-embedded terms that is wreaking havoc.
But Kaplan has a solution, based on the following reasoning: Indexicals
are rigid designators (“Principle 2” (Kaplan 1989:492), cf. 1.2.3.3), so their
reference cannot be shifted by natural language operators (“Fixity Thesis”
(Schlenker 2003:29), cf. 1.2.4.2), in other words, natural language operators
are at most intensional. This last constraint is often called “the prohibition
of monsters”, because Kaplan (1989:510) coined the term “monsters” for
characterial operators, i.e. operators, all too easily definable in his formal
system, that need more than their argument’s actual intensions to give an
output. In fact, the operator bel above is a good example of a monster,
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since it depends on the diagonal expressed by its argument, which is more,
or rather to some extent independent of the intension actually expressed.
Kaplan’s original indirect speech semantics, (72), p. 69, was even worse,
taking into account the argument’s entire character, modeling the reported
speech’s or attitude’s linguistic and/or cognitive significance.
It’s easily verified that a monster like bel indeed violates Principle 2;
we just saw how the diagonal shifts a bel embedded indexical’s reference
in the computation in (29). This is not yet a real problem, because Kaplan
only forbids monsters in natural language, not in the analysis of attitudes. In
fact, we were already looking for a different analysis of the linguistic operator
believes (that) because we just showed that it gives the wrong predictions, at
least for English reports with embedded indexicals. We have to come up with
a semantics where interpreting a complex formula at a context and an index
depends only on the intensions of the parts with respect to that same context.
To decide if (28) (Arata thinks that the dumbest can beat me) is true in c, we
should not have to look any deeper than at the proposition actually expressed
by the complement clause in c, which in this case is that the dumbest girl can
beat Emar. The characterial or diagonal sensitivity in the definition of belief,
(27), was meant to give the exact mode of presentation under which a belief
is held, so in an intensional system this will have to be abandoned, e.g. as
Kaplan suggests for indirect speech, by “quantifying away” the characterial
mode of presentation of the direct speech. In his own words, x says that . . .
is true iff:
∃c, C [c is a context ∧ C is a character ∧ x is the agent of c ∧
x direct-discourse-verb C at time t of c ∧ the content of C in c is
that. . . ]
[
(Kaplan 1989:554)
]
In other words, for a report to be true there has to be some character C
(of the original utterance) and context c (the original speech context) such
that C ∈ Say in c, and the original’s propositional content in its utterance
context (c) = the report complement’s propositional content in its utterance
context. The only level of content needed from the “. . . ”—the complement
of the indirect speech operator—is the proposition actually expressed by it.
The rest of the character of the complement is irrelevant; the requirement
that there is some original character (usually different from the complement’s
character because of speaker or time changes) that was directly said doesn’t
change that. For this reason, the prohibition on monsters is not violated,
and consequently Principle 2 is unharmed. In short, since the complement
is only evaluated in the actual report’s utterance context, any indexical in it
will receive its unshifted reference.
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In appendix 1.B.4 we formalize and extend this analysis of indirect dis-
course to belief reports. The main difference with the Kaplanian original
is that for belief, we argued in 1.2.4.3, full character would be overkill, we
are much better off using just diagonals, i.e. (27). In other words, we define
believing a character as self-ascribing the diagonal, which is further reducible
to the familiar Bel ⊆ δC. One consequence for the resulting report seman-
tics, constituting a major departure from Kaplan’s original sketch of indirect
discourse, is the fact that we now have a kind of inferential closure for belief
and thus for reports. In any case:
(31) Jbelthatτ ϕKf,ci = 1 iff there is a character C s.t. δC ⊇ BelC(JτKf,ci , i)
and JϕKf,c = C(〈JτKf,ci , ti, wi〉) [≈(75), p. 70]
Returning to our earlier example (28), it will become evident how (31)
achieves its goal: a semantics that can handle de re and de se belief reports
uniformly and in a non-monstrous way. Moreover we can keep the same
clean lf with the in situ indexicals, replacing only bel with belthat. Cru-
cially, computing the truth conditions according to (31) no longer requires
the computation of a diagonal or other monstrosities. To get at the truth
conditions, let’s assume that I now say (28) to you, i.e. ac = Emar, then the
Kaplanian analysis predicts:
(32) Jbelthata can beat( ιx.dumbest(x), i)Kf,ci = 1
iff there is a C s.t. δC ⊇ BelC(JaKf,ci , i) andJcan beat( ιx.dumbest(x), i)Kf,c = C(〈JaKf,ci , ti, wi〉)
iff there is a C s.t. δC ⊇ BelC(arata, i) and{
j
〈J ιx.dumbest(x)Kcj , JiKcj〉 ∈ I(can beat)(c)(j)}
= C(〈arata, ti, wi〉)
iff there is a C s.t. Arata self-ascribes δC in i, and C(〈arata, ti, wi〉)
= the proposition that the dumbest girl can beat Emar.
In the above example, the belief complement actually expresses the propo-
sition that Emar can be beaten by the dumbest girl, the report context is
the current index i with Arata as center, so C, the original thought can be
for instance the character of any sentence of the form the dumbest girl can
beat x, where x rigidly refers to Emar in Arata’s context. Even more con-
crete, (28) counts as a report of Arata’s sincere utterance of any of (33), even
though these sentences have very different characters and correspond to (are
expressions of) indexically distinct attitudes of Arata’s:
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(33) The dumbest girl can beat

you [addressing Emar]
that guy [pointing at Emar]
him [anaphoric to Emar]
Emar

Let us look at some more concrete predictions to see how far this theory
goes. In fact, let’s tackle our familiar test cases from 2.1. For the de dicto
report (1a) we get the following truth conditions:
(34) Ellsworth Kimmel believes pretty girls always win
[≈(1a), p. 72]
 belthate ∀x[pretty(x)→ win(x)] [≈(4)]J(34)Kf,ci = 1 iff [by (31)] there’s a C s.t. δC ⊇ BelC(ellsworth, i) andJ∀x[pretty(x)→ win(x)]Kf,c = C(〈ellsworth, ti, wi〉)
These truth conditions amount to saying that there is a character/utterance/
thought expressing a belief of Arata’s which has the same content as the re-
port complement, i.e. that all pretty girls win. Given that there are no
indexicals or other context dependent terms in there, the original utter-
ance/thought may well have been totally the same, characterially, (“Pretty
girls always win” or a translation thereof) though it need not be, since the
original’s full character is heavily underdetermined (a very important point
that shall be taken up later). One a priori problem of this underdetermi-
nation is that it is quite hard to prove that a report really is false, because
that’s a negative existential statement: there is no character that fulfills. . . .
In computing truth values, for now, we’ll focus on saying when and why some
reports are obviously true in some familiar contexts, by providing a verifying
character.
We want to compare the current theory’s predictions with those of the
rival (partial) accounts of the data represented in table 2.1, that is to say,
the scopal accounts of de dicto/de re in 2.2.1, the Kaplan (1969) account
of de re in 2.2.2, and the relational account of de re/de se reporting from
2.3.1. Thus, the contexts we are interested in are the by now familiar ones
from 2.1, A, B, and C, so in order to get concrete truth values to fill the
schema, let ca, the one uttering the report, be me, and let the time and
world of context c and index i be determined by the situations described
in A through C. For our first lf (34) that gives truth at A with verifying
character C1 = J∀x[pretty(x)→ win(x)]K. We want to get falsity for B and
C, and indeed C1’s diagonal is not self-ascribed in these contexts, so at least
that character won’t verify it. Whether there really is no verifying character
remains to be seen.
Next, the de re report:
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(35) Ellsworth believes of Arata that she’ll win
[≈(1b)]
 belthate win(a) [≈(5)+fn.3]J(35)Kf,ci = 1 iff there’s a C s.t. δC ⊇ BelC(ellsworth, i) andJwin(a)Kf,c = C(〈ellsworth, ti, wi〉)
Here, a is a rigid designator, but still not context dependent (let’s assume that
much). As a result, (35)’s truth conditions are fulfilled by C2 = Jwin(a)K, i.e.
in B, and by C3 = Jwin(i)K, in C. We leave A, where we hope to get falsity,
for later.
Thirdly, the de dicto/de re ambiguous report. First consider what hap-
pens on the most obvious lf, the one with an in situ definite description:
(36) Ellsworth believes the prettiest girl will win
[≈(2)]
 belthate win( ιx.prettiest(x)) [≈(13a)]
So construed, the report should be de dicto, and indeed, takingJbelthate win( ιx.prettiest(x))K for C4 will do the trick. For a de re lf we
have two options: scope out the description as in 2.2.1, or somehow rigidify
it. The result will be the same, but since Kaplan’s system introduces a spe-
cial operator, dthat, for rigidification, let’s see how that works. In 1.B we
defined dthat as follows:
(37) Jdthat Kf,ci = JKf,c〈wc,tc〉 [=(70a), p. 69]
Applied to the embedded description that makes:
(38) belthate win(dthat(
ιx.prettiest(x)))
And then:
J(38)Kf,ci = 1 iff there’s a C s.t. δC ⊇ BelC(ellsworth, i) and{
j ∈ I J ιx.prettiest(x)Kf,c〈wc,tc〉 ∈ JwinKf,cj } = C(〈ellsworth, ti, wi〉)
In other words, the prettiest is now evaluated only in the actual context, not
in subjective belief alternative indices, and therefore this lf is equivalent to
a wide scope one, and even, since in all of A through C Arata = Ellsworth
= the prettiest, to the one in (35).
Postponing the unambiguously pure de se report, let’s first deal with
the embedded co-referential pronoun, since that raises one of the issues Ka-
plan himself spends some time on, and which he considers one of the main
motivations for his report semantics:
100 Chapter 2. Attitude reports
(39) Ellsworth believes she’s going to win
[
=(3)
]
 belthate win(e)
This lf is satisfied iff Ellsworth believes some character that expresses the
proposition that Ellsworth, under whatever mode of presentation, will win.
In other words, the report is true if the reported belief were pure, 1st person
de se, i.e. C3 (“I am going to win”), but also if the belief were expressed
under a mere de re or intentional de se guise like C2 (“Arata will win”) or
“that woman [pointing at self on TV] will win” respectively. This means
that, just as on the relational account no ambiguity is needed to account
for the judgment that (39) is true in both pure (C) and impure (B) de se
scenarios. In this sense, both analyses offer a unified account of de se re-
ports, while still powerful enough to represent the distinct truth conditions
of the various types of real de re/de se beliefs. In the relational account we
distinguished the subtypes by classifying acquaintance relations (table 1.1,
p.54), an analogous classification here would require a typology of characters
or diagonals believed.
This smooth account of (39) however has an immediate drawback anal-
ogous to the one we encountered with the earlier unificatory proposal of re-
lational attitudes. Both unified accounts of de re/de se reports predict that
language does not distinguish between pure de se and other de re beliefs. In
the current system this is because a single lf is compatible with any mode of
presentation as long as the expressed proposition matches with the report’s
complement’s. This should come as no surprise for it’s very explicitly built
into Kaplan’s system by means of the prohibition on monsters, which, for-
mulated as a composition principle, says that the semantic value of a belief
report depends only on the intensions of its component parts (subject NP
and complement S). The problem then is, how can there be reports like (1c)
that are true only in pure de se scenarios? Let’s see what we really predict
for (1c). First of all, we mold it in the prescribed syntactic format by assum-
ing an (independently motivated) PRO as subject, which we then assume to
refer to the matrix subject, rigidly, just as in 2.3.1.
(40) Ellsworth believes PRO to be on the winning side
[
=(18)≈(1c)]
 belthate win(e)
I claim that this is the best we are going to get on a Kaplanian analysis.
Unfortunately it turns out to be the same lf as in (39), which won’t do,
because that one is compatible with any de re scenario, in particular one
where Ellsworth ascribes the winning to her mirror image that she doesn’t
recognize.
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As before we now gather the predictions discussed above and display
them in a table, 2.5, for comparison with our intuitions in table 2.1. I have
put question marks at all coordinates where we have not found verifying
characters representing modes of presentation occurring in the story contexts,
but we have not yet shown that there really aren’t any. The results so far
lf A. B. C.
(1a) (34) 1 ? ?
(2)
(36) 1 ? ?
(38) ? 1 1
(1b) (35) ? 1 1
(3) (39) ? 1 1
(1c) (40) ? 1 1
Table 2.5: Preliminary predictions of Kaplan’s (1989) ‘Adding “Says”’
(with tentative zeros at the question marked positions) coincide on the de
dicto/de re part with the analyses of 2.2, and on the de re/de se part with
the relational analysis of 2.3.1. The main problem already rearing its head
in this preliminary table is the pure de se report (1c), which however was
equally problematic for the relational analysis, so we’ll discuss that particular
problem and some solutions in 2.4.
2.3.5 Kaplan refuted
Both reductionist attempts, relational attitudes (with acquaintance rela-
tions) and Kaplan’s (1989) no-monster theory above, fail with respect to
pure de se reports, and more or less for the same reasons too. As for the
other belief reports discussed so far, the preliminary predictions coincide
as well. Theoretically, though, the Kaplanian character theory has the big
advantage of being fully compositional, whereas we saw in 2.3.3 that the rela-
tional analysis required syntactic and semantic complications (res movement,
structured propositions, infinitely ambiguous bel) making the whole thing
non-compositional. However, in the current section we’ll uncover major flaws
in the Kaplanian analysis, so the relational account eventually beats Kaplan
in the category ‘best unified de re/de se semantics of belief reports’.
2.3.5.1 Zeevat’s observation
One problematic prediction has been discussed by Schlenker (2003:43,104),
who calls it Zeevat’s observation, citing an earlier discussion about it by
Zimmermann (1991:206-7). A second, much graver issue is addressed by von
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Stechow & Zimmermann (2004). Their point is directly related to the diffi-
culty of proving that a report is false by the Kaplanian semantics, an issue
carefully sidestepped (cf. the question marks in table 2.5) until now. Be-
fore launching that more general attack, let’s reproduce Zeevat’s observation
about belief in contradictions.
First recap the discussion of Heimson in 1.2.3.2. One of the nice features
of Kaplan’s analysis of belief as characterial is that we can account for the
cognitive difference between the beliefs expressed by mad Heimson as:
(41) a. Heimson: “I am Hume.”
b. Heimson: “Heimson is Hume.”
The first is something he often says, for he is indeed insane, but the second
is different, Heimson would never say something like that, he is not logically
insane. Assuming direct reference of proper names to their bearers, and of the
first person pronoun to its utterer, we cannot distinguish the two utterances
in a merely intensional system, since they express the same proposition, viz.
that Heimson is Hume, i.e. ∅.
Kaplan’s solution to this was the notion of a character, for although both
are intensionally contradictory, the sentences do have distinct characters, of
which the first is non-empty. In fact, not even full characters are needed for
this solution, shifting the notion of a belief alternative from worlds or indices
to contexts will do, so the relational analysis of belief can handle it too:
Heimson believes de re of himself that he is Hume under acquaintance R =
λxλy[x = y] but not under λxλy[y is (called and known to x as) Heimson].
So much for Heimson’s belief, now for a report. On Kaplan’s theory the only
constraint on truthful reporting is conservation of the proposition expressed.
For example:
(42) Heimson believes he is Hume
 belthatheimsonheimson = humeJ(42)Kf,ci = 1 iff [by (31)] there is a C δC ⊇ BelC(heimson, i) and
C(〈heimson, ti, wi〉) = Jheimson = humeKf,c (= ∅)
So, (42) is true if we can find something that Heimson believes and that
actually expresses a contradiction. The character of I am Hume obviously
verifies these criteria, so (42) is true. No problem there, but it is easily
seen that the very same character verifies every report about Heimson whose
complement expresses a necessary falsehood, so, for example we incorrectly
predict that in the Heimson scenario, each of the reports in (43) are true.
Moreover, in a sense, they are true by virtue of the fact that Heimson self-
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ascribes the contingent/non-empty property of being Hume.
(43) Heimson believes

Heimson is Hume
he is Napoleon
Napoleon is Hume
0=1

In general, it’s a rather immediate consequence of the prohibition of monsters
that x believes that ϕ and x believes that ψ are truth-conditionally equivalent
whenever ϕ and ψ are (e.g. if both are contradictory).
So we’ve seen a case where the existential definition of belief reports turns
out to be too weak. This is partly due to an interaction between direct refer-
ence of proper names in possible worlds semantics, and omniscience problems
due to belief set closure properties. An important question now is, can part
of the reason we incorrectly predict truth in the Zeevat example lie in the fact
that it’s just too easy to find verifying characters? Are the two criteria given
in (31) enough to appropriately restrict the huge set of all characters, or is
the underspecification noted earlier getting out of hand? With this in mind,
we may begin to worry about the question marks in table 2.5. We placed
these question marks in cases where we wanted to get falsity, and where the
obvious candidate characters indeed fail, but where we have not yet proven
that no character will do.
2.3.5.2 Von Stechow & Zimmerman (2004): the fatal blow
To facilitate the (dis)proving of instances of the existential statement in (31),
our reconstruction of Kaplan’s ‘Adding “Says”’ for belief reports, we will
present von Stechow & Zimmermann’s (2004) proof of (44), a very interesting
theorem of the Kaplanian Logic of Demonstratives with Belief and Reports:
(44) If JϕKci = 1 then Jbelthatτ ϕKci = 1
A dramatic result with a simple proof based on the massive underspecification
of the believed character subsistent in the report semantics of (31).21
21This underspecification theorem is very close to an argument by Crimmins (1998:27)
who wants to show that “[a] semantic account of [diagonal propositions] seriously un-
derdetermines an account of [horizontal/intensional] content.” The reverse of this claim
would relate to the current issue of Kaplanian belief reports, because there the search for
a verifying character is constrained only horizontally by the intension of the complement,
and diagonally by the belief set of the subject. So let’s translate Crimmins’ (1998:fn.20)
argument to our Kaplanian framework:
(i) If M |=c ϕ and M |=c ψ, then there is χ s.t. \\χ\\ = \\ϕ\\ and JχKc = JψKc
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proof Assume JϕKci = 1. Let d = 〈JτKci , ti, wi〉 ∈ C. We build a verifying
character D for the report as follows: (i) for all j ∈ I, set D(d)(j) =JϕKcj; (ii) for all other context-index pairs 〈c′, j′〉 (i.e. those with c′ 6=
d) set D(c′)(j′) = 1, so that immediately all contexts besides d are
trivially in the diagonal of D. In fact, even D(d)(〈wd, td〉) = [by (i)] =JϕKc〈wd,td〉 = [by definition of d] = JϕKc〈wi,ti〉 = JϕKci = [ex hypothesi] = 1,
so d is also in D’s diagonal. So, δD = C ⊇ BelC(JτKci , i). Also, by (i)
and definition of d, JϕKc = D(〈JτKci , ti, wi〉), so by (31) Jbelthatτ ϕKci = 1.
QED.22
Everything that happens to be true is believed by everyone? That’s in-
finitely worse than classical omniscience, i.e. the prediction that everybody
knows all logical truths. Obviously, semantic predictions will be way too
weak. Returning to the test cases we’ve been considering throughout the
chapter, let’s assume that in all of A, B and C all the belief complements are
actually true. This won’t change the intuitions of table 2.1, nor any predic-
tions of earlier theories, especially since the belief complements in question
are all in future tense, so their actual truth value should have even less of
an effect on the reported beliefs’. Consequently, applying (44), we’d get all
1’s for the question marks in table 2.5, forcing us to discard the Kaplanian
semantics of belief reports.
How did this happen? Well, the construction of the verifying C uti-
lizes the underspecification of believed character by the report’s horizontal
intension and diagonal belief, worsened by the logical closure intrinsic to
the classical use of belief sets in the analysis of the latter. Von Stechow &
Zimmermann consider and reject two tentative solutions to the underspeci-
fication problem. First, we could give up the reduction of characterial belief
to diagonal self-ascription, thus getting rid of the fact that the set of believed
characters is closed under ‘diagonal supersets’. Second, we could try adding
a restriction on the domain of quantification over characters, in particular,
proof Take χ = anϕ ∧ (anψ → ψ) and use the following facts provable in Kaplan’s
logic (Appendix 1.B, a = actually, n = now): if ϕ and ψ are true in c, JanϕKc =JanψKc = I; and \\an . . . \\ = \\ . . . \\.
Von Stechow and Zimmermann’s proof exploits the same peculiarity of the system: an
arbitrary diagonal and horizontal proposition can always be unified in one character as
long as they agree in the actual context and actual index (for that’s where they intersect).
The added feature here is that it gives a recipe for building a formula expressing the
appropriate character. This aspect will be mimicked in the proof of the strengthened
version (81a) below.
22In addition to (44), we get from this proof that, if JϕKci = 0 and 〈JτKci , ti, wi〉 6∈
BelC(JτKci , i), then too Jbelthatτ ϕKci = 1.
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we’ll consider restrictions to linguistically expressible characters, and to vivid
ones.
To start with the discussion about diagonals versus full characters as
models of belief. In our reconstruction of Kaplanian belief logic in 1.2.4.3
and 1.B.4 we argued that the cognitive significance of belief resides solely
in the character’s diagonal. Thus, we molded Kaplan’s indirect discourse
analysis into a diagonal-based belief semantics, with belief sets as sets of belief
alternative contexts, BelC, by means of the following meaning postulate:
(45) C ∈ BelChar(a, i) iff δC ⊇ BelC(a, i) [≈(74), p. 70]
Let’s say we give up (45) and take BelChar as a primitive in the definition of
belief:
(46) Characterial belief:
[≈(72), p. 69]
a. Model: BelChar : D × I → ℘[C → [I → {0, 1}]]
b. Semantics: JbelτϕKf,ci = 1 iff JϕKf ∈ BelChar(JτKf,ci , i)
In doing so we get rid of the bug/feature that believing a character automat-
ically implies believing every other character whose diagonal is a superset
of the first character’s diagonal. Consequently, we no longer predict that
diagonally tautological characters, like the one constructed in the proof, are
necessarily believed by the subject. Problem solved? Perhaps, but at what
cost? A closer look reveals that this move amounts to giving up an essential
distinction between indirect speech (75bi), p. 70, and belief reports (75bii).
It thus constitutes a rather drastic shift towards sententialism, severely ham-
pering the logic of belief, as witness the immediate loss of all general princi-
ples of rationality, like if x believes ϕ and also believes ψ, then she believes
ϕ ∧ ψ.23 For reasons discussed a bit in 1.1.2 we will shy away from senten-
tialism, preferring a more semantic account with possible worlds or contexts
modeling belief alternatives. Besides getting a questionable logic of belief
(that may or may not be remedied by independent logical tools) and a less
attractive conceptual basis, we lose all other benefits of the reduction to di-
agonals enumerated in 1.2.4.3. In short, for reasons elaborated upon in that
section and more generally in 1.1.2.2, I oppose to this type of sentential-
23It may be possible to reintroduce some of these principles to the logic, without falling
back into the full logical closure that we started out with, and/or we may resort to other
logical tricks, familiar from doxastic logic, to block various kinds of omniscience properties
of belief (impossible worlds, awareness logic, compartmentalized minds etc., cf. 1.1.2.3).
However, all of this is independent of the issue at hand; back in chapter 1 we argued already
that omniscience is a problem, but one that concerns the logic of belief independently, so
we were going to refrain from building anti-omniscience machinery into our logic.
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ism, maintaining—with von Stechow & Zimmermann (2004) and most other
semanticists working in the tradition started by Kripke, Lewis, Stalnaker,
Montague and others—that, for the purpose of an empirically adequate re-
port semantics, we better stick to the pure possible world/context analysis
and, in this case, the consequent reduction of characters, via diagonals, to
Lewisian properties. Admittedly, a semantic treatment of belief with possible
worlds necessarily results in some logical omniscience, which may have to be
addressed at some point, but as we’d agreed before, not here. Besides, the
problem facing Kaplan goes beyond logical omniscience: it’s a consequence of
the particular underspecification intrinsic to the belief report generalization
of ‘Adding “Says”’.
The second attempt at fixing the Kaplanian semantics was to add restric-
tions on the characterial quantification. Still inspired by Kaplan’s analysis of
indirect speech, von Stechow & Zimmermann (2004) propose a restriction in
Kaplan’s belief semantics to characters “expressible in the language spoken
by the subject” (p.13), by which they mean that a believed character must
not only have the diagonal self-ascribed, but it must also be the character of
an (English) sentence that the subject might have uttered or entertained as
a thought.
(47) C ∈ BelChar(a, i) iff there is a sentence with character C in a’s lan-
guage in i and δC ⊇ BelC(a, i)
so JbelτϕKf,ci = 1 iff there is a sentence with character JϕKf inJτKf,ci ’s language in i and \\ϕ\\f ⊇ BelC(JτKf,ci , i)
Using that, we get the following for reports:
(48) Jbelthatτ ϕKf,ci = 1 iff there is a sentence with character C inJτKf,ci ’s language in i and δC ⊇ BelC(JτKf,ci , i) and JϕKf,c =
C(
〈JτKf,ci , ti, wi〉)
This, again, brings a form of sententialism into the belief semantics, but
perhaps an acceptable one, at least by von Stechow’s and Zimmermann’s
standards, so let’s try it on.24 It was hoped that this would block the very
24The argument for diagonals, against characters, in chapter 1 only applies to belief,
so the expressibility condition will definitely be acceptable if we leave it outside the logic
of belief and just put it in the report semantics, i.e.:
(i) a. JbelτϕKf,ci = 1 iff \\ϕ\\f ⊇ BelC(JτKf,ci , i)
b. Jbelthatτ ϕKf,ci = 1 iff there is a sentence in JτKf,ci ’s language at i with character
C and δC ⊇ BelC(JτKf,ci , i) and JϕKf,c = C(〈JτKf,ci , ti, wi〉)
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artificially constructed, abstract, near tautological character that was used as
witness in the proof of (44). Indeed the restriction seems quite heavy, and in
fact it excludes most characters, because our formal (and natural) languages
are but countably infinite so there are only countably many expressible char-
acters, whereas time is often assumed to be uncountable (modeled as real
numbers in physics), so the set of contexts and thus the set of characters
must also be uncountable.
However, as pointed out by von Stechow & Zimmermann (2004) crediting
Philippe Schlenker (p.c.), a restriction to expressible characters is not enough.
We can still prove the following special case of (44):
(49) If M |=c win(a) and win(a) ∨ ¬anwin(a) is expressible in JeKc〈wc,tc〉’s
language in c, then M |=c belthate win(a)
proof The proof consists in showing that Jwin(a) ∨ ¬anwin(a)K is a verify-
ing character for the belief report. That it is then also an expressible
character follows from the premises, which are easily fulfilled, given that
the logical form of Either Arata will win, or it’s not actually (now) the
case that she will, for many English speakers, is win(a) ∨ ¬anwin(a).
So, assume M |=c win(a), and let D = Jwin(a) ∨ ¬anwin(a)K and
d = 〈ellsworth, tc, wc〉. With expressibility out of the way, we check
the other two criteria:
• δD =
{
c′ ∈ C Jwin(a) ∨ ¬anwin(a)Kc′〈wc′ ,tc′ 〉 = 1}
=
{
c′ ∈ C Jwin(a)Kc′〈wc′ ,tc′ 〉 = 1 or Janwin(a)Kc′〈wc′ ,tc′ 〉 = 0}
=
{
c′ ∈ C Jwin(a)Kc′〈wc′ ,tc′ 〉 = 1 or Jwin(a)Kc′〈wc′ ,tc′ 〉 = 0}
= C ⊇ BelC(ellsworth, 〈wc, tc〉);
• D(d) = D(〈ellsworth, tc, wc〉)
= Jwin(a) ∨ ¬anwin(a)K (〈ellsworth, tc, wc〉)
= [no person indexicals] = Jwin(a) ∨ ¬anwin(a)K (c)
=
{
j ∈ I Jwin(a)Kcj = 1 or Janwin(a)Kcj = 0}
Otherwise, as we take it in (47), i.e. construed as a principle of belief, it may still make
sense, but then it cannot be a merely characterial restriction, i.e. in order to have any effect,
it must constitute a restriction on diagonals, since belief was argued in 1.2.4.3 to depend
only on diagonals. From the cardinality argument above (there are more characters than
formulas and sentences) and the fact that there are as many diagonals as full characters,
it follows that the expressibility restriction in the semantics proposed in (47) is so strong
that it will indeed restrict diagonals. Even if this is a big step towards sententialism,
it’s still defensible as it doesn’t mean we have to rely on non-diagonal points of believed
characters.
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=
{
j ∈ I Jwin(a)Kcj = 1} ∪ {j ∈ I Jwin(a)Kc〈wc,tc〉 = 0}
= [ex hypothesi] = Jwin(a)K (c) ∪ ∅ = Jwin(a)Kc
So, Jbelthate win(a)Kc〈wc,tc〉 = 1 QED
In general, Schlenker’s argument shows that any sentence without person
indexicals that is part of someone’s language and that is actually true, is
therefore believed by that subject. In particular, it helps us find express-
ible verifiers for all the question marked positions in table 2.5. In other
words, even with the significant restriction of expressibility, we cannot ex-
clude enough unwanted verifying characters to save the Kaplanian analysis
of belief.
Finally, von Stechow & Zimmermann (2004) mention a suggestion of Uli
Sauerland’s (p.c.) to exclude characters like those constructed according to
the recipe in the previous proof, on grounds of their lack of vividness a` la
Kaplan (1969). To counter this last attempt to repair Kaplanian report
semantics, let us briefly consider what a vividness restriction in belief would
amount to.
First note that, for Kaplan and the later development of vivid names into
acquaintance relations, vividness was really a relation between the belief’s
subject and a res. If we want to use that, we need something like structured
propositions and res movement to keep the dictum and the res apart and
we end up with something quite like the relational analysis, with all distin-
guishing non-compositional aspects. Evidently, a different type of vividness
is intended.
If vividness is to work within Kaplan’s compositional framework, it should
apply to whole sentence characters: Jbelthatτ ϕKf,ci = 1 iff there is a vivid char-
acter C s.t. δC ⊇. . . . But a character is not vivid per se, it can only be vivid
for a certain individual at a certain index. Among the characters, or rather,
diagonals, that an individual believes, there are certain vivid ones, and we can
take only those as verifiers. Presumably, Schlenker’s Jwin(a) ∨ ¬anwin(a)K
is not vivid here. Since the vividness restriction is built into belief, it’s really
only the diagonal that counts, so, it follows that in this case, the tautology is
not vivid. Apparently, the vividly believed propositions form a subset that
is not closed under logical consequence/superset. It seems we have slowly
drifted into something akin to awareness logic (cf. discussion in 1.1.2.3),
combating the underspecification problem with quite heavy anti-omniscience
machinery, which we intended to steer clear of. Besides a commitment to
a conceptually dubious and often criticized split between explicit and im-
plicit belief, we might ask if a mere set of contexts is enough information
to decide whether or not it constitutes a vivid diagonal. Or should we give
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up our adherence to diagonals and go sentential, thus combining a couple of
the strategies discussed above, as in true reports require a character that’s
expressible with a sentence vivid in the subject’s mind or something?
Instead of resorting to sententialism, I would sooner try to go contextual,
by analogy with the suggestions in 2.3.2: A report is true in a context iff
that context provides a (vivid, expressible) character C s.t.. . . . It seems not
quite reasonable to assume that contexts like our test cases A, B, and C
do not provide as salient characters the near-tautological concoctions of the
two above proofs, thus blocking all the unwanted predictions. On the other
hand, it remains to be made precise how such contexts sometimes can provide
verifying characters for the points where we do want them (cf. the 1’s in
table 2.5). And here, the differences between the relational and characterial
analyses of attitudes, as described back in 1.2.4.4, become crucial. Remember
that the main theoretical difference was pinpointed in the analysis of the wide,
‘in the world’ aspect of content: in the relational account the res and the
relation of acquaintance linking the believer and res are to be found in the
actual world; in Kaplan’s theory it’s a sentential character that is sought.
Moving to report semantics this meant we were able to contextualize the
relational account by shifting the wide part, there is an R s.t. R(a, b) and. . . ,
into the context: the context provides an R with R(a, b), and. . . . What this
means is that, prior to an utterance of a de re report, a suitable relation
of acquaintance has to have been established in the context (≈ common
ground). Thus given a res and acquaintance relation, the new information
carried by the report merely consists in the assertion that a believes that it
(the res as represented to a via R) has the property predicated in the report’s
complement clause.
Now see what happens if we try and apply the same trick of contextualiza-
tion to Kaplan: there is a character C s.t.. . . becomes the context provides
a character C s.t.. . . , meaning that by the time the report gets interpreted
by the hearer the characterial mode of presentation of the reported belief
should already be old news, just as res and acquaintance are assumed given
in the contextualized relational analysis. But then what new information can
the report’s utterance bring? Given the characterial mode of presentation
(C), the speaker (a), and the evaluation parameters (c and i), the report
cannot tell us anything we don’t already know, for in that case the comple-
ment’s content is already fully recoverable (cf. JϕKf,c = C(〈a, ti, wi〉) from
(31)). Note that it’s exactly the res movement separating believed predicate
and res and thereby making the relational account non-compositional, that is
here turned into a virtue by allowing a sensible contextualization. Thus, I’m
even tempted to say that it’s precisely Kaplan’s compositional interpretation
of report complements that causes its downfall. From now on, we’ll focus on
110 Chapter 2. Attitude reports
the relational analysis and take that as the starting point for a truly dynamic
account of belief reports in chapter 3
2.4 Anti-reductionism and pure de se sepa-
ratism
Over the previous sections we have reviewed and tested some accounts of
belief reports, covering various parts of the de dicto - de re - de se spectrum.
For the first half of our test schema in table 2.1, de dicto and de re, we were
able to match our semantic judgments quite accurately with simple scope, or
with Kaplan’s (1969) reduction of de re as de dicto under a vivid name. With
Cresswell & von Stechow’s (1982) Lewis-inspired generalization, we extended
that to cover the whole de re/de se area. Doing so, we got a nice unified
account of de re/de se in accordance with the arguments in chapter 1 that
established that de se is but a special case of de re. An immediate bonus
of the unification is the account of Arata believes that she will win as com-
patible with various de re scenarios, from pure de se (Arata: “I am going to
win”) to mere de re (Arata (with amnesia): “Arata will win”). The theory of
relational attitudes achieves this by stipulating that English reports are un-
derspecified for mode of presentation of the reported belief. The same is true
for Kaplan’s compositional, but on closer examination fundamentally flawed,
two-dimensional analysis of belief reports. There, the so-called prohibition
of monsters implies a necessary underspecification of reports in natural lan-
guage. Because of this underspecification, both analyses fail with respect to
(1c), a report that is only true for a first person de se belief.
In this section we focus on the remaining problems in the de re/de se do-
main. In particular, we review the arguments for and against the unification
of de re/de se. We start with Chierchia (1989), who argues for a semantic
ambiguity between de re and pure de se logical forms, on the basis of the
infinitive and gerund data that the relational and non-monstrous character
analyses can’t handle. In reaction, Zimmermann (1991) analyses the same
pure de se data by means of a different, less pervasive ambiguity, thus creat-
ing a kind of hybrid theory, with a Chierchia-inspired separate lf for infinitival
complement constructions, while following Kaplan (1989) (and the relational
analysis) in not admitting an ambiguity in the embedded coreferential pro-
noun cases. Meanwhile, Chierchia’s other arguments for the ambiguity, based
on abstract anaphora and elided (ambiguous) belief reports, are attacked by
Reinhart (1990), who argues directly against Chierchia and in favor of a vari-
ant of the relational analysis. The data, arguments and analyses originating
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in Chierchia’s work will be discussed in 2.4.1.
In the realm of quantified belief reports there have also been arguments
for and against de se separatism. In 2.4.2 we first present Zimmermann’s
observation about everybody believes that . . . , which points in the direction
of a unified account like the relational analysis. On the other hand, Percus
& Sauerland’s (2003a) arguably quantificational only x believes that . . . da-
tum is meant to support Chierchia’s ambiguity thesis. In this connection we
also reheat the discussion about contextualism of acquaintance, as addressed
already in 2.3.2.1, because whether and how acquaintance relations are them-
selves quantified over at lf or contextually given, will affect the interpretation
of these explicitly quantified data.
Meanwhile, Schlenker (1999; 2003) launches yet another attack on the
classical theories by first adding to Chierchia’s infinitives and gerunds more
examples of reports that retain a certain pure de se perspective from the
original belief (e.g. logophoric pronouns in Ewe and Bafut). In addition, he
discusses examples of shifted indexicals in belief reports and (free) indirect
discourse. Shifted indexicals are indexicals that directly violate Kaplan’s
(1989) Principle 2 and thus his prohibition of monsters, in other words, their
reference is not fixed by the actual speech act but shifted by a (monstrous)
operator. As Schlenker points out, these monstrously shifted indexicals occur
systematically in attitude and speech reports in some languages. He shows for
example that the first person pronoun of Amharic, which is just as indexical
as English ‘I’, can be interpreted as shifted by attitude verbs, something
explicitly ruled out by Kaplanian and relational analyses:
(50) John says that I am a hero
[
Pseudo-Amharic, (Schlenker 2003)
]
‘John says that he’s a hero’
Schlenker proposes an account that treats all attitude reporting operators
as quantifiers over contexts, i.e. monsters. This leaves a lot of work to be
done to derive the old-fashioned Kaplanian English cases. In 2.4.3 we discuss
Schlenker’s system(s) and the relationships with our earlier accounts of de
re/de se reporting.
Schlenker’s rejection of the Kaplanian analysis (and consequently its sis-
ter, the relational account) has stirred up quite some discussion and this time
it’s von Stechow (2002) who steps up to defend (what he calls) the classical
theory, employing a mechanism of feature deletion to enforce bound-variable
interpretations for embedded pronouns and other (apparent) indexicals. In
2.4.3.5 we set out to compare this reaction with its direct rival and the earlier
accounts.
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2.4.1 Pure de se reports
As we have seen, both unified accounts of de re/de se predict that reports
do not and cannot convey purely indexical distinctions. In other words,
the exact mode of presentation (be it acquaintance relation or character) of
the original thought gets lost upon reporting. This section discusses some
constructions in English that contradict that prediction and thus undermine
the unified accounts. In each case, we arguably have a belief or other attitude
reporting construction that unambiguously reports a pure de se attitude. We
also look at the alternative theories that have been proposed in light of these
data.
2.4.1.1 Indirect reflexives and he?
The claim that English belief reports can distinguish between general de re
and pure de se can be traced back at least to Geach (1957) who considers
the contrast between:
(51) a. Philip [. . . ] believes that Philip’s worst enemy is dead
b. ??Philip [. . . ] believes that he himself is dead
[
(Geach 1957:129)
]25
Geach remarks that these are not equivalent, because unlike (51b), (51a) may
have a true reading, for instance if Philip is his own worst enemy though he
does not realize that.26 He analyses (51b) as “containing what classical gram-
marians call an indirect reflexive pronoun”, viz. he himself, which serves as
“an oratio obliqua proxy for the first-person pronoun of oratio recta” (Geach
1957:129). Apparently, according to Geach’s intuitions, reports with reflex-
ives as in (51b) are only true if the reported thought is first person, in this
case the absurd “I am dead.” This observation contradicts our unified anal-
yses of de re/de se that predict underspecification with regard to the mode
of presentation for all reports.
Castan˜eda (1966) takes up the study of de re/de se reporting, arguing
for an enrichment of the logical language used in semantics to capture the
distinction between pure de se and general de re reports. In particular, he
introduces the term he? that does exactly what Geach claimed about he
himself, so:27
25For reasons that do not concern us here, Geach’s original examples had the more
complex (yet in the crucial case coreferential) Philip’s worst enemy as matrix subject.
26The distinction is independent of a de dicto/de re ambiguity in (51a), because even
on the de re reading, with singular proposition as complement, the fact remains that it
has this true reading of mistaken self-identity.
27The existence of a dedicated pure de se pronoun gives rise to the question whether
there are any languages that grammaticalize intentional de se reports? Or just non-first
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(52) a. JAvis thought that she was looking goodK = 1
iff Avis expressed the proposition that Avis is looking good,
e.g. in cases like:
- Avis: “I look good”
- Avis [pointing to photo of herself]: “She’s pretty”
- Avis, with amnesia: “Avis Fish is looking good”
b. JAvis thought that she? was looking goodK = 1
iff Avis: “I look good”
Castan˜eda calls the starred, pure de se reporting pronoun of (52b) a quasi-
indicator (other names sometimes used to capture this semantic property
include de se pronouns or logophoric pronouns, but we’ll discuss that last
term in depth in 2.4.1.2). By definition, quasi-indicators convey the first
person perspective in a report and therefore the classic theories of unified de
re/de se will deny that he? has a counterpart in natural language. However,
Castan˜eda himself seems to suggest that English (he) himself when it occurs
as subject of a report complement, is just that, a quasi-indicator, which is
exactly what Geach (1957) had claimed before him. It’s debatable whether
he himself has a truly distinct indirect reflexive (aka long distance reflexive)
person de se? Or de hic, or even de re non-de se? Given the division of pragmatic labor
(marked forms ↔ marked meanings), you might even expect there to be a he?? for:
(i) JAvis thought that she?? was looking goodK = 1
iff Avis expressed the proposition that Avis is looking good, without referring
to herself in the first person, e.g. by thinking: “She’s pretty” while looking
at a photo of herself.
For it’s obvious that the pure de se reading is the unmarked meaning of English coref-
erential reports, i.e. of the form NPi believes that NPi VP. Wouldn’t it be cheaper to
have a special construction dedicated to the marked meaning? I guess the marginality
of coreferential impure reports (mistaken self-identity) would provide a negative answer
there. But still, assuming Castan˜eda and Geach are right about the existence of he? and
not he?? in the (English) lexicon, we’d expect a pragmatic shift in meaning for the general
de re/de se pronoun to take on the leftover meaning, i.e. impure de re/de se (compare it
with the classic lexical pragmatics example of cause to die taking on the marked, indirect
meaning in view of the lighter alternative kill, though I can’t really say which of he and he?
should be considered the lighter form). In English this pragmatic prediction is not borne
out at all, there’s not the slightest hint of impure de se if a reporter just uses a regular
coreferential pronoun instead of a he? or he himself, unless the context very explicitly sets
it up (and even then its reportedly hard to get). However, in some African languages with
so-called logophoric pronouns (≈ he?, see below in 2.4.1.2), it has been noted that the
non-logophoric third person pronominal forms take on an anti-logophoric meaning (≈ ev-
erything but pure de se) (Schlenker p.c.). Unfortunately, but for Kusumoto’s (55b) below,
the typological literature shows only anti-logophoric pronouns not interpreted coreferen-
tially with the matrix subject at all, so more empirical evidence is needed.
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use, and if so, whether indirect reflexives (including the ones in Ancient Greek
and Latin) really are quasi-indicators, semantically.
Schlenker (2003:59), citing a discussion by Clements (1975), notes that
the classical reflexives and he himself differ at least in one important respect
from he?, viz. their distribution: English he himself, Latin se, and Greek
heautos also occur as so-called direct reflexives, i.e. bound by c-commanding
antecedent, whereas he?, by definition, grammaticalizes the role of quasi-
indicator unambiguously and can therefore never occur outside an indirect
discourse complement. The question remains whether, assuming the direct
and indirect uses are really distinct and separable, the indirect one is a quasi-
indicator. Also, it seems that Anscombe’s (1975) remark about Ancient
Greek cannot be so easily discarded, since the rare forms she quotes as natural
language instantiations of he?, viz. hoi, he and hou, are only allowed in report
complements, so there it appears there are dedicated indirect reflexives.
To settle the matter of whether indirect reflexives are really quasi-
indicators we need to look at reports of mistaken self-identity with mirrors
or the like. For English he himself we can ask native speakers, but unfor-
tunately, judgments are not clear. On the side of Geach and Castan˜eda
(a nonnative English speaker) we have, for instance, Sells (1987), Chierchia
(1989), Reinhart (1990) and Atlas (p.c., to appear). To maintain such a
position we need to distinguish the direct and indirect reflexive he himself
from a third, focus related usage of he himself to signal contrast or emphasis.
Atlas, for instance, claims that a phonetically unstressed himself in American
English is truly quasi-indexical. The data appear to be something like:
(53) Looking at a photo in a portfolio, Avis Fish, a really bitchy Amer-
ica’s Next Topmodel28 judge, says: “Who’s that? She looks awful”.
What she didn’t know was that she was actually pointing at a rather
unflattering picture of herself, so it seems that, despite her apparent
self-confidence Avis actually believed that

she
she herself
?she herself
*she?
 looked
awful.
For the classical indirect reflexives it’s even harder to find hard evidence.
Descriptive grammars are inconclusive but the literature contains some sug-
gestive evidence for the claim that indirect reflexives are quasi-indexicals.
Consider for instance the following quote from a study about reflexives in
the New Testament, immediately following an almost complete list of the
28http://www.upn.com/shows/top model/
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indirectly reflexive occurrences of heautos:
What distinguishes these examples from others where the reflex-
ive is not used in the embedded clause is that these verbs all
indicate either the thought or the expression of the subject. Such
verbs may be called “logophoric.” We may therefore provision-
ally propose that when a complement clause of a logophoric verb
contains a pronoun which is co-referent with the subject of the
logophoric verb, the pronoun will be reflexive even if it is not
co-referent with anything in its own clause. Such pronouns may
be also called “logophoric.”
[
(Tiller 2001:53)
]
In other words, indirect reflexives are logophors, which means they only occur
in reports that represent the subject’s thought or words. After looking at
some remaining examples the definition of logophoricity is made more precise
by, among other things, the following:
A logophoric verb is a verb of saying or thinking that takes a
complement clause which contains the thought or expression of
the subject. [. . . ] a logophoric verb must portray the thought as
consciously present to the mind of the thinker.
[
(Tiller 2001:55)
]
Does the belief complement in (53), that she [herself ] looked awful represent
“the thought or expression of the subject [. . . ] as consciously present to the
mind of the thinker”, i.e. Avis? No; Avis is brimming with self-confidence
and the thought of looking awful herself would never cross her mind. If this
is correct, the Greek indirect uses of reflexives are indeed quasi-indexicals,
which concludes a demonstration of the inadequacy of de re/de se unifica-
tions that predict a total underspecification of the original thought’s mode
of presentation.
2.4.1.2 Logophors
In the previous subsection we introduced the concept of logophoricity in
relation to indirect reflexives. It was claimed that indirect reflexives are
logophoric and logophoricity was defined, a bit vaguely, as reporting the con-
scious thought or utterance of a subject. There seems to be a connection
between the notions of logophoricity and quasi-indexicality, which had gone
unnoticed until Schlenker (1999) (crediting Heim’s 1991 classnotes) equated
them. To reach his conclusion, that logophoric pronouns are natural lan-
guage instantiations of he?, Schlenker uses the definition of logophoricity by
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Clements (1975) with data from Ewe29, Gokana30 and Bafut31.
A typical example of logophoric vs. anaphoric/deictic reference:
(54) a. kofi
Kofi
be
say
ye`
LOG
-dzo
-leave
‘Kofii said that hei/∗j left’
b. kofi
Kofi
be
say
e
3.sg
-dzo
-leave
‘Kofii said that hej left’
32 [Ewe (Clements 1975:142)]
Apparently, the logophoric pronoun (LOG) is used to signal co-reference
between matrix and embedded subjects. Additionally, logophors only occur
in report contexts, and must reflect the reported thought from the point of
view of the thought’s subject. These three criteria, according to Schlenker
(2003:59), make logophoricity “remarkably similar” to quasi-indexicality as
defined by Castan˜eda. The decisive data, infelicity of LOG in mistaken self-
identity reports, were provided later by Kusumoto (1998):
(55) John is looking at a mirror from a distance and sees a man in the
mirror. He notices that the man’s pants are on fire. In fact, the man
he sees in the mirror is John himself, but he doesn’t realize it.
a. John believes that his pants are on fire
b. John
John
wa`?a`tk
thinks
mk
that
*yu/a`
*LOG/he
ka´
FUT
khi
burn
‘John thinks that he’s going to get burnt’[
Bafut (Kusumoto 1998)
]
It seems clear then that logophors really are the natural language counter-
parts of he?, matching in semantic (co-referent with matrix subject, reporting
pure de se thoughts of that subject), syntactic (occur only in report contexts),
and morphological properties (3rd person). Their peculiar semantic property
of unambiguously reporting the thought as perceived from the point of view
of the subject, i.e. purely de se, was a crucial part of the evidence that led
Schlenker to denounce Kaplan’s analysis and replace it with a system that
treats attitude operators as genuine monsters.
29A language spoken in Ghana and Togo by approximately three million people
30A language spoken in Nigeria
31A Bantu language of Cameroon
32Usually, in such examples, j 6= i, but this need not always be the case, as (55b)
shows. On the other hand, some schools view these subscripted indices merely as indicators
of syntactic binding, in which case you’d probably say that the indices here are always
distinct, but (pragmasemantically) coreference might still occur (as accidental coreference,
(Lasnik 1976)).
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However, let me point out some qualifications to Schlenker’s claim. First,
as for logophors only occurring in attitude or speech reports, consider:
(56) ãevi
child
-a
-D
xO
receive
tohehe
punishment
be
so that
ye`
LOG
-a
-T
-ga
-P
-da
-tell
alakpa
lie
ake
again
o
NEG
‘the childi received punishment so that hei wouldn’t tell lies again’[
Ewe (Clements 1975:160-1)
]
According to Clements the logophor here suggests that “the child voluntarily
received punishment, in the belief that this would cure him of his untruthful-
ness” (p.161), i.e. it indicates that the second clause, describing the purpose
of the punishment, is to be understood from the child’s point of view. So, in
a way, the logophor does represent the antecedent’s subjective point of view
here, but there is no indirect discourse embedding to be found, contradicting
many a theory of logophoricity.
Second, the first person point of view criterion, exemplified by (54)
and (55b) and perhaps still satisfied on a vague, implicit level in (56), is
too strict. This is shown in (57) where the reported speech seems to have
been second rather than first person:
(57) a`mı˜
I
lama´
tell
go´spel
Gospel
kO
COMP
m
COMP
-E`
-3
-dO`
-fall
-E`
-LOG
‘I told Gospeli that hei fell.’
[
Eleme (Bond 2004:7)
]
Obviously, this is a reports of the matrix subject saying: “You fell.” Besides
reporting a non-first person thought, it is (therefore) also a report about the
reporter’s own speech, not Gospel’s, who is the antecedents of the logophor.
Let me immediately point out that, interestingly, the data are not uniform
with respect to allowing second person speech to be reported with logophors,
even among closely related languages:33
(58) *mm`
I
kO´
said
nE`
give
le´ba`re`
Lebare
kO
that
ae`
he
dO
fell
-E`
-LOG
‘I said to Lebarei that hei fell.’
[
Gokana (Hyman & Comrie 1981:22)
]
Apparently, the standard definitions of logophoricity or quasi-indexicality
cannot quite capture the full range of data: In some languages it may be the
case that third person (accidental) coreference, as in mistaken self-identity
scenarios (cf. (55)), cannot be reported logophorically, while second person
33Both Eleme, (57), and Gokana are so-called Ogonoid languages spoken in Nigeria.
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intentionally disjoint reference can (cf. (56), (57)). In the next subsection
we will see that the English construction dedicated to reporting pure de se
belief also allows for second person de se in addition to just first.34
Picking up on these second person de se reports, Culy (1994; 1997) and
Bond (2004) argue against the idea that logophors convey any point of view
at all. These authors propose that the “[p]rimary function of morphologi-
cally distinct logophoric pronouns is to mark discourse as ‘reported’ and not
to reflect point of view” (Bond (2004:1) paraphrasing Culy (1997)), which
unfortunately lands us right back in the first problem, the one posed by (56),
containing no indirect discourse. More needs to be said, evidently, about the
relation between he?, logophors, indirect reflexives, and 1st and 2nd person
de se reporting, but we’ll have to leave that for future research.
2.4.1.3 Chierchia’s PRO and the ambiguity thesis
In 2.3.1 we spent some time establishing that—for some attitude verbs in
some languages—there is a genuine semantic contrast between coreferen-
tial 3rd person pronoun reports and reports with subjectless infinitives and
gerunds as complements. Examples considered so far to make this point
include, first, the contrast between 2.1’s (1c) and (3) in the mistaken self-
identity scenario B:
34Chierchia (1989:17) and Schlenker (2003:61) give examples like:
(i) John [to Mary, whom he doesn’t recognize]: “Mary should leave”
a. #John told Mary to leave.
b. John told Mary that she should leave.
This also shows that it is sometimes possible to distinguish general de re reports, com-
patible with mistaken identity, from a specific subclass of de se, but this special subclass
apparently includes not only pure first person attitudes, but also (in some cases) second
person speech/attitudes. As with the African logophors, there’s variation across languages
and also across different attitudes within a language, deserving of further research. Fur-
ther, connecting this discussion of 2nd person de se with logophors and quasi-indexicals,
another interesting question comes to mind: What happens if we introduce a Geachian he
himself as embedded subject of a command report?
(ii) ??John told Mary that she herself should leave.
I have no data about this last one, but it seems out, unless perhaps the reflexive emphat-
ically marks some kind of contrast, thus reporting e.g. “Mary herself should leave!”?
Recall the discussion about Atlas and the uses of reflexives in 2.4.1.1 where it’s suggested
that the emphatic use of the reflexive is distinct from the logophoric. In fact, I’m even un-
sure about the status of (ii) in a non-pathological 2nd person context, where the reported
command was “You yourself should leave.”
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(59) Ellsworth, hearing people talk about Arata Suggs while watching her
speech on TV, says: “That girl, Arata, I’m sure she’ll win” In fact
this Arata Suggs is none other than herself, she just didn’t recognize
the image on the TV, nor did she know of this nickname the others
use to refer to her.
[≈B, p. 74]
a. Ellsworth believes she’ll win.
[≈(3), p. 73]
b. #Ellsworth believes to be on the winning side.
[≈(1c), p. 72]
The same point was made in 2.3.1 with the attitude verb hope:
(60) Thinking she’s seeing her opponent, but actually seeing herself, Essie
mutters: “I hope you lose.”
[≈(15), p. 82]
a. Essie hopes that she’ll lose.
b. #Essie hopes to lose.
which was strengthened in the form of a contextless infelic-
ity/ungrammaticality judgment:
(61) Although she doesn’t realize it herself, Avis
believes that she is
*believes to have been
hopes that she is
*hopes to be
 elected.
Chierchia (1989) uses such judgments—in Italian—as the empirical basis
for his argumentation against unified de re/de se semantics, which he iden-
tifies with Boe¨r & Lycan’s (1980) propositional unification, cf. 1.2.4.1. The
data show that, contra predictions of not only the arguably flawed account
of Boe¨r & Lycan (1980) but also more sophisticated unifications by Cresswell
& von Stechow (1982) and Kaplan (1989), there is a linguistically real dis-
tinction between pure de se and other de re, even in English belief reporting.
The contrasts show that reports with infinitival complements, like (59b), are
unambiguously pure de se, whereas the pronoun report (59a) is compatible
with any de re or de se mode of presentation.35
35Following up on footnote 34, recall that Chierchia’s data include infinitival command
reports that are unambiguously 2nd rather than 1st person de se:
(i) John to Mary, whom he doesn’t recognize: “Mary should leave”
[
=(i), p. 118
]
a. John told Mary that she should leave.
b. #John told Mary to leave.
If we simply restrict attention to belief, we do not have to modify the generalization that
PRO corelates with a first person perspective, but in the interest of extendability these
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Chierchia’s main thesis is what I shall refer to as the ambiguity thesis: de
re/de se reporting does not form a homogeneous class. Within it, we need
to distinguish two logical forms, one for pure, first person, de se, and one
for de re. Chierchia cashes out this distinction semantically in terms of the
distinction between property self-ascription vs. propositional belief. The first
person de se readings (which he calls just de se) correspond to Lewis-style
property self-ascriptions:
(62) a. bel∗eλx[win(x)]
b. J(62a)Kw = 1
iff Ellsworth self-ascribes the property of winning
data should be taken into account at some point. The contrast in (i) itself does not really
pose a problem, what makes the issue more puzzling is the addition of Schlenker’s (p.c.)
scenario, which seems to turn the judgments around:
(ii) John, dividing part of his inheritance over his as yet unborn third generation
descendants: “My great-grandchildren should behave, otherwise. . . ”
a. ??In his will John told his great-grandchildren that they should behave
b. In his will John told his great-grandchildren to behave
What is the relation of acquaintance between John and his unborn great-grandchildren?
Since he doesn’t know them yet, how can the command expressed in the will be de re?
Let alone 2nd person de se, because, for the same reason, the direct discourse version, the
written text of the will, cannot have contained any (irreducibly 2nd person) imperatives or
you’s to talk about those great-grandchildren. Note that this is not so much a problem for
unificatory analyses that heap de re and de se together, but rather for 1st+2nd person de
se separatist proposals like Chierchia’s ambiguity thesis below, which predicts the reverse
of Schlenker’s judgment (as in (i)). A unificationist way out is to argue that actually both
are OK, which is what she’d predict, since they both report a general de re/de se belief
under a somewhat indirect (de dicto-ish) relation of acquaintance. That sentences like
(iib) are quite OK is corroborated by some similar, Googled examples:
(iii) a. God told his people that they should multiply, he said “Be fruitful and in-
crease, fill the earth” (Genesis 1:28).
b. When he got back to Kapiti [from his last raid on the South Island] he told
his people that they should go to Otakou and Rakiura to kill the men of Te
[. . . ]
c. President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya told his compatriots that they should
refrain from sex for two years to stop the spread of AIDS.
Is God really acquainted with “his people”? Isn’t that just as indirect as John’s relation
to his grandchildren via his will? Or presidents with their people? The data need further
attention, but perhaps an important observation is that all of these examples, including
Schlenker’s, seem to involve de dicto reporting. In addressing their audience, the subjects
may or may not have used 2nd person pronouns, but they intended their command to
be de dicto, i.e. his great-grandchildren, whoever/wherever/whatever/whenever they might
turn out to be; my people as in whoever chooses to follow me, etc.
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iff Jλx[win(x)]K = I(win) ⊇ BelC(ellsworth, w)
This, then, is the lf of the infinitival report (59b), which accounts for the
falsity in the 3rd person mistaken identity scenario B. The pronoun report
(59a) has this same reading most of the time, but, says Chierchia, this type
of report is actually ambiguous between that and a de re reading represented
by the following lf:
(63) a. ∃x[x = e ∧ belxwin(x)]36
b. J(63a)Kw = 1
iff Ellsworth believes de re of Ellsworth that she is winning
The bel operator has to defined in such a way the whole de re lf is true in
B, for which purpose any variant of the de-re-under-vivid-description frame-
work, in the line of Kaplan-Lewis-Creswell-von Stechow, would do fine. For
instance, we can opt for a de re lf a` la Kaplan (1969):
(64) a. ∃d[R(d, e, e) ∧ belewin(∨d)]
b. J(64a)Kw = 1
iff there is a vivid name d of Ellsworth for Ellsworth in w andJwin(∨d)K ⊇ Bel(ellsworth, w)
Truth in B is then verified with person on TV called ‘Arata’ as d. As for
alternative de re lfs, a slightly more sophisticated analysis would involve a
structured complement of bel, which is then interpreted along the lines of
Cresswell & von Stechow’s (1982) relational, structured propositions analysis
(cf. 2.3.3.1):
(65) a. bele×ete 〈e, win〉
[
cf. (24a), p. 91
]
b. J(65a)Kw = 1
iff there is an acquaintance relation R holding between
Ellsworth and Ellsworth in w and Ellsworth believes that
the person she bears R to is winning
A third possibility would be to have a nicely compositional LF interpreted
according to Kaplan’s (1989) quantified character theory (cf. 2.3.4). But, for
simplicity, let’s just follow the unspecified wide scope lf (63a).
The interesting part of Chierchia’s proposal is its explication of the re-
lation between these lfs and their surface realizations. More precisely, he’s
interested in where, syntactically speaking, the property-type complement in
de se readings comes from. His answer starts by observing that the crucial
36≡ (λx[belxwin(x)])(e)
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difference between the de re and pure de se lfs is the extra λ in the latter
that binds the subject of the complement clause. In other words, we can get
from (63a) to (62a) by inserting a λx to bind the deepest variable:37
(66) ∃x[x = e ∧ belxwin(x)] [≈(63a)]
; ∃x[x = e ∧ bel∗xλx[win(x)]] ≡ bel∗eλx[win(x)] [≈(62a)]
What happens here is we insert a λ to shift the sentential complement into a
property and since, moreover, the λ binds the embedded variable, we get the
pure de se reading. Note that if we had chosen a different variable, λy, we’d
have gotten a vacuous property reading, self-ascribing Jλy[win(x)]K means
self-ascribing the property of inhabiting a world where x (Ellsworth) wins,
which corresponds to believing the proposition that she, under whatever
guise, wins. Chierchia does not consider this possibility for unification, which
will be an important ingredient in later developments to be discussed in 2.4.3.
On a semantic level the difference between pure de se and general de re
is one measly λx. Unfortunately, neither coreferential pronoun reports, nor
infinitivals show something that could count as the surface realization of this
binder, so a hidden operator (“adjoined to CP”, in the GB implementation
(Chierchia 1989:10)), let’s call it Λ, is posited. Chierchia’s GB approach thus
assigns two syntactic analyses for a coreferential pronoun report:
(67) Ellsworth believes she’ll win
[
=(59a)
]
a. Ellsworthi believes [shei will win] ∃x[x = e ∧ belxwin(x)] [=(63a)]
b. Ellsworthi believes [Λi [shei will win]] ∃x[x = e ∧ bel∗xλx[win(x)]]
≡ bel∗eλx[win(x)]
[
=(62a), cf. (66)
]
A genuine ambiguity plus a hidden operator to derive the readings we could
have gotten for free on our de re/de se unificatory attempts of 2.3? So
far, not so good, but the payoff lies in the analysis of unambiguously de
se reports—the bane of de re unification—and anaphorized/elided versions
thereof, which form a new set of data to be introduced in 2.4.1.4 below.
What is Chierchia’s famed analysis of infinitival and gerundial, pure de
se reports? As we have seen before, in GB, infinitival complements are as-
sumed to have an unrealized subject, PRO. The stipulation that is needed to
enforce the right reading of infinitival reports, is that PRO has to be bound
37Technical remark: We must set up the syntax and semantics of our formal language
in such a way that a variable is bound by the closest lambda or quantifier that can bind
it. This is to make sense of formulas that have two x-binders with overlapping scope.
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locally, i.e. by our property abstractor Λi (i.e. a λ, semantically speaking).
Assuming this as the crucial difference between PRO and normal, third per-
son, coreferential pronouns, for which this binding is only optional, gives us
a correct analysis. In short:
(68) Ellsworth believes to be on the winning side.
[
=(59b)
]
- Ellsworthi believes [Λi [PROi to be on the winning side]] bel∗eλx[win(x)] [=(62a)]
In the next subsection we’ll look at some more data bringing to light in-
teresting divergences between Chierchia’s ambiguity thesis, total unification,
and intermediate proposals.
2.4.1.4 Abstract anaphora: Chierchia vs. the hybrids
The obvious criticism against Chierchia’s theory above concerns not its treat-
ment of infinitives, but the postulation of a syntactic ambiguity in pronoun
reports. Is there perhaps a way to avoid that ambiguity, while more or less
maintaining the idea of PRO denoting a locally bound variable to account
for infinitival pure de se? Well, we can define truth conditions for the de re
LFs in such a way that they cover the whole range of de re/de se, in fact
that’s exactly what we’ve been doing quite extensively in 2.3. If we take on
Cresswell & von Stechow’s (1982) relational explication of the de re reading,
as suggested in (65a), we get that pure de se asymmetrically implies de re,
i.e. pure de se becomes a special case of de re, or rather, de re/de se, as
we have been calling it. Thus, we don’t need a separate de se LF or lf for
pronoun reports anymore, just:
(69) a. Ellsworth believes she’ll win
[
=(59a)
]
 bele×ete 〈e, win〉
≡ ∃R[R(e, e) ∧ bel∗eλx[win( ιy[R(x, y)])]]
b. Ellsworth believes to be on the winning side.
[
=(59b)
]
 bel∗eλx[win(x)] [=(62a)]
In other words, take the old unified analysis of de re/de se for pronoun
reports, and in addition assume that Chierchia’s story applies to the class
of infinitival and gerundial complements with PRO subjects. This kind of
hybrid account has been suggested by Reinhart (1990), although her version
relies on the Boe¨r & Lycan (1980)-style propositional unification of de re/de
se that we argued against in 1.2.4.1. Another implementation of the same
idea (unified account for pronoun reports but separate lf for PRO reports)
is developed by Zimmermann (1991) who uses Kaplan’s quantified character
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theory (cf. 2.3.4-2.3.5).
Chierchia, however, comes up with some counterevidence, arguing against
such an intermediate position and in favor of a real ambiguity in pronoun
reports. These involve anaphorized belief complements:
(70) Ellsworth believes she’ll win, and her father believes that too
Intuitively, the second clause is compatible with Ellsworth’s father believ-
ing that his daughter will win, and with believing that he himself will win
(the preferred reading depends, of course, on the context and the choice of
markers like but instead of and). Such readings are often referred to as strict
and sloppy, respectively. Strict/sloppy ambiguities are a common and well-
studied phenomenon, for instance in VP ellipsis: Ligia loves her cat, and
so does Essie can mean either that Essie loves Ligia’s cat (strict), or her
own (sloppy). In our example, the ambiguity seems to arise from having
a so-called propositional anaphor (that) refer back to (the denotation of) a
phrase containing a pronoun (she).38In the course of this subsection I will
offer a variety of abstract anaphoric belief reports, some of which can be
used as arguments in favor of Chierchian ambiguity, some against it. My
final conclusion will be that the abstract anaphora data do not tip the scales
either way, so apparently an additional mechanism is needed to account for
the strict/sloppy ambiguities that we will encounter. I will not provide a
detailed account here, but eventually we’ll get back to the data as a test case
for the account to be developed in chapter 3.
Chierchia’s theory offers the following analysis of the data connected
with (70). The first conjunct is ambiguous between a propositional (de re)
and a property (pure de se) complement. Given some standard assumptions
on abstract anaphora, the second conjunct copies (or anaphorically links) a
38In addition to (70)’s pronominalization with that, we could have chosen it or this
without much effect on available interpretations. In fact, anaphorization of the second
belief complement could also have been achieved by means of a definite description, (ia),
or a relative clause, (ib). Another way to achieve arguably the same thing is by ellipsis of
the whole VP, (ic), and by constructions in between anaphora and ellipsis like (id). We
classify all of these as instances of abstract anaphora, following Asher (1993):
(i) a. . . . and her father believes the same thing
b. . . . and her father believes what Ellsworth believes
c. . . . and so does her father
d. . . . and her father thinks so too
We will not go into the syntactic and semantic peculiarities of each of these types of
abstract anaphora, but note merely that they all exhibit the same strict/sloppy ambiguity
(though, some with more bias one way or the other).
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complement for the father’s belief from the semantic representation of the
belief ascribed to Ellsworth in the first conjunct. If the first conjunct is read
de re, i.e. LF=(67a), then the father’s belief complement can only pick up a
singular proposition (about Ellsworth), giving the strict reading:
(71) [Ellsworthi believes [shei will win]] and [[heri father]j believes that?
too]
 ∃x∃y[x = e ∧ y = father of(e) ∧ belxwin(x) ∧ bel?y?]; ∃x∃y[x = e ∧ y = father of(e) ∧ belxwin(x) ∧ belywin(x)]
If, on the other hand, Ellsworth’s belief is read purely de se (i.e. with inter-
vening abstractor Λi, (67b)) then the open slot in her father’s belief will pick
up a property, viz. the property of winning, yielding a sloppy reading:
(72) [Ellsworthi believes [Λi [shei will win]]] and [[heri father]j believes
that? too]
 ∃y[y = father of(e) ∧ bel∗eλx[win(x)] ∧ bel?y?]; ∃y[y = father of(e) ∧ bel∗eλx[win(x)] ∧ bel∗yλx[win(x)]]
At first sight, it seems that Chierchia’s original ambiguity provides a natural
account of the strict/sloppy ambiguity of abstract anaphora reports. We will
shortly come back to these predictions.
But first let’s see how a reductionist (or hybrid) account fares with these
data. Let’s assume the relational account of pronoun reports, as briefly
reconsidered at the start of this subsection and in depth in 2.3.1. The pre-
resolution LF of (70) is:
(73) ∃y[y = father of(e) ∧ bele×ete 〈e, win〉 ∧ bel?y?]
If indeed anaphora resolution takes place at this level of logical form, the only
possible resolution for the anaphor (?) seems to be the structured proposition
〈e, win〉, which would give us a strict reading:
; ∃y[y = father of(e) ∧ bele×ete 〈e, win〉 ∧ bele×ety 〈e, win〉]
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In other words, there’s no way to get a sloppy reading, one where the father’s
belief is about himself.3940 Another tentative way out would be to say that
abstract anaphora is just a copying procedure in syntax, i.e. the that goes
proxy for the (suitably neutralized) phrase that shei will win. I will not
pursue this suggestion any further but preliminarily conclude that Chierchia
can account for the strict/sloppy data where the hybrid theory falters.
However, if we now take a closer look at the predictions of the ambiguity
thesis we will find some faults with it as well. Let’s re-examine the anal-
ysis of (70) in (71) and (72); the first ascribes to Ellsworth a de re belief
about herself and her father one de re about Ellsworth, the second ascribes
them both pure de se beliefs. And these are the only two possible read-
ings. Though they do correspond to a strict and a sloppy reading, they
don’t seem to exhaust the possible combinations of the (de re/pure de se ×
about self/other)(Ellsworth,father) grid.41 How about the sloppy readings where
Ellsworth’s belief is not pure, but still de re about herself while her father’s
belief is either pure or impure about himself? Or those where Ellsworth’s
is pure de se, but her father’s is mere de re about her (strict), or about
himself (sloppy)? To discredit Chierchia’s solution all we need to do is make
up some scenarios corresponding to these 4 extra-Chierchian readings and
see if our (70) can felicitously report them. In fact, for the first couple just
mentioned (sloppy, first belief mere de re, second de re/de se about self) this
has already been done, by Reinhart (1990) who offers the following critique
of Chierchia’s ambiguity thesis:
(74) Lucie1 thought that she1 sounded too aggressive and Lili
thought the same thing (/believed it too).
39Not even if we somehow first expand the definition of bele×et to bring out the ac-
quaintance relations, i.e. if the pre-resolution lf had been something like:
(i) ∃z∃R[z = father of(e) ∧ R(e, e) ∧ bel∗eλx[win( ιy[R(x, y)])] ∧ ? ∧ bel?z?]
The first ? is a half-hearted attempt to get in the fact that we should somehow look for an
acquaintance relation for the father, otherwise we’d end up ascribing Ellsworth’s father the
belief that the person he’s R-acquainted with will win, where R is the acquaintance relation
associated with Ellsworth and her belief. I’m not sure there’s any feasible derivation of
the sloppy reading along these lines. Also, even if we can get it, now the strict one has
become even more problematic.
40A more sophisticated semantic analysis of abstract anaphora based on Dalrymple
et al.’s (1991) account of VP ellipsis, using higher order unification to derive strict/sloppy
ambiguities, might be of help. I will not pursue this suggestion any further, but we’ll get
back to the higher order unification tool in later chapters.
41Well, the parameters are not really independent, e.g. pure de se is always about self,
discarding 7 of the total 16 already. We can get rid of 3 more by assuming, as we have
been doing all along, that the pronoun in Ellsworth’s belief refers back to Ellsworth.
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(75) Lili1 thought she1 sounded too aggressive (ambiguous).
Suppose that both Lucie and Lili were recorded, and, not recog-
nizing their voice, they each thought that it sounded too aggres-
sive. It is perfectly possible to report this state of affairs using
(74), in which case Lili’s belief is construed as in (75). But this
is a clear case of a de-re belief. If the construal in (75) was al-
lowed only in the case of de-se belief as argued by Chierchia, this
reading could not be obtained. In other words, the construal (75)
[. . . ] is still ambiguous between the de-re and de-se interpretation
(Reinhart 1990:4)42
I will leave it to the reader to find out if the remaining (two) readings can
also occur.
It seems that neither a unificatory hybrid, nor Chierchian ambiguity can
by itself derive all available strict and sloppy readings of (70), which leads
me to conclude, with Reinhart, “that the anaphoric process illustrated in
these contexts is independent of the de-se issue.”(Reinhart 1990:4). I would
suggest a combination of the relational hybrid with a higher-order unification
analysis of abstract anaphora and ellipsis resolution.
Let’s move on to Chierchia’s next pro-ambiguity argument based on
anaphorized belief complements. According to his intuitions:
the sloppy reading disappears if the antecedent [of the abstract
anaphor] is taken to be a pronounless structure like the one in
(76):
(76) a. Domingoi believes that Domingoi is a genius
b. Domingoi believes that [the author of this book]i is
a genius
Sentences of this kind are slightly odd due to a principle C effect
[. . . ] However it has been noted that these sentences can be
42Reinhart fleshes out her recorded voice version of the worn pants-on-fire mistaken
identity example as follows:
(i) Lucie thought that she sounded too aggressive.
[. . . ] Suppose that Lucie, a broadcast manager, is looking for the perfect
female voice for an ad, and requests to hear some samples of women in natural
conversation. Unbeknown to her, the technician records her too, and adds it
to the samples as number 17. Lucie does not recognize her recorded voice, and
rules out 17 as too aggressive. In this scenario, (i) is true de-re, but is still
false de-se (for the specific reported thought).
[
(Reinhart 1990:1)
]
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rescued in suitably contrastive contexts [. . . ] Yet, even when they
are grammatical, such sentences never support sloppy anaphora
[. . . ]
[
(Chierchia 1989:22)
]
The “principle C violation” can be made more palatable, in the case of (76a),
by setting up the context so as the put extra focus on either of the two occur-
rences (everybody thinks Domingo’s a genius, even Domingo thinks Domingo
is a genius), or, for (76b) (and in general in cases of different but coreferring
referential expressions), by placing it in a mistaken self-identity context.43
So I agree with Chierchia that these sentences are grammatical, but he goes
further and considers the data evidence for his ambiguity thesis, which, he
says, excludes a (pure) de se interpretation of such sentences, presumably
because his property-abstractor can only bind pronouns, the surface realiza-
tions of variables, not ‘R(eferring)-expressions’ like definite descriptions or
proper names.
But how robust are these intuitions? And what would a unificatory anal-
ysis predict? Let’s focus on the repeated proper name example first:
(77) [Very few people believe that Domingo is a genius. But,] Domingo
believes that Domingo is a genius.
But then,

Pavarotti believes that as well
so does Pavarotti
his rival believes the same thing
everybody thinks that, sometimes
don’t we all?

I’m not at all convinced such discourses require strict readings of the second
part. If indeed some of the above variations are true if Pavarotti or ‘every-
body’ merely thinks “I am a genius”, we’d have another counterexample to
Chierchia’s theory. As for the relational analysis, well, pending an indepen-
dent analysis of sloppy anaphora, we do already predict that, regardless of
Principle C violations, the antecedent belief report is true in de re as well as
pure de se scenarios (contra Chierchia). It is thus to be expected that the re-
lational analysis will allow sloppy readings. Note that if this prediction is not
borne out, we still have the option of blaming the Principle C effect itself for
blocking the sloppy anaphora. I envisage a (pragmatic) argument along the
following lines: because the proper name repetition is quite unusual/marked,
it makes the name and its bearer so salient that the consequent ellipsis is
automatically taken to still be about that same individual, thus forcing a
strict reading.
43Bart Geurts (p.c.) and Jennifer Spenader (p.c.) note that principle C violations like
(76a) also occur quite naturally in legalese and motherese respectively.
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Elaborating on this issue, let’s extend the range of examples a bit. Ap-
plying Chierchia’s reasoning to our earlier (1b) (Ellsworth believes of Arata
Suggs that she’ll win) we’d get that it does not have a pure de se reading, i.e.,
following Chierchia’s view of de re, it’s false in scene C where Ellsworth/Arata
sincerely says: “I am going to win.”44 As we saw in table 2.4 in 2.3.1, the
relational account makes it true there, because whenever the matrix and em-
bedded subjects corefer we get de re/de se. I am not sure which prediction
is correct, but it does seem correct that in the progression below the pure de
se reading becomes less and less prominent, in favor of (mistaken-identity)
de re or de dicto readings (cf. table 2.1 p. 75, where we already put question
marks for these last two judgments):
(78) Ellsworth = Arata (though she doesn’t know that nickname) = the
prettiest (though she’d disagree), says: “I am gonna win”
[≈C, p. 74]
Ellsworth believes
a. PRO to be winning
[≈(59b)]
b. she’ll win
[≈(59a)]
c. Ellsworth will win [cf. (76a)]
d. ?Arata will win
[≈(1b), p. 72]
e. ??the prettiest will win
[≈(1b), p. 72]
I have yet to see a fully worked-out account of this, but I strongly disagree
with Chierchia who draws a sharp line between (78b) and (78c). In defense
of the rather weak relational predictions I can only suggest that we can
always augment our semantic analysis (all are true, semantically speaking)
with a pragmatic explanation of the infelicity of the lower ones. Pragmatic
explanations could include the fact that the reporter’s word choice in (78d-e)
is quite misleading; if Ellsworth talks about herself in the first person why
would a report use two different names? A somewhat different, yet related,
pragmatic explanation could build on the uncontroversial assumption that
the use of proper names and descriptions is blocked by ‘lighter’ semantically
compatible alternatives (in this case PRO and the pronoun in (78a-b), which
can already express a pure de se). This in turn already comes pretty close
to the above pragmatic reasoning using the markedness to block the sloppy
anaphora.
44Actually, Chierchia is not too clear and seems to change his mind about whether or
not the de re LF corresponds to the relational analysis’ unified de re/de se, or whether
it’s dedicated to de re plus impure de se. I put Chierchia in the latter camp, but note
that the former view is suggested by his discussion of a meaning postulate that turns de
se into a subset of de re.
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Getting back to the possibility of sloppy anaphora, which on Chierchia’s
account depends on the availability of a pure de se LF, i.e. only (78a-b)
support sloppy readings of anaphorized continuations. I agree that sloppy
readings for (78d-e) are out, but for (78c), see (77) above, and for (78a), see
(79) below. Before moving on to this anaphoric continuation of (78a), let
me put all this criticism in perspective by reminding you once again that the
relational (hybrid) alternative by itself still has no way to account for any
sloppy readings whatsoever, so we’re arguably hardly better off than with
Chierchia. The fact that Chierchia gets the facts wrong as well, however, I
take as purely negative evidence that more than just de re/de se is needed
to account for these (sloppiness) data. As suggested before, a separate ellip-
sis/abstract anaphora mechanism is called for.
The last piece of data to be discussed here concerns an unexpected strict
reading in the dual of the above proper name example: a report that is
unambiguously pure de se serving as antecedent for an abstract anaphor:
(79) Ellsworth believes to be on the winning side, but her father doesn’t
believe that. He thinks she should have stuck with the other team.
This discourse seems fine, so the that must have picked up a de re belief,
about Ellsworth.45 Chierchia fails to account for this strict reading, this time
because he only assigns a property to the PRO-headed complement of the
first belief.46 Again, the problem remains for the hybrid analysis, precisely
because it coincides with Chierchia’s on PRO.
This concludes the discussion on unambiguously pure de se reports. Al-
though we’ve had to deviate from our original intention to focus solely on the
attitude of belief in English, the data, featuring indirect reflexives (2.4.1.1),
logophors (2.4.1.2) and PRO+infinitive (2.4.1.3), do constitute a genuine
45This judgment of a strict/sloppy ambiguity with infinitival pure de se antecedents is
attested by quite a few (mostly Dutch) people, e.g. in response to this homework assign-
ment (B3, Fall 2004):
(i) Marie
Mary
wil
wants PRO
gelukkig
happy
zijn
be.INF
en
and
haar
her
man
husband
wil
wants
dat
that
ook
too
‘Mary wants to be happy and her husband wants that too’
How many readings do you get (intuitively)? Can you get a “strict” reading
for the elided content of the husband’s wants? Does anything change for
your intuitions if you replace “that too” with “it too”, “the same thing”,
“what his wife wants” or something similar?
46Mysteriously, Chierchia himself recognizes that this strict reading exists (p.23), but
somehow he doesn’t consider it to be problematic.
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problem for de re/de se unification. One way to take care of it is to abandon
the unity of de re/de se and follow Chierchia’s ambiguity thesis, according to
which pronouns in belief complements make reports syntactically ambiguous
(2.4.1.3). In 2.4.1.4, hybrid theories, taking an intermediate position between
unification and ambiguity, were shown to be a viable alternative, despite
prima facie counterevidence based on strict and sloppy readings of abstract
anaphoric reports. In 2.4.3 we will introduce more data (shifted indexicals)
that are supposed to put an end to both Chierchia’s and hybrid unifica-
tory analyses (together classified under ‘intermediate’ theories by Schlenker
(2003)). My own analysis in chapter 3 offers a significant improvement over
the simple hybrid sketched here in that it provides a unified account of de
re/de se reports of the form NP believes that NP VP that treats embedded
PRO truly on a par with anaphoric and (shiftable and unshiftable) deictic
expressions (though some stipulations about the special semantics of PRO
are unavoidable, cf. 2.4.3.3 and 3.4.4.4).
2.4.2 De re and de se under quantifiers
In this section we discuss more data in connection with the de re/de se
ambiguity vs. unification debate. This time it’s quantified belief reports, i.e.
sentences like everybody believes they will be chosen and nobody thought that
Arata Suggs would win. Though there is quite compelling evidence to the
contrary (non-conservative quantifiers anyone?), we will include here only as
a quantifier, following e.g. de Mey (1991), but mainly in order to reconstruct
a particular argument against de re/de se unification depending on it (in
2.4.2.2).
As in the previous section, we will end up with judgments that can be
accounted for in simple reductionist frameworks but not in the Chierchian
LF ambiguity framework, and vice versa. We will discuss the effects of some
small framework tweaks, but you’ll have to wait until the next chapter, which
brings first a more serious and modern treatment of context dependence, for
a framework that can handle them all.
2.4.2.1 Zimmermann: every
In this chapter we have been looking at reports of the form NP1 believes that
NP2 VP with NP1 a proper name and NP2 a proper name, description, in-
dexical, anaphor, logophor, or a PRO. It turned out that the most interesting
data were these last three where both NPs are coreferential, because that’s
where the de re/ vs. pure de se distinction comes to the fore. Now that we’ve
gotten bored tampering with the res denoting second NP, it’s time to play
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around with NP1. In this subsection we consider a universally quantified
variant of our much discussed (3), Ellsworth believes she’s going to win, in
scenarios with multiple believers.
The first discussion of such data is by Zimmermann (p.c.) whose exam-
ple (allegedly)47 involves several drunk election candidates, some of whom
saying, “I should be elected”, and others saying “She should be elected”
about themselves. According to Zimmermann, spectators might felicitously
describe this situation by saying Each candidate hopes that he gets elected.
For simplicity’s and uniformity’s sake, let’s strip it down to the bare
essentials (two individuals, believe instead of hope) and reformulate it in
terms of the ongoing Ellsworth Kimmel story of 2.1:
D. Ellsworth Kimmel and her rival Shavonne McManus are at the party
described earlier. Not realizing Arata Suggs is used as a nickname re-
ferring to herself, Ellsworth tells Shavonne: “That Arata Suggs person
on TV is probably going to win”, to which Shavonne responds with a
“Fat chance! I’m gonna win.”
[≈B+C, p. 74-74]
A minimal scenario, in a sense combining scene B, where Ellsworth had an
impure de re/de se belief about herself, with scene C, where the belief (here,
Shavonne’s) is impure, but still about herself. From 2.1 we know that belief
reports with coreferential third person pronouns can report both of these
types of beliefs, so (80a) and (80b) are both true (even if the second is much
harder to read as true), so it seems natural to combine them into a single
report, (80c):
(80) a. Shavonne thinks she’s going to win
[≈(3), p. 73]
b. Ellsworth thinks she’s going to win
[
=(3), p. 73
]
c. Both women think they’re going to win
Indeed the quantified version seems as true as a mere conjunction of (80a)
and (80b).
Note that we’ve already discussed an alternative way to conjoin coref-
erential pronoun reports, viz. by ellipsis/abstract anaphora of the second,
which led to some interesting observations in 2.4.1.4:
(81) a. Shavonne thinks she’s going to win and so does Ellsworth
b. Ellsworth thinks she’s going to win and Shavonne believes that
47Schlenker attributes it to his 1991 and others have followed this attribution. Reinhart
(1990) seems to have a similar intuition, though she does not really give a mixed scenario.
Nor does Chierchia (1989), but the truth conditions he suggests would make the sentence
false in a mixed context, contradicting Zimmermann.
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too
[≈(70), p. 124]
As described in 2.4.1.4, the first to consider such conjoined reports was Chier-
chia (1989). We’ve already criticized his account for predicting that a pure
de se antecedent implies a pure (sloppy) reading for the elided conjunct (so
(81a) becomes false in D), and for predicting only strict readings when the
antecedent is just de re (so (81b) is also false). In passing, Chierchia also
mentions quantified reports like (80c):
The very same contrast [between de re and pure de se LFs] ob-
tains, of course, if we have quantified NPs. Thus consider, for
example, (82).
(82) Everyone in that room thinks that he is Hume
. . .
The most plausible interpretation of (82) claims that each person
in the relevant room has a certain [pure] de se attitude (perhaps
due to schizophren[ia]). (Chierchia 1989:10)
Ergo, (80c) is false in D.48
In a reaction to that paper, especially to his judgments concerning reports
of the form of (81b), Reinhart (1990) claims that sloppy readings are possible
whether or not the antecedent of the abstract anaphor is read purely de se,
and moreover, if the antecedent is not pure, the second conjunct’s sloppy
reading is ambiguous between pure and general de re/de se, so (81b) would
come out true. It’s unclear what she’d say about (81a) in D, but the LF
assigned to (80c) in analogy with (81b) is true.
So much for an informal discussion of the data, let’s test our frameworks
on it. Chierchia’s ambiguity obviously fails here. For the anaphorized re-
ports this failure has been documented in detail in 2.4.1.4 above. For the
universal quantification example we predict that either there is an appropri-
ate Λi binder (and then the truth conditions are such that both believe “I
am going to win”), or else, there’s no intervening Λi binding the embedded
pronoun and both beliefs are de re (and as before, I take it that that means
propositional/non-de se, cf. 2.4.1.3), which is equally false in D:
(83) Both women believe they are going to win
[≈(80c)]
a. [both women]i [believe [Λi [theyi are going to win]]] ∀x[woman(x)→ bel∗xλy[win(y)]]
48Note that I do not really consider this a semantic intuition about the truth value of
a sentence in a specific context, rather I’d say it’s a faulty prediction of the theory.
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b. [both women]i [believe [theyi are going to win]] ∀x[woman(x)→ belxwin( ιy[R(x, y)])]]
Simple unification of de re/de se (relational or characterial, hybrid or
not) on the other hand works out of the box for the quantified reports like
(80c):
(84)  ∀x[woman(x)→ belx〈x, win〉]
≡ ∀x[woman(x)→ ∃R[R(x, x) ∧ bel∗xλy[win( ιz[R(y, z)])]]]
In words, for each of the women there should be some mode of presentation
of the res (= that woman herself) under which the belief holds. It’s easy to
see that this works and, by the same token, so would a (fully compositional)
characterial analysis. Recall however that we had some trouble with the
abstract anaphoric examples in 2.4.1.4 and the conclusion there was that the
relational theory as such can’t handle sloppy anaphora. On the other hand,
since sloppy anaphora occur outside the realm of belief reporting anyway,
this was hardly surprising and it seems likely that an independent account of
sloppy anaphora (say, along the lines of Dalrymple et al.’s (1991) higher-order
unification account of ellipsis) will do the trick.
Contextualizing the acquaintance relation along the lines of Abusch
(1997), among others, seemed like a good idea in 2.3.2, but here we hit
upon a serious drawback. What salient acquaintance relation do we pick
from a mixed context? Obviously, picking either one gives the wrong result:
either we take up Shavonne’s acquaintance relation and we end up saying
that both are consciously acquainted with themselves as themselves (pure de
se), or we pick Ellsworth’s so that both have to see themselves on TV and
believe that the person they are currently seeing will win.49 If we think in
terms of scope, we must conclude that in mixed contexts the acquaintance
relation cannot outscope overt subject quantifiers like the one contributed by
both of (80c). This is a significant hurdle in the way of a unified, pragmatic
account of de re/de se, which the current work attempts to provide. It will
be overcome in 3.4.3.
To sum up this section, here’s a table. The first two rows are old news,
repeated for completeness. The data with respect to the next two, the el-
liptic constructions, are extrapolated from remarks by Reinhart (1990) and
my own discussion in 2.4.1.4. In the last row, the quantified report, the
data is Zimmermann’s rather uncontroversial judgment. I take it then that
49Even worse, if Ellsworth’s acquaintance to the res involves the fact that people are
referring to it as ‘Arata Suggs’, the resulting readings for (80c)-(81b) under the contextual
acquaintance theory will end up ‘strict’, saying in a sense that both have beliefs about the
same res, implying moreover that both women are actually referred to by that name.
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Chierchia’s remark about an analogous quantified report (quoted above) is
more a (faulty) prediction of his theory than a genuine, robust intuition that
extends to mixed utterance contexts like this one.
D. data Chierchian
ambiguity
de re/de se
unification
contextualized
acquaintance
(80a) 1 1 1 1
(80b) 1 1 1 1
(80c) 1 0 1? 0
(81a) 1 0 1? 0
(81b) 1 0 1 0
Table 2.6: Intuitions and predictions in mixed scenario D
2.4.2.2 De re/de se asymmetries with only
The previous subsection showed how Zimmermann’s example can be used
to argue for a simple (characterial) unification of de re/de se. Ironically,
the same scenario, with a different sentence, has been used as an explicit
argument for pure de se separatism. The current subsection introduces,
discusses and extends that argument, which is due to Percus & Sauerland
(2003a).
The data they present involves a mixed scenario, so let’s use our D, in
which Shavonne has a first person belief and Ellsworth a third person belief
about herself. The sentence they judge true in D is:
(85) Only Shavonne believes she will win
Let’s grant that this is indeed the case and consider the consequences for a
theory of de re and de se belief reports. As before, we’ll check the predictions
of the main frameworks under discussion here, to wit (i) simple unification
via acquaintance or characterial quantification, (ii) de se purist separatism,
and (iii) contextualized unification-by-acquaintance.
However, before attempting this comparison we must make some deci-
sions about the semantics of only, a notoriously ill-behaved adverb. It has
been a matter of much debate what semantic and/or pragmatic category or
categories only belongs to and it is certainly not my intention to add anything
to it. Historically,50 only was first analyzed as, or in terms of, quantification.
Its meaning was something like the reverse of the universal quantifier: only
50See for an overview of the “classic” positions http://staff.science.uva.nl/
∼pdekker/Only/
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philosophers understand this ≈ everybody who understands this is a philoso-
pher. In generalized quantifier theory quantifiers are construed as relations
between two sets, called restrictor and (nuclear) scope, as in some(A,B),
where A is the restrictor (or domain of quantification) and B the scope,
meaning “some A’s are B” and definable as A∩B 6= ∅. The relation between
all and only comes out as only(A,B) = all(B,A). Sure enough the literature
contains many objections and complications connected with the analysis of
only as a reversed universal quantifier, but none of these will concern us
here, just to keep things manageable. One way of defending this simplifi-
cation would be to say that we’re currently interested in representing truth
conditions, not in, say, determining how these truth conditions depend on
focus patterns, or what aspects of only’s meaning are truly semantic, (con-
ventionally or conversationally) implicated, and/or presuppositional. To sum
up then, I propose the simplest analysis of the quantifier only imaginable,
and represent it as follows:
(86) Only NPP VPQ
 onlyx[P(x)][Q(x)]
≡ ∀x[Q(x)→ P(x)]
Now, we’ll be focusing on sentences where the restrictor set P is given by a
definite NP, which are most naturally represented as in (87) (which employs
the relational account in the analysis of the quantifier’s scope):
(87) Only Shavonne believes she will win
[
=(85)
]
 onlyx[x = s][belx〈x, win〉]
≡ ∀x[∃R[R(x, x) ∧ bel∗xλy[win( ιz[R(y, z)])]]→ x = s]
As with every in 2.4.2.1, this straightforward implementation of de re/de se
unification gives a reading where the existentially quantified description of
the res takes narrow scope with respect to the overt quantifier only. Note
again that exactly the same would hold of the Kaplanian unification with
characters as modes of presentation. We might paraphrase the unificationist
truth conditions as Shavonne is the only person with the property of being
acquainted with oneself in such a way that believing the person one is so
acquainted with will win. In D, this is false, since Ellsworth has a belief
about herself under an acquaintance relation too, except it’s not equality, but
seeing a fellow contestant on TV called ‘Arata’. Thus, simple reductionist
frameworks cannot account for the observation that the sentence is in fact
true in D.
As Percus & Sauerland (2003a) point out, the facts are easily captured
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if we adopt Chierchia’s ambiguity thesis. Their version has it that a VP like
thinks that she will win “has an LF with the ‘[pure] de se denotation’ [. . . ] in
addition to any LF it might have in which the pronoun is construed de re”
(p.5).51 According to this separatist proposal the sentence may well have a
de re LF, interpreted along the lines of (87) (which would be false), but in
addition it will also have a distinct pure de se LF, interpreted as in (88).
(88)  onlyx[x = s][bel∗xλx[win(x)]]
This says that Shavonne is the only person who self-ascribes the property
of winning, which is true in D, because Ellsworth merely believes that the
person she is seeing on TV will win. So, postulating a syntactic ambiguity in
the belief reporting construction between a strong pure de se (though under
only that ‘strong’ becomes weak and vice versa) and a general de re, can
account for the fact that there’s a true reading in scenario D. Add to this the
need for separate de se LFs for PRO constructions, plus (some of) Chierchia’s
arguments with abstract anaphora and it becomes clear why the seemingly
superfluous postulation of syntactic ambiguity for reports with pronouns is
not that implausible.
A third possibility that needs to be considered, especially since it made
such a big difference for the universal quantifier in the previous subsection,
is the Hintikka-Aloni-Abusch inspired contextualization of unification by ac-
quaintance. This is the idea that the acquaintance relation of the reduction-
ist proposal should be determined in the global context rather than being
quantified away. Not being all that interested in the semantics-pragmatics
distinction at this point it makes little difference whether we implement this
by leaving a free variable for R or by existentially quantifying over it with
widest scope. The logical form would have to be (89), though the exact
derivation is not unproblematic, depending on some details in the analysis
of only (R(x, x) vs R(s, s), cf. 3.4.3).
(89)  ∃R[R(s, s) ∧ . . . ∧ onlyx[x = s][bel∗xλy[win( ιz[R(y, z)])]]
≡ ∃R[R(s, s) ∧ . . . ∧ ∀x[bel∗xλy[win( ιz[R(y, z)])]→ x = s]]
Meaning, in the context Shavonne must be known to bear a certain salient
acquaintance relation to herself, and she is claimed to be the only person
believing to win under that acquaintance relation. Unlike the quantified,
narrow scope unification considered first, this gives the correct prediction,
because the context provides us with equality as a suitable acquaintance
51Furthermore, Percus & Sauerland (2003a) assume that de re LFs are compatible with
the whole de re/de se spectrum, something that was not quite clear with Chierchia (1989)
(cf. discussion about this in 2.4.1.3, and, especially, footnote 44).
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relation relating Shavonne to herself and verifying that she’s the only one
who believes to be winning under that pure de se acquaintance relation.
Contextualization seems to be the way out of the Percus & Sauerland (2003a)
argument for de se LF separatism.52
Unfortunately, Henk Zeevat (p.c.) has pointed out that the wide scope
(or contextual) acquaintance analysis sketched above fails for only embedded
reports in general. Consider, still in D, the following minimal variant of (85):
(90) Only Ellsworth believes she will win
With a bit of imagination, we have judged it true that Ellsworth believes (of
herself) that she will win, but in the context at hand she is not the only one
who believes that: intuitions are very clear that (90) is false in D. It’s easily
checked that (narrow scope) quantified acquaintance gets this right, as does
the ambiguity analysis (Ellsworth is neither the only one with a general de
re/de se belief, nor (the only) one with a pure de se belief).53 But if we
extend the relational analysis to look for the acquaintance relation in the
context we predict that the sentence is true in D. This is because in that
context there is a highly salient and suitable R relating Ellsworth to herself,
viz. the relation of seeing a rival contestant, ‘Arata’, on the TV. Taking that
relation as the description under which the belief is held, we end up with a
true belief of Ellsworth’s.
D. data de re/de se
unification
P&S ambi-
guity
contextualized
acquaintance
(85) 1 0 1 1
(90) 0 0 0 1
Table 2.7: Only in mixed scenario D
Looking at the bigger picture, the minimal pair consisting of Percus &
Sauerland’s (2003a) and Zeevat’s (p.c.) reports in Zimmermann’s mixed sce-
nario shows that the acquaintance relation of equality is somehow special
among the acquaintance relations you can bear to yourself. From a philo-
sophical point of view this is perhaps not so surprising, as the acquaintance
relation of equality represents the perspective you have on yourself qua the
person you are. What’s more interesting is that these examples show that
52In fact, this was the line I took in my first talk on the subject (Szklarska Poreba
2004).
53But the way we’ve construed Chierchia’s original ambiguity (impure vs pure de se)
would incorrectly make the Zeevat report true.
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the epistemologically special status of the self-perspective is grammaticalized
into the language of attitude reporting, in line with Chierchia’s observations
about PRO-headed reports as encoding that special epistemic perspective in
natural language. Once we have this only pair, we can see parallels with even
reports in D:54
(91) a. [Shavonne thinks she’s going to win.]
Even Ellsworth thinks she’s going to win.
b. [Ellsworth thinks she’s going to win.]
#Even Shavonne thinks she’s going to win.
This re-affirms the observed asymmetry between pure de se and other forms
of de re that provides the main challenge for the unificationist program.
2.4.3 Shifted indexicals and monsters
In this section we take a look at some of the data and arguments that have
lately received quite some attention as the final nail in Kaplan’s monster-free
coffin. The data show blatant violations of the prohibition on monsters; in
some languages the reference of proven indexicals (so not just tenses) can
be affected by embedding under attitudes, which show that the attitudes
are monstrous operators. Although Kaplanian character theory is not our
unification of choice (given the recent arguments presented in 2.3.5), I show
that the data can be wielded against relational analyses as well.
As for the data, we had promised to concentrate on the English language,
the attitude of belief, and res in the person domain. In order to present these
highly relevant and influential arguments we must broaden our interests with
respect to the language or the domain parameters. As in the discussion of
logophoricity in 2.4.1.2, we will include other languages, mainly because the
examples involving modalities other than person, such as tense and mood,
are generally less clear and, in the case of tense, readily explained away
on independent grounds (e.g. anaphoricity of (English present) tense, some
obnoxious sequence of tense phenomena).
Schlenker (1999) was the first to challenge Kaplan’s monster prohibition
on the basis of empirical, linguistic evidence.55 He sets out to prove Kaplan
wrong by showing that natural languages do contain monstrous operators,
viz. the language’s attitude reporting constructions. The first thing to point
out was that attitude reports are not always underspecified for the de re or
54Brought to my attention by Michael Franke.
55Perry & Israel’s (1994) earlier ‘plea for monsters’ was based solely on theoretical
arguments.
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de se mode of presentation of the reported attitude, contrary to Kaplan’s
(and other) unified semantics’ predictions. Complementing the mere the-
oretical arguments to this effect, e.g. by Castan˜eda (1966), Schlenker cites
actual data showing unambiguously pure de se reports. These data are, first,
the African logophors, discussed in 2.4.1.2, and second, Chierchia’s PRO in
English, 2.4.1.3.
He briefly considers a so-called ‘intermediate theory’ to account for the
data so far. His intermediate proposal is basically a reformulation of Chier-
chia’s ambiguity analysis and of what we have called hybrids in 2.4.1.4. It
is a theory which avoids monstrous belief operators by postulating that at-
titude operators can bind certain pronominal items, notably logophors and
PRO, but not ‘real’ indexicals like English I, for that would contradict the
Fixity Thesis (and therefore the ban on monsters, and Principle 2, cf. 2.3.4).
Completely in line with Chierchia’s analysis in 2.4.1.3, PRO is represented as
a locally bound variable, while I is free (or else at least not bound by/inside
the attitude). There are several ways to represent this idea formally: (i) we
could turn belthat itself into a quantifier, explicitly quantifying over individ-
uals, belthata xϕ, so it can bind PRO, or (ii), staying closer to Chierchia’s and
others’ formulas, we could stick with the self-ascription operator bel∗ taking
property-type complements, prefixing the complement with a λ, and bind
any logophoric variables in it. Continuing in this last, Chierchian fashion,
we get:
(92) a. Ellsworth believes

she? is
she herself is
LOG be
PRO to be
 on the winning side[≈(1c), p. 72] bel∗eλx[win(x)]
b. Ellsworth believes

she
Ellsworth
Arata
 is winning [≈(3), p. 73]
 bel∗eλx[win(e)]
Various bells and whistles will be added below, and when we pick up this
framework in 2.4.3.5.56 The essential ingredient however remains that lo-
gophoric pronouns and PRO are never treated exactly like (first person)
indexicals: indexicals get their reference from the context, locally bound
56E.g. explicitly representing (and abstracting over) person, tense and mood; unify-
ing matrix and embedded clauses as denoting properties; unifying de se pronouns and
indexicals as variables at lf.
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variables do not. And, frankly, that seems quite alright, and, for reasons of
conservativity preferable over any monster-based account.
So far so good for the classical theory, but at this point Schlenker brings
in a new set of data showing real indexicals blatantly violating Principle 2.
These shifted indexicals occur in various forms of indirect discourse and the
paradigmatic example is Amharic’s57 shifted first person:
(93) ˇon
john
ˇ@gna
hero
n@
be
-n˜n˜
-1.sg
y1l
say.3.sg
-all
-aux.3.sg
‘Johni says that hei is a hero’
[
Amharic
(Schlenker 2003:68)
]
The embedded first person morpheme is rendered with a third person in the
English translation, since it refers to the matrix subject John, not to the
actual speaker. At first sight, the data appears to be in direct violation of
Kaplan’s Principle 2, that indexicals are always interpreted with respect to
the utterance context. It remains to be seen whether and how this necessi-
tates monsters, but, in any case, Amharic contrasts with English, where the
first person pronoun’s reference is always determined by the speech context,
independent of modal or attitudinal embeddings.
So what is going on here? There are a couple of ways to deal with these
data, one being the introduction of monsters, but to maximize dramatic
impact let’s save that one for last. First let’s debunk some simpler alterna-
tives: shifted indexicals as anaphors 2.4.3.1, and shifting as quotation 2.4.3.2.
After presenting Schlenker’s empirically superior yet monstrous analysis in
2.4.3.3-2.4.3.4, we will investigate whether that account really is monstrous
by comparing it with von Stechow’s (2002) allegedly nonmonstrous variant
in 2.4.3.5.
2.4.3.1 Indexicals as pseudo-indexical anaphors
The first option that springs to mind is to deny that Amharic I is indexical,
in which case Kaplan’s prohibition of monsters would be saved and we could
stick with an intermediate theory, analyzing this Amharic first person as
we did logophors and PRO: as anaphors/variables bound by a lambda. In
2.4.3.5 we’ll outline a more fully worked out semantics based on the idea of
Amharic I as a ‘fake indexical’ (Kratzer 2006), but here let’s consider the
general arguments against such a workaround.
The first counterargument is of a merely theoretical nature, concerning
the danger of circularity. It urges us to be careful not to take Principle 2 as
57A Semitic language of Ethiopia with over 17 million speakers.
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an a priori rule and argue that Amharic first person (and any other shiftable
items found in other languages and domains, see examples below) cannot be
indexical because of Principle 2. So construed Kaplan can never be falsified.
With Schlenker (2003:31-2), I think we should view it rather as an empirical
generalization that makes for a nice analysis of the classical, introspective
data set, but, perhaps, does not stand up to closer, cross-linguistic scrutiny.58
A second, more empirically driven counterargument builds on the obser-
vation that the Amharic first person pronoun occurs in main clauses and
non-reporting embeddings as well. This already sets it apart from African
logophors59 and controlled PRO60 which, as observed in 2.4.1, are confined
to (various forms of) indirect discourse. One might still argue then that
Amharic I is an all-purpose anaphor that can be bound by the Chierchian
lambda, but, in other types of clauses also by other, salient agents. Note
however that in all but the report-embedded cases, the Amharic first person
morpheme is used indistinguishably from English I:
(94) w@nd1m
brother
-e
-poss.1.sg
y@mm
rel
-1
-1
-w@d
-love
-at
-3.fem
-1n
-acc
l1ˇˇ
girl
ag@n˜n˜@
find.3m
‘My brother found a girl I like’
[
Amharic (Schlenker 2003:69)
]
Crucially, this sentence cannot be used to mean ‘My brother found a girl
he likes’, which rules out analyses of Amharic first person as a feature-free
anaphor that can pick up any salient, animate individual from the context.
In fact, even when embedded in speech reports, the Amharic I of (93) still
has a strict reading, as in John says that I am a hero.61 So, assimilating the
58There’s some discussion about the theoretical status of Principle 2 and the Prohibition
of Monsters by Zimmermann (1991:167-8), who tries to defend Kaplan by applying the
hack we’re currently arguing against. In the opposite camp, Perry & Israel (1994) argue
that Kaplan’s Prohibition is pure stipulation that should be done away with. However,
they do not provide any new empirical evidence for their claim, nor a semantics that
could compete with Kaplan’s on the familiar English introspective data. Then, after
Schlenker’s data had become well known, Zimmermann’s original discussion is picked up
by von Stechow & Zimmermann (2004:fn.11,15), who now stress they take the monster ban
to be a falsifiable, empirical claim. Interestingly, like Zimmermann (1991), von Stechow
(2001) still argues against Schlenker’s monstrous analysis, instead trying to save the ban
on monsters, by removing semantically indexical features from Amharic I, a version of the
intermediate theory to be discussed in 2.4.3.5.
59At least, as Schlenker conceives of logophors. On p. 117 I briefly questioned the
validity of the claim that logophors only occur in reports with (56).
60I am ignoring the kind of PRO that is hidden in to win would be nice.
61I haven’t seen actual glosses that show that (93) has this ‘Kaplanian’ reading, but it
is certainly implied by Schlenker’s discussion, and predicted by his analyses. von Stechow
(2002:8) makes it explicit by writing that in Amharic “an embedded first person pronoun
can refer to the [actual] speaker or it can be interpreted de se.”
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Amharic shifted first person to logophoricity and control would introduce
unwanted ambiguities: Amharic I would be the equivalent of an English I in
some cases, or something completely different in others. A unified analysis as
free variable/anaphor overgenerates: there would be no way to account for
the fact that Amharic I is shiftable only in reports. It is perhaps important
to note that the above arguments and data hold not only for the Amharic
person domain, but, according to Schlenker, extend to Engenni62, Aghem63,
and Navajo64. Bary & Maier (2003) added Ancient Greek to the list, and
Anand & Nevins (2004) Zazaki65 and Slave66:
(95) oÉ
the(y).nom.pl
dà
part
eÚpon
say.past.3.pl
íti
that.comp
ÉkanoÐ
able.nom.pl
âsmen
be.1.pl
eÊc
into
tn q¸ran
the land.acc.sg
eÊsbllein
invade.inf
‘They replied that they were able to invade this land’67[
Ancient Greek. Xenophon, Anabasis 5.4.10 (Bary & Maier 2003)
]
(96) HEseni
Hesen.obl
(m1
(I.obl
-ra)
-to)
va
said
kE
that
Ez
I
dEwletia
be rich.pres
‘Heseni said (to mej) that
{
Ij am
hei is
}
rich’[
Zazaki (Anand & Nevins 2004:2)
]
In the temporal domain, Schlenker describes completely analogous shifta-
bility phenomena with the Russian present tense and English two days ago
and in two days, which we will not go into, but while we’re at it, let’s just
finish our brief inventory of shifted indexicals, in order to cast further doubt
62Nigeria, 20,000 speakers
63Cameroon, 20,000 to 25,000 speakers.
64Athapaskan language spoken by 150,000 people in the US.
65Indo-Iranian language spoken by 2-4 million Kurds in Turkey.
66Athapaskan language spoken in Northwest Territories, Canada (2,600 speaker).
67Interestingly, a very natural translation (e.g. the one given in Xenophon (2005)) uses
direct discourse quotation marks, despite the presence of the complementizer íti. It may
be possible of course that íti is indeed ambiguous and can mark both indirect and direct
quotation. Note further that the continuation of this example would be very hard to
translate in English indirect discourse, which may count as an additional argument for
treating this as real, direct quotation:
[. . . ] âk toÜ âpÈ jtera tn tÀn ÍmØn.2.pl te kaÈ mØn.1.pl polemÐwn
‘[They replied: “We are able to invade this land] of your enemies and ours
from the opposite side”’
We return to the possibility of analyzing indexical shifting as indicating direct discourse
in 2.4.3.2.
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on the noted objection that these examples do not involve real first person
indexicals, but rather some kind of PRO or general anaphor.
In sign languages, a person’s speech (or signs) can be reported by signing
the reported utterance, while physically marking that one is playing the role
of the reportee. This marking can consist of various things, from mimicking
some characteristic aspects of the reportee or her speech, to changes in body
posture or eye-gaze. Most indexicals, including first and second person, shift
their reference under such a role-shift:68
(97) aGEORGE IPRONOUN WIN WILL
George’s facial expression
George [→George I win will]
‘George’s like, “I’ll win”’
[
American Sign Language (Lillo-Martin 1995:158)
]
What sets sign languages apart from the other examples discussed so far is
that they quite freely allows shifting of the first person outside of speech and
attitude reports.
Something similar to role-shifting happens in the spoken language
Kwaza69, which has a speech reporting construction consisting of adding
matrix verb person inflexion to a literal copy of the reported utterance:70
(98) kukuihy˜
ill
-da
-1.sg
-ki
-dec
-∅
-3
-tsE
-dec
‘shei says shei is ill’
[
Kwaza (van der Voort 2002:312)
]
This same construction, with the shifted first person may be used for animals
and even inanimate objects, so it’s really more than just quotation:
(99) bwa
finish
-da
-1.sg
-my˜
-vol
-∅
-3
-tsE
-dec
‘it is about to run out’ (the gas of the cigarette lighter)
lit: it (says): “I’ll be finished!”
[
Kwaza (van der Voort 2002:321)
]
As suggested by van der Voort (2002), examples like this one might be ex-
plained away by saying that the first person + volitional marking combination
has grammaticalized and now denotes something like the verb want/be about
to. Otherwise, we might eventually have to include in our analysis indexical
shifters beyond the usual attitude operators.
A final piece of data to firmly establish that indexical shifting is not some-
thing that can be swept under the carpet by disqualifying dubiously indexical
68Analyses of role-shifts as monsters have been proposed, recently, by Zucchi (2004)
and Quer (2005), more about this below.
69An isolated language of Brazil with 25 speakers.
70vol = volitional marker, dec = declarative mood.
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markers from exotic languages, is so-called free indirect discourse. Schlenker
notes that in free indirect discourse, a literary style mixing the point of view
of the character with that of the narrator, some (rather specific) indexical
features can be shifted. Consider, for example (100), where the combination
of tomorrow with the past tense on was (both obviously indexical) indicates
that they can not both be interpreted as indexical to the same context:
(100) Tomorrow was Monday. Monday, the beginning of another school
week!
[
(Banfield 1982), cited by Schlenker (2003:63)
]
It seems that in story telling contexts, indexicals like tomorrow and now are
often interpreted as in the context of the story as experienced from the char-
acter’s point of view, while others are interpreted ‘truly’ indexical, i.e. with
respect to the context of the narrator (or the reader, depending on the narra-
tive style). In this sense, (100)’s tomorrow is a shifted indexical like Amharic
I. It must however be noted that this literary perspective shifting appears
to be a slightly different phenomenon, if only because one of the defining
characteristics of free indirect discourse is the absence of a explicitly prefixed
reporting verb, i.e. the shifts occur freely in main clauses. Though Schlenker
(2004a) has abandoned the view, advocated in his (1999) and Sharvit (2004),
that free indirect discourse constitutes a genuine monster, such a view would
still be preferable over an analysis that stipulates that somehow this tomor-
row is not the indexical it is in ordinary spoken English.
2.4.3.2 Shifty indexicals as quotation
A second maneuver that can be performed to avoid monsters is to claim
that we are really dealing with quotation here. The argument originates
with Kaplan (1989:510-1) who, after formulating the Prohibition on Mon-
sters, observes that English does seem to have a way to shift the reference of
indexicals, viz. by quoting them:
(101) Otto said “I am a fool.”
[
(Kaplan 1989:511)
]
He goes on to claim that such direct discourse-type quotationsmention rather
than use the quoted expressions. This means that the quoted first person
pronoun in (101) is not used to refer to any individual whatsoever, rather
the whole quoted phrase refers to an utterance. On this view, quotation
marks turn expressions of the object language into terms referring to those
expressions, just like we sometimes use the Greek letter ϕ to refer to a for-
mula, or a bracketed natural number to refer to an example sentence. In all
those cases we do not use the intended expressions, but make claims about
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them, which is what makes Kaplan view all statements exemplified below as
metalinguistic:
(102) a. A formula ϕ is valid iff it is true in all models
b. This is illustrated in sentence (37c)
c. Otto’s favorite one letter word is I
Adhering to the logician’s strict use/mention distinction, Kaplan considers
any form of metalinguistic reference to fall outside the scope of semantic the-
ory, perhaps for fear of infesting the logic with paradoxical self-reference. But
even if we were to widen the scope of semantic theory so as to accommodate
(102)’s perfectly fine specimens of naturally occurring, spoken and written,
English, by somehow adding devices to refer to expressions of the object lan-
guage to that same object language, we wouldn’t need monsters: from the
fact that the occurrences of I in (101) and (102c) refer to linguistic entities
rather than persons we can already derive the apparent indexical shift in the
latter.
Along these lines, direct discourse in English is rendered harmless for
Kaplanian theory. Now, can we disqualify all the above shifting data by
analyzing the reporting constructions as quotation? Well, putting aside the
temporal shifts, and the free indirect discourse, which was a bit odd anyway,
this seems a prudent course of action. At this point it does indeed seem
quite feasible to analyze our examples as involving optional, hidden quota-
tion marks: John says: “I am a hero” for (93), They said: “We are able” for
(95), Hesen said “I am rich” for (96), and, finally, note that Lillo-Martin’s
(1995) translation of the signed example already uses a direct discourse con-
struction with quotation marks. The observed ambiguity between a shifted
and a non-shifted, Kaplanian reading (cf. fn. 61 and (96)) shows that the
quotation marks are not realized on the surface and the hearer may choose
to interpret the reports with or without them. This may not be the pretti-
est solution (hidden operator, ambiguity) but in its defense it must be noted
that quotation marks are often not that clearly pronounced in spoken English
either, at least not as separate morphemes.71
71It does seem that often a very specific intonation pattern marks quotation in English,
perhaps following Potts’ hypothesis:
Lexicalization hypothesis In quotation, each prosodic word projects
to its own intonational phrase with a rise-fall-rise contour.[
(Potts 2005:8)
]
The extent to which this covers all forms of quotation (from pure mention to scare quoting)
and successfully disambiguates, definitely requires further research:
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Anand & Nevins’s (2004) analysis of Zazaki shifting lends some prima fa-
cie credibility to the quotation analysis. In Zazaki, indexicals obey what they
call the ShiftTogether constraint, which says that indexicals may (or may
not) shift under an attitude operator, but they cannot shift independently.
They provide data like (103), to show, convincingly, that once an indexical
shifts, all the other indexicals in the same report shift too. Consider:
(103) V1zeri
yesterday
Rojda
Rojda
Bill
Bill
-ra
-to
va
said
kE
that
Ez
I
to
you
-ra
-to
miradi˘sa
be angry.pres
‘Yesterday Rojda said to Bill that she was angry at him’[
Zazaki (Anand & Nevins 2004:4)
]
With two embedded indexicals (disregarding the present tense on the verb),
and the possibility of shifting or not, we might expect three more readings
beside the one given in in the translation. As it turns out, the sentence has
only two: either both indexicals or neither is shifted. For ease of presentation,
imagine me uttering (103) to Hesen (in his native language). The possible
readings are:
(104) Rojda to Bill:
a. “I am angry at you”
b. “Emar is angry at Hesen”
c. *“Emar is angry at you”
d. *“I am angry at Hesen”
For completeness, note that the two readings of the Zazaki report corre-
spond exactly to what we get on a direct vs. indirect discourse ambiguity, as
predicted by a quotational analysis:
(105) a. Yesterday Rojda said to Bill, “I am angry at you”
[≈(104a)]
b. Yesterday Rojda said to Bill that I am angry at you
[≈(104b)]
Anand & Nevins (2004) formalize the ShiftTogether constraint by postu-
lating an optional indexical shift operator, introduced by the attitude verb,
together with an implicit, yet in my view quite bold, assumption that indexi-
cals have to be interpreted in situ (i.e. they can never escape the scope of the
nearest such operator by means of, say, presupposition projection or covert
movements).72 The operator-theoretic approach faithfully captures Shift-
Together and makes an interesting further prediction, viz. that “[i]n cases
72 My own approach in chapter 3 is one that treats indexicals as presuppositions that
prefer to take widest possible scope. This follows earlier DRT analyses of referential
expressions: Geurts (1997) for proper names, and Zeevat (1999) for indexicals.
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of multiple embedding, shifting in the intermediate clause prevents a lower in-
dexical from being interpreted indexical to the matrix context” (p.16), which
they show to be borne out by the data as well.
Now, is ShiftTogether a universal constraint, and if so, is there an
empirical difference between the operator-theoretic and the quotational anal-
yses? As for the first question, it seems the answer must be no. For consider:
(106) IXa MADRIDm MOMENT
t
placea Madrid at time t
JOANi
John
THINK IX-1i STUDY FINISH HEREb
RS→i
[→John think I study finish here]
‘When he was in Madrid, John thought he would finish his studies
here (in Barcelona)’
[
Catalan Sign Language (Quer 2005)
]
In this sign language example, the first person is shifted, but the locative in-
dexical here gets a Kaplanian interpretation. Even within the person domain
we can get similar mixes:
(107) Simon
Simon
ra´sereyineht’u
2.sg-hit-1.sg
hadi
say.3.sg
‘Simon said that you hit him’
[
Slave (Anand & Nevins 2004:5)
]
This last one may not be too clear, because the English sentence is compatible
with a fully shifted reading of the original as well. To highlight the mixed
reading, imagine I utter (107) to Ellsworth, because I’ve heard that Simon
has been going around telling people, “Ellsworth hit me”, behind her back.
In this case the full shift reading, Simon said, “you hit me”, is out, but the
Slave example should still be true.73
In light of the Slave data in particular, Anand & Nevins propose a some-
what weaker version of the ShiftTogether constraint which allows for
language variation with respect to the indexical domain. In other words, for
Zazaki, there’s a ShiftTogether for all indexicals, whereas in Slave it holds
only for first person indexicals, and in Catalan Sign Language perhaps for all
but locative and temporal indexicals. Consequently, the operator-theoretic
approach must be adapted to affect only a particular group of indexicals.
Note that, even combined with the optionality of shifting, the predictions
are still non-trivial, because (i) indexicals of the exact same type in the
same clause must still always shift (or not shift) together, and (ii), in case of
73Anand & Nevins’ discussion leaves this implicit, but that’s what their gloss and
analysis predict.
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multiple embeddings, a shift in some shallow embedding prevents deeper in-
dexicals (of the given type) from being indexical to the main context. Anand
& Nevins claim that this holds for Slave and Zazaki. For other languages
rigorous testing has yet to be done. A tentative counterexample to (i) might
be Amharic: 74
(108) al@ttazz@z@n˜n˜
1.sg-will-not-obey-1.sg
al@
3.sg.m-past-say
‘Hei said hei would not obey mej’
[
Amharic (Leslau 1995:779)
]
In this example the embedded clause contains two first person markers, only
one of which is interpreted as shifted. But, before we throw out the ShiftTo-
gether constraint too hastily, note that further research may be necessary
to confirm the Amharic judgment, as it has been noted that the example
is “not very solid” (Schlenker p.c. to von Stechow, who uses this example
to show that Amharic shifting is not simply reducable to direct discourse).
We must therefore leave the matter of the alleged universality of ShiftTo-
gether for future research.
So, a weakened version of ShiftTogether may hold, but with the re-
striction to a particular domain of indexicality we have immediately lost the
close parallel with the direct discourse analysis which did equivalent pre-
dictions for the Zazaki examples considered so far, including the one with
the multiple embeddings. But, obviously, the mixed indexicality examples
in (106), (107) and (108) cannot be analyzed by quoting the entire report
complement. Thus, as to the second question—is ShiftTogether equiv-
alent to a direct discourse analysis?—the answer must be no, quotation is
much stronger, because it necessarily affects every term in its scope, not just
indexicals. Counterexamples to the quotation analysis are therefore provided
by mixed cases that retain some feature as if they were in direct discourse,
while adapting others to conform to the format of indirect discourse. We’ve
already seen some, but these mixes need not be confined to indexical features:
(109) eÙc
one
dà
prt
d
prt
eÚpe
said
[. . . ]
[. . . ]
pèmyai
to send.inf
dà
prt
kaÈ
and
prokatalhyomènouc
occupy.prtc.acc.pl
t Łkra,
the heights.acc,
ípwc
so that
m
not
fjswsi
forestall.past.3.pl
m te
neither
KÜroc
Cyrus.nom
74This example is cited by von Stechow (2001:5) and (2002:9), as well as Anand &
Nevins (2004:15), though Schlenker (2003) doesn’t mention it, presumably because it “is
not very solid” and there are better investigated alternatives to show that indexical shifts
are not quotation, like (116) (Schlenker p.c. to von Stechow)
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m te
nor
oÉ KÐlikec
the Cilicians.nom.pl
katalabìntec,
occupy.prtc.nom.pl,
Án
whose.gen.pl
polloÌc
many (people).m/f.acc.pl
kaÈ
and
poll
many.n.acc.pl
qr mata
possessions.n.acc.pl
êqomen
have.1.pl
nhrpakìtec
plunder.prtc.nom.pl
‘one man in particular proposed [. . . ] to send a force to occupy
the mountain heights in advance, in order that neither Cyrus nor
the Cilicians, of whom they had seized many people and things as
plunder, should forestall them’[
Ancient Greek, Xenophon, Anabasis 1.3.14 (Bary & Maier 2003)
]
In (109), the main verb of the reported clause is an infinitive, pèmyai, which
indicates that the report is indirect, for in direct discourse the relevant com-
mander must have used a finite form of the verb come, probably 1st person
plural like the shifted/quoted êqomen in the relative clause. On a quotation
analysis, this doesn’t add up: apparently, the report is indirect except for
(part of) the relative clause. In English, it has been argued that such in-
trasentential mixes of direct and indirect discourse make little sense, so we
can give up the quotation analysis:
(110) ??one man in particular proposed [. . . ] to send a force [. . . ] in order
that neither Cyrus nor the Cilicians, of whom “we have seized many
people and things as plunder,” should forestall them
On the other hand, a quick look at your local newspaper suffices to show
that mid-sentential mixes of indirect and direct discourse are ubiquitous in
written language, and indeed the translation given in Xenophon (2005) relies
on just such a mix:
(111) one man in particular proposed [. . . ] to send a force [. . . ] in order
that neither Cyrus nor the Cilicians should forestall them—“and
we have in our possession,” he said, “many of these Cilicians and
much of their property that we have seized as plunder.”
Though this particular sentence may be a rather special case, as it’s intro-
duced by a dash and starts (almost) at a sentence boundary, the recent liter-
ature on subclausal quotation shows that it’s quite a powerful tool (Cappelen
& Lepore 1997; Recanati 2001; Potts 2004a; de Brabanter 2005; Geurts &
Maier 2005). Perhaps, then, mixed quotation, as Cappelen & Lepore (1997)
have termed the mix of direct and indirect discourse paradigmatically ex-
emplified by (112), is exactly what we need to explain away these alleged
2.4 Anti-reductionism and pure de se separatism 151
indexical shifting monsters?
(112) Quine says that quotation “. . . has a certain anomalous feature”[
(Davidson 1979:30)
]
Note for instance that mixed quotations in English appear to shift indexi-
cals:75
(113) a. Their accord on this issue, he said, has proved “quite a surprise
to both of us.”
[
New York Times, (Cappelen & Lepore 1997)
]
b. Pascal suspected that the mercury was really supported by
the “weight and pressure of the air because I consider them
only as a particular case of a universal principle concerning
the equilibriums of fluids.”
[
(Hall 1981:252)
]
c. Niet
Not
alleen
just
de
the
RAI,
RAI,
ook
also
het
the
parlement,
parliament,
nee,
no,
heel
all of
Italie¨
Italy
is
is
trots
proud
op
of
“onze
“our
meiden”
girls”
in
in
Irak
Iraq [
Dutch, Volkskrant, 19-4-’03
]
d. Hij
He
vindt
thinks
iemand
someone
stoer
cool
als
if
‘hij
he
is
is
zoals
like
mij’
me.acc
‘He thinks somebody’s cool if “he is like me”’[
Dutch, Contrast, 20-12-’02
]
e. Naturally John Lennon was expelled and sent to art school,
“so I can fail there as well”.[
Guardian, 2-11-’00, cited by de Brabanter (2005:2)
]
f. [The] commercial for a popular pain reliever which is endorsed
by an actor who is “not a doctor, but I play one on TV”[
itre.cis.upenn.edu/∼myl/languagelog/archives/002541.html
]
Apparently, subclausal quotation is not only ubiquitous in English, it’s also
powerful enough to shift some indexicals in a report, while leaving other
parts of the same clause in indirect form. Quotation might go a long way
in explaining indexical shifts after all.76 It remains unclear whether we can
adequately capture all the apparent direct/indirect mixes encountered above
75I have discussed the matter of indexical shift in mixed quotation elsewhere, along
with some of the examples in (113), e.g. in (Maier 2003)
76It is not clear what are the restriction on mixed quotation as it is still a relatively new
field of study. Some authors argue, for instance, that subclausal quotation can only apply
to syntactic constituents (Geurts & Maier 2005), while others say this is too strict (Cum-
ming 2005). (We’ve already seen apparent counterexamples to the constituent hypothesis
in (113b) and (113f), though there may be room for a fix along the lines of breaking down
the larger quotation into two parts, at the clausal boundary indicated by the conjunction.)
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by mixed quotations. Note that the mechanisms of mixed quoting must be
quite flexible indeed. I offer some more empirical evidence to cast further
doubt on the quotation analysis. These involve NPI licensing, indirect ques-
tions, and extraction. Besides, there’s also a purely theoretical complication
in using mixed quotation, but data first.
So-called negative polarity items (NPIs) are terms that can occur only in
negative, i.e. downward entailing positions in a sentence, like, say, under the
scope of a negation, or in the antecedent of a conditional. In Zazaki kes is
such an NPI—as is, by the way, its translation, anyone, in English. As in
English, a negative marker in the main clause may license this NPI in an
indirect discourse report complement, but interestingly it does the same if
that complement contains shifted indexicals:
(114) Rojda
Rojda
ne
not
va
said
kE
that
m1
I.erg
kes
anyone.NPI
paci
kiss
kErd
did
‘Rojda didn’t say that she kissed anyone’[
Zazaki, (Anand & Nevins 2004:3)
]
Obviously then, we’re not dealing with direct discourse for the complement
on its own is ungrammatical, as is its English counterpart:
(115) *Rojda didn’t say: “I kissed anyone”
The translation obviously doesn’t allow mixed quotation that quotes the
first person while leaving the NPI object alone, but perhaps that’s just a
typological difference in the rules governing mixed quotation.
The same kind of observation can be made with respect to belief embed-
ded wh-question formation: In English, the required wh-extraction is possible
in indirect, but not direct discourse; in Amharic it’s possible in reports with
shifted indexicals:
(116) m1n
what
amt’
bring.imper
-a
-2.m
1nd
comp
-al
-say
-@
-3.m
-n˜n˜
-1.sg.obj
al
neg
-s@mma
-hear
-hu
-1.sg
-mm
-neg
‘I didn’t hear what he told me to bring’ [
Amharic, (Leslau 1995:779)
]
As for terminology, we say that the wh-phrase what is ‘(base-)generated’ as
the object argument of the embedded imperative bring, and then, in the
English translation at least, ‘extracted’, i.e. moved out of its clause to sur-
face somewhere else, leaving but an ‘invisible trace’ at the object position it
started at.
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To see what this example is supposed to show, let me sketch you a scenario
in which it could occur:
(117) In the distance, a rather agitated fellow is yelling to me: “Bring my
grrm. . . !” Since I can’t make out what he wants me to bring him,
I turn to a nearby Ethiopian and utter (116), i.e.
a. I didn’t hear what he told me to bring
b. *I didn’t hear that he said to me “bring what!”
c. *I didn’t hear what he told me to “bring!”
The shifted indexical is the second person feature on the embedded bring. In
addition, the fact that this verb is in imperative mood also points to a direct
discourse-like quotation. But given the scenario in (117), the embedded
object, what, is certainly not quoted (cf. (117b)): it is what makes the report
an indirect question, as in (117a). So, if we really want to maintain it’s
quotation, we are forced to accept some rather shady mix quotes, as in (117c).
The same point can be made for (other types of) extraction from a report
complement. As a final example, consider:
(118) c˘EnEkE
girl
[kE
that
HEseni
Hesen
va
said
m1
I
paci
kiss
kErda]
did
rindEka
be pretty.pres’
the girl that Hesen said he kissed is pretty’[
Zazaki, (Anand & Nevins 2004:3)
]
According to Anand & Nevins (2004:3), this extraction of the girl from the
object argument slot of kiss “is illicit in bona fide cases of direct discourse”.
Note the cautious use of bona fide, perhaps in order to leave room for a
weakened, mixed quotational analysis.77
77The proposal under investigation here (i.e. that shifted indexicals are mixed quoted)
bears some striking outward resemblance to Schlenker’s (1998) idea that shifted indexi-
cals are indirectly quoted. In Schlenker’s terminology, a report is an indirect quotation iff
its complement’s LF corresponds to the reported utterance’s. Note that Schlenker’s LFs
are highly structured semantic entities, think syntactic trees with semantic leaves, mak-
ing indirect quotation something in between direct quotation and indirect speech, hence
the name. He successfully employs indirect quotation to account for intraclausal combina-
tions of shifted indexicals with extraction, like (118). However, since his indirect quotation
operator ‘QUOT’ takes scope over the whole embedded clause, examples of mixed indexi-
cality, like our (106), require something extra, viz. that “constituents of a quoted LF may
be scoped out of QUOT and interpreted a` la Kaplan [(1969)]” (p.3). This is no longer
compatible with our tentative mixed quote analysis, which does not require scoping of
indexicals, but instead adjusts the scope of the quotation. I intend to explore the various
ways one can go about implementing a ‘quotational analysis’ of shifted indexicality in
future research.
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This concludes a brief overview of the shifty data. It shows that the
pseudo-indexical/anaphoric and direct discourse analyses are too simple. The
status of the ShiftTogether constraint is still an open question (along with
the possibility of an operator-theoretic approach), as is the possibility of a
weakly (mixed) quotational analysis. Before going on with Schlenker’s alter-
native analysis in terms of context quantification, let me close this quotation
section with a theoretical issue concerning mixed quotation.
As is well-known in the quotation literature, mixed quotation is logically
quite distinct from direct discourse. The first one to pinpoint the issue was
Davidson:
Quine says that quotation “. . . has a certain anomalous
feature”
[
=(112)
]
Are the quoted words used or mentioned? Obviously mentioned
since the words are Quine’s own, and I want to mark the fact.
But equally obvious is the fact that the words are used; if they
were not, what follows the word ‘quotation’ would be a singu-
lar term, and this cannot be if I have produced a grammatical
sentence.
[
(Davidson 1979:30)
]
In other words, mixed quoted phrases cannot be analyzed as mere mention,
for that would turn the phrase into a referring term, which, given the position
of the quotation marks, often makes little sense, grammatically speaking.
Additional evidence for what I call the use hypothesis for mixed quotation
comes from anaphora across quotation marks:78
(119) David Penberthy [. . . ] has said that his paper’s stories about
Mr Brogden’s behaviour, quote: “Wouldn’t be appearing, if there
weren’t peoplei inside the Liberal Party who were trying to get them
out,” unquote. Who were thesei people inside the Liberal Party?[
http://www.abc.net.au/stateline/nsw/content/2005/s1452416.htm
02-09-’05.
]
This example shows that a quoted expression can still contribute a ‘dis-
course referent’ to the common ground, which indicates that, at some level,
these expressions are ordinarily interpreted, as if used, in addition to any
mention-based meaning they may have.79 Another piece of data supporting
the use hypothesis concerns the occasional occurrence of unshifted indexicals
in mixed quotation:
78There’s a purely technical reason for the fact that (119) and (120) below both contain
the, not all that common, phonetically spelled out quote/unquote construction: there’s no
way to Google for (most) punctuation marks.
79Interestingly, the same thing holds for full, direct quotations:
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(120) And I even pissed off the youngest one so much that he told me to
quote unquote ‘stick a lamp up my ass’.[
http://www.fansfromoz.com/lowie.html, 21-11-’05
]
We see here an unambiguously Kaplanian interpretation of my, referring to
the actual speaker, who was probably addressed in second person originally.
Apparently, the pronoun is not mentioned or it would have retained its direct
discourse form. In connection with the indexical shifts in mixed quotation
observed earlier, (113), note that it’s a completely open question why some
mixed quoted indexicals shift, while others do not.
As Davidson also noted, we’re not just dealing with ordinary use either,
mixed quotation combines elements of both modes of reference. In the recent
literature there has been a lot of discussion about the (relative) status of the
use and mention components of a mixed quotation’s ‘meaning’: some say the
mention part belongs to a fully independent layer of content (Potts 2004a);
others that it is ‘merely’ pragmatic—with truth-conditional impact (Recanati
2001; Predelli 2003), or without (Geurts 2001).80
In any case mixed quoted expressions are not just mentioned, but used.
Now remember that the whole point of the quotational enterprise was to
reduce shiftiness to mention. The reasoning was as follows: if, as in pure
mention or direct discourse, an indexical refers to a linguistic item instead
of a contextually supplied individual, it is hardly surprising that it violates
Principle 2. Moreover, if, as in direct discourse and mixed quotations, the
words mentioned are specified as belonging to the reportee’s original utter-
ance, we get the fact that quoted indexicals appear to be interpreted from
that reportee’s point of view/context for free. Now that it has become clear
that in mixed quoting we’re really using the so quoted indexicals, we are
at a loss to explain why we can get shifts. The use hypothesis for mixed
quoting, plus the apparent optionality of indexical shifts therein, make the
situation remarkably similar to, and at least as complex and ill-understood
as, the cross-linguistic data we were trying to analyze with it. Perhaps then
it makes more sense to turn things around and start from an account of shift-
ing in indirect discourse, and then reduce mixed quotation to that. The next
(i) “Obviously, not to do it in New York was crucial, because it would offend the
sensibilities of some New Yorkersi,” said Mr. Stone, who is onei himself.[
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/12/movies/MoviesFeatures/12zero.html
]
[Note also the interesting ambiguity that arises because the proper name is also a com-
mon name (as described in http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/∼myl/languagelog/archives/
002702.html)]
80Geurts & Maier (2005) argue for a ‘one-dimensional’ analysis, unifying the two levels
into one: the deferred use of the mentioned constituent.
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section will provide just such an analysis of indirect discourse: Schlenker’s
analysis of shifty indexicals, formulated in terms of a monstrous quantifica-
tion over contexts, independent of quotation.
2.4.3.3 Schlenker’s Monsters
Schlenker (2003) proposes an alternative account of the data with logophors,
PRO, and shifted indexicals. It treats these elements as indexicals that can
pick up a referent from a reported speech/attitude context, which in turn
is made available by the attitude verb. His analysis requires significant ex-
tensions to the logical language, first of all, he moves from an intensional
logic to a many-sorted extensional system, replacing modal operators with
quantification over worlds and times, as exemplified below:
(121) J2¬∃x[fish(x) ∧ walk(x)]Kf〈w,t〉
; J∀w′∀t′¬∃x[fish(x, w′, t′) ∧ walk(x, w′, t′)]Kf [w 7→w][t 7→t]
Note how the assignment function now takes over the role of the intensional
interpretation parameters (which in the new system are represented by free
variables), and how all predicates suddenly require two extra argument po-
sitions. The result of this move is a seemingly more complex and powerful
system but, as Schlenker points out, at least this much expressiveness is
needed on independent linguistic grounds.
To handle indexicals we already went beyond intensional logic and added
a second interpretation parameter, the context. We could just leave that one
as is, and mimic Kaplan’s logic:
(122) J2nwalk(i)Kf,c〈w,t〉
; J∀w′[walk(i, w′, n)Kf,c
Note how, as a bonus, we have a more unified representation of indexicals in
different domains, i.e. we have constants a(ctually) and n(ow), like i, instead
of operators a and n. And since Kaplan’s prohibition of monsters required
that belief reporting is an intensional operator, like 2, it too becomes a world
quantifier, albeit a parametrized one:
(123) Jbelthate nwalk(i)Kf,c〈w,t〉
; qbelthate,w,tw′[walk(i, w′, n)]yf [w 7→w][t 7→t],c
The semantics of this quantifier can be copied mutatis mutandis from the
one discussed in 2.3.4, but let’s leave our extensional emulation of Kaplan
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and move on to the more advanced system that can cope with the data of
this section.
As previously announced, the logic will be monstrous in the sense that
its attitude operators are really quantifiers over contexts. A last addition
is therefore a fourth quantification type, the context. Truth will always
have to be defined relative to a context, outside the object language, but
with the addition of context variables in the language we can specify which
contexts a given indexical depends on. To achieve this we turn our indexical
constants into function symbols, mapping context variables onto individuals.
The indexical now or a present tense marker, for instance, are represented
at lf as t(c), consisting of the indexical ‘now’ function mapping each context
onto its time coordinate, and a context variable. As a notational shorthand
we’ll always just subscript the context argument to an indexical. The first
person thus comes out as ac, where JacKc 7→c = ac = the agent/center/speaker
of context c.
Let’s go through an example to make things clearer:
(124) Jbelthate nwalk(i)Kf,ci
; qbelthate,w,tc′[walk(ac, wc′ , tc)]yf [w 7→wi][t 7→ti][c 7→c]
Using the notion of a belief context, c ∈ BelC, as described for example in
1.2.3 and 1.B.4, the semantics of this monster is as follows:
(125)
q
belthate,w,tc
′[walk(ac, wc′ , tc)]
yf [w 7→wi][t 7→ti][c 7→c] = 1
iff for all c′ ∈ BelC(JeK... , 〈JwK... , JtK...〉) :Jwalk(ac, wc′ , tc)Kf...[c 7→c][c′ 7→c′] = 1
iff for all c′ ∈ BelC(ellsworth, i): 〈ac, wc′ , tc〉 ∈ JwalkK
Assuming the utterance context, c, is the actual context centered around me,
while I’m writing this, this means (124) is true iff in every context compatible
with Ellsworth’s belief the world is such that Emar walks October 8, 2006.
With our new machinery, we can say that some indexical constants, like
English I and now, as demonstrated above, always take the main context c
as their argument, while shiftable elements like Amharic I can take either
that, or the one introduced by the attitude verb. In that last case we get:
(126) John thinks I am a hero
[
Pseudo-Amharic, ≈(93)]
 belthatj,w,tc′[hero(ac′ , wc′ , tc′)]q
belthatj,w,tc
′[hero(ac′ , wc′ , tc′)]
yc
= 1
iff
q
belthatj,w,tc
′[hero(ac′ , wc′ , tc′)]
y[w 7→wc][t 7→tc][c 7→c]
= 1
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iff for all c′ ∈ BelC(john, 〈wc, tc〉): 〈ac′ , wc′ , tc′〉 ∈ JheroK
That is, (126) is true iff in all of John’s actual belief contexts the center is a
hero. This is exactly the pure de se belief that in English we would normally
report with John thinks he’s a hero, but that in Pseudo-Amharic would be
spelled out as (126). This immediately leads to an interesting prediction:
unlike the English gloss with the coreferential pronoun, we predict that the
Amharic shifted reading is unambiguously pure de se. The quotational ac-
count shares this prediction, for it requires directly that John used the first
person pronoun, and so does the anaphoric account, which treats shifted I
as a he? (which is defined as allowing only pure de se readings). Unfortu-
nately, as far as I know, this prediction has not been tested (e.g. by using a
pants-on-fire scenario, as Kusumoto (1998) did with a Bafut logophor, here
in (55b)). For completeness, here’s a representation of the de re/de se am-
biguous English coreferential pronoun report, pure de se reading first:
(127) Ellsworth believes she is going to win
[
=(3), p. 73
]
a.  belthate,w,tc′∃t′ > tc′ [win(ac′ , wc′ , t′)]
b.  belthate,w,tc′∃t′ > tc′ [win(e, wc′ , t′)]
Before we go on, it should be noted that many of the shifty data are
tested (or even known to hold) only with indirect speech rather than belief
reports (cf. the genuine Amharic (93) that gave rise this Pseudo-Amharic
adaptation), but with minor modifications, essentially the same story can be
told for speech as for any other type of attitude report, we just need to define
SayC, the set of contexts compatible with what a person said:
(128) SayC : D × I → ℘C
c ∈ SayC(a, i) iff there is a σ uttered by a at i and JσKc = 1
In other words, SayC(a, i) is simply the diagonal of the utterance of a in
i. Obviously this infests the semantics of speech reporting with a very high
degree of omniscience/closure, but, as argued before, this does not concern
us here.
Some examples from 2.4.3.1 and 2.4.3.2:
(129) oÉ
the(y).nom.pl
dà
part
eÚpon
say.past.3.pl
íti
that.comp
ÉkanoÐ
able.nom.pl
âsmen
be.1.pl
[. . . ]
[. . . ]
‘They replied that they were able [to invade this land]’
[
=(95)
]
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 ∃t′ < t[saythatX,w,t′c′[able(ac′ + Y, wc′ , tc′)]]81
(130) IXa MADRIDm MOMENT
t
placea Madrid at time t
JOANi
John
THINK IX-1i STUDY FINISH HEREb
RS→i
[→John think I study finish here]
‘When he was in Madrid, John thought he would finish his studies
here’
[
=(106)
]
 ∀t′[t′ < t ∧ loc(j, m, w, t′)→
belthatj,w,t′c
′∃t′′ > tc′ [finish studies(ac′ , wc′ , t′′)
∧loc(ac′ , pc, wc′ , t′′)]]82
(131) Rojda
Rojda
ne
not
va
said
kE
that
m1
I.erg
kes
anyone.NPI
paci
kiss
kErd
did
‘Rojda didn’t say that she kissed anyone’
[
=(114)
]
 ∃t′ < t[¬saythatr,w,t′c′∃t′′ < tc′∃x[kiss(ac′ , x, wc′ , t′′)]]
In all of these the indexicals, shifted or not are represented as logical in-
dexicals, i.e. as individual constants/functions that get their referent from a
context. Some indexicals, like I and now in (124) and here in (130), take the
actual context, c, which means they get a Kaplanian interpretation. Others
may pick up the quantified variable c′ introduced by the report, so that they
receive a shifted interpretation, e.g. the first persons and the, not so directly
surface-realized, tense and mood arguments of the embedded predicates in
(129)-(131).
You’ve been promised a unified account of shifts with PRO and logophors,
so let’s now turn to those other data, from 2.4.1. Of course, the way to go is
pretty obvious: we’ve already seen how to write purely de se logical forms,
apparently we just need to stipulate that indirect reflexives, logophors and
PROs are always represented as shifted first person indexicals, i.e. ac′ .
83
(132) ??Philip believes that he himself is dead
[≈(51b)]
 belthatp,w,tc′[dead(ac′ , wc′ , tc′)]
81The first person plural is simplifyingly represented as ac + Y, i.e. the context’s center
plus some other individuals left unspecified. The free plural variable Y should be thought
of as a presupposition or anaphor, as it can be bound to any salient set of individuals
available in the discourse or the wider context. In this case, the, in part pragmatically
determined, assignment function should map Y onto the denotation of X minus the speaker,
ac′ .
82pc denotes the place of context c, i.e. the place where ac is at tc in wc.
83In the case of second person de se reports, the logophor or PRO is represented as hc′
(= the addressee/hearer of context c′).
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(133) kofi
Kofi
be
say
ye`
LOG
-dzo
-leave
‘Kofi said he’d left’
[≈(54a)]
 ∃t′ < t[saythatk,w,t′c′∃t′′ < tc′ [leave(ac′ , wc′ , t′′)]]
(134) Ellsworth believes PRO to be on the winning side.
[≈(59b)]
 belthate,w,tc′[winning(ac′ , wc′ , tc′)]
In a sense, we’re doing the exact opposite of the anaphoric proposal de-
nounced in 2.4.3.1: we reduce the observed pure de se reporting through
PRO and logophors to monstrously shifted indexicality, instead of analyz-
ing shiftability of indexicals as a special case of Chierchia-style logophoric
binding (by intervening property abstractors).
Having gone through a couple of examples above, note how we’re led
to a three part typology of indexicals: there are rigid ones, shiftables, and
obligatorily shifted ones, exemplified in the person domain by English I,
Amharic I and PRO, respectively. The lexical stipulations, preliminarily
cashed out in terms of the features ±actual and ±c(ontextual), that say
which indexical form belongs to which category Schlenker calls the filtering
mechanism. Part of Schlenker’s paper is devoted to a derivation of this
filtering mechanism (using a theory of presuppositions).
Besides filtering, which is necessarily stipulative to a degree, Schlenker’s
full semantics requires a so-called agreement mechanism to explain why some
surface features of indexicals in reports appear to be left uninterpreted. One
example would be the third person feature of the embedded subject in a ‘co-
referential’ third person report, like (127). I put scare quotes on coreferential
because in the proposed pure de se lf, (127a), the second pronoun is really
represented as independent of the matrix clause. Rather, the embedded she
is represented as ac′ , denoting the center of a context, i.e. a semantically
first, rather than third person. Reasoning in the opposite direction, from
deep to surface structure: something is needed to explain why the pure de
se lf’s ac′ can surface either as a third person pronoun (in English, (127)), a
third person logophor (Ewe, (133)), a first person pronoun (Amharic, (126)),
or a (silent) PRO (English, (134)). Amharic represents the most natural
grammaticalization; simply analyzing the Amharic first person as carrying
the features +c and 1st does the trick.
Leaving the pronominal realizations for what they are, Schlenker focuses
on PRO, which, he shows, even though it’s invisible and semantically first
person, actually carries the person, gender and number features of the matrix
subject. That it has these features is easily brought out by making it bind a
reflexive:
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(135) John hopes PRO to buy
{
*myself
himself
}
a car
 hopethatj,w,tc′[buy car for(ac′ , ac′)]84
In (135), PRO binds the reflexive, so their features must match, from which
it follows that PRO is not morphosyntactically first person. Moreover, if we
ensure that in all hope alternatives c′ the center buying the car has become
female, we still get a masculine reflexive and PRO, provided that the main
clause subject, John, is a man in the actual context:
(136) John, a transsexual, hopes to become a woman and then [he hopes
to] buy
{
*herself
himself
}
a car
[≈(Schlenker 2003:79)]
 hopethatj,w,tc′[woman(ac′) ∧ buy car for(ac′ , ac′)]
Conclusion: PRO is a third person, masculine pronoun that may refer to a
female center, meaning that its hidden features are somehow deleted at lf.
In the temporal domain, we find a completely parallel situation, already
extensively documented, e.g. for Latin, as part the ‘consecutio temporum’
(sequence of tense) rules:
(137) Ignoravi
not know.1.sg.ind.past(perf)
quid
what
ageres
do.2.sg.subj.past(impf)
‘I didn’t know what you were doing’[
Latin, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latin grammar
]
 ∃t′ < t[¬knowwhac,w,t′c′[do(hc, ?, wc′ , tc′)]]
In (137) the embedded past tense contributes a tc′ to the lf,
85 reflecting the
fact that the embedded action is interpreted as simultaneous86 with the not
knowing. We might also describe this by saying that the formal past tense
feature of the embedded verb is deleted in the derivation of lf. As the trans-
lation in (137) shows, the same thing happens in English. Now, there are
some alternative analyses of the simultaneity of past-under-past (e.g. Enc¸
(1987)), but we will not go into those, or their limitations. Instead let’s fol-
low Schlenker (1999)87 who stipulates sequence of tense rules that say that
84We occasionally suppress some irrelevant, obvious arguments, like in this case wc′ , tc′
85Note that the subjunctive mood can be seen as a realization of a shifted wc′ argument.
In fact, Schlenker argues that the subjunctive is a logophor in the possible worlds domain.
86Or, perhaps, ‘pseudo-simultaneous’, in reference to our earlier remark on coreferen-
tiality in agreeing third person reports on p. 160.
87In later work, Schlenker also tries to formulate ways to get around sequence of tense,
and of person stipulations.
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under certain conditions, embedded tense inflections are not semantically
interpreted, thus allowing simultaneous, pure de se interpretations of e.g.
past-under-past constructions. I shall not formulate here what these condi-
tions are, for we’d better return to the person domain, where things are more
manageable.
Acknowledging the parallel between de me readings of ‘third-under-third’,
and de nunc readings of past-under-past constructions, Schlenker proposes
the addition of a sequence of person rule to semantically delete person and
gender features on embedded PROs and other pronouns. But, the question
remains, when do we delete features, and when do we interpret them? An-
swer: embedded features may be deleted at lf when they agree on the surface
with the matrix subject of the report in question. Or, formulating minimalis-
tically, i.e. the other way around, in the morphological spell-out process, em-
bedded (pseudo-coreferential) pure de se pronouns inherit the person, gender
and number features from the main clause’s subject, to achieve morphological
agreement. The idea that indexical features can get lost under morphological
agreement is not that new, so let’s trace its history to see it in action, and
hopefully to get some independent motivation for it. This will conclude our
discussion of Schlenker’s (1999; 2003) semantics of attitude reports.
2.4.3.4 Binding and feature deletion under agreement
Starting from Chierchia’s idea of a complement phrase introducing a λ as
property abstractor (2.4.1.3, 2.4.3.1), Heim (1994) describes how embedded
(indexical) pronouns may be represented as variables bound by such an atti-
tudinal abstractor at lf. For Heim, the possibility of bound variable interpre-
tations is governed by an agreement constraint: a person pronoun in a report
complement may be represented as a bound variable iff its person, number
and gender features match those of the main clause subject. For example:
(138) I think I’ll win
 bel∗iλx[win(x)]
The embedded pronoun in (138) has the same features as the report’s subject
and therefore it may be bound by the intervening λ. The semantic effect of
this binding is that we get a pure de se reading, the speaker self-ascribes
the property of winning. Note how, in the process, the indexical has lost all
its referential features until only a bare variable remains at lf, an aspect of
the current analysis that Schlenker’s monstrous theory of shifted indexicality
does not adopt.
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Obviously, the agreement constraint is not vacuous, it’s needed to avoid
unwanted pure de se readings in cases of feature mismatch:
(139) Ellsworth thinks I’ll win
 bel∗eλx[win(i)]
Further, the optionality of binding under agreement is necessary to account
for the so-called ‘de re/de se ambiguity’ observed time and again for third
person reports:
(140) Ellsworth believes she’s going to win
a.  bel∗eλx[win(x)]
b.  bel∗eλx[win(e)]
Completely in line with Chierchia’s ambiguity thesis, (140) is ambiguous
between (140a), the pure de se reading, and (140b), one that’s also true in
mistaken identity scenarios. The same should hold for (138), i.e. in addition
to the pure de se one given, we predict a reading that is true if I think, “that
guy will win”, unaware that I’m pointing to myself. However, I suspect
that, due to certain epistemic peculiarities of the first person, indicative,
present tense nature of the main clause of (138), this impure reading is highly
unlikely, or even pragmatically out.88 As shown by von Stechow (1982:28),
dream reports bring out the semantic binding of agreeing first persons much
clearer:89
(141) I dreamt I was Brigitte Bardot and I kissed me
[
(Lakoff 1972:639)
]
 dream∗iλx[bardot(x) ∧ kiss(x, i)]
I’ve represented the reading I get for (141) as uttered by Lakoff. It involves a
dream where the dreamself is, or at least strongly resembles, Brigitte Bardot
and as such kisses Lakoff, who, in this particular dream is seen as a third
person character, through the eyes of the dreamself.90
88The peculiar status of first person de re/de se reports, and their connection to Moore’s
paradox, *It is raining but I don’t believe it, are discussed by Atlas (to appear).
89Cf. also Heim (1994) and Percus & Sauerland (2003b) for more data and theory
concerning de re/de se dream reports.
90Though I’ve never had a dream where I see a third person version of myself this is
attested by people who dream they see themselves as if in a movie, from an impersonal,
objective camera perspective. It was quite hard to find testimony of dreams of the more
complex type required for the Lakoff report, i.e. seeing a version of yourself through another
person’s eyes, but I managed to get some confirmation at http://www.dreamviews.com/
forum/viewtopic.php?p=234258.
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As described by Heim (ms) and Kratzer (1998; 2006), binding under
agreement is more widely applicable than just to attitude reports. As it turns
out, the above account of the de re vs. pure de se ambiguity generalizes to an
account of the strict and sloppy readings of pronouns in only complements
(see 2.4.2.2 for our syntax/semantics of only):
(142) Only Ligia did her homework
a.  onlyx[x = l][did homework of(x, x)]
b.  onlyx[x = l][did homework of(x, l)]
In (142) the possessive pronoun’s surface features (3.sg.f) match those of
the subordinating quantifier (Only Ligia, which derives those features from
its restrictor, Ligia). By binding under agreement we may then remove the
features of the pronoun in the quantifier’s scope and replace it, at lf, with
an appropriately bound variable introduced by that quantifier. Incidentally,
since we’ve already set up the our only as a traditional, variable binding
quantifier, there’s no need for an extra λ here, and we can just pick x to
replace the possessive. This gives us (142a), according to which Ligia is the
only member of the set of students doing their own homework. If we forgo
the binding option we get (142b), where Ligia is the only person who did
Ligia’s homework.
Crucially, this same ambiguity applies to the first person variant:
(143) Only I did my homework
[
(Heim ms)
]
a.  onlyx[x = i][did homework of(x, x)]
b.  onlyx[x = i][did homework of(x, i)]
The intuitive possibility of the sloppy reading in (143a), which is predicted
by binding under agreement, supports the, at first preposterous sounding,
idea (hastily rejected in 2.4.3.1, and e.g. by Partee (1989)91) that even the
paradigmatic indexical, an English first person pronoun, is sometimes inter-
preted as a bound variable rather than a directly referential device.
Now recall that the difference between Schlenker’s system and Heim’s
was the fact that Schlenker maintains that embedded, shifted indexicals and
pronominal elements like PRO and he under agreement, are semantically
indexical in the sense that, even after feature deletion (if applicable), they
get their reference from a context, viz. a quantified context variable, made
91In fact, Partee claims only that a first person pronoun cannot be bound by a quantifier
and gives the following example of a bound I in a relative clause:
(i) I’m the only one around here who will admit that I could be wrong
[
(Partee 1989)
]
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available by a monstrous attitude operator. Since there is no candidate for a
monster to be found in examples like (143), it seems that indeed the deletion
rules are independent of attitude reporting and context shifting. This has
led von Stechow to the conclusion that we don’t really need monsters, we
can let the deletion under agreement do all the work, i.e. turning indexicals
into bound variables to derive pure de se readings.
2.4.3.5 A monster-free alternative?
Inspired by the Heim/Kratzer binding under agreement principle, Von Ste-
chow (2001; 2002) sets out to defend Kaplan against Schlenker’s monsters.
In his own words, he wants to show that:
while Kaplan (1989) is wrong in his claim that pronouns such as
I or you are always directly referential, Schlenker’s (1999) criti-
cism of Kaplan’s Prohibition against Monsters is not warranted.
Schlenker’s attitudes are arguably purely intensional operators.
There is no expression of natural language that denotes a gen-
uine monster.
But if attitudes are not monsters how come they seem to sometimes shift the
context of interpretation of an indexical? Short answer:
Attitudes [. . . ] may bind the egocentric variables of their
verbal complement under agreement and therefore may pro-
duce bound person/tense/mood readings. Under these
circumstances the variables lose their referential character
entirely.
[
(von Stechow 2002)92
]
The main idea, apparently, is still that of feature deletion under agree-
ment, as discussed in the previous subsection: indexicals may be represented
as mere bound variables when their surface features agree with those of the
reporting verb.
Now, to rival Schlenker’s system, von Stechow integrates this principle in
a more comprehensive semantics of attitude and speech reports that can
handle all varieties of shifty and rigid indexicals. First of all, following
Schlenker, he uses a many-sorted predicate logical extension with explicit
quantification over individuals, worlds and times. Then, instead of context
variables and monstrous quantifiers, he uses λ’s to represent ‘de se-binding’
in belief reports, following Heim’s (1994) analysis of (140), which in turn
follows Chierchia’s (1989). As shown in 1.2.3.2 already, the properties self-
ascribed in belief reports are not merely properties of individuals, but rather
of contexts, construed as person-world-time triples. This corresponds also to
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the observed fact that attitudinal de se binding can occur in exactly those
3 domains: individual, temporal, and modal. Where Schlenker quantifies
over context variables, von Stechow heads his complements with a complex
λxλwλt abstractor to get self-ascribable complements.
(144) Ellsworth believes she’s going to win
[
cf. (140), (127), (3)
]
a.  bel∗e,w,tλx′λw′λt′[∃t′′ > t′[win(x′, w′, t′′)]]
b.  bel∗e,w,tλx′λw′λt′[∃t′′ > t′[win(e, w′, t′′)]]
Semantically, we’re getting the same as before with Schlenker’s context quan-
tifier, cf. (126):q
(144a)
yc
= 1
iff
q
(144a)
y[w 7→wc][t 7→tc]
= 1
iff Jλx′λw′λt′[∃t′′ > t′[win(x′, w′, t′′)]]K... ⊇ BelC(JeK... , JwK... , JtK...)
iff for all c′ ∈ BelC(ellsworth, wc, tc):J∃t′′ > t′[win(x′, w′, t′′)]K[x 7→ac][w 7→wc][t 7→tc][x′ 7→ac′ ][w′ 7→wc′ ][t′ 7→tc′ ] = 1
iff for all belief alternatives c′ ∈ BelC(ellsworth, wc, tc), there is a
t > tc′ at which ac′′ wins (in wc′′)
In short, the logical representation and its semantics are but minimally dif-
ferent from Schlenker’s: abstracting x, w, and t out of attitude embedded
clauses comes out equivalent to having the attitude quantify over c’s (denot-
ing the same 〈a, w, c〉 triples), as long as we assume that certain referential
elements may be bound by such a local parameter, while others are not, i.e.
we need some version of Schlenker’s filtering mechanism, p. 160. Since both
theories are in need of a deletion under agreement principle as well, what is
the difference? As von Stechow himself observes, the differences are quite
subtle, the crucial point is the way features are deleted, or rather, what’s
left after a deletion. We’ve said it before, for Schlenker, the most straightfor-
ward grammaticalization of a de me report is Amharic I, that is to say, a first
person form. Agreement principles are needed to ensure that third person
logophors, pronouns and PRO can denote the belief context’s center as well.
For von Stechow on the other hand, pure de se readings corelate with a plain
bound variable. This always requires feature deletion, for Amharic first as
well as for English third person pronouns. Obviously then, something more
than just feature agreement is needed, for the third person matrix subject
John and the embedded first person in (93) do not agree in person. Von
Stechow’s solution is to stipulate an extra, agreement independent deletion
rule, called the Amharic Parameter (von Stechow (2002:25), ascribed to Heim
(ms)), that allows Amharic attitude verbs to delete and bind embedded first
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person features at will.
Thus, with an impressive array of morphosyntactic tools, von Stechow,
like Schlenker, succeeds in accounting for the full range of data. As presented
here, the differences between them are rather small, but to do them justice,
a more thorough reconstruction and comparison of their approaches is neces-
sary. For lack of space, we’ll have to leave it at this, however. The point on
which I wish to improve on these approaches in the following is not empiri-
cal coverage—I’ll settle for equal coverage—but mostly methodological. The
general motivation will be to shift the work from morphosyntax (agreement,
deletion, movement, etc.) to pragmasemantics (dynamic interpretation, pre-
supposition resolution, unification, etc.). The end result will be an account
with a thoroughly transparent syntax, and a properly context-dependent in-
terpretation module relying heavily on presupposition resolution.
2.A Many-sorted predicate logic
One can reduce the intensional predicate logic of 1.A to an extensional one
by allowing quantification over possible worlds in the object language. The
result is a two-sorted theory, indicating that there are two sets of points
(individuals and worlds) in the model, and two corresponding types of vari-
ables and constants. Let’s go through a three sorted version with individuals,
worlds and times.
2.A.1 Syntax
(145) a. Primitive symbols
(i) Variables: Var = VarD ∪ VarW ∪ VarT , i.e.:
over individuals: VarD = {x, x′, y, . . .}
over worlds: VarW = {w, w′, . . .}
over times: VarT = {t, t′, . . .}
(ii) Constants: Con = ConD ∪ ConW ∪ ConT
(iii) Terms: Term ... = Var ... ∪ Con ...
(iv) For each k, l,m a set of k, l,m-place predicate symbols:
walk, loser (1-1-1-place); love, = (2-1-1).
b. Atomic formulas
(i) If Π is an k, l,m-place predicate and τ1, . . . , τk ∈ TermD,
τk+1, . . . , τk+l ∈ TermW , τk+l+1, . . . , τk+l+m ∈ TermT ,
then Π(τ1, . . . , τk+l+m) is a formula.
c. Complex formulas
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(i) If ϕ and ψ are formulas and ξ ∈ Var , then ¬ϕ, [ϕ ∧ ψ],
and ∃ξϕ are formulas.
(146) Free variables, FV (ϕ) ⊂ Var , defined as in 1.A.3.
2.A.2 Semantics
(147) Model: M = 〈D,W, T, I〉
(148) Assignment function: a partial function f :⊆ Var → D, such that
if ξ ∈ VarD/W/T ∩Dom(f), then f(ξ) ∈ D/W/T
And an assignment is proper for ϕ iff FV (ϕ) ⊆ Dom(f), as before.
(149) Interpretation function: maps every γ ∈ ConD/W/T to a concept in
(D/W/T )W , and every k, l,m-predicate to a property in (℘(Dk ×
W l × Tm))W
Then, the Tarskian truth definition. In the following, f as always denotes
a proper assignment of the formula beneath it.
(150) a. Primitive symbols:
(i) If τ ∈ TermD/W/T , then JτKf ∈ D/W/T
(ii) If Π is a k-l-m-place predicate symbol, JΠKf ∈ (℘(Dk ×
W l × Tm))W
b. Atomic formulas:
(i) JΠ(τ1, . . . , τk+l+m)Kf = 1 iff 〈Jτ1Kf , . . . , Jτk+l+mKf〉 ∈JΠKf (otherwise = 0)
c. Complex formulas
(i) J¬ϕKf = 1− JϕKf
(ii) Jϕ ∧ ψKf = JϕKf · JψKf
(iii) J∃ξϕKf = 1 iff there is a g ⊇{ξ} f s.t. JϕKg = 1
2.A.3 Schlenker’s extensional Kaplan
Add a set of contexts C to the model and add a c as extra evaluation pa-
rameter to each semantic value: J. . .Kf,c. This context parameter is simply
passed through until we hit an indexical.
(151) Indexicals:
a. Syntax:
(i) i ∈ ConD (I)
(ii) a ∈ ConW (actually)
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(iii) n ∈ ConT (now)
b. Semantics
(i) JiKf,c = ac, the speaker/agent of c
(ii) JaKf,c = wc, the world of c
(iii) JnKf,c = tc, the time of c
Truth in a context is defined as truth in a context with respect to an
assignment that maps the free variables w and t to wc and tc respectively.
In other words, you can use these two special variables in your formula to
denote, when free, the actual time and world, which is useful for emulating
the index/evaluation parameters of the intensional system. We define fc =
f [w7→wc][t7→tc] (an assignment compatible with context c).
Now, belthat is an intensional operator, which, in this system comes down
to a world quantifier:
(152) Belief report:
q
belthatτ,w,tw
′ϕ
yf,c
= 1 iff there is a character C s.t.
δC ⊇ BelC(JτKf,c , f(w), f(t)) and for all w′ ∈ W : JϕKf [w′ 7→w′],c =
C(
〈JτKf,c , f(w), f(t)〉)(w′)
2.A.4 Adding contexts to the language
(153) Context variables: VarC = {c, c′, . . .}
(154) Functional indexicals: for every c ∈ VarC :
a. Syntax:
(i) ac ∈ TermD (I)
(ii) wc ∈ TermW (actually)
(iii) tc ∈ ConT (now)
b. Semantics
(i) JacKf = af(c), the speaker/agent of f(c)
(ii) JwcKf = wf(c), the world of f(c)
(iii) JtcKf = tf(c), the time of f(c)
Note that the definition of truth does not need any relativization to context or
index parameters, this is now taken over by the assignment function. Truth
in a context c is therefore defined as truth with respect to a c-compatible
assignment fc = f [c7→c][w7→wc][t7→tc].
Belief reports quantify over contexts:
(155) Belief report:
q
belthatτ,w,tc
′ϕ
yf
= 1 iff for all c′ ∈
BelC(JτKf , f(w), f(t)): JϕKf [c′ 7→c′] = 1
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2.B Typed λ-calculus
In type theory, every expression has a type which determines whether that
expression refers to an individual, a predicate, a relation or something higher-
order. The types therefore determine whether or not two or more expressions
together can form a new one. Furthermore, at a semantic level all such
syntactic combinations correspond to functional application.
2.B.1 Types
The set of types for standard extensional type theory is defined as follows:
(156) a. e is a type (the type for referring to entities)
b. t is a type (the type for referring to truth values)
c. if τ and σ are types then so is 〈τ, σ〉
A notational convention: association of type brackets is to the right, e.g.:
(157) 〈e, 〈〈t, t〉, t〉〉 = e〈tt〉t
2.B.2 Syntax
(158) The set of well-formed expressions, Exp:
a. Basic expressions (of a certain type):
(i) Conτ is the (possibly empty) set of constants of type τ
(ii) Var τ is the (infinite) set of variables of type τ
(iii) Expτ ⊇ Conτ ∪ Var τ
b. Complex expressions:
(i) If α, β ∈ Expt and ξ ∈ Var τ , then ¬α, [α∧β],∃ξα ∈ Expt
(ii) If α, β ∈ Expτ , then [α = β] ∈ Expt
(iii) If α ∈ Expτ , β ∈ Exp〈τ,σ〉, then [β(α)] ∈ Expσ
(iv) If α ∈ Expσ, ξ ∈ Var τ , then λξα ∈ Exp〈τ,σ〉
(159) Con =
⋃
τ Conτ , Var =
⋃
τ Var τ , Exp =
⋃
τ Expτ
There’s couple of conventions that make our formulas easier to read: (i) we
abbreviate statements like ‘α ∈ Conτ ’ by subscripting the first occurrence
of a basic expression in a formula with the type to which it belongs, (ii)
superfluous brackets are omitted, and (iii) the higher the type, the fancier
the lettering: x, X, X. . . . To further the intended denotation of constants and
variables we always try to choose appropriate letters and even abbreviated
words and phrases. For example:
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(160) λxe∃Xet[pt = (X(x))](ye)∈ Expt
Further, (iv) consecutive arguments may be grouped together:
(161) [loveeet(xe, ye)] = [[loveeet(xe)](ye)]
2.B.3 Models
A model must contain denotations for every type of expression. Given only a
basic domain of individuals D and a set of truth values, a model determines
an entire domain function mapping each type τ onto a domain of individuals
Dτ suitable for that type:
(162) a. De = D
b. Dt = {0, 1}
c. D〈τ,σ〉 = DDτσ
(163) D = ⋃τ Dτ
A model must also contain an interpretation function to interpret the con-
stants of the language:
(164) I : Con → D s.t. for all α ∈ Conτ : I(α) ∈ Dτ
(165) A model M is a pair 〈D, I〉
2.B.4 Semantics
We define the set of free variables of a formula recursively:
(166) a. If ξ ∈ Var , then FV (ξ) = {ξ}
b. FV (α ∧ β) = FV (α = β) = FV (α(β)) = FV (α) ∪ FV (β)
c. FV (¬α) = FV (α)
d. FV (∃ξα) = FV (λξα) = FV (α)\{ξ}
Semantic values of arbitrary expressions are given relative to an assignment
function:
(167) A partial function f :⊆ Var → D with for each ξ ∈ Var τ , f(ξ) ∈
Dτ is called a proper assignment for an expression α iff FV (α) ⊆
Dom(f)
Interpretation is defined as follows (it is assumed that f is a proper as-
signment for the formula it is superscripting):
(168) a. Basic expressions:
172 Chapter 2. Attitude reports
(i) If α ∈ Con, then JαKf = I(α)
(ii) If ξ ∈ Var , then JξKf = f(ξ) ∈ D
b. Complex expressions:
(i) J¬αKf = 1− JαKf
(ii) Jα ∧ βKf = JαKf · JβKf
(iii) J∃ξαKf = 1 iff there is a g ⊇ξ f s.t. JαKg = 1
(iv) Jα = βKf = 1 iff JαKf = JβKf
(v) Jβ(α)Kf = JβKf (JαKf )
(vi) JλξτασKf : Dτ → Dσ and for all d ∈ Dτ , JλξαKf (d) =JαKf [ξ 7→d]
2.B.5 Conversions
The semantics validates three well-known syntactic conversion operations,
but first a notational shorthand:
(169) ασ[ξτ 7→βτ ] is the expression that results from replacing in α all free
occurrences of the variable ξ by the expression β.
The annoying thing is that if we substitute a variable in α for a complex
expression with free variables of its own, these free variables may become
bound by quantifiers or lambdas already present in α. The ‘ifs’ below are
meant to exclude this possibility.
(170) Renaming bound variables/α-conversion:
λξτασ = λυτασ[ξτ 7→υτ ], if FV (λξα) = FV (λυα[ξ 7→υ]) (idem
for ∃ or ∀ instead of λ)
(171) Functional application/β-reduction:
λξτασ(βτ ) = ασ[ξτ 7→βτ ], if FV (λξα(β)) = FV (α[ξ 7→β])
(172) Extensionality/η-reduction:
λξτ (α〈τ,σ〉(ξτ )) = α
2.B.6 Product types
(173) Types:
If σ1 . . . σn are types, then so is σ1 × . . .× σn
(174) Syntax:
a. If α1 ∈ Expσ1 , . . . , αn ∈ Expσn , then 〈α1, . . . , αn〉 ∈
Expσ1×...×σn
b. If α ∈ Expσ1×...×σn , then (α)1 ∈ Expσ1 , . . . , (α)n ∈ Expσn
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(175) Structured propositions:
If α1, . . . , αn, β ∈ Exp s.t. β(α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Expt, then
〈〈α1, . . . , αn〉, β〉 is a structured proposition
(176) Free variables:
a. FV (〈α1, . . . , αn〉) =
⋃
n FV (αn)
b. FV ((α)i) = FV (α)
(177) Domains:
Dσ1×...×σn = Dσ1 × . . .×Dσn
(178) Semantics:
a. J〈α1, . . . , αn〉Kf = 〈Jα1Kf , . . . , JαnKf〉
b. J(ασ1×...×σn)iKf = (JαKf )i (i.e., the ith coordinate of the n-tuple
denoted by α)
2.B.7 Intensional types and belief
(179) If τ is a type, then so is 〈s, τ〉
We assume that sentence representation have intensional types, 〈s, t〉, so we
define conjunction and other sentential operators only for these. Lambda
abstraction remains the same as before. ∨ is the operator that makes an
intensional term ‘less intensional’.
(180) a. If α ∈ Expe, ξ ∈ Var τ , ϕ, ψ ∈ Exp〈s,t〉, then ¬ϕ, ϕ ∧
ψ, ∃ξϕ,2ϕ ∈ Exp〈s,t〉
b. If α ∈ Exp〈s,τ〉 then ∨α ∈ Expτ
(181) M = 〈D,W, I〉
(182) Ds = W
(183) a. J¬ϕKf = W\ JϕKf
b. Jϕ ∧ ψKf = JϕKf ∩ JψKf
c. J∃ξϕKfw = 1 iff there is a g ⊇ξ f with JϕKgw = 1
d. J2ϕKfw = 1 iff for all w′Rw: JϕKfw′ = 1
(184) J∨αKfw = JαKfw (w)
Belief as property self-ascription:93
93Chapter 2 explores a host of different variations on bel∗ (bel, bele×et, bel) which
we will not repeat here.
174 Chapter 2. Attitude reports
(185) If β ∈ Exp〈s,〈e,t〉〉 then Jbel∗αβKf (w) = 1 iff all 〈w, d〉 with JβKfw (d) =
1 are in Bel(JαKfw , w) (iff α self-ascribes the property β)
Chapter 3
A semantics of attitude reports
Now it’s time to present an alternative theory, a formal framework that
ultimately maps belief reporting sentences onto their interpretations. As
mentioned before, we will pick up the relational attitude analysis in which
first person de se and de re are just two examples of acquaintance relations
giving rise to a relational attitude. Note that we have also considered the fully
compositional semantics provided by Kaplan (1989). That account and a
semantics based on the relational view of belief share the unified treatment of
de re/de se and the idea that natural language reports are underspecified for
the exact subtype of the underlying belief. Unfortunately, Kaplan’s analysis,
originally intended for speech reports in indirect discourse, turned out to be
fundamentally flawed as a semantics for natural language belief reporting.
Moreover, Kaplan’s analysis was shown to be incompatible with what I
consider a sine qua non for the semantics of belief reporting: taking con-
text dependence into account. Semantic history, and in particular the tiny
fraction described in 2.3.2, has shown that a formal semantics of attitude
reports may benefit a lot from taking into account the context dependence
of acquaintance relations. However, despite some promising first steps, the
classical report semantics in terms of relational attitudes with contextualized
acquaintance suffers a number of serious defects, as pointed out in subsequent
sections of chapter 2. The objections in a nutshell: (i) not even the relational
semantics itself can be cashed out in a fully compositional fashion, let alone
any contextualized version; (ii) with or without the contextualization of ac-
quaintance, the relational semantics fails to make the right predictions with
respect to reports embedded under quantifiers; (iii) in fact, the underlying
assumption that the various types of de re and de se belief can be taken to-
gether and given a unified/underspecified semantics has become threatened
by more recent data showing that natural languages can select for specific
pure de se types of attitude; (iv) occurrences of shifted indexicality pose
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problems for relational (and Kaplanian) analyses, which in effect evaluate
all attitude embedded referential terms as if they had wide scope over the
attitude (Principle 2).
In the following I aim to solve these problems, developing an enhanced
version of the relational account with context dependent acquaintance. How-
ever, to make it outperform Schlenker’s and von Stechow’s state of the art
rival accounts, a rather drastic change is needed. Over the next sections I
propose a change of framework, from static to dynamic semantics, Discourse
Representation Theory to be precise, to fully exploit context dependence.
3.1 Discourse Representation Theory
3.1.1 Varieties of dynamic semantics
Increasing awareness of the importance of context dependence for the study
of natural language semantics, and the long standing problems and puzzles
posed by one of its main manifestations (presupposition) in particular,1 have
inspired the rise of a new paradigm in semantics, called dynamic semantics.
The first fully developed version was Kamp’s (1981)Discourse Representation
Theory (DRT), closely followed by the independent File Change Semantics
(FCS) of Heim (1982; 1983a), and later Groenendijk & Stokhof’s (1991) Dy-
namic Predicate Logic (DPL). More variations, extensions and improvements
on these exist, but the defining characteristic of the new paradigm is that
context change replaces truth and reference as the central semantic notions.
Thus, classical truth conditional semantics is now often referred to as static
semantics. This is not to say that classical semantics cannot deal with con-
text dependence or context change—as witness for example Kaplan’s (1989)
work on deictic context dependence and Stalnaker’s (1978) work on context
change in an arguably static framework2—nor that dynamic semantics can-
not account for the fact that utterances express propositions and are (often)
true or false, as will be shown below.
In 3.1.2 I make a case for dynamic semantics, and for DRT in partic-
ular. Then, in 3.1.3, I give a detailed, formal presentation of the logic of
standard DRT. After the basic framework is laid out, I’ll proceed to add
the necessary features needed to accommodate my version of the relational
1Other manifestations of context dependence are still a mess (implicature), or already
quite satisfactorily accounted for in static semantics (indexicality).
2In Stalnaker’s seminal writings from the seventies, utterances are taken to express
static propositions, or rather two-dimensionally generalized versions thereof called proposi-
tional concepts, which are then used to narrow down a context set representing the growing
common ground (by intersecting with it).
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attitude semantics. First, presuppositions (3.2), and attitude operators with
classical possible worlds semantics 3.2.3. Then some more advanced concepts
in 3.3, like layers to separate rigid and descriptive content (with matching
two-dimensional semantics), and the addition of higher-order expressions and
unification thereof. In the resulting DRT extension we then implement the
contextualized relational attitude semantics.
3.1.2 Why DRT?
We shall be concerned exclusively with DRT, so let’s briefly consider what
could be the reasons for adopting that framework, as opposed to the familiar,
classical frameworks and the dynamic alternatives.
3.1.2.1 DRT vs. static semantics
As implied by its name, DRT is a theory of discourse interpretation, which
means that we shift the focus from isolated sentences to sentences uttered in
the context of a discourse. One of the original motivations was to account for
the interpretation of intersentential anaphora. Consider the following mini
discourse:
(1) Ligia has a dog. Her husband abuses it.
To interpret the second sentence, we need the context provided by the first,
otherwise, what would her refer to, or it?
As it turns out, many expressions in natural language exhibit this type of
anaphoric context dependence, and classical logic is not very well suited to
deal with it. In predicate logic we can easily represent the truth conditions
of the first sentence, and of the whole discourse, but what exactly is the
contribution of the second?
How to model the transition of one closed formula to the next? And
should we map entire texts onto gigantic, monolithic formulas?
 ∃x[dog(x) ∧ own(l, x)] + ????; ∃x∃y[dog(x) ∧ own(l, x) ∧ husband(y, l) ∧ abuse(y, x)]
To be fair, there are some ways to deal with intersentential anaphora in
classical semantics. One is to represent anaphoric expressions as free vari-
ables, which means they are seen as referential expressions that get their
interpretation from an assignment function. It is then further assumed that
assignment functions are somehow fixed by an independent, unspecified prag-
matic module that takes the context into account. We’ve already encoun-
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tered an application of this maneuver in 2.3.2 where we also pointed out
that it merely moves the real issue out of sight, into a pragmatic wastebas-
ket. Besides, though it may work fine for (1)’s her, picking out Ligia, it’s
already harder (though not impossible) to see how it would pick out the dog
introduced by the existentially quantified NP inside the first sentence. Ap-
parently, a solution along these lines would have to meddle with the seman-
tics of indefinites as well, for apparently they are able to extend assignment
functions beyond sentence boundaries. To put it differently, indefinites can
pragmasemantically bind variables outside their syntactic scope. This is ac-
tually getting us quite close to the role of indefinites in dynamic frameworks,
though the next example will show that still more is needed.3
A much harder version of the above problem similarly revolving around
anaphora to indefinite antecedents, concerns intrasentential but cross-clausal
anaphora. This issue has become known as the problem of donkey anaphora,
after its paradigmatic examples involving all manner of donkey molestation:4
(2) If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it
Again, it’s quite easy to write down adequate truth conditions for the whole,
and for the first clause (a farmer owns a donkey), but now it’s even more of a
mystery than for the intersentential case how conjoining the existential first
and the anaphoric second clause can get us the overall universal reading:
 ∃x∃y[farmer(x) ∧ donkey(y) ∧ own(x, y)] + ????; ∀x∀y[[farmer(x) ∧ donkey(y) ∧ own(x, y)]→ beat(x, y)]
Presented like this it’s really a compositionality problem: it seems that the
whole sentence’s lf is not compositionally built up from the lfs of its con-
stituent clauses and an implication. DRT tries to fix this by offering a differ-
ent syntax and semantics for (existential) quantification and implication (in
addition to a new way of representing and binding anaphors).
3The second classical solution to the intersentential anaphora problem is Evans’s (1977)
E-type analysis, according to which anaphoric expressions are to be represented as full
definite descriptions whose content is somehow copied from the context. In paraphrase,
(1) is analyzed as There exists a dog that Ligia has. Ligia’s husband abuses the dog that
Ligia has. In this simple form it has the same defects as the free variable approach: (i) we
need a pragmatic black box that picks an appropriate description from the context, and
(ii) donkey sentences remain problematic (though Heim (1990) introduces some nontrivial
extensions to make this work).
4The original examples (with donkeys) originated in the Middle Ages. The problem
was reintroduced into the philosophy of language by Geach (1962).
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To repeat, in dynamic semantics we take a different view of meaning
and interpretation: instead of (a formula representing) a set of worlds, each
clause contributes a context change potential, specifying how it would affect
the context it is uttered in. To see how the idea of context change is cashed
out in DRT, we must first take a look at the notion of context. In DRT,
contexts are represented by a special kind of formulas called Discourse Rep-
resentation Structures (DRS), to be defined in 3.1.3. As we will see, DRSs
can be translated back into predicate logic, or given their own static inter-
pretation directly, but their syntax is designed in such a way that we can
add the context changing information conveyed by an utterance in a rela-
tively straightforward, algorithmic fashion. The result of this process, which
comprises the monotonic information growth and the resolution of anaphora,
among other things, will be a new context DRS, to which we can add the
next sentence and so on for the rest of the discourse.
To make this work smoothly, van der Sandt & Geurts (1991) propose that
the DRS syntax used to represent contexts, be used to model context change
potentials as well. This requires some adaptation of the DRS language;
we need a way to preliminarily represent anaphors and other expressions
that derive their meaning from the discourse context. To distinguish them,
the structures representing context change potentials are called preliminary
DRSs. The dynamic interpretation of an utterance in a discourse is thus
cashed out as a merge operation of a context DRS with the current sentence’s
preliminary DRS after which anaphora are resolved. In 3.1.3 and 3.2 we will
see in some detail, and with examples, how this works exactly.
3.1.2.2 DRT vs. the dynamic alternatives
Now that we have outlined the idea behind DRT’s implementation of the dy-
namic aspect of discourse meaning, it might be interesting to consider briefly
what sets apart DRT from the other types of dynamic semantics, before going
into the details of formalization. The most heavily debated feature peculiar
to DRT is its reliance on representations. The whole interpretation process is
formalized at this representational, syntactic level. It’s like an algorithm that
manipulates formulas, taking a context DRS and a preliminary DRS as input
and giving a new DRS as output. In the previous chapter we have similarly
used the language of predicate logic as a convenient way to talk about truth
conditions. In both cases the formal language serves as an intermediary be-
tween natural language and semantic interpretation, though in the original
DRT framework truly semantic interpretations are defined only for contexts.
After the idea of stand-alone preliminary DRSs had caught on, they too
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were quickly endowed with model theoretic interpretations,5 Unfortunately,
the challenge of giving a truly semantic interpretation of preliminary DRSs
that include adequate representations of presuppositions has not been met.6
So in the case of preliminary DRS construction and transformation we see
DRT operating at a syntactic level with no (obvious) counterpart in model
theoretic semantics. Some philosophers and semanticists might take issue
with this kind of thing, but it is fully compatible with the mentalistic phi-
losophy behind DRT, which was really designed to model what goes on in
the mind of a human (or computer) language user interpreting a discourse,
at a suitably abstract level, obviously. In other words, familiar from 1.2.4.4,
DRT primarily aims to capture the narrow aspect of meaning and inter-
pretation, i.e. meaning as thought of by many psychologists and cognitive
scientists.7 The only thing that stands between DRT’s representationalism
and full-blown mentalistic sententialism (denounced in 1.1.2.3) is that DRT
comes with a ‘wide’, Tarskian truth definition for its representations—though
only for context representations that constitute the outputs of the procedu-
ral interpretation process. In short, given its roots in cognitive science, it’s
not surprising that DRT essentially relies on representational data structures
and their algorithmic manipulation. In dealing with presupposition resolu-
tion, more specifically with presupposition accommodation, we’ll again rely
on symbol manipulation at the DRS level.
The DRT conception of meaning and representation is in stark contrast
with the use of lf representations in the Montagovian tradition. There, the
logical language is merely a matter of convenience, in the sense that it can be
eliminated. This is because of the strong compositionality built into Mon-
tagovian systems (1.1.1.3): each syntactic rule corresponds to a semantic
rule, so in giving the general rules of the system and a sentence’s syntac-
5E.g. in terms of ccps, by analogy with Heim’s semantic interpretation of FCS ‘file
cards’ as context change potentials, modeled as operators on information states, i.e. sets
of 〈world,assignment〉-pairs.
6 DRT’s founding father expresses his own defeatist attitude towards this challenge
thus:
Unfortunately the possibility of such a semantics [for preliminary DRSs] is
limited. [. . . ] [F]or those preliminary representations [. . . ] in which all
presuppositions appear in the highest possible position [. . . ] an intuitively
plausible model theoretic semantics can be stated without too much diffi-
culty. But for representations with presuppositions in subordinate positions
I haven’t yet been able to find a satisfactory semantics and I very much
doubt that one is to be had.
[
(Kamp 2001:44)
]
7Well, a specific type of cognitive scientist at least, perhaps to be identified with those
who believe in symbolic or ‘good old-fashioned AI’.
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tic tree we have already fixed the whole interpretation; nothing can really
be gained by introducing an intermediate level of lfs in a logical language.
Montague (1970a) actually demonstrated this by providing a fragment of
English in which each syntactic constituent gets a model theoretic inter-
pretation directly. Obviously this feat requires heavy semantic assumptions
to intrude on the syntax (thereby clashing with the generative/Chomskyan
tradition which preaches the autonomy of syntax in the determination of
constituent structure), and a lot of work would have to be done to turn the
theories of chapter 2 into genuinely non-representational ones in this strong
sense. It is not even very likely that this can be done, so in effect many
theories of natural language rely on some form of indispensable intermedi-
ate representation. For instance in the neo-Chomsky-Montagovian semantic
tradition—Chierchia, von Stechow, Heim, Kratzer, and Schlenker, to name
a few key theorists already encountered in the previous chapter—this level is
the LF which is typically not compositionally derived from the surface form,
but which does translate immediately to an lf and thus to truth conditions.
In the simplified toy versions of these theories sketched in chapter 2 we con-
densed lf and LF into an appropriate extension of predicate logic, but I’m
not convinced that that representational level can be dispensed with in favor
of a rigorous syntactic analysis of surface structure a` la Montague.
Now, back to dynamic semantics, where DRT competes with Heim’s FCS
and Groenendijk & Stokhof’s DPL. Heim (1983a) introduces a representa-
tional level called file cards which are remarkably similar to DRSs in both
form and function. So, in their representation of context, DRT and FCS do
not really differ, especially since file cards, like DRSs, can be embedded into
a genuine, static model. Moreover, preliminary DRSs also have an exact ana-
logue in FCS, viz. logical forms (henceforth with capitalized initials, since the
notion is closer to our LF than to lf). However, the semantic philosophy be-
hind FCS appears to be quite different from DRT’s, which comes to the fore
when Heim starts filling in details and actual applications of her theory. From
an early point on, file cards are identified with their model theoretic satis-
faction sets. LFs are similarly interpreted as functions from satisfaction sets
to satisfaction sets (context change potentials), rather than from files to files
(file change potentials). It’s obvious that Heim tries to bypass the represen-
tational level in favor of model theoretic entities.8 The Montagovian goal of
8It should be noted that satisfaction sets are sets of assignment functions, or something
interdefinable with that, and thus not as purely non-representational as, say, propositions
or even characters in static predicate semantics, for an assignment function crucially con-
tains variables, which are symbolic entities. This representational aspect is retained in
DPL which claims explicitly that it’s main advantage over DRT lies in its elimination of
the representational level. This point was made by Geurts (1999).
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eliminating representations is made explicit by Groenendijk & Stokhof (1991)
whose DPL looks like normal predicate logic, syntactically, but with a dy-
namic model theoretic interpretation. The details of this system really don’t
concern us here, the important thing is that it recycles the familiar syntax
of classical predicate logic. The next logical step would be to see if this dy-
namicization of predicate logic extends to full higher order, intensional type
theory, so that Montague’s fully compositional, non-representational system
could be straightforwardly enhanced with a dynamic rather than static in-
terpretation via a similarly eliminable type logic in the middle. Indeed, such
a dynamic Montague Grammar was constructed by Groenendijk & Stokhof
(1990).
It should be noted that the powerful presupposition theory that van
der Sandt (1992) proposed for DRT requires movements at the represen-
tational level, which makes it unsuitable for the semanticized FCS and for
DPL/DMG. Alternative presupposition theories have been developed for
both, but their empirical predictions are quite distinct (see Beaver (2001)
for an overview and defense of the non-representational view of presupposi-
tions and Geurts (1999) for the opposing view, which is to be presented in
3.2). Tentatively adding presupposition theory as a plus of DRT, let’s sum up
the rest of the advantages. Firstly, DRT has shown its merits in the unparal-
leled empirical coverage with its analysis of tense and aspect (Kamp & Reyle
1993). Then, with considerable extensions, (S)DRT is considered the state of
the art in analyzing discourse relations (Asher & Lascarides 2003). Thirdly,
there have been very promising attempts at solving the classic omniscience
puzzles by using DRSs as models of the mental states of individuals. We will
say something about this in 3.2.3, but note that things have gotten rather
complicated here in a way that I cannot do justice to. In this area, the men-
talism of DRT has come to play a major role, but for reasons of compatibility
with the classic theories of attitude report semantics (e.g. the ones discussed
in the previous chapter), my own proposal will not follow in this tradition,
in line with my conviction that the studies of attitudes and of attitude re-
ports should be separated as rigorously as possible (as stated in 1.1.2.3). I
view DRSs as representing the common ground, rather than the mental state
of the hearer. A final, more general advantage of the AI-inspired represen-
tationalism of DRT and its add-ons, like van der Sandtian presupposition
theory, is the possibility of straightforward computational implementation,
but we will not go in to that here (Blackburn & Bos 1999).
To summarize, DRT was originally based on a mentalistic conception
of meaning, so interpretation is primarily cashed out in terms of symbolic
operations encoding context change. The whole process is nonetheless re-
stricted by the external world in the sense that the output after a clause’s
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processing is subject to a static truth definition. Presuppositions are one
area where the representational level can make a big difference. DRT’s rival
FCS has similar data structures but puts the focus on their model theoretic
semantic interpretations, thus forgoing the powerful representational theory
of presuppositions that was developed for DRT. This Montagovian tendency
of bypassing the symbolic level is taken up in DPL which forms the basis of
a non-representational, fully compositional yet dynamic implementation of
Montague’s program.
3.1.3 The language of DRT
In this we take a look at the details of the DRT formalism, i.e. the syntax
and (static) semantics of the DRS language. I will closely follow all standard
definitions and terminology, mostly from Kamp & Reyle (1993), including the
two-dimensional box notation. In this subsection I concentrate on DRSs as a
language for representing the common ground. Section 3.2 deals with natural
language interpretation and common ground incrementation via preliminary
DRSs.
3.1.3.1 Syntax
A DRS is an ordered pair consisting of a set of discourse referents (e.g. x, y),
called the universe of the DRS, and a set of DRS conditions. Discourse
referents in DRT serve the same function as variables in predicate logic,
and the ones that occur in a DRS universe are bound within that DRS.
Conditions come in two types, atomic, like atomic formulas, (e.g. beat(x, y));
and complex, i.e. conditions that themselves contain full DRSs (e.g. ¬ψ).
The following notations go with these notions: ϕ = 〈U(ϕ), C(ϕ)〉 ∈ DRS =
DRef ×DCond . In real examples I opt for the familiar notation which depicts
DRSs as two-compartment boxes; universe on top, conditions below:
(3) Colby is in love with a philosopher

x y
colby(x)
philosopher(y)
love(x, y)
Think of this as follows: the universe specifies that the discourse is about two
individuals, and the three conditions further specify who these individuals
are and what they do. An equivalent representation in predicate logic would
look like this:
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(4)  ∃x∃y[colby(x) ∧ philosopher(y) ∧ love(x, y)]
The only difference with the predicate logical lf we’d normally assign to
the sentence in (3), is the proper name, which is not represented by a con-
stant, but by a variable whose reference is restricted by a predicate. This
is only a superficial difference though; with our implicit assumptions on
proper name reference (uniqueness and rigidity, cf. chapter 1: 1.2.2.1 and
footnotes 25 and 26) we can easily interdefine these: (i) c ; ιx.colby(x);
(ii) colby(x); x = c. I’ve simply chosen the traditional way of doing things
in DRT, conforming to the intuitive idea that every entity that figures in the
discourse is made available for future anaphora by introducing a correspond-
ing discourse referent (or by picking up an already existing one). There’s
more to be said about proper names, but only after we’ve introduced pre-
supposition resolution in 3.2.
Simply put, the interpretation of new sentences in a discourse proceeds by
adding new discourse referents to the existing DRS universe and/or adding
new conditions to its condition set. How this is done exactly is discussed
3.2, but the end result of adding, say He gave her a present is the following
incrementation:
(5) Colby is in love with a philosopher. He gave her a present.

x y
colby(x)
philosopher(y)
love(x, y)
;
x y z
colby(x)
philosopher(y)
love(x, y)
present(z)
give(x, z, y)
So much for atomic conditions. Negation, implication and disjunction are
represented as operators on DRSs:
(6) If ϕ and ψ are DRSs, then ¬ϕ, ϕ⇒ ψ and ϕ ∨ ψ are DRS conditions
Note that we don’t need a conjunction, because it’s already given in our box
notation, where a sequence of conditions is going to mean what predicate
logic would express with conjunction, as shown by the example translations
into predicate logic above. The same holds for existential quantification:
putting a discourse referent in the top compartment of a DRS is the DRT
way of existentially quantifying over it. We should however not hastily con-
clude the work is done if we’ve defined just a negation to go with our im-
plicit conjunction and existential quantifier, because, as we will see in the
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well-formedness definition and the semantics, DRT will bestow some extra,
dynamic features on our implication which might9 invalidate some definito-
rily useful equivalences of propositional logic (e.g. in DRT ¬¬ϕ is statically
but not dynamically equivalent to ϕ, in a sense to be made precise below).
An example:
(7) Ligia doesn’t know Colby, or, if she does know him, she doesn’t like
him

x y
ligia(x)
colby(y)
¬
know(x, y)
∨
know(x, y)
⇒ ¬
like(x, y)
Let’s use this rather ‘boxy’ DRS to demonstrate a handful of formal notions
useful for describing the hierarchical nesting structure of DRSs. First, we
say that the biggest box is the main or global DRS, the others are embedded
within it. More precisely, there is a relation <, pronounced “is immediately
subordinate to” on DRSs,10 according to which, for instance:
(8)
like(x, y)
< ¬
like(x, y)
<
know(x, y)
⇒ ¬
like(x, y)
For future applications the so-called transitive reflexive closure of <, denoted
v and pronounced “is subordinate to” or “is a subDRS of”, is more interest-
ing. By definition, two DRSs stand in this relation, ϕ v ψ, iff ϕ = ψ or there
is a <-chain of ever growing DRSs connecting ϕ to ψ. This captures the
9Though, actually, the DRT counterparts of [ϕ ⇒ ψ] ↔ [¬[ϕ ∧ ¬ψ]] and [ϕ ∨ ψ] ↔
[¬[¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ]] are still valid.
10We are really talking about DRSs as tokens, or specific occurrences of DRSs if you
will, because, for example, the DRS 〈{}, {know(x, y)}〉 as such would be immediately sub-
ordinate to two non-overlapping DRSs within (7).
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intuitive notion of a DRS box nested inside another.11 What we are going to
need later on is the notion of accessibility that is directly based on this. A
DRS ϕ has access to a DRS ψ (or “ψ is accessible to ϕ”), denoted ϕ ≺ ψ, iff
ϕ v ψ or there is a (superordinate) DRS χ containing ψ ⇒ ϕ as a condition.
So, a given embedded DRS has access to all DRSs it is nested in, including
itself, and in addition, conditionals’ consequents can see their antecedents.
Derivatively, a discourse referent or condition is said to be accessible to an-
other referent or condition iff the corresponding DRSs themselves stand in
the accessibility relation.
Another important notion is that of free versus bound discourse referents.
This is really the exact analogue of predicate logic’s free and bound variables,
except that here the only variable binders are the DRS universes: a U(ϕ) =
{x, y} as in the main DRS in (7) binds all x and y’s occurring in the atomic
conditions of C(ϕ) and in all subordinated DRS conditions. Formulated
in terms of accessibility, a discourse referent in an atomic condition is a
free variable iff that condition has no access to a DRS universe with that
discourse referent. A DRS with no free variables is called closed, and a
DRS that, throughout its subDRSs never introduces discourse referents in
universes that have access to other DRSs that already use them (in universe
or conditions), are called pure. We will henceforth work with pure DRSs
only.
3.1.3.2 Semantics
As we’ve said before, DRT comes with a static definition of truth in a model.
For the extensional fragment considered so far, the ingredients match those
of predicate logic. A model is a pair 〈D, I〉 of a domain of individuals and
an interpretation function mapping the basic predicates of the language onto
appropriate extensions:
(9) M = 〈D, I〉 is model for a given DRS language fragment
a. D is a domain of individuals
b. I is the interpretation function
for every n > 0, I maps all n-place predicates to subsets of
Dn (and 0-place predicates to truth values, ∈ {0, 1})
11One sometimes sees definitions of the subDRS notion on which the consequent of a
conditional is subordinate to its antecedent. One argument in favor of this is the fact that,
as we remarked in footnote 9, [ϕ⇒ ψ]↔ [¬[ϕ ∧ ¬ψ]], the right-hand side of which shows
ψ obviously embedded into the antecedent ϕ. In the current account, we introduce the
notion of accessibility to capture this somewhat more inclusive notion of subDRS.
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We will consider very minimalistic DRS language fragments. For instance,
since we represent proper names as predicates, we will not consider individual
constants, nor function symbols. Arguably, we have no need for ι-operators
either, since definite descriptions will later be analyzed as presupposition
inducers.
As in predicate logic, we need a kind of auxiliary interpretation function
for discourse referents/variables. In DRT these are commonly called embed-
ding functions, and they are used as interpretation parameter for both DRSs
and DRS conditions:
(10) f :⊆ DRef → D is a proper embedding for a DRS condition γ if
FV (γ) ⊆ Dom(f)
A proper embedding can either verify or falsify a DRS condition. This and the
notion of DRS verification are defined by simultaneous recursion as follows.
First, for a DRS ϕ:
(11) M |=f ϕ iff there is a g ⊇ f with Dom(g) = Dom(f)∪U(ϕ) (hence-
forth: g ⊇U(ϕ) f) and for all γ ∈ C(ϕ): M |=g γ
Since this depends on the verification of conditions we proceed as follows,
starting with atomic conditions:
(12) a. M |=f ξ = η iff f(ξ) = f(η)
b. M |=f Π(ξ1, . . . , ξn) iff 〈f(ξ1), . . . , f(ξn)〉 ∈ I(Π)
Defining truth for complex conditions means we have to rely on DRS verifi-
cation in (11) again:
(13) a. M |=f ¬ϕ iff there is no g ⊇U(ϕ) f with M |=g ϕ
b. M |=f ϕ ⇒ ψ iff for all g ⊇U(ϕ) f with M |=g ϕ there exists a
further extension h ⊇U(ψ) g with M |=h ψ
c. M |=f ϕ ∨ ψ iff there is a g ⊇U(ϕ) f with M |=g ϕ or there is a
h ⊇U(ψ) f with M |=h ψ
For closed DRSs we can now compute whether or not they are true in a
model with respect to the empty embedding. If so, we call them simply true
in the model: M |= ϕ. As usual, we often suppress mention of the model and
use the following notation, pronounced “the extension(al semantic value) of
ϕ”: JϕKf = 1 iffM |= ϕ (for conditions, as well as DRSs). This notation will
be especially useful when we have intensions as well as extensions, see 3.1.5.
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3.1.4 Quantifiers and donkeys
In this section I introduce a small extension to the DRS language needed to
capture some aspects of quantification. In 3.1.4.1 we return to our donkey
sentences but introduce a new puzzle known as the proportion problem, for
which duplex conditions with selective binding will prove a solution. We’ll
see how this gives us a nice, general account of quantification in DRT. In
3.1.4.2 I propose to analyze only along the same lines.
3.1.4.1 Duplex conditions
The semantics of DRT is set up in such a way that the classical universal
quantification can be defined in terms of a DRS implication where the an-
tecedent’s universe corresponds to the quantified variables, the antecedent’s
conditions constitute the restrictor (in generalized quantifier terminology,
cf. 2.4.2.2), and the consequent then corresponds to the so-called (nuclear)
scope:
(14) Everybody in the department likes Ligia

x
ligia(x)
y
in dept(y)
⇒
like(y, x)
To see that this is indeed an adequate representation, we must show that
the static truth conditions of the DRS in (14) are as represented in the
corresponding predicate logical form for (14):
 ∃x[ligia(x) ∧ ∀y[in dept(y)→ like(y, x)]]
The crucial step in that proof is the application of the semantic rule for⇒ in
the computation of truth of the DRS in (13), call it ϕ: M |= ϕ iff there is a f
with domain {x} and f(x) is Ligia, and for all extensions g of f with domain
{x, y} that map y to someone in the department, it holds that g(y) likes
f(x). This is exactly what we get when we compute the the truth conditions
of the predicate logical formula with its existential quantifier followed by a
universal.
After our sketchy attempt at capturing intersentential anaphora by incor-
porating a kind of incremental context change, which we will expand upon
in 3.2, now we are ready to deal with the second problem of predicate logic:
donkeys. The problem, if you recall, was that, on its own, the clause a farmer
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owns a donkey is existential, but as soon as we embed it in the antecedent
of a conditional the existential quantifiers magically turn into universal ones.
In DRT, there’s no problem: according to DRT semantics a discourse ref-
erent in a DRS universe is interpreted existentially, unless it occurs as the
antecedent of a conditional, in which case it’s interpreted universally:
(15) If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it
[
=(2)
]

x y
farmer(x)
donkey(y)
own(x, y)
⇒
beat(x, y)
This DRS has the correct, universal truth conditions, while at the same time
retaining as recognizable subDRSs the representations of each clause on its
own, in accordance with the principle of (clausal) compositionality.
This is not the place to launch a comprehensive discussion of the DRT
semantics of quantification, but we will need a little more than the classical
∃ and ∀ analogs we have now. One characteristic of our current univer-
sal/implication is that it universally quantifies over all discourse referents in
the antecedent universe, and it does so unselectively. This means that every
farmer has to beat every donkey he owns in order for (15) to be true. Though
this may or may not be a reasonable requirement for this particular sentence,
it is quite inadequate for the following sentence, which is assigned the same
DRS, structurally:
(16) Everybody who found a dime in their pocket, put it in the parking
meter
[≈(Schubert & Pelletier 1989:200)]
Intuitively, it suffices that everybody just uses one of the dimes they have in
their pocket. This is an instance of an issue known as the proportion problem,
on which much ink has been spilled. I’ll just use it as a reason for introducing
selective quantification in DRT.
What we seem to need is a way to specify which discourse referent is
universally quantified, and which will remain existential. The following type
of condition, called duplex conditions, is introduced to facilitate the repre-
sentation of selective (and unselective) binding:
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(17) 
x y
person(x)
dime(y)
find in pocket(x, y)
〈∀ x〉
put in pm(x, y)
The syntax and semantics are given in (19), which uses the useful auxiliary
notion of a DRS merge, ⊕, defined as the pairwise union of referents and
conditions:
(18) ϕ⊕ ψ = 〈U(ϕ) ∪ U(ψ), C(ϕ) ∪ C(ψ)〉
(19) a. Syntax: if ϕ and ψ are DRSs and Ξ ⊆ U(ϕ), then
ϕ 〈∀ Ξ〉ψ is a DRS condition
b. Free variables: FV (ϕ 〈∀ Ξ〉ψ) = FV (ϕ) ∪ (FV (ψ)\U(ϕ))
c. Access: if ϕ 〈∀ Ξ〉ψ ∈ C(χ) then ϕ < χ and ψ < χ, and
ψ ≺ ϕ ≺ χ
d. Truth definition: M |=f ϕ 〈∀ Ξ〉ψ iff for all extensions
g ⊇Ξ f verifying ϕ there is a further extension h ⊇U(ϕ)\Ξ g
that verifies ϕ⊕ ψ
So, we now have selective binding with universal quantifiers. Another nice
thing about duplex representations is that they easily extend to other quanti-
fiers, in fact, the mechanism closely resembles that of generalized quantifiers
as discussed before. The quantifier most for instance would work like this:
(20) Most farmers who own a donkey beat it

x y
farmer(x)
donkey(y)
own(x, y)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
most
x beat(x, y)
Calculating truth conditions in the style of (19) gives:
J(20)K = 1 iff most f mapping x to a farmer with a donkey can be
extended to map y to a donkey owned and beaten by x
In effect the truth of (19) thus depend on the ratio between farmers owning
at least one donkey and farmers owning and beating at least one donkey.
In generalized quantifier theory with lambdas for set abstraction we would
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represent these truth conditions as:
(21)  most(λx∃y[farmer(x) ∧ donkey(y) ∧ own(x, y)])
(λx∃y[farmer(x) ∧ donkey(y) ∧ own(x, y) ∧ beat(x, y)])
This is indeed a plausible reading of the sentence. At least
it’s much better than what we’d end up with if we were to
have only unselective binding. In that case, we would presum-
ably be counting farmer-donkey pairs, so as to compare the cardinali-
ties of {〈a, b〉 a is a farmer and b is a donkey owned by a} and the subset
{〈a, b〉 a is a farmer and b is a donkey owned and beaten by a}. On such
an semantics, one farmer beating all of his 74 donkeys would, counterin-
tuitively, make (20) true even if his 8 colleagues, who each own only one or
two donkeys for fun, are very nice to theirs.
3.1.4.2 Only as a quantifier in DRT
Recall our discussion about only in 2.4.2.2. There I speculated that the
somewhat simplistic view of only as a generalized quantifier would serve us
just fine. But what we can do with generalized quantifiers, we can also do
with duplex conditions, so I propose the following DRT representation of
only constructions:
(22) Only sadists beat donkeys
 x
sadist(x)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
only
x beat donkeys(x)
Given that proper names and other referential definites are usually repre-
sented at the main DRS, we get representations like the following:
(23) Only Colby likes Ligia

x y
colby(x)
ligia(y)
z
z = x
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
only
z like(z, y)
The semantics of this duplex condition is based on the observation that
only is essentially the dual of all, in the sense that only P’s are Q is equivalent
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to all Q’s are P. Building this argument reversal into the definition of only
requires some extra attention however, for it might well give rise to some some
complications with respect to variable binding or its linguistic counterpart,
anaphoric binding. But let’s start with an easy example, like (22). It’s clear
what we want the duplex condition to mean: all donkey-beaters are sadists,
i.e. the duplex condition in (22) should be equivalent to (24):
(24)
x
beat donkeys(x)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
∀
x sadist(x)
A general definition for deriving this equivalence can take two forms: a syn-
tactic transformation on DRSs or a purely semantic definition. The syntactic
rule will have to specify how to turn around the arguments of an arbitrary
only condition to get the corresponding universal duplex condition. The
only tricky thing there is the treatment of the arguments’ universes in cases
where some discourse referents are not quantified over. Consider for instance
an only duplex condition with an existentially quantified discourse referent on
the right, and see what happens if we represent its intuitive truth conditions
with a universal:12
(25) Only a weirdo owns a pet donkey
 x
weirdo(x)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
only
x
y
pet donkey(y)
own(x, y)
;
x y
pet donkey(y)
own(x, y)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
∀
x weirdo(x)
Conclusion: conditions swap, duplex bound discourse referents remain in
their original universe on the left, and the referents on the right move with
their conditions to the left.
The only question that remains is what happens to any existential dis-
course referents in the restrictor of an only condition. And that turns out
to be somewhat more difficult question. If they would move with their con-
ditions to the right it would be impossible to bind anaphors in the nuclear
12For ease of presentation I have overlooked the fact that we have now created a uni-
versally quantified condition where y is bound in both the restrictor and scope of the
quantifier whereas it was originally constrained solely within the scope. This will not
cause any trouble if we require that the original DRS with only is pure (i.e. introducing
fresh variables instead of re-using accessible ones wherever possible).
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scope of only with them.
(26) ?Only a man with a donkey beats it
Further research is needed to determine whether or not (and to what extent)
this prediction is borne out. The clear impact of focusing on such sentences,
leads me to suspect that we need a better understanding of the mechanisms
of focusing/backgrounding before attempting an analysis:
(27) a. Only a man with a donkey beats it
b. Only a man with a donkey beats it
I have nothing to say about what how exactly intonation alters the logical
form of only constructions, or any quantified or unquantified sentence for that
matter. And even if I did, it would almost certainly lead us too far astray
from our goal. Therefore, at this point I am forced to admit that more has to
be said about complex restrictors of the quantifier only and further research
is required to investigate whether the position that only can be represented
as a quantifier is really tenable in light of these and further data.
At this point, some might be tempted to get rid of the whole idea of
only as a quantifier and replace it with a focus based analysis. The reason
I will not go down that road has to do with my analysis of bound readings
of indexicals (only I did my homework cf. 2.4.3.4, 3.3.3.2) and, ultimately,
de re/de se belief reports under only (cf. 2.4.2.2, 3.4.3.2). Further research
would be required to determine if these accounts could be adapted to a more
focus-based analysis of only. For now, I’ll just stick with the quantificational
account and assume some separate information structure module to account
for the extra effects witnessed in (27). And as for complex restrictors, the
only’s that we will encounter in our study of de re/de se belief reporting will
all have non-complex restrictors consisting of no more than a proper name,
so let’s not worry about those just yet.
For future reference, we could capture the syntactically described (partial)
analysis of only in a simple semantic interpretation clause:
(28) M |=f ϕ 〈only Ξ〉ψ iff for all extensions g ⊇Ξ f verifying ψ there is
a further extension h ⊇U(ϕ)\Ξ g that verifies ψ ⊕ ϕ
Note that this rule captures a convenient, but somewhat arbitrary, decision
to copy unquantified discourse referents in the only restrictor (U(ϕ)\Ξ) to
the universal’s restrictor and scope, thus making (26) interpretable, without
relying on a particular focus structure.
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3.1.5 Intensionality
We are going to be focusing on belief, so we’d better add an intensional
dimension to our semantics. In this section we first simply follow the lead of
intensional predicate logic. Then we evaluate the belief semantics that gives
us, and we investigate how we might want to extend it.
3.1.5.1 Modal DRT syntax and semantics
As in predicate logic, we add modal operators (2, bel,. . . ) to the language
and a domain of possible worlds to the model. Then we need to specify the
specific interpretations of our modalities, e.g. by giving accessibility relations,
and finally we need to add appropriate interpretation clauses to our truth
definition. In short:
(29) a. Syntax: if ϕ is a DRS, ξ a discourse referent, then 2ϕ and belξϕ
are DRS conditions
b. Free variables: FV (2ϕ) = FV (ϕ) and FV (belξϕ) = FV (ϕ) ∪
{ξ}
c. Access: if 2ϕ or belξϕ ∈ C(ψ), then ϕ < ψ
d. Model: M = 〈D,W, I,Bel〉13
Up to here, it’s been an entirely straightforward copying exercise. Now we
come to the interpretation of the modally extended DRS language in this
extended model. Again, there’ll be no surprises. We just have to add an
extra interpretation parameter, a possible world, to every clause in the truth
definition. There are of course some decisions to be made, but we stay as close
as possible to the simple system of 1.A that we’re familiar with. In particular,
we choose a purely extensional treatment of discourse referents and equality,
so all the intensionality is placed in the interpretation of predicates, i.e. by
adding a possible world parameter to I. Let’s spell out some key clauses,
keeping in mind that all the embeddings f here are supposed to be proper
embeddings for the terms they are to interpret:
(30) Truth definition:
a. M |=fw ϕ iff there is a g ⊇U(ϕ) f and for all γ ∈ C(ϕ): M |=gw γ
b. M |=fw ξ = η iff f(ξ) = f(η)
c. M |=fw Π(ξ1, . . . , ξn) iff 〈f(ξ1), . . . , f(ξn)〉 ∈ I(Π, w)
d. M |=fw ¬ϕ iff there is no g ⊇U(ϕ) f with M |=gw ϕ
13For simplicity we assume a trivial, universal accessibility for the 2 modality, and we
reformulate the belief accessibility relations for bel in terms of a belief sets, as we’ve been
doing since 1.1.2.1.
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And then we need to add two clauses for the new, modal conditions:
(31) a. M |=fw 2ϕ iff for all v ∈ W : M |=fv 2ϕ
b. M |=fw belξϕ iff for all v ∈ Bel(f(ξ), w): M |=fv ϕ
We can now define the very useful notions of extensional and intensional
semantic values of an expression, J. . .Kw and J. . .K, respectively:
(32) If ϕ is a DRS or condition:14
a. JϕKfw = 1 iff M |=fw ϕ, and 0 otherwise.
b. JϕKf = {w ∈ W JϕKfw = 1}
c. JϕK = JϕK∅
For the sake of uniformity we sometimes denote the extensions and intensions
of discourse referents and predicates (given by f and I directly) with JK-
brackets as well. For DRSs and conditions we usually pronounce JϕK as “the
(classical) proposition expressed by ϕ”, for predicates we stick to “intension”,
and for discourse referents we speak of “reference”.
3.1.5.2 Beyond intensionality: belief
So now we have the familiar notion of a proposition as a set of possible
worlds, and a modal semantics of bel to go with it. We can reformulate
the interpretation clause of bel somewhat to bring out the underlying idea
that belief is a relation between an individual and a set of worlds, i.e. a
proposition, in line with the predicate logical definitions of 1.1.2 and 1.A:
(33) M |=fw belξϕ iff JϕKf ⊇ Bel(f(ξ), w) [≡(31b)]
Note that this serves only as a first approximation, because, as we’ve
seen in the previous chapters, there’s more to belief and report semantics.
We’ve seen how omniscience problems and essential indexicality pose severe
threats to the simple, intensional belief semantics sketched here. One way
to improve on these points was to add a dimension of context-dependence
to the semantics in order to properly handle indexicality, and then, in the
enhanced, two-dimensional semantics, introduce more fine-grained semantic
14In some textbooks, extensional semantic values of DRSs are sets of strictly veri-
fying embeddings, i.e. the minimal embeddings that verify the condition set: JϕKfw ={
g g ⊇U(ϕ) f and for all ψ ∈ C(ϕ): M |=gw ψ
}
. Intensions, then, are sets of pairs 〈g, w〉,
g strictly verifying ϕ in w. This setup facilitates an elegant reformulation of the basic truth
definition, but it’s equivalent to the one given here. We like to think of JϕK as denoting
the proposition expressed by ϕ, and thus we’re led to the definitions in (32).
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objects (characters, diagonal properties) for belief. We will not go down that
road—at least, not yet—for two reasons, which we shall dwell on for the
remainder of this section. Both have to do with natural alternatives to two-
dimensionalism offered by the dynamic and representational nature of the
DRT framework itself. It remains to be seen if these are viable alternatives
for analyzing indexicality and belief, so let’s take a look.
First, we have switched to a dynamic semantics primarily in order to
deal with context dependence, so we’ll examine a truly dynamic treatment
of indexical context dependence before falling back on Kaplan’s static con-
texts and characters. This native DRT account treats all definites, including
definite descriptions, anaphoric pronouns, indexicals and proper names, as
presupposition inducing expressions. In 3.2 we take up presupposition the-
ory and its uniform treatment of definites. We’ll see in 3.3 however that
this purely dynamic account of indexicals and proper names turns out to
be unsatisfactory unless we add some Kaplanian elements to it, which will
eventually result in a hybrid analysis superior to either framework. Indeed
this framework employs semantic context parameters alongside dynamic dis-
course contexts. Still later, in 3.3.4, we use this to refine our modal semantics
of the bel operator somewhat. Note however that the real work lies in the
representation of natural language reports, more specifically, we’re ultimately
interested in the way English belief reporting sentences can convey particular
de re and de se meanings, depending on context and syntactic structure. We
return to this difficult issue in 3.4. What I’m trying to get across here is
that all this talk about a good semantics of bel is not directly about the
semantics of English belief reporting constructions. It has more to do with
the underlying belief semantics, which, as I’ve been arguing in the previous
chapters, should be treated as independently as possible.
The second prima facie reason not to go two-dimensional already, is that
DRT’s representationalism offers a native account of structured belief. In
1.1.2.3 we saw how simple possible worlds analyses of attitudes were plagued
with logical omniscience, and how adding structure to the belief objects could
help reduce the number of unwanted inferences. The ultimate structured
belief object would be a sentence, or at least some formal, syntactic object,
structured like a natural language sentence, supposedly modeling a language
of thought. On such an analysis, believing something means having the
corresponding sentence of thought stored in your belief box. We criticized this
analysis for a variety of different reasons already, but it does effectively render
logical omniscience and essential indexicality harmless. Now, DRT may be
seen as providing a superior structured belief object: the DRS. This would
be totally compatible with the original mentalist inspiration behind DRT
that saw DRSs as representing what happens in the mind of an interpreter.
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It is only natural then to define someone believing something, as having the
mental state represented by the corresponding DRS. In such a model, we’d
replace the belief set with a DRS capturing the individual’s mental state. It’s
obvious that this is essentially still a sententialist approach to omniscience,
and as such it’s pretty successful. For example, the DRSs for Ligia is a
philosopher and 37 is prime and Ligia is not not a philosopher [=(13), p. 13]
are very different and we may well assume that a structured mental state
(whether a DRS or a set of DRSs) can contain the first but not the second.
Furthermore, things may be set up in such a way that we can do justice to
the more difficult belief puzzles involving co-referential res terms in belief
(historical examples include Frege’s Hesperus/Phosphorus, Quine’s Ortcutt
and Kripke’s Pierre in London/Londres) also including essential indexicals
(Lingens, Heimson,. . . ). The formal machinery involved is quite intricate,
so I refer the interested reader to Zeevat (1984; 1986), Asher (1986; 1987;
1993) and Kamp (1985; 1990). Furthermore, the resulting framework of DRS
belief objects, with internal and external anchors, has even been successfully
applied to the notorious belief puzzles of intentional identity (Geach’s (1967)
Hob/Nob).
To sum up, (i) the cognitive science roots of DRT provide independent
motivation for DRSs as representations of mental states, and (ii) the resulting
structured belief account has been worked out and successfully applied to
even the most obstinate belief puzzles that the philosophy of language has
to offer. In addition, (iii) the account beats basic sententialism in that its
highly structured belief objects can also be interpreted in a model: DRSs are
only an intermediate stage of interpretation, somewhere in between language
and the world, i.e. DRS representations are still connected to the external
world by a real Tarskian truth definition. In other words, DRT can take into
account both a narrow and a wide perspective on meaning and mental states
(cf. 1.2.4.4 and 3.1.2.2).
Although in principle I’m all for the use of DRSs as structured belief
objects, I will not develop the idea here any further. This is essentially for
the same, mostly practical, reasons I did not follow up on any of the omni-
science counter-measures listed in 1.1.2.3: I am primarily interested in report
semantics and thus will choose the simplest, most transparent semantics of
belief possible. Unfortunately, despite the fact that it is in some sense the
obvious way to go in DRT, taking DRSs themselves as belief objects in the
semantics makes for a much more complicated theory than does a simple
modal, or even two-dimensional, alternative. Besides, I want to be able to
compare my results in de re report semantics with the static state of the
art alternatives of chapter 2, all of which use some kind of doxastic possible
worlds framework. I will here abandon the DRS-belief account in favor of a
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possible worlds account. Whether this will require one or two dimensions of
intensionality remains to be seen after we’ve first developed an account of
indexicals as definites, i.e. as presuppositions, in the next section.
3.2 Presupposition
Presupposition theories have become an important and integral part of the
various forms of dynamic semantics. Here we discuss what presuppositions
are (3.2.1), and how we can incorporate them into DRT (3.2.2). The proposed
presuppositional extension of DRT is what inspired the two-stage interpre-
tation model that we’ve been talking about and that we’ll continue to work
with. In 3.2.3 we apply our theory to belief reports and get a nice analysis
of the de dicto/de re distinction.
3.2.1 Triggers, satisfaction, accommodation, and pro-
jection
Utterances often presuppose a certain amount of information, i.e. information
that has to be assumed as given for the utterance to make sense. Take (34)
for instance:
(34) I talked to the bearded logician
Uttering this sentence out of the blue will most likely raise some eyebrows,
unless the discourse context somehow already provides a specific logician.
Therefore, we say that (34) presupposes the existence of a bearded logician.
The first thing to note is that presuppositions are triggered by specific linguis-
tic constructions, called presupposition triggers. In this case it’s the definite
description that triggers the existential presupposition. By contrast, indef-
inites usually lack presuppositional force, i.e. I talked to a bearded logician
does not presuppose, but simply asserts the existence of a logician with a
beard: if there were no such logicians, (34) would be nonsensical whereas
the indefinite variant would just be false. Other examples of presupposition
triggers include factives, (35a), it-clefts, (35b), particles like too, also and
again, (35c), and so-called aspectual verbs (start, stop), (35d).
(35) a. Ligia knows that Colby likes her
 Colby likes Ligia
b. It was a logician I talked to
 I talked to someone
c. I also talked to Colby
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 I talked to someone else
d. He quit smoking yesterday
 He used to smoke
I use  to denote the presupposition normally associated with an utterance
of the sentence, i.e. to denote the information taken for granted when one
utters such a sentence. It is important to note that the term presupposition
is also used to denote the material that is conventionally invoked by presup-
position triggers.15 We shall see cases where a sentence constituent triggers
a presupposition in this last sense, even though an utterance of the whole
sentence does not presuppose anything in the first sense.
Characteristic of presuppositions is also their tendency to survive any
kind of embedding. The classic examples of this involve embeddings under
negation, but it holds more generally for any kind of embedding, including
e.g. connectives and intensional operators:
(36) a. Ligia doesn’t know that Colby likes her
 Colby likes Ligia
b. If I also talked to Colby, I must have been quite drunk
 I talked to someone else
c. Some people may not believe that he quit smoking yesterday
 He used to smoke
The combination of (35a) and (36a) suffices to show that presupposition
is not a special kind of (classical) inference, for something entailed by a
statement and by its negation would have to be a tautology.16 But then why
is it that normally utterances of the sentences above do seem to imply their
presuppositions? The answer lies in the context dependence of utterance and
presupposition. Presuppositions, we said, impose certain requirements on a
discourse, to the effect that a presupposing utterance demands a discourse
context in which its presuppositions are fulfilled. Apparently, (35a) and
(36a) are felicitous in the same contexts, viz. contexts where it is understood
that Colby likes Ligia. Thus it is no surprise that any felicitous discourse
containing these sentences entails that Colby likes Ligia.
As it turns out, things are not as clear-cut as that. There are many cases
of an arguably presupposing sentence uttered felicitously in a context where
the presupposition is not already common ground. For instance, we can eas-
ily imagine a discourse where Ligia uses (35d) to explain Colby’s annoying
15For this second sense I later introduce the marker ∂.
16This argument only holds for classical two-valued logic, which is precisely why for
some time, three or more valued logics were de rigueur in presupposition theory.
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behavior to a friend of hers that never met Colby before and therefore had
no idea he used to be a smoker. In such a case, the presupposition triggered
by the aspectual verb quit in Ligia’s utterance is not contextually given, but
new information, for the hearer at least. This use of presuppositions, to con-
vey new information, is called accommodation, following Lewis (1979b). One
popular way to think of accommodation is as a repair strategy: (35d) triggers
a presupposition that Colby used to smoke, so the context sketched in the
scenario above is defective; accommodation of the presupposition amounts
to an enrichment of the context with the presupposition’s content; after this
fix, the presupposition is trivially verified, the sentence is felicitous and the
discourse entails that Colby used to smoke. The status of accommodation
within the theory of presupposition is still hotly debated; for some, in the
tradition of Heim (1983b), such a repair strategy has no place in a com-
positional, semantic theory of presupposition and assertion, but should be
relegated to a truly pragmatic level of interpretation concerned with what
people actually do with words in particular situations (cf. Beaver 2001). In
the school of thought underlying the current work on the other hand, ac-
commodation is analyzed on a par with contextual (or local) givenness of
presuppositions. This second type of analysis thus allows a unified formal
analysis of accommodation, which on the Heimian view ended up in the
pragmatic wastebasket. The cost of this is that the formalization will be
non-compositional in a very real sense, and moreover, will rely essentially on
the representational level offered by DRT’s originally mentalistic framework.
But there’s one more basic fact to know about presupposition before we
go into formalization. The third characteristic trait of presuppositions is that
they are defeasible in the sense that a sentence that would be presuppositional
on its own, may lose its presuppositional character under certain embeddings.
A case in point is (37), which does not require a context where the speaker
is known to have talked to anyone, and what is more, the utterance doesn’t
even entail that she talked to anyone:
(37) If indeed I spoke to anyone at all last night, it was a logician I
talked to.
The consequent of this conditional, i.e. (35b), would normally presuppose
that I talked to someone, but if we embed it in a conditional that relativizes
it to the information otherwise presupposed, the resulting utterance no longer
presupposes anything. The phenomenon that a given clause’s presupposition
often survives embedding, but is sometimes defeated is called presupposi-
tion projection. This used to be known as the projection problem, but with
dynamic semantics soon came a satisfactory analysis. The main idea was
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that dynamically interpreting a conditional like (37), we first, temporarily,
increment the discourse context with the antecedent’s content. This gives
a so-called local context, which serves as the background against which the
consequent is evaluated. In a case like (37), the antecedent adds enough
information to satisfy the presupposition triggered in the consequent. The
presupposition is satisfied locally, which explains the observation that the
sentence as a whole no longer poses restrictions on the context. The fact
that conditionals don’t entail their antecedents then explains why this sen-
tence, even if embedded in a felicitous discourse, doesn’t entail that I talked
to someone.
Let me finish with some terminological remarks. Firstly, in order not
to confuse presupposition with implicature, a different type of pragmatic in-
formational content often characterized by its ‘cancelability’, I will refrain
from talking about presupposition cancellation in favor of presuppositions
being ‘defeated’. Secondly, when talking about presupposition projection on
a pre-theoretical level, I will speak of justification or verification of a presup-
position, instead of satisfaction, because the latter is too easily associated
with a particular theory of presuppositions, viz. Heim’s (1983b) Satisfaction
Theory. In fact, the theory I favor, van der Sandt’s (1992), cashes out the
general idea of presuppositions being defeated in terms of a stronger notion
called presupposition binding.
3.2.2 Presupposition as anaphora in DRT
In this subsection I will detail what I consider the most natural analysis
of presupposition within the DRT framework: van der Sandt’s (1992) the-
ory of Presupposition as Anaphora (PA), also known as the Binding Theory
of Presupposition (Geurts 1999). As I briefly pointed out above, its main
contemporary rival is Heim’s (1983b) Satisfaction Theory of presupposition,
which is based on Karttunen (1974) and Stalnaker (1974). For lack of space
I will forgo an in depth comparison of the two theories, in fact I will only
develop PA, mostly because it’s the obvious choice once we’ve already de-
cided to go with DRT; the Satisfaction Theory is designed specifically to
meet the demands of compositionality and non-representationalism imposed
by FCS and DPL. The interested reader is referred to Beaver (2001) and
Geurts (1999) for (not unbiased) overviews and comparisons of the modern
theories of presupposition.
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3.2.2.1 Two-stage interpretation
So let’s focus on the DRT+PA analysis of the phenomena described in 3.2.1.
As discussed before, nowadays we like to think of DRT as a two-stage in-
terpretation process that separates the construction of a preliminary DRSs
from the incrementation of the context.17 I have little to say here about the
first stage, except that we will require that preliminary DRS be composi-
tionally derivable from the sentence’s surface structure. In practice, I cannot
always provide the exact derivations, let alone a fully general system to parse
a certain fragment of English and map it to the corresponding preliminary
structures. In other words, the exact formulation of this so-called construc-
tion algorithm is not my concern here, but I trust that in my example DRSs
it will always be clear that such a compositional derivation of the preliminary
structure could be given straightforwardly.
On to stage two then: the resolution algorithm. This algorithm takes a
preliminary and a context DRS as input and gives a new context DRS as out-
put. The resulting two-stage interpretation of a multi-sentence discourse can
illustrated schematically as follows (construction algorithm denoted Prel,
resolution abbreviated Res):
(38) Let 〈σ1, . . . , σn〉 be a discourse, then ϕi, the representation of the
initial segment 〈σ1, . . . , σi〉, is given by:
a. ϕ0 represents the context at the start of the discourse
b. ϕi+1 = Res (ϕi ⊕Prel(σi+1))
But what exactly is the place of presupposition in all this? As we saw, pre-
suppositions are triggered by specific phrases or constructions in a sentence.
A preliminary DRS of a sentence will need to mark that it has triggered pre-
suppositions in order for the resolution algorithm to check whether these are
indeed satisfied in the context, or whether they should be accommodated.
Given the possibility of presuppositional information being already provided
somewhere earlier in the same sentence, as in (37), it is important that pre-
liminary DRSs encode precisely where (in the ≺ hierarchy of the DRS) the
17Originally this distinction was not made, as witness the standard DRT textbook of
Kamp & Reyle (1993) in which dynamic interpretation proceeds by adding to the context
DRS a syntactic parse tree of a sentence and then gradually turning that tree into DRS
conditions, resolving context dependencies such as presuppositions and anaphora on the
fly. Given that DRT was supposed to model incremental information growth in the mind
of a hearer, this may be the most natural way to model dynamic interpretation. However,
an empirically adequate and elegant treatment of presuppositions turned out to work out
better if we separate construction and resolution. Therefore, the new textbook by Kamp
et al. (1999) does incorporate a two-stage interpretation strategy, even at the cost of sac-
rificing some of the psychological appeal of the earlier, fully incremental implementation.
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presupposition is triggered. We add a special operator ∂ (symbolizing par-
tiality) to the language to mark presuppositions in preliminary DRSs. The
content of a presupposition is represented as a DRS, prefixed with this ∂.
In box notation we like to use the more visual dashed boxes instead of the
∂ prefix. In the compositional construction of a preliminary DRS such a
presupposition box is inserted at the point where the construction algorithm
parsed its trigger.
Let’s look at an example:
(39) The logician is asleep
 sleep(x)x
logician(x)
In this preliminary DRS we see that the sentence asserts no more than that
an individual x is asleep. Who this individual is, is to be determined by
resolution of the presupposition triggered by the definite NP. The dynamic
interpretation of this representation may be paraphrased as: find a represen-
tation of a logician in the context, say z; set x = z; and add the information
that x sleeps. Dashed boxes thus represent a request to search for a suit-
able antecedent to identify their presupposed discourse referent with. The
metaphor of ‘looking for an antecedent’ brings to mind the name of the
framework, Presupposition as Anaphora. Indeed, the basic idea is that the
same representation and resolution methods can be applied to anaphora and
presupposition alike. We’ll look at resolution examples below, but a prelim-
inary representation of a sentence with a anaphoric pronoun would look like
this:
(40) She is asleep
 sleep(x)x
female(x)
Since proper names and indexical pronouns are context dependent defi-
nites as well, we might want to represent them as presuppositions/anaphors
too. They certainly share the main trait of presuppositionality, viz. that they
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require a contextually given antecedent for the discourse to be acceptable:
if I am aware that nobody in my audience knows who Colby is, I shouldn’t
want to enter the conversation with (41a), just as I cannot use the definite
subjects of (39) or (40) if I know their antecedents are not common ground.
With pure indexicals, the story is essentially the same, but note that we need
their antecedents to be given in the actual, external context. This raises a
delicate issue which we will discuss at length in 3.3. For now, let’s just treat
names and indexicals as regular presupposition triggers, keeping in mind that
these representations will be refined in 3.3:
(41) a. Colby is asleep
 sleep(x)x
colby(x)
b. I am asleep
 sleep(x)x
speaker(x)
Now, let’s look at embedded triggers and their presuppositions. In view
of local binding possibilities it is important to place the presupposition boxes
at the right level of embedding, i.e. the level at which they are triggered (as
already dictated by compositionality). Unfortunately, the examples of (35)
all involve presupposed entities such as events and propositions which we are
not equipped to deal with yet. So let’s stick with definites:
(42) Most people Ligia knows believe that she is dating the bearded logi-
cian
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
x
person(x)
know(y, x)
y
ligia(y)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
most
x belx
dating(z, w)
z
female(z)
w
bearded(w)
logician(w)
The first trigger, a proper name, is syntactically embedded in the restric-
tor of a quantifier, the other two are even further embedded, inside a belief
complement inside the quantifier’s scope. By compositionality, the presuppo-
sitions they give rise to must be located accordingly within the hierarchical
structure of the preliminary DRS, as they are in the DRS in (42).
3.2.2.2 Binding presuppositions
Now that we know, at least roughly, how to construct preliminary represen-
tations, let’s bring the context into the picture and consider some example
resolutions. Let’s assume a context where Ligia is already known. Of course,
the existence of Ligia is not the only thing that is common ground, but let’s
simplify and represent as little as possible:
(43)
x
ligia(x)
Now I utter (44) (preliminary DRS given below):
(44) Ligia is friends with a handsome linguist and a bearded logician

y z
friends(w, y)
handsome(y) linguist(y)
friends(w, z)
bearded(z) logician(z)
w
ligia(w)
206 Chapter 3. A semantics of attitude reports
The indefinites are represented as simply introducing new discourse referents
and conditions to the preliminary DRS. The proper name, of course, triggers
a presupposition. Merging (44) with the context, (43), gives:
(45)
x y z
ligia(x)
friends(w, y)
handsome(y) linguist(y)
friends(w, z)
bearded(z) logician(z)
w
ligia(w)
In this big DRS we now need to find an antecedent for the presupposition.
The first constraint on resolution is a semantic one:
match The content of a presupposition must semantically match the inter-
pretation of the antecedent
Let me illustrate matching on the current example. Applied to (45), it ba-
sically means I can take x as the antecedent for w, since what x refers to is
clearly something that fits the content of the presupposition. More precisely,
for all g with x ∈ Dom(g) that verify the non-presuppositional part of (45),
the presuppositional DRS is verified by the extension of g that maps w to
g(x). I will not yet offer a fully general and exact formulation of what it
means for a presupposition to match with an antecedent, but I aim here to
capture the idea that binding can only occur when the antecedent’s content
entails the presupposition’s content.18 I choose this rather strong entailment
18Determining the ‘antecedent’s content’ in a multiply embedded DRS containing vari-
ables bound higher up, is a serious technical challenge. Let’s see how van der Sandt
(1992) deals with it. Note first that he weakens match to a consistency check: we bind
a presupposition to an antecedent if the content associated with that antecedent does not
conflict with the presupposition’s content. I consider the resulting notion of binding a
mixture of binding and accommodation, as to be discussed at the end of 3.2.2.3, but the
point here is that van der Sandt depends on a way of collecting all information currently
associated with a candidate antecedent for checking what he calls local consistency and
local informativity. Unfortunately he does not properly define these notions, as witness
Beaver’s (1997) criticism:
Van der Sandt’s formulations of informativity and consistency constraints
seem to involve a notion of local entailment of sub-DRSs, although I am not
aware of such a notion ever having been formalized.
[
(Beaver 1997:980)
]
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model for now because I think it comes closest to the pre-theoretical ideas
of dynamic presupposition justification and filtering, and also to Heimian
satisfaction. Later on, we’ll discuss a weakening of the notion of matching,
merely requiring consistency of the presupposition with the content associ-
ated with the antecedent. I postpone this point of divergence between PA
and the Satisfaction Theory until after we have introduced accommodation
in PA.
Once we have identified a semantically matching antecedent, we bind the
presupposition to it. Formally this consists in a unification of the discourse
referents involved, in this case that comes down to a substitution
[
w7→x], and
deletion of the presupposition. The idea behind this deletion is that, once
we have identified x and w, the presupposition’s content is justified by the
context: it constitutes information already entailed by the context above it
and is thus superfluous. The result is a closed and pure DRS, representing
the old context updated with the information conveyed by the first sentence:
(46)
x y z
ligia(x)
friends(x, y)
handsome(y) linguist(y)
friends(x, z)
bearded(z) logician(z)
This DRS is again truth-conditionally interpretable: it is true if the model
provides a person called Ligia and two friends of hers, one a handsome lin-
guist, and one a bearded logician.
In this new context we would expect that (42) can be uttered felicitously.
Let’s see how we can derive that. First, we need to construct the preliminary
DRS, which we did in (42) already, and then we merge that with our context:
Fortunately, in later work on PA, more sensible formulations of the so-called local con-
straints have come up. Cf. Kamp’s (2001) still sketchy notion of an “‘extended’ local con-
text, which consists of the information in the local context representation itself together
with all information located at those contexts to which the local context is subordinate”
(p.8). For a real definition, I refer the reader to Bos’s (2003:203-4) implementation of the
relation supersub that is determined by walking through the DRS along the accessibil-
ity paths while gathering the relevant pieces of information. Interestingly, Geurts (1999)
seems to think we can make do with only ‘global’ versions of the constraints in question,
more concretely, he reduces them to constraints grouped under our pragmatics (the out-
put must be informative and consistent), which we will encounter below. Beaver (1997)
also proposes a constraint on finished output DRSs, but one that checks informativity and
consistency for all subDRSs.
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(47)
x y z
ligia(x)
friends(x, y)
handsome(y) linguist(y)
friends(x, z)
bearded(z) logician(z)
u
person(u)
know(v, u)
v
ligia(v)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
most
u belu
dating(s, t)
s
female(s)
t
bearded(t)
logician(t)
Here we have embedded presuppositions looking for antecedents and then a
second constraint on binding kicks in:
access an antecedent must be accessible from the (sub)DRS where the pre-
supposition is triggered.
Alternatively, we could try and derive this constraint from an apparently
more general constraint:
closure the output DRS must be closed
Under certain standard assumptions on Prel,19 closure implies access,
since the introduction of a presupposition always creates a preliminary DRS
with free variables, viz. the discourse referents that occur in the presuppo-
sition universes (cf. (39)-(42)). To bind those free discourse referents we
unify them with already bound ones, as exemplified in (45)-(46). But this
will only close the open DRS conditions if these conditions have access to
19To be precise, we have to assume that preliminary DRSs obey the following constraint:
(i) If a DRS ϕ contains a presupposition ∂ψ ∈ C(ϕ) then it also contains an atomic
condition Π(ξ1, . . . , ξn) ∈ C(ϕ) containing at least one ξi from the presuppositional
universe U(ψ).
Once we allow Prel to form preliminary structures violating this well-formedness restric-
tion, closure can be achieved by binding presuppositions to inaccessible antecedents.
van der Sandt & Huitink (2003) exploit this feature in their analysis of again.
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the antecedent universe, otherwise, if we were to bind the presupposition
in a position inaccessible (e.g. strictly subordinated) to the trigger, the free
variables left behind at the trigger location would remain free, even after
unification with the bound antecedent. Because I’m not sure I really want
to enforce the aforementioned ‘standard assumptions on Prel’ I’ll just take
closure and access as two separate constraints.
Combining the two main constraints on binding gives: presuppositions
look for a semantically matching antecedent that is accessible from the trigger
location. Let’s apply this to our example. The first presupposition was the
one triggered by the proper name in the quantifier’s restrictor. As defined
in 3.1.4, a restrictor does not have access to its quantifier’s scope, just as a
conditional’s antecedent has no access to its consequent, only the other way
around. The only accessible DRSs thus are the restrictor itself and of course
the main DRS. In the restrictor we find u, but there’s nothing that makes
this u satisfy the presupposed content of being Ligia, so we turn to the global
context, where indeed we find a Ligia to bind to, so we substitute x/v.
Then we take on the pronoun’s presupposition. All four subDRS are
accessible from this position, but the first two have empty universes, and
the third only has u, who need not be female at all. Though our simplified
initial context representation makes no explicit mention of it, we may well
assume that it’s commonly known that Ligia is a woman, if only because
it’s a girl’s name, so again x seems a plausible candidate to bind to. The
bearded logician, obviously, is out, because of the beard, but why not take
the handsome linguist? Well, it depends, in certain situations, e.g. if you’re
convinced that ‘Ligia’ must refer to a man, we might well bind she to the
linguist y; as a general rule, just pick whatever makes the most sense in the
given situation. Let’s turn this into a third constraint on binding:
pragmatics pick the resolution candidate that will eventually yield a prag-
matically optimal output interpretation
The term ‘pragmatically optimal’ here hides a competition of a number of
(mostly Gricean) constraints such as coherence, non-redundancy and rel-
evance, which I will only refer to on a very informal level.20 We should
be careful about the order in which to apply these constraints, the seman-
tic/formal ones should outrank the pragmatics (but for the system so far we
20A straightforward formalization of the competing constraints idea may be in the
framework of Optimality Theory, which has been successfully applied to both semantics
(de Hoop & Hendriks 2001) and pragmatics (Blutner 2000). We could use OT not only
within the family of constraints dubbed pragmatics, but also to the whole constraint
based definition of the binding algorithm sketched above. The most natural order of the
constraints introduced so far would be: {closure, access}>match>pragmatics.
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get part of that ordering for free, since an open DRS cannot even compete
in the race for pragmatic optimality). A proper order may also muffle the
combinatorial explosion that we get from computing possible resolution com-
binations to get interpretable output candidates whose felicity we can then
compare according to pragmatics.
In any case, in the current example, we bind s to x, and then we go and
look for an antecedent for the last presupposition, the bearded logician, which
can only be z. The final output of Res is the following, closed and proper
DRS:
(48)
x y z
ligia(x)
friends(x, y)
handsome(y) linguist(y)
friends(x, z)
bearded(z) logician(z)
u
person(u)
know(x, u)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
most
u belu dating(x, z)
Before we look at accommodation, we take a look at a local verification
example where a presupposition triggered in a conditional’s consequent is
filtered out because it gets bound by asserted material in the conditional’s
antecedent:
(49) If I did talk to anyone, it must have been a logician I talked
to.
[≈(37)]
The sentence DRS for this one will involves two presuppositions for each of
the two first person pronouns, and one for the it-cleft, to the effect that I
talked to someone. So, the second I’s presupposition is actually embedded in
the it-cleft’s. In cases of multiply embedded presuppositions, Res will take
the most deeply embedded presupposition first, if only because it is difficult
to check match if the presupposition to be bound carries a stack of further
unresolved presuppositions with it. So after merging with a minimal context,
with nothing more than a speaker, we resolve the I’s and we have:
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(50)
x
speaker(x)
y
talk(x, y)
⇒ 2 logician(z)z
talk(x, z)
As for the it-cleft’s presupposition, the conditional’s antecedent is accessible
and introduces a perfectly matching discourse individual, i.e. someone the
speaker talked to,21 so we need not look any further and bind there:
(51)
x
speaker(x)
y
talk(x, y)
⇒ 2
logician(y)
We thus get a perfectly good (closed, pure, pragmatically sound) DRS, with-
out demanding anything of the context but a speaker, exactly as described
in 3.2.1.
Considering many more examples of local, or rather intermediate, binding,
a tendency to bind close to the trigger has been observed in cases where there
are various accessible, matching candidate antecedents. We thus formulate
a new resolution constraint, ranked on a par with the pragmatic ones:
local bind a presupposition as close to the trigger as possible
For computational implementation this may be especially useful as it implies
that a presupposition starts its search for an antecedent in the DRS where it’s
triggered; if it finds no suitable antecedent there, it gradually works its way
down the so-called projection path (the complete chain of accessible DRSs)
until, if all else fails, it arrives at the global DRS, where it is either bound or
reports failure.
21This is a case where we need a better formalization of ‘the content associated with
a discourse referent’ in the definition of the match constraint, as discussed earlier in
footnote 18.
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3.2.2.3 Accommodation
With all these constraints on binding, it may well happen that no suitable
antecedent for a presupposition is found. In such a case we can resort to
our aforementioned repair strategy of accommodation. To capture the fact
that accommodation really is a repair strategy and thus only applies after all
binding options have been ruled out, we could introduce another constraint
on Res:
repair avoid accommodation
As presented in 3.2.1, accommodation means we fix the context in such a
way that it will trivially satisfy/bind the presupposition, viz. by adding the
presupposed information to it. In DRT this comes down to merging the pre-
supposition with an appropriate DRS accessible from the trigger location.
We thus reformulate the access constraint on binding, to include accommo-
dation:
access accommodation and binding sites must be accessible from the trigger
location
Depending on where on the projection path this merge occurs, we speak of
global, intermediate or local accommodation.
Let’s consider examples of each of these types of accommodation. And
at the same time, let me introduce another bit of notation, , for denot-
ing resolution processes, as opposed to  which signifies the (underspecified)
representation of a sentence in isolation, i.e. a PrelDRS (or lf, in other frame-
works).
(52) I think Ligia likes the logician

x y
speaker(x)
ligia(y)
;
x y
speaker(x)
ligia(y)
belx
like(y, z)
z
logician(z)
;
3.2 Presupposition 213
x y z
speaker(x)
ligia(y)
logician(z)
belx like(y, z)
I’ve represented the input context, the context merged with the preliminary
DRS, and, after some trivial presupposition bindings, the output. In the
last step, binding according to our constraints was not an option, so we
resorted to global accommodation. With the constraints formulated so far,
a weaker, local accommodation would have been possible as well. Several
accommodation constraints have been formulated to derive a preference for
global accommodation for this example:
global accommodate as far away from the trigger as possible
This is the dual of local, which said that presuppositions want to bind
as close to the trigger as possible. Another constraint that works for this
example, but gives different predictions in others is:
strength choose the accommodation site that maximizes the output’s log-
ical strength
This formulation uses the notion of ϕ being stronger than ψ iff ϕ asymmet-
rically entails ψ. Thus, it can be viewed as a specific instance of the general
pragmatic maxim “be informative!” Without further argument I will opt to
have global replace, or at least outrank, strength. For an empirically
informed defense of global over strength I refer the reader to Geurts
(2000).
However, in some cases, the global DRS, though trivially accessible, is not
available for accommodation (or binding) due to the structure of the DRSs
and presuppositions involved. We want our outputs to be properly inter-
pretable (i.e. closed), as specified by our earlier constraint closure. When
closure prevents the accommodation process from reaching the global DRS
we speak of trapping. In (53) the presupposition triggered by his car is
trapped in the restrictor by the quantified Germans:22
(53) Every German loves his car
22I skipped the part where the possessive pronoun triggers a presupposition that gets
bound, intermediately, by the x in the restrictor. Idem for (55).
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 ; x
german(x)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
all
x
love(x, y)
y
car(y)
own(x, y)
;
x y
german(x)
car(y)
own(x, y)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
all
x love(x, y)
The resulting reading every German who has a car loves it, is quite plausible,
but others have defended a stronger reading, every German owns a car and
loves it, which we would get by local accommodation of the presupposition:
(54) ; x
german(x)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
all
x
y
love(x, y)
car(y)
own(x, y)
Since we chose global over strength, local accommodation is dispreferred.
There is a heated debate between satisfaction theorists and PA people over
such examples, for it is one of the issues on which the two really make diver-
gent empirical predictions.
Finally, contextual, pragmatic factors may influence accommodation pref-
erences, so that even purely local accommodation becomes possible:
(55) [Why is Colby so sad?]
[You mean that guy? Well, I don’t know. . . ] Perhaps his girlfriend
broke up with him, or maybe his dog died.
3.2 Presupposition 215

x
colby(x)
sad(x)
;
x
colby(x)
sad(x)
3 break up with(y, x)y
girlfriend of(y, x)
∨ 3 dead(z)z
dog of(z, x)
;
x
colby(x)
sad(x)
3 break up with(y, x)
girlfriend of(y, x)
∨ 3
z
dead(z)
dog of(z, x)
Here, binding is out, but there’s no trapping, and the global and intermedi-
ate positions do give closed, interpretable results. The local accommodation
reading however is the one that makes the most sense, given standard conver-
sational maxims applied to the context sketched. The global accommodation
output for instance would imply that (it is common ground that) Colby had a
girlfriend and a dog, which is contradicted by the fact that the second speaker
doesn’t even remember for sure who Colby is. In other words, pragmatics
applies to accommodation as well as binding and is ranked at least as high
as global.
A final constraint is needed to prevent accommodation of pronouns, be-
cause it is almost impossible that a sentence like (56a) can mean there is a
man who likes to talk, by accommodation of the presupposition triggered by
the pronoun. It has been hypothesized that this has to do with the lack of
specific content in a pronominal presupposition. Adding more content to the
presupposition makes the sentence much easier, as witness the acceptability
of the examples below, all uttered in a context where the subject term cannot
be bound to a contextually familiar discourse referent:
(56) a. *He likes to talk
b. ?My friend likes to talk
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c. My best friend Colby from high school likes to talk
Presumably, the rich content of the bigger definite in (56) makes it more
eligible for accommodation because it allows the hearer to construct a rea-
sonably accurate picture of the kind of individual the speaker has in mind.
As a constraint:
specificity do not accommodate presuppositions low on informational con-
tent
This applies to indexical (1st and 2nd) pronouns as well, but for such pro-
nouns, accommodation does not even come into play usually, because in any
sane conversational context it’s quite clear who addresses whom. Note that
there seems to be a connection with rigidity/direct reference, though proper
names seem to be able to accommodate on occasion (Geurts 1997). We
return to the issue of rigidity in DRT in section 3.3.
We have now discussed the major pragmasemantic factors that play a role
in computing optimal resolutions. But until now, we have looked at bind-
ing and accommodation as separate strategies for resolving presuppositions,
and because of that we have overlooked one important resolution option: the
binding/accommodation mix. So far, binding meant that the presupposed
discourse referent and conditions were fully ‘absorbed’ into the antecedent,
which could only happen if there was a match between them, i.e. if the an-
tecedent’s content entailed the presupposition. Accommodation on the other
hand meant that the whole presupposition was added as new information
to a DRS. What if the presupposed content only partially matches the an-
tecedent’s, i.e. it does not really follow from it, but it is not contradictory
either (Krahmer & van Deemter 1998). A simple example:
(57) A famous professor visited the department. She gave a talk.

x y
famous(x)
prof(x)
dept(y)
visit(x, y)
;
x y
famous(x)
prof(x)
dept(y)
visit(x, y)
give talk(z)
z
female(z)
What to do with the pronoun’s presupposition? pragmatics, repair and
specificity would select binding to x over accommodation, but, as it stands,
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match does not allow that since the context does not specify that the famous
professor is indeed female.23 By far the most intuitive reading of the discourse
is one where z binds to x but accommodates its content:
;
x y
famous(x)
prof(x)
dept(y)
visit(x, y)
give talk(x)
female(x)
The presupposition is essentially bound, but part of its content is accom-
modated into the context, i.e. we learn from the second sentence that this
famous professor mentioned in the first was a woman. For the purpose of
formalization we classify such resolutions as binding, since the presupposed
discourse referent gets identified with an existing one, but it does necessitate
two small adaptations (built into most versions of PA from the start (van der
Sandt 1992; Geurts 1999)). First, binding itself now consists in the unifica-
tion of discourse referents plus the addition of the presupposition’s condition
set to the binding site. In cases of full matching, this results in semantically
superfluous conditions, which, by way of notational convention, will simply
remain invisible in our box notations. Second, match must be weakened
to allow partial matching. Perhaps, one way to go about this would be to
weaken it all the way down to a mere consistency check and trust that the
other constraints, especially pragmatics, will provide enough further re-
strictions on binding possibilities. A further refinement to be considered is
that the accommodation of conditions is subject to the general accommoda-
tion constraints repair and specificity. Unfortunately I do not have time
to go into these matters in detail, but in the following we will often make use
of partially matched binding/accommodation.
To sum up, we have tried to cast van der Sandt’s (1992) presupposition
resolution mechanism in the form of a competition of (partial) output can-
didates according to a set of constraints on binding and accommodation. In
other words, we’ve made some first steps towards an implementation of PA’s
Res in OT. It’s just a rough sketch though, and certainly not ready for com-
putational implementation (see Bos (2003) for that). In fact we haven’t even
been very specific about the exact ranking of the constraints.24 I hope I’ve
23For this example, the other constraints are irrelevant.
24I think we’d get a good approximation of van der Sandt’s proposal by using a standard
OT, taking preliminary DRSs as input and generating full DRSs as output candidates,
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nonetheless managed to clarify the ideas behind DRT+PA, because in the
following we rely heavily on the two-stage formulation of DRT, with a Prel
and a Res algorithm essentially operating as discussed here. There will be
some minor adjustments necessitated by the introduction of layers in 3.3 and
second order variables, but then we’re all ready for our analysis of de re/de
se reporting. But first, in the next section, let’s look at what we get if we
simply merge our modal analysis of belief and PA into a simple account of
attitude reports, and why that fails.
3.2.3 Presuppositions in attitude reports
We’ve seen in the previous section how presuppositions tend to escape any
kind of embedding, including embedding under a bel operator. We’ve left
it more or less open whether we can really keep the simple modal semantics
of bel conditions, or whether something more sophisticated is required, but
let’s just represent “x believes that. . . ” as belx and worry about the un-
derlying belief semantics later. In 3.2.3.1 I’ll show how treating definites as
presuppositions leads to a new and improved version of the old scopal analy-
sis of the de dicto/de re distinction (2.2.1). Though it does get some things
right, it also suffers some of the same defects as its Russellian predecessor, i.e.
in de re readings we get truly singular propositions and therefore we run into
problems with Ortcutt scenarios (1.2.2). In 3.2.3.2 we thus follow the reason-
ing of 2.2.2 and introduce res descriptions into belief. Finally, we’ll want to
extend our account to incorporate the insights of 2.3.1 and allow treatment
of the somewhat subtler de re/de se distinction. To do that however we
need to move from propositions to properties, or, from worlds to contexts.
But for a proper introduction of semantic contexts to the DRT framework
we will have to wait until 3.3 adds a layer for indexicals with accompanying
interpretation. We’ll pick up belief reports again in 3.3.4.
In this section we also return to the examples discussed throughout chap-
ter 2, because we want to test our theorizing against the concrete sentences
and contexts that we have been using to test other theories of belief report-
ing. The test cases in question are 2.1’s sentences (1)-(3) and the contexts
described in scenes A, B, and C. To apply our dynamic account, bear in
mind that we shouldn’t simply represent the complete stories as DRSs and
take those as input contexts. That would mean that all that information
using the soft constraints described above and ranking them as follows:
(i)
 closureaccess
match
 <
 pragmaticslocal
repair
 < specificity < global < strength
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is already common ground between the reporter and the audience, in which
case the reports in question would become redundant. Of course, we may as-
sume that the reporter has full knowledge of what’s going on with Ellsworth,
but not all of that is common ground yet. For the most part we take the
scene description to establish a possible world, in which to evaluate the pre-
dicted output DRS for truth or falsity. So, in order to adapt our paradigm
to the dynamic setting, we must split the stories into a background context
or common ground, modeled as a DRS, and a factual context of evaluation,
modeled as a possible world.
Concretely: for the interpretation of all our reports we need the back-
ground contexts of A, B, and C to provide someone called Ellsworth. For A
and C this should suffice to make most of the utterances interpretable, but,
following our earlier discussion of the crucial judgments of (2) in connec-
tion with ‘mistaken self-identity’, we had better assume that it is commonly
known that Ellsworth is watching someone called Arata Suggs on TV and
that that Arata is actually herself. For future reference, let me suggest the
following dynamic and evaluation contexts for A, B, and C:25
(58) ϕA:
x
ellsworth(x)
cA: Ellsworth is the prettiest, though she doesn’t believe that. In
fact, she is a bit disappointed because she believes the prettiest
will win, saying: “The pretty ones always win, I don’t stand
a chance.” Meanwhile, Ellsworth is known to some as Arata
Suggs.
[
cf. A, p. 73
]
(59) ϕB:
x
ellsworth(x)
arata(x)
see on tv(x, x)
cB: Ellsworth is still the prettiest, but she doesn’t think that mat-
ters anymore. Arata is a nickname name for Ellsworth, though
she thinks this Arata, the person she’s watching on TV, drunk,
is someone else, someone better, so she says: “She’s really good,
this Arata on TV, I think she’ll win, not me”
[
cf. B, p. 74
]
(60) ϕC :
x
ellsworth(x)
25The DRS representations of (58)-(60) can be taken as highlighting only the minimally
required and highly salient knowledge present in the discourse context.
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cC : Ellsworth, full of self-confidence, thinks: “Looks don’t mat-
ter, I’ll definitely win” For compatibility: Arata=the pretti-
est=Ellsworth.
[
cf. C, p. 74
]
For completeness, here are the reports we want to evaluate, and the table
of our intuitive judgments, whose columns indicate the truth values of the
sentences uttered in the background of A, B, or C, and evaluated in the
corresponding world.
(61) a. Ellsworth Kimmel believes pretty girls always win
[
=(1a), p. 72
]
b. Ellsworth believes the prettiest girl will win
[
=(2), p. 72
]
c. Ellsworth believes of Arata Suggs that she’ll win
[
=(1b), p. 72
]
d. Ellsworth believes she’s going to win
[
=(3), p. 73
]
e. Ellsworth believes to be on the winning side
[
=(1c), p. 72
]
A B C
(61a) 1 0 0
(61b) 1 ?1 ?1
(61c) 0 1 ?1
(61d) 0 ?1 1
(61e) 0 0 1
Table 3.1: Intuitions
3.2.3.1 Presupposition as scope in de dicto/de re reports
DRT+PA currently predicts that presuppositions triggered inside a belief
report generally project out of that belief, in order to be bound or accom-
modated at a higher level. Let’s see what this means exactly by applying it
to the paradigm de dicto/de re reports (61a)-(61d).
First (61a), uttered in ϕA. Since there’s no presupposition triggered inside
the belief, we just get a straightforward translation26 into a DRS by Prel
alone—apart from the trivially resolved proper name in the main clause,
which we will henceforth no longer represent explicitly.
(62) Ellsworth Kimmel believes pretty girls always win
[
=(61a)
]
26I will not go into the question how bare plural + always gives a universal reading. Note
also that a universal quantification over events would be closer to the truth about (62),
but I don’t want to go into event semantics either.
3.2 Presupposition 221
 ϕA = ϕC = xellsworth(x)
;
x
ellsworth(x)
bely
x
pretty(x)
girl(x)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
every
x win(x)
y
ellsworth(y)
;
x
ellsworth(x)
belx
x
pretty(x)
girl(x)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
every
x win(x)
The truth conditions of the output correspond to the de dicto reading that
we want: in all of Ellsworth’s belief worlds pretty girls always win. In fact,
translating the DRS into predicate logic we’ll see the exact same lf as assigned
in chapter 2, to wit (4), p. 76. Putting the sentence in the context of ϕB
doesn’t change anything, so, as expected, the outputs are true only in cA,
because in the other worlds Ellsworth does not believe looks matter.
Let’s move on to an allegedly ambiguous report, (61b). First, we add the
preliminary structure to the minimal context, ϕA. We see a presupposition
triggered inside a belief box:
(63) Ellsworth believes the prettiest girl will win
[
=(61b)
]
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 x
ellsworth(x)
;
x
ellsworth(x)
belx
win(y)
y
prettiest(y)
The context is so minimal indeed that we have to accommodate the prettiest’s
presupposition. Global is preferred over local (by global):
(64) ;
x y
ellsworth(x)
prettiest(y)
belx win(y)
This output truth-conditionally corresponds to the wide scope lf presented
in 2.2.1, i.e. (6b), p. 76. In the computation of a truthful embedding we
first evaluate who’s prettiest and then ask whether that individual wins in
Ellsworth’s belief worlds. It doesn’t matter who Ellsworth considers pretty,
it’s about who actually is the prettiest (or rather, whom we (the reporter
and her audience) consider the prettiest). The content of the prettiest is thus
used only to fix a certain individual that the belief is about, which makes
this a de re logical form. Since we assumed that Ellsworth is the prettiest
in all of cA to cC , the belief is de re about Ellsworth, which makes it true
in cB and cC , because there Ellsworth verbalizes her belief in the form of a
sentence about herself (though she is unaware of that aboutness in cB).
We can also imagine that due to all manner of contextual factors not
represented explicitly here, this reading doesn’t quite fit in to the wider
conversational context. Perhaps because it’s obviously false, or because it’s
somehow redundant. In such a case we could invoke a violation of prag-
matics to enforce local accommodation:
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(65) ;
x
ellsworth(x)
belx
y
win(y)
prettiest(y)
Thus, we get a reading equivalent to (6a), p. 76.27 This narrow scope/local
accommodation output obviously corresponds to a de dicto reading: in all of
Ellsworth’s belief worlds there’s a prettiest girl and that one wins. Note that
it doesn’t matter who’s actually pretty, we only evaluate who’s prettiest ac-
cording to Ellsworth. As expected this DRS is true only in the first scenario,
cA.
The same resolutions are possible in ϕB and ϕC . In none of these does
the context provide matching, accessible antecedents for the presupposition
to bind to. If it did, globally or locally, we’d of course immediately bind to
them without even considering accommodation.28 The net result will still be
the same outputs as (64) or (65), but now there would be only one candidate
output, the one given by binding to the nearest antecedent. For instance, if
we were to assume that it was common ground that Ellsworth herself is the
27To prove the equivalences (64)≡(6b) and (65)≡(6a) you’ll need the fact that the
predicate prettiest already verifies uniqueness, so we can indeed leave out the ιcon-
structions. We’ll see examples later on where uniqueness is not part of the predicate but
where we nonetheless choose not to use a ιoperator. The idea behind this simplification in
DRT+PA is that the uniqueness that is often inherent in the use of a definite is captured
at a meta-level, viz. by the fact that, as presuppositions, they want to project out and bind
to an already given, hence definite, discourse individual. It is therefore not the case that
we replace the contribution of the predicate logical ιsimply with an existential quantifier.
28How, you ask, can we get local binding with this particular sentence? How can the
context make available a pretty girl within the belief introduced by the current sentence?
The answer involves something called modal subordination. I cannot go into details, but
consider this discourse:
(i) Ellsworth believes there’s always one contestant who’s considered to be the pret-
tiest, and one who’s the smartest. [Furthermore,] Ellsworth believes the prettiest
will win.
The first sentence creates a belief box for Ellsworth with a prettiest and a smartest. I
propose that the second, our (63), doesn’t introduce a second belief box, but adds to
the already given one. Somehow, the parallel construction with repetition of believes
licenses this. Incorporating this into our theory requires some adaptation of the ‘merge-
and-resolve’ component of our interpretation strategy. Note, by the way, that this kind of
modal subordination is nowhere near as mysterious as the Hob/Nob problem of intentional
identity, for that involves belief of different individuals somehow linked together.
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prettiest, we’d predict only the de re reading. I think this prediction is more
or less borne out, i.e. I expect for instance the following natural language
inference to be valid:
(66) Ellsworth is the prettiest. She believes the prettiest will win. There-
fore, she believes she herself will win.
We see how adding information to the background may influence the out-
come of the resolution process (by blocking a possible accommodation site,
or blocking accommodation completely). This is one big advantage of the
flexible dynamics of DRT+PA.
The other, related, advantage of the DRT+PA analysis over the old scope
account is that we have gotten rid of a syntactic ambiguity. In DRT+PA we
can make do with a single ‘logical form’, a compositionally derived prelim-
inary DRS, viz. the one in (63). The distinct truth conditions are derived
pragmatically, by putting the preliminary DRS in context and applying Res.
In other words, instead of a stipulative lf ambiguity, we have underspecifica-
tion that is resolved in context.
Let’s also take a quick look at the de re construction of (61b). If pressed,
I’d propose the following preliminary structure and resolutions:
(67) Ellsworth believes of Arata Suggs that she’ll win
[
=(61c)
]
 ϕA = ϕC = xellsworth(x) ;
x
ellsworth(x)
belx win(y)
y
arata(y)
;
x y
ellsworth(x)
arata(y)
belx win(y)
The hearer should accommodate the existence of someone called Arata Suggs
and then the sentence ascribes to Ellsworth a de re belief about that indi-
vidual (so the hearer should also infer that Ellsworth is properly acquainted
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with this individual). Since in our evaluation contexts, Arata is Ellsworth
herself, the ascribed de re belief is about Ellsworth herself, which is verified
only by contexts cB and cC .
In the context of ϕB the nickname Arata for Ellsworth is saliently common
knowledge so we can bind instead of accommodate:
(68)  ϕB =
x
ellsworth(x)
arata(x)
see on tv(x, x)
;
x
ellsworth(x)
arata(x)
see on tv(x, x)
belx win(y)
y
arata(y)
;
x
ellsworth(x)
arata(x)
see on tv(x, x)
belx win(x)
Again, a de re belief of Ellsworth about herself, so true in cB and cC .
With the coreferential pronoun report (61d) we get outputs similar to
(68), independent of the input context. The embedded presupposition trig-
gered by she cannot be bound locally, because there is no local antecedent,
so it will be bound globally, by Ellsworth. Accommodation is absolutely
no option here (by repair and specificity). So we only get one possible
output, which is, moreover, truth-conditionally equivalent to (68).
(69) Ellsworth believes that she’s going to win
[
=(61d)
]
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 ϕA = ϕC ≈ ϕB ;
x
ellsworth(x)
belx
win(y)
y
fem(y)
;
x
ellsworth(x)
belx win(x)
I summarize these predictions in a table, separately representing the dy-
namic aspects of interpretation on the left, and the outputs’ static truth
values on the right-hand side:
prelim. context resolution29 output cA cB cC
(61a) (62) 1 0 0
(61b)
glob.acc. (64) 0 1 1
loc.acc. (65) 1 0 0
(61c)
ϕA, ϕC glob.acc. (67) 0 1 1
ϕB glob.bind. (68) 0 1 1
(61d) glob.bind. (69) 0 1 1
Table 3.2: Predictions of DRT+PA’s scopal analysis of de dicto/de re
The first thing to note is that our predictions match our semantic intu-
itions (table 3.1), and also the predictions of the simple scope account (ta-
ble 2.2). The big plus here is that we don’t rely on syntactic ambiguity. In
a sense we moved the de dicto/de re distinction into semantics/pragmatics.
Unfortunately, the account, like its lf-scopal predecessor, cannot handle Ort-
cutt cases, as we shall see in 3.2.3.2, nor can it do full justice to the de se
mode, as it involves too coarse-grained (singular) propositional belief objects,
as to be discussed in 3.2.3.3.
3.2.3.2 De re as de dicto in DRT
The scope account did well on our Ellsworth related test cases, but failed with
respect to a Quinian Ortcutt scenario. The same goes for the dynamification
proposed in the preceding section. The reason is that in both cases we
eventually model res with directly referential expressions (variables bound
from the outside). This gives singular propositions for sure, but, as we saw
29This of course refers to the resolution of the embedded subject.
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in 2.2.2, it’s too strong a model of intentionality. Let’s just go through the
crucial example (from 1.1.3.2) again:
(70) Janell is a big fan of Professor Ortcutt’s work. One day, when ref-
ereeing for a conference, she rejects a certain anonymous abstract,
saying: “This guy’s totally stupid”. Unbeknownst to her, the ab-
stract was in fact Ortcutt’s.
a. Janell believes Ortcutt is dumb
b. Janell believes Ortcutt is brilliant
The puzzle is that both sentences are fine, and in fact both report a de re
belief of Janell’s. On a wide scope analysis of de re however, we can conclude
from (70a) and (70b) together that Janell must have a contradictory belief
state.
Now, to apply our dynamically enhanced version, we must first divide
up the story into a background (DRS) and an evaluation context (possible
world). I propose to put the two distinct ways Janell is acquainted with
Ortcutt in the background representation. The reason for this is that I am
convinced that, out of the blue, a discourse containing both (70a) and (70b)
is indeed incoherent. Though the decision will not have any consequences
yet, the idea of utilizing that contextually given information will eventually
form the basis of my own analysis in 3.4.
(71) ϕ(70):
x y
janell(x)
ortcutt(y) famous(y)
admire(x, y)
referee(x, y)
c(70): Janell: “Ortcutt is great, but that guy who wrote abstract #042
is dumb”. Ortcutt wrote #042.
What do we predict then? Say, we were to utter the two reports in
succession—a bit of an oversimplification because in reality I’d expect to
need some intervening statements (preferably contributing part of the con-
textual background ϕ(70)) to make it really acceptable as a discourse.
30
30Here’s a more realistic discourse based on (70) containing both reports:
(i) Did you hear who turned down professor Ortcutt for the conference? It was this
PhD. student called Janell Ventress, maybe you’ve heard the name. Did you see
the comments? Apparently she thinks Ortcutt’s pretty dumb. Funny thing, when
I met her the other day she said she’d read all his books and thinks Ortcutt’s
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(72)  ϕ(70) ; ⊕Prel((70a)) ;
x y
janell(x)
ortcutt(y) famous(y)
admire(x, y)
referee(x, y)
belx
dumb(z)
z
ortcutt(z)
;
x y
janell(x)
ortcutt(y) famous(y)
admire(x, y)
referee(x, y)
belx dumb(y)
; ⊕Prel((70b)) ; . . .;
x y
janell(x)
ortcutt(y) famous(y)
admire(x, y)
referee(x, y)
belx dumb(y)
belx brilliant(y)
The output here is inconsistent, for it implies that there is this famous Ort-
cutt being refereed by Janell, represented as y, and in all of Janell’s belief
alternatives this individual is dumb, but at the same time, he’s brilliant in
all of her belief worlds.31
brilliant.
31If we take the idea that proper names are just presupposition triggers, with content,
seriously, we should expect a local, or even global accommodation option. We could for
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Exactly as in static semantics, Ortcutt cases show the need for taking
descriptions into account. In 2.2.2 we argued for Kaplan’s (1969) way of going
about this, essentially turning de re belief into de dicto belief by replacing
the res with a vivid name of the res for the believer. We can simply plug the
Kaplanian theory into our DRT framework, and get the following derivations
for (70):
instance reason as follows: after the first sentence is resolved, its Ortcutt bound globally,
we turn to the second. Binding globally again, yields an inconsistent output, which violates
pragmatics, so we look for another option. Global accommodation might yield a reading
on which the two sentences deal with two distinct Ortcutts. Perhaps a plausible solution
in some cases, though c(70) does not provide two Ortcutts. The other option is local
accommodation, inside the belief ascribed to Janell, meaning that the person Janell knows
as ‘Ortcutt’ is brilliant:
(i)
x y
janell(x)
ortcutt(y) famous(y)
admire(x, y)
referee(x, y)
belx dumb(y)
belx
z
brilliant(z)
ortcutt(z)
Unfortunately this doesn’t work in general, because the name used in the report to pick
out the res may well be distinct from any description known to the attitude holder. For
instance, if my audience consists of professor Ortcutt’s close friends, I could have used
her first name, Deandre, in my reports, even if Janell doesn’t know Ortcutt’s first name.
When informing Ortcutt directly of Janell’s funny misidentifications of her, I’d use the
appropriate indexical (Janell thinks you are dumb/brilliant), which under a local accom-
modation would give demonstrably wrong truth conditions (at least if Janell is not also
present at my talk with Ortcutt). Additionally, it’s not even strictly speaking a solution
to the puzzle as set out in chapter 1, because one of the argument’s premises was that
both beliefs ascribed were de re. The local accommodation resolution makes the second
one completely de dicto.
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(73)  ϕ(70) ; ⊕Prel((70a)) ; . . .;
x y d
janell(x)
ortcutt(y) famous(y)
admire(x, y)
referee(x, y)
R(d, x, y)
belx dumb(∨d)
;
; ⊕Prel((70b)) ; . . .;
x y d d′
janell(x)
ortcutt(y) famous(y)
admire(x, y)
referee(x, y)
R(d, x, y)
belx dumb(∨d)
R(d′, x, y)
belx brilliant(∨d′)
This output is easily verified since the context supplies two appropriate in-
dividual concepts to map d and d ’ to. As shown in 2.2.2, if we apply this
to the Ellsworth examples and scenarios we’d get predictions matching those
of the scopal account. But, without even looking very closely at the exact
predictions, there are some disadvantages. A minor technical consideration
is that we need to enrich the language with intensional discourse referents
(d ) and predicates that apply to them (R ). More seriously, we have to give
up the scopal unification of de dicto/de re provided by DRT+PA, because
we’d still have the usual in situ, or narrow scope, preliminary structures
for de dicto beliefs, but we need more than a simple wide scope resolution
for de re, apparently we need the properly quantified and restricted vivid
names already given in the de re preliminary structures, thus reintroducing
a syntactic ambiguity between de dicto and de re:
(74) Ellsworth believes the prettiest girl will win
[
=(61b)
]
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a. 
x
ellsworth(x)
belx
y
prettiest(y)
win(y)
[
de dicto
]
b. 
d
R(d, x, y)
x
ellsworth(x)
y
prettiest(y)
belx win(∨d)
[
de re
]
Obviously a highly unsatisfactory state of affairs about which more should
be said, and if it weren’t for lack of space, I would certainly try my hand
at a proper unification of de dicto and de re incorporating the Kaplanian
insights. As it is, we’re focusing on de re/de se issues and besides, we’re
about to replace our vivid names with de se sensitive acquaintance relations
anyway, so, for what it’s worth, let me just sketch very briefly the kind of
unification I envisage, borrowing ideas from Kraut (1983) and Heim (1992).
The starting point would be something like the quantified vivid name
structure, (74b). My first step would be to weaken the acquain-
tance/vividness notion built into the semantics of R ((7), p. 78) so as to
allow individuals to be ‘acquainted’ with concepts instead of with just real
objects. Next, I’d extend the resolution algorithm to allow certain descriptive
presuppositions to bind to (and accommodate as) individual concepts, based
on the idea that the use of the definite the prettiest may be justified by the
givenness of a prettiest individual, but also by the contextual availability of
the concept of ‘being the prettiest’. This should do the trick: the presuppo-
sition triggered by the prettiest in the main DRS can be bound to an actual
prettiest known to Ellsworth, or it can give rise to the accommodation of the
the prettiest concept. In the first case, resolution proceeds as in (73), i.e. de
re. In the second, we can just equate d to the accommodated concept and
get the right de dicto reading, disguised as a de re reading about a concept,
to wit, the concept derived from the subject term surfacing in the report
complement.
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3.2.3.3 From vivid names to acquaintance relations
Let’s leave de dicto reporting and the much discussed de dicto/de re interface
behind and start focusing on the lower half of our test data in (61): de re
and de se. In 1.2.3 we have argued that essential indexicality necessitates
a more fine grained analysis of belief, involving self-ascription of properties
and centered contexts. The belief expressed by Ellsworth’s “I am going
to win” is not merely a de re belief of Ellsworth about Ellsworth, under
some vivid name, but rather, a pure de se belief. Pure de se beliefs cannot
be modeled in the still propositional vivid name framework, for that we
need Cresswell & von Stechow’s (1982) extension dubbed relational attitudes.
Now, Ellsworth’s first person belief does fall under a general de re/de se
definition: it’s a relational belief of Ellsworth about Ellsworth under the
acquaintance relation of identity. In 2.3 these insights were straightforwardly
incorporated in a report semantics, and applied to Ortcutt, and the remaining
de re/de se example sentences, repeated here as (61c), (61d) and (61e). We
got nice results, especially for (61d), the one with the anaphoric pronoun,
which was assigned the right truth conditions without the need for a de re/de
se ambiguity on which Chierchia (1989) has to rely. The problem lies in the
unambiguously pure de se PRO construction, (61e), which we would have to
assign the same general relational lf.
All of this is directly applicable to DRT after we’ve extended the DRS
language to include e.g. λ-abstraction (to turn DRSs into properties), and
higher-order discourse referents:32
(75) Ellsworth believes that she’s going to win
[
=(61d)
]

R
R(x, y)
x
ellsworth(x)
y
fem(y)
belx λu
v
R(u, v)
win(v)
32One apparent difference with the static analogue is due to the fact that we don’t want
ιoperators in DRSs. Since we should really restrict R to range only over suitably vivid
acquaintance relations, the definition of which comes with a clause for uniqueness in the
second argument (cf. footnote 37, p. 50), this difference will be inconsequential.
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 ϕA = ϕC ≈ ϕB ;
x R
ellsworth(x)
R(x, x)
belx λu
v
R(u, v)
win(v)
Our output is true in both cB and cC . For cB we can verify the existence
of R with the contextually available relation of seeing someone on TV. For
the pure de se context cC , we can simply take the egocentric acquaintance
relation of equality as an R.
Great. But what about the unambiguously 1st person de se report, (61e)?
If we assume a PRO as embedded subject and further assume that that PRO
is, presuppositionally or syntactically, bound by the subject, Ellsworth, we
get exactly the same resolutions as for the co-referential pronoun example
above, cf. 2.3.1. Since our intuitions clearly showed a contrast with respect
to cB, the mistaken identity scenario, we obviously need more. Incorporating
Chierchia’s (1989) main insight we developed a ‘hybrid’ or ‘intermediate’
theory that left the analysis of pronouns reports intact, but directly assigns
a non-relational property self-ascription to PRO reports (2.4.1.3-2.4.1.4):
(76) Ellsworth believes PRO to be on the winning side
[
=(61e)
]

x
ellsworth(x)
belx λu win(u)
Note how this is truth conditionally equivalent to the output in (75) if we
replace R in the latter with =, which is as it should be (cf. table 1.1, p. 54).
All in all, we have reached a stage where we can do justice to all our
test intuitions, as demonstrated in table 3.3, plus the additional Ortcutt
example. Are we done then? Well there’s a couple of things that still need
our attention. We may distinguish a number of theoretical and empirical
shortcomings.
Let’s start with the theoretical qualms: First of all, we still need to look
into the semantically 1-dimensional, presuppositional treatment of proper
names and indexicals, especially given that we’ve sneaked in Kaplanian con-
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prelim. context resolution output cA cB cC
(61a) n.a. (62) 1 0 0
(61b)
≈(74a) n.a. 1 0 0
≈(74b) global 0 1 1
(61c) global 0 1 1
(61d) (75) glob.bind. (75) 0 1 1
(61e) (76) n.a. 0 0 1
Table 3.3: Predictions of DRT+PA’s relational hybrid
texts through the back door, viz. in the semantics of the self-ascriptive,
property-sensitive bel operator (cf. 1.2.3, (43), p. 46). Secondly, the syntac-
tic ambiguity distinguishing de dicto and de re readings of a definite descrip-
tion based report at the preliminary DRS level, and the somewhat similar
fact that pure de se reports encoded via PRO have a dedicated de se struc-
ture in which there is no presuppositional element corresponding to an em-
bedded subject, whereas the co-referential pronoun report complement does
trigger a presupposition for its pronominal subject. Note that both outputs
are nonetheless similar in that replacing the quantified acquaintance relation
with equality in the second gives us the first. We’re going to exploit this
similarity in our unification of de re/de se in 3.4. Next, in 2.3.2 we argued
for contextualization of the acquaintance relation, but it remained a rather
vague idea whose actual implementation was left to an unspecified pragmatic
module. With our move to dynamic semantics we finally have a good grip on
context dependence and context change, but, as table 3.3 shows, we’re not
taking advantage of it at all, in fact, even less so than in our enhanced scopal
account (which turned out to be insufficient for different reasons however),
cf. table 3.2. To my mind, the crucial argument for the contextualization of
acquaintance was that:
one can analyze [(70a) (=Janell believes that Ortcutt is dumb)] as
true in one context but false in another. I feel that an analysis
which simply characterizes [(70a)] and [(70b)] as both true does
not do justice to my intuitions.
[
(Abusch 1997:9, fn.9)
]
And the same applies, perhaps even more so, to the de re/de se example (75):
apart from the somehow unmarked pure de se interpretation that we get in
C, we’ve agreed that an impure reading is needed, but it seems to me that
one should only be available if the discourse context provides a particular
and salient non-egocentric way of picking out Ellsworth for Ellsworth, like
seeing someone on TV in B. For such cases I totally agree with Abusch that
it’s insufficient to say that sentence (75) is simply true in both scenarios B
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and C, as the quantified relational account currently predicts. In 3.4 I’ll take
advantage of our dynamic framework to implement a proper contextualiza-
tion of de re/de se reports to do justice to this intuition. The concomitant
split of contexts into a dynamic, discourse context (modeled as a DRS), and
a static, semantic context (modeled as a centered possible world) will play
a crucial role in tackling particular examples. Last but not least in the list
of theoretical objections is the questionable compositionality of Prel given
the ‘wide scope property’ of the relational (and the vivid name) accounts, as
discussed in detail for the static variants in 2.3.3.
Each of these theoretical issues comes with a corresponding empirical
manifestation, so let’s list those in order. First, the presuppositional treat-
ment of referential terms makes a couple of interesting predictions, some
unorthodox but deserving of further attention, others just plain false. The
unorthodox predictions involve the possibilities of non-global binding and ac-
commodation of indexicals; the wrong ones involve the examples used in the
Kripke/Kaplan arguments against descriptivity (cf. 1.2.4.2) and are due to
a collapse of the important distinction between indexicals and their descrip-
tive counterparts, e.g. I vs. the speaker, or this vs. the object pointed at. Both
of these points will be taken up in 3.3 where I couple the presuppositional
account of rigidity with a two-dimensional semantics.
Second, the de dicto/de re ambiguity, about which I have nothing more
to say, and the hybrid analysis of de se that postulates a dedicated pure
de se LF/Prel(iminary )DRS for infinitival reports. Perhaps our analysis
doesn’t count as a real unification of de re/de se reports of the form NP
believes that NP VP, since infinitivals now have no subject, but if there were
no empirical objections, it would be quite plausible to say that infinitivals
are special in that their semantic representation does not involve a presuppo-
sitional embedded subject or quantified acquaintance relation. This line of
reasoning was already debunked in 2.4.3, by the introduction of Schlenker’s
(2003) Amharic data (93). Translated into DRT the point there was that the
dedicated pure de se PrelDRS, (76), may be plausible for pure de se reports
with PRO and perhaps even for reports with logophors, but it is insufficient
for Amharic I and the numerous other examples of shifted indexicality, be-
cause in such examples there is clearly a referential/presuppositional subject
term, with an independently well established semantic content. Amharic I,
for instance, is a first person pronoun, so, pending some technicalities to be
addressed by the 2-dimensional extension in 3.3, it triggers a presupposition
looking for a speaker. Indeed, in many contexts Amharic I behaves exactly
as its English counterpart (i.e. as a real first person indexical rather than as
an anaphoric third person pronoun, or a special purpose de se element like
he?, PRO or a logophor, cf. 2.4.3.1), but when embedded in belief reports
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it has a reading that flaunts Kaplan’s Prohibition of Monsters by referring
to the ascribee, rather than the person who’s actually uttering the report.
In 3.4 I follow Schlenker in analyzing Amharic I as a real indexical, but one
that somehow gets evaluated with respect to the belief alternative contexts,
rather than the actual world. It is not at all trivial to cast this idea into the
general form provided by the acquaintance based framework and some ex-
tensions are needed. In any case, the way this is cashed out in my dynamic,
pragmasemantic, presuppositional, relational framework is radically different
from Schlenker’s system (2.4.3.3), or the rival system of von Stechow (2002)
(2.4.3.5). Both of these rival analyses rely heavily on a morphosyntactic the-
ory of agreement (2.4.3.4), which my own account seeks to minimize in favor
of a flexible pragmatic presupposition resolution mechanism. The next step
is to treat PRO and logophors semantically just as Amharic I, which solves
the problem of the dedicated pure de se prelDRS and clears the way for a
full unification of de re/de se.
The third issue involved the missed opportunity of the acquaintance re-
lation’s context dependence, which is scheduled for repair in 3.4. However,
this immediately raises questions about the data involving quantified belief
reports, which, in 2.4.2, were shown to cause problems for a straightforward
contextualization of the relational framework. In 3.4.3 we show how a mi-
nor extension to the acquaintance resolution framework can handle all these
problematic examples.
The fourth and final theoretical worry, viz. the one about Prel being
non-compositional, has no direct empirical counterpart, but I can already
assure the reader that my acquaintance based PrelDRSs for de re/de se be-
lief reports will be fully compositional, as I represent both the embedded
subject representation and the acquaintance relation in situ—at least, at the
level of PrelDRS construction. Of course, this is a rather superficial kind of
compositionality, in a sense comparable to the static trick of the free variable
discussed in 2.3.2.1, in that the final output of the interpretation is by no
means derived compositionally. Recall from 3.2.2.1 that that was never our
intention: DRT+PA’s two-stage architecture distinguishes a compositional
PrelDRS construction mechanism, and a pragmasemantic resolution algo-
rithm that must be systematic and computable but that can never be fully
compositional in the strict Montagovian sense in which we have been using
that term. In short, PrelDRSs are generated compositionally and that’s all
that matters.
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3.3 Layered DRT
The main aim here is to provide DRT with a sound, two-dimensional ac-
count of semantic rigidity, and use that to counter the obvious objection
that treating proper names and indexicals as presuppositions amounts to de-
scriptivism, and is therefore easily rebutted by the so-called Kripke-Kaplan
(KK) argumentation. It so happens that the very general framework devel-
oped by Geurts & Maier (2003), called L(ayered )DRT, is well suited to deal
with this task. In essence LDRT is a simple extension of DRT that allows the
information conveyed by an utterance to be stored in different layers of the
same DRS. For instance, there could be a layer for representing the ordinary
truth-conditional contribution, one for implicatures, and one for merely for-
mal information (like the gender features on nouns in Germanic languages).
As such, LDRT fits in with the recently popular family of multidimensional
semantic frameworks,33 somewhat related to, for instance Potts (2003) or
Dekker (2002), but more general. Let’s focus on the interaction between
assertion and implicature a bit.
(77) There was a nice philosopher

x
philosopher(x)
nice(x)
This DRS represents the truth conditional, or assertoric, information con-
veyed by an utterance of the sentence, but the choice of words in the predi-
cate suggests that that philosopher is not the coolest person you’ve ever met,
though nice doesn’t really exclude that interpretation, since the set of very
cool individuals is a subset of the set of nice ones. This inference may be
derived by Gricean pragmatic principles as follows: the term nice evokes a
lexical scale of non-negative evaluative predicates, each more exclusive than
the previous, e.g. nice < cool < fantastic. Obviously, the higher up in the
scale, the stronger/more informative the predication would be. If we then
assume that a speaker seeks to maximize informativity, we get that his use of
the term nice implies that that philosopher was not really great, or he would
have used a stronger, more appropriate term. The information so derived
however is not of the same status as the rest of the information conveyed
by the sentence. An important feature of these so-called scalar implicatures
is that they are easily canceled by contradicting information. Consider the
33A nice and comprehensive overview of the various forms of multidimensional semantics
is Potts’s (2004b).
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following continuation of (77):
(78) There was a nice philosopher
In fact, she was great
Obviously the implicature that the philosopher is not great is canceled by
this continuation. Note that it’s almost impossible to cancel assertoric infor-
mation in the same way:34
(79) There was a nice philosopher
a. ??In fact, she was not nice at all
b. ??In fact, she was not a philosopher
The upshot of this is that, if we want to represent implicatures as conditions
in a DRS, we must take care to mark their distinct, defeasible status. Well,
that’s easy enough, take for instance Levinson’s (2000) idea of coloring DRS
conditions, blue for assertion, red for implicature. In LDRT we use labeling,
e.g. fr for assertoric content, imp for implicature:
(80) 
xfr
philosopherfr(x)
nicefr(x)
¬imp greatimp(x)
The objection is that so far that’s just syntax, we need a way to cash out these
colors semantically if it is to mean anything. And that’s where LDRT proves
superior to Levinson’s coloring: it not only slices the DRS into different
layers, but also adjusts the Tarskian truth definition to be sensitive to the
layered composition. Details follow in 3.3.1, but the idea is that for any
given combination of layers, we can compute the semantic contribution of
those layers. For instance we can compute the Fregean contribution of (80),
denoted J(80)Kfr, or the full pragmasemantic contribution, J(80)Kfr,imp, by
simply ignoring conditions that fall outside the specified set of layers.
34Unless by means of a denial, which is a kind of speech act usually restricted to a
dialogue where one speaker corrects another. However, denials can occasionally occur in
monologue, in cases where a speaker realizes he has made a mistake and corrects himself,
as in:
(i) There was a nice philosopher. No wait, she was probably a linguist, come to think
of it.
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Let’s briefly consider some applications of the LDRT framework. Geurts
& Maier (2003) focus mainly on solving so-called ‘binding problems’ which
have been around in presupposition theory for a long time (Karttunen &
Peters 1979), but which arise for implicature as well. Take (77); on a sim-
ple theory of implicature representation, one that computes and represents
implicatures at the sentential level and separately from other content, this
statement would assert that there was a nice philosopher, and implicate that
there was a not so great philosopher. Obviously that’s too weak, the lexical
scalar implicature evoked by the use of nice should really be bound in the
Fregean layer, i.e. there was a nice philosopher, and that philosopher was not
great. In LDRT we get this by allowing fr-labeled discourse referents to bind
imp-labeled atomic conditions. In other words, discourse referents are the
glue connecting the different layers.
A proper representation and segregation of semantically interpretable
types of information other than plain old Fregean truth conditions comes
in handy when analyzing denial, which can be targeted at different layers
resulting in e.g. Fregean (81a), implicature (81b), or presupposition (81c) de-
nials (Horn 1985; van der Sandt & Maier 2003):
(81) a. That’s not a donkey; that’s a mule
b. She didn’t get sufficient marks; she got all A’s
c. He didn’t stop smoking; he never smoked
To unify these, Maier & der Sandt (2003) propose a mechanism that re-
moves ‘offensive content’ from a DRS representation of a dialogue to restore
full cross-layer consistency. It is therefore crucial that we represent not just
Fregean content, but also implicatures and (accommodated) presuppositions,
and whatever other content is correctable in this way, and that we can in-
terpret all these layers of content semantically in order to determine what
causes inconsistency.
The third application of LDRT, the one that’s most interesting for us here,
has to do with rigidity and indexicals. The idea, developed to some extent
by Geurts & Maier (2003), is to introduce a layer, labeled k(ripke/kaplan),
for the content of proper names and indexicals. Complicating the semantics
a little, we can ensure that the content of these expressions is evaluated at
a semantic context parameter. We’ll see in 3.3.2 how this effectively solves
the Kripke/Kaplan objections against descriptivism. In 3.3.3 I’ll combine it
with the presuppositional account of referential terms to do justice to some
subtle data involving apparently non-rigid uses of proper names.
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3.3.1 Basic LDRT
3.3.1.1 Syntax
In this section I give the syntax and semantics of basic LDRT. First the
syntax, which is real simple. We extend our primitive inventory of discourse
referents, predicates, modal operators and quantifiers with a finite set of
layer labels, say L = {fr, imp, form, k, . . .}. If we attach one of these labels
to a discourse referent we get a labeled discourse referent: ximp, zform. At-
taching them to atomic conditions gives atomic labeled conditions: x =fr y,
donkeyk(x). An LDRS simply pairs a set of labeled discourse referents with
a set of labeled conditions, which is either atomic, or something like ¬impϕ,2frϕ, or a duplex condition with a labeled quantifier such as mostfr.
Let’s illustrate the basic syntax of the LDRS language with an example:
(82) Some of my friends own a donkey

xk
speakerk(x)
yfr
friend offr(y, x)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
somefr
y
zfr
donkeyfr(z)
ownfr(y, z)
¬imp yimp
friend ofimp(y, x)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
allimp
y
zimp
donkeyimp(z)
ownimp(y, z)
In the following, we often avoid all too tedious labeling by the notational
convention that everything in a subDRS belongs to the layer of the condition
in which it is embedded, unless explicitly labeled otherwise. For instance,
in (82), one imp label, on the negation, would be enough. We may further
abbreviate an identical condition occurring at more than one layer at once, by
subscripting it with multiple labels, i.e. walkk,form(x) = walkk(x) walkform(x)
Whether a discourse referent should be considered bound or free depends
on what layers you’re looking at.35 In (82), for instance, x is free in the
35I’m currently looking into the possibility of foregoing the labeling of discourse refer-
ents. One advantage is that it would simplify the syntax and semantics somewhat, because
many more DRSs would count as closed so semantic values are more often defined. Also,
it would fit well with the idea of discourse referents as cross-layer ‘pegs’ that serve merely
to connect layered information. On the other hand we do lose information that seems
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fr and imp layers, but bound if we take the k into consideration. This
has repercussions for the notions of free variable, accessibility and proper
embedding. First an auxiliary definition:
(83) For L ⊆ L, and ϕ (=〈U(ϕ), C(ϕ)〉) an LDRS:
a. UL(ϕ) = {ξ there is an l ∈ L with ξl ∈ U(ϕ)}
b. CL(ϕ) = {γ ∈ C(ϕ) γ bears a label l ∈ L}
(γ bears label l iff it is of the form ξ =l η, Πl(ξ1, . . . , ξn),
¬lϕ, belξlϕ, ϕ 〈mostl Ξ〉ψ,. . . )
(84) FVL(ϕ) = (
⋃
γ∈CL(ϕ) FVL(γ))\UL(ϕ)
(85) If γ’s label, l, is not contained in L then FVL(γ) = ∅, otherwise, one
of the following applies:
a. FVL(Πl(ξ1, . . . , ξn)) = {ξ1, . . . , ξn}
b. FVL(¬lϕ) = FVL(ϕ)
c. FVL(ϕ ∨l ψ) = FVL(ϕ) ∪ FVL(ψ)
d. FVL(belξlϕ) = ξ ∪ FVL(ϕ)
e. FVL(ϕ⇒l ψ) = FVL(ϕ 〈mostl Ξ〉ψ)
= FVL(ϕ) ∪ (FVL(ψ)\UL(ϕ))
Applied to example (82), which consists of three layers, k, fr, and imp,
this means, for instance: FV{k,fr,imp}((82)) = FV{k}((82)) = ∅, and
FV{fr,imp}((82)) = {x}.
(86) f is an L-proper embedding for an LDRS or labeled condition ϕ
iff Dom(f) ⊇ FVL(ϕ)
For example: ∅ is an L-proper embedding for (82) iff k ∈ L.
3.3.1.2 Semantics
The semantics of this intensional, layered fragment then. As stated before,
the idea is to make interpretation relative to a set of layers. We need not
touch the definition of a model at all:
(87) M = 〈D,W, I,Bel〉 [=(29d), p. 194]
We must now define verification of LDRSs and conditions relative to set of
labels and a possible world: M |=fw,L ϕ. One complication is the already
crucial, esp. when considering layered presupposition resolution and cases where you’d
want undefined semantic values. It remains to be seen if these hurdles can be overcome in
the interest of simplicity.
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noted layer dependence of FV : individual layers of an LDRS often contain
free variables which makes them uninterpretable on their own, while a com-
bination of layers might make the same LDRS closed. This necessitates a
partial semantics with special attention for definedness:
(88) If f is an L-proper embedding for ϕ:
M |=fw,L ϕ iff there is a g ⊇UL(ϕ) f and for all γ ∈ CL(ϕ):
M |=gw,L γ
Otherwise, undefined
(89) If f is an L-proper embedding for γ:
M |=fw,L γ iff γ’s label l does not appear in L, or one of the
following applies:
(i) M |=fw,L ξ =l η iff f(ξ) = f(η)
(ii) M |=fw,L Π(ξ1, . . . , ξn) iff 〈f(ξ1), . . . , f(ξn)〉 ∈ I(Π)
(iii) M |=fw,L ¬lϕ iff there is no g ⊇UL(ϕ) f with M |=gw,L ϕ
(iv) M |=fw,L ϕ⇒l ψ iff for all g ⊇UL(ϕ) f withM |=gw,L ϕ there
exists a further extension h ⊇UL(ψ) g with M |=hw,L ψ
(v) M |=fw,L ϕ 〈mostl Ξ〉ψ iff for most extensions g ⊇Ξ f with
M |=gw,L ϕ there is a further extension h ⊇UL(ϕ)\Ξ g with
M |=hw,L ϕ⊕ ψ
(vi) M |=fw,L belξlϕ iff for all v ∈ Bel(f(ξ), w): M |=fv,L ϕ
Otherwise, undefined
Extensional and intensional semantic values (of LDRSs and conditions) are
defined as follows:
(90) a. JϕKfw,L = 1 iffM |=fw ϕ, and 0 if f is L-proper for ϕ butM 6|=fw ϕ
b. JϕKfL = {w ∈ W JϕKfw,L = 1}
c. JϕKL = JϕK∅L
Just to be sure, let’s interpret some layers of our earlier example (82):
(91) a. J(82)K{k,fr,imp} = the set of worlds where there is a speaker, x,
and some but not all of x’s friends own a donkey
b. J(82)K{k,fr} = the set of worlds in which there is a speaker, x,
and at least one of x’s friends owns a donkey
c. J(82)K{fr} undefined, since x ∈ FV{fr}((82))
d. J(82)K[x 7→Emar]{fr} = the set of worlds in which at least one of my
friends owns a donkey
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In (91b) we interpret the indexical as a description, so the real asserted
content must be something else. In fact, the result in (91d) looks quite right,
but how exactly did we determine that partial embedding to close off the
open layer encountered in (91c)? The next section is dedicated to a two-
dimensional treatment of k that will answer this.
3.3.2 Direct reference vs. descriptivism in LDRT
I’ll start by applying the crucial Kripke-Kaplan argument against descrip-
tivism to DRT to reaffirm the need for rigidity. Then we’ll see Geurts’s (1997)
defense of an PA-enhanced descriptivism of directly referential terms. Unfor-
tunately, this framework still fails the KK test. Next, we discuss a different
approach to rigidity in DRT, using ‘external anchors’, which we criticize for
being, in a sense, too rigid. Then, I propose my own layered alternative and
show how it passes the KK test. The really interesting data will have to wait
until we can combine the layered account with the presuppositional one in
3.3.3.
3.3.2.1 Against descriptivism
Following Russell (1905), various authors have tried to analyze proper names
as hidden descriptions specifying a list of properties that refer to a unique
individual (Kneale 1962; Dummett 1973; Katz 1977, 2001). The standard
example was the definition of ‘Aristotle’ as ‘the famous philosopher who
was a student of Plato, teacher of Alexander the Great, born in Stagira,
384BC, died in Chalcis, 322BC,. . . ’. This was supposed to explain the fact
that ‘Aristotle’ refers to Aristotle, by reducing the semantic contribution
of the proper name to that of a definite description, often understood as
quantificational, via Russell’s Theory of Descriptions. The main problem
with this type of account is that if ‘Aristotle’ were really to abbreviate a full
description of Aristotle, we’d predict that Aristotle was a student of Plato and
he died in 322BC expresses a tautology. This is obviously wrong: Aristotle
might well have had a different teacher, and he might have contracted some
kind of disease and died five years earlier.36
As Kripke (1972) notes, this argument is applicable to any kind of de-
scriptive analysis of names, so we can’t get out of it by choosing only univer-
sally known properties of Aristotle to define the meaning of Aristotle. Take
for instance the most uncontroversial descriptive definition we can think of:
36Formulated in more metaphysical terms, none of the characteristics listed seem to be
essential properties of Aristotle, in the sense that without any one of them he would still
be Aristotle.
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Aristotle = the person called Aristotle. Surely everybody will agree with
that, it’s as close as you’ll get to a tautological (and readily generalizable so
semantically useful) reduction of the name to a description of its bearer. But
if we test substitutability in intensional contexts it’s easily seen that even
this minimal descriptive analysis fails miserably:
(92) a. Aristotle is Aristotle
b. Aristotle is [the person] called Aristotle37
c. It’s necessarily true that Aristotle is Aristotle
d. #It’s necessarily true that Aristotle is called Aristotle
e. #Some historians now claim that Aristotle was not really Aristotle
f. Some historians now claim that Aristotle was not really called
Aristotle
These examples strongly suggest that being called Aristotle is but an acci-
dental property of Aristotle, and thus the distribution of a proper name X
is not captured by the descriptive paraphrase the person called X.
In (92), intensional contexts were needed to bring out this distributional
difference, but in fact, we don’t really need embedding at all. Let’s take a
closer look at the unembedded equality (92a) and its descriptive counterpart
(92b). The first is a real truism of the form x = x, it is necessarily true
and as uninformative as it gets. But the second, though obviously true
and highly uninformative, does not express a necessary truth. In terms of
possible worlds, J(92a)K = W (the tautological proposition), while J(129)K =
the subset of worlds where Aristotle is called Aristotle, i.e. excluding worlds
where his mother changed her mind and called him Thrasyboulos.
This sometimes forgotten contrast in unembedded sentences nips in the
bud an otherwise attractive way out for the descriptivist. This attempted
fix uses scope to provide an explanation of the observed contrasts between
proper names and their descriptive paraphrases. Let’s take in some predicate
logic with ι-terms and for every proper name a (non-rigid) predicate meaning
‘the person called such-and-such’, i.e. JaristlKw = the set of people called
Aristotle in w. With this, we can represent both narrow (93a) and wide
scope (93b) readings:
(93) #It’s necessarily true that Aristotle is called Aristotle
[
=(92d)
]
a.  2[aristl( ιx.aristl(x))]
b.  #∃y[y = ιx.aristl(x) ∧2[aristl(y)]]
37I prefer to use . . . is called . . . instead of . . . is the person called . . . for readability.
If not strictly equivalent in cases of multiple bearers of the same name, the first certainly
is a logical consequence of the second.
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Apparently, the false wide scope reading is preferred over the trivial narrow
scope one. By postulating widest possible scope for our descriptions we can
get the right truth conditions for this and other embedded proper name
examples, like (92e) and (92f). However, if there’s no operator, there’s no
scope, so for unembedded examples the wide scope stipulation doesn’t help
at all:
(94) a. Aristotle is Aristotle
[
=(92a)
]
 ιx.aristl(x) = ιy.aristl(y)
b. Aristotle is called Aristotle
[
=(92b)
]
 aristl( ιx.aristl(x))
It’s easy to see that these lfs are equivalent,
q
(94a)
y
=
q
(94b)
y
= W , so
we have no account of the intuitive difference in metaphysical status—the
contingent status of (94b) in particular—that we observed above. So let’s
leave descriptivism for now and look at the alternative.
Kripke’s solution is that proper names are not abbreviations or hidden
descriptions, they are simply tags that are ‘attached’ to an individual by an
act of ‘baptism’. Once fixed and in use, this arbitrary connection between
the name and its bearer makes continued referential use of the name possible.
In some cases, such uses are transmitted through the ages, as with Aristotle,
resulting in so-called causal-historical chains from the current use to the
initial baptism. Philosophical and historical subtleties aside, what matters
for us is that names have no hidden descriptive content that enables users to
find the referent, they just refer, just like the filename ch3 semantics.tex
refers to a particular text file I’ve created a little while ago.38 I feel such
a filename example brings out especially clearly what is meant by Kaplan’s
(1989:483) saying that proper names and indexicals “refer directly, without
the mediation of a Fregean Sinn as meaning”, which sums up the theory of
direct reference.
Technically, Kripke and Kaplan work this out by assigning rigid inten-
sions to proper names, to capture the fact that they really have no intensional
content, just their referent, while staying within the intensional model the-
oretical framework. Applied to predicate logic this means we can represent
proper names by individual constants, but assign these constants a rigid, i.e.
world-independent, denotation (cf. 1.2.2.1).39 A definite (linguistic) advan-
38Geurts (1997) uses a filename example to question the thesis that the proper refer-
ential use of names is always grounded in a social network.
39A conceptually more direct formalization of direct reference would be the structured
propositions approach in which the proper name’s referent can literally be contained.
We’ve discussed this already in 1.2.2.1 and 2.3.3.1.
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tage of doing things this way is that proper names are simply represented in
situ: no scope, no movement, no problems with compositionality.
(95) a. It’s necessarily true that Aristotle is Aristotle
[
=(92c)
]
 2[a = a]
b. #It’s necessarily true that Aristotle is called Aristotle
[
=(92d)
]
 2[aristl(a)]
If we assume that a rigidly refers to the actual Aristotle, in every possible
world, the truth conditions of these simple lfs are exactly as we want them:J2[a = a]Kw = 1 regardless of w, but J2[aristl(a)]Kw = 0 because there
are w′ where JaKw′ = I(a) 6∈ JaristlKw′ (i.e., worlds where Aristotle got a
different name).
Because of the strong compositionality of the representations in (95), the
truth conditions reflect a contrast in the underlying simple sentences:
(96) a. Aristotle is Aristotle
[
=(92a)
]
 a = a
b. Aristotle is called Aristotle
[
=(92b)
]
 aristl(a)
By the same reasoning as above: Ja = aK = W 6= Jaristl(a)K. To sum up,
the view that proper names are directly referential is both theoretically and
empirically superior to descriptivist attempts, with or without a wide scope
assumption.
Most of the above applies to indexicals as well as proper names. If we’d try
to reduce I to a description, the most likely candidate would be the speaker.
Now consider some substitution instances similar to the ones in (92):
(97) a. I am speaking
b. The speaker is speaking
c. #I’m necessarily speaking
d. ?The speaker is necessarily speaking
The judgments are relatively clear: an utterance of (97a) is always true and
therefore uninformative, but it is never necessarily true, it does not express
a tautology. This is corroborated by the fact that (97c) is so plainly false,
because it’s easy to imagine an alternative state of affairs where I realized
that silence is golden and not say anything at that particular point in time.
On the other hand, (97b) does express a tautology, and (97d) is ambiguous
between a false (‘wide scope’) and a tautological (‘narrow scope’) reading.
By assuming I corresponds to a widest scope description the speaker we can
get the embedded cases right, but the necessity contrast between (97a) and
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(97b) remains problematic.
Kaplan (1989) proposes that indexicals, like proper names are directly
referential: If I utter I, I rigidly/necessarily refer to me, Emar. The tricky
thing is how to reconcile this rigidity with the obvious context dependence
of indexicals—when you utter I it refers to you. Kaplan’s solution has been
discussed in detail in 1.2.4.2, but summarizing: we need two dimensions
of intensionality: one for context dependence, one for modal, intensional
phenomena. The resulting semantics assigns every expression a character,
which can be thought of as a function mapping contexts to intensions, which
in turn, as usual, consist of functions from worlds to extensions. Intensional
rigidity (which makes them immune to embeddings under modal operators)
and context dependence are thus united in a two-dimensional framework in
which they live orthogonally. Applied to (97) we make the right predictions,
viz.: If c is some context centered around me, Emar, then the proposition
expressed by uttering (97a) in c = J(97a)Kc = the set of worlds where Emar,
the contextually determined speaker, is speaking; J(97b)Kc = the set of worlds
whose speaker is speaking = W ; J(97c)Kc = the set of worlds where Emar
is necessarily speaking = ∅; (97d) is scopally ambiguous, but there’s no
indexicality involved there.
3.3.2.2 Descriptivism revisited: proper names as presuppositions
Kripke’s and Kaplan’s arguments had converted many semanticists to the di-
rect reference paradigm, because its account of proper names and indexicals
was evidently superior to its descriptivist rivals. However, the subtle contrast
in unembedded sentences, (92a)-(92b) and (97a)-(97b), is sometimes forgot-
ten, leading to the defense of wide scope descriptivism in some form or other.
I will argue that Geurts’s (1997) account of proper names as presupposition
commits this fallacy, as does the analogous account of indexicals by Hunter
& Asher (2005). Showing this, I’m merely reformulating the argumentation
of Zeevat (1999) who already wielded the old KK argument against (his own)
presuppositionally enhanced descriptivist account of indexicals.
The basic idea of this neo-descriptivism is that names and indexicals are
definites, just like definite descriptions and anaphoric pronouns, and as such
they are presupposition triggers. Taking the minimal descriptive content
as presupposed content we automatically derive the observation that their
reference is consistently unaffected by modal operators from the projection
behavior of presuppositions. Despite a more sensible formulation in dynamic
semantics, this is essentially a wide scope descriptivist account, since the
result of presupposition projection in these cases is always an output DRS
equivalent to an lf with wide scope descriptions.
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(98) a. #It’s necessarily true that Aristotle is called Aristotle
[
=(92d)
]
 2 aristl(x)x
aristl(x)
 x
aristl(x)
; #
x
aristl(x)
2
aristl(x)
b. #I’m necessarily speaking
[
=(97c)
]
 2 speak(x)x
speaker(x)
 x
speaker(x)
; #
x
speaker(x)
2
speak(x)
Note that the conditions used are still the same descriptive predicates as
before: JaristlKw = the set of people called Aristotle in w; JspeakerKw =
the set of speakers in w. Note further that with the transition from static
to dynamic, I’ve put an Aristotle and a speaker in the input contexts be-
cause otherwise there would be nothing to bind to (and the specificity
constraint might block accommodation). I agree with Geurts that proper
names can occasionally be used to introduce a new discourse entity (through
accommodation, cf. 3.3.3.2), but at least for I there is really no need for
accommodation, since every proper speech context surely contains a highly
salient speaker.
It’s now easy to see that these outputs represent the correct truth con-
ditions. Unfortunately, replacing the proper name or indexical with its de-
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scriptive counterpart gives us the exact same preliminary DRS and outputs,
so we’re at a loss to explain the observed contrast between, say, (97c) and
(97d). Perhaps we could try to fix this, for instance by stipulating that the
presupposition triggered by I is different from that triggered by a surface
realized definite description the speaker in that the former really has to float
up to the main context, whereas the latter is more easily bound or even ac-
commodated locally. Hunter & Asher (2005) propose a fix along these lines,
but before discussing the pros and cons of such a stipulation, there’s another
problem to worry about: the unembedded cases. Again, if there’s no op-
erator, there’s only one place for the presupposition to go, so there can be
no distinction between name/indexical presuppositions and those triggered
by the corresponding genuine definite descriptions. Crucially, for the proper
name case:
(99) a. Aristotle is Aristotle
[
=(92a)
]
 x = yx
aristl(x)
y
aristl(y)
 x
aristl(x)
;
x
aristl(x)
x = x
b. Aristotle is called Aristotle
[
=(92b)
]
 aristl(x)x
aristl(x)
 x
aristl(x)
;
x
aristl(x)
aristl(x)
Both outputs of course are equivalent, moreover they are equivalent to the
input contexts. In any case, these DRSs in no way reflect the different ne-
cessity status of (92a) and (92b) that played such a crucial role in the KK
argumentation. At this point I think we can discard the presuppositional
theory of indexicals and proper names as it is presented above—which is not
to say that Geurts doesn’t have some important criticism for rigid direct
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referentialist accounts, which we shall examine more closely in 3.3.3 after we
have first introduced such an account of rigidity in DRT.
3.3.2.3 Real rigidity in DRT: external anchors
The Kamp & Reyle (1993) textbook apparently does take the KK arguments
seriously and consequently tries to build in real rigidity. The idea is that
apart from constructing a mental representation, the purely symbolic DRS,
a hearer connects certain discourse referents to their actual referents in the
outside world, if available and if so prompted by the speaker’s words. This
last condition is to properly tie rigidity to certain linguistic items, most
notably to proper names and indexicals.
Technically, these links, called external anchors, are simply restrictions on
truthful embeddings. For ease of discussion, let’s illustrate Kamp’s external
anchoring with the proper name example:
(100) Aristotle is called Aristotle
[
=(92b)
]
 ; x
aristl(x)
[
x7→Aristotle]
On the left, the DRS; on the right, the anchor, a partial function from dis-
course referents to individuals. Let’s not go in to the exact two-stage deriva-
tion of this anchored DRS yet, but concentrate on the endpoint and its inter-
pretation. We see that the predication is represented as a DRS condition, as
usual, but the proper name subject is lifted out of the DRS into the anchor,
leaving but a bare discourse referent. The anchor, interpreted as a restriction
on embeddings, thus only contributes referents on a metalevel, so to say, the
information contained therein is in no way way subject to operators or any
kind of hierarchical DRS structure in general. This immediately apparent
from the way (100)’s truth conditions are computed:
(101) J(100)Kf = J(100)Kf∪[x 7→Aristotle] ={
w Jaristl(x)K[x 7→Aristotle]w = 1}
In short, we get the correct, KK-proof proposition about the actual Aristotle.
The Kampian story behind the construction of (100) is as follows: the
hearer noticed that the speaker used a proper name with referential intentions
and thus searched his surroundings in the actual external world for an indi-
vidual that would match these intentions, in this case a (salient) individual
called Aristotle. He found Aristotle and extended his anchor accordingly, i.e.
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with a link mapping the subject term’s discourse referent to this Aristotle.
There’s a couple of things to consider here, all of them combined cast-
ing serious doubt on the appropriateness of external anchoring for treating
rigidity in DRT. First and foremost, the theoretical status of anchors is a
bit unclear: on the one hand they are part of the interpretation process,
they are constructed in parallel with the DRSs and share discourse referents
with them, but on the other hand anchors are really partial embeddings,
which live in the meta language and contain actual individuals taken from
the model’s domain. It seems they are constructed and represented alongside
DRSs but do not belong to the same object language. Such confusion would
be problematic for classical theories, but for DRT it is even more worrisome,
for parallel to the object-/metalanguage distinction there’s the narrow/wide
one that’s especially relevant for DRT, which was originally intended as a
purely symbolic, representational theory of interpretation as part of human
cognition. Remarkably, it was Kamp himself, an outspoken proponent of the
mentalistic conception of DRT, who introduced a mechanism to encode a
definitely wide aspect of semantics. It is this methodological inconsistency
that led others, like Geurts and van der Sandt (p.c.), to drop anchors in favor
of the unified account of referential terms as presuppositions, even if their
conception of DRT was less obviously mentalistic. Kamp and Asher take a
different course, keeping the wide, external anchors, but supplementing them
with narrow, descriptive counterparts called internal anchors.40
Second, I’m not quite sure how anchors fit in to the two-stage procedure of
DRT, i.e. are they constructed in the resolution process as just another type of
context dependency that needs to be resolved? Or is there a separate module
for constructing external links? More specifically, if we look at DRT+PA,
we might ask how does this relate to the basic idea that all definites are
treated as presupposition triggers? Does that not hold for directly referential
ones, or is the construction of anchors something that comes on top of the
presupposition resolution of proper names.
A third point concerns the way we determine what goes into an anchor.
The idea expressed in the ‘Kampian story’ above are clear enough, but don’t
we really want to see some of that hardwired into the semantics, rather
than all in metatheoretical talk? It seems a shame not to represent the
linguistically specified descriptive content of the proper name that is used
to retrieve the appropriate referent. The problem becomes more apparent
with indexicals: an utterance of I always refers to its speaker, that’s the
lexical meaning. But we’d lose that on a simple anchoring approach, because
40We should mention here also Zeevat’s (1999) related approach of replacing external
anchors with so-called intensional anchors.
252 Chapter 3. A semantics of attitude reports
we’d first determine who said it and then simply put that individual into the
anchor:
(102) #I’m necessarily speaking
[
=(97c)
]
 ; # 2
speak(x)
[
x7→Emar]
Compare this to the step from Kripke’s theory to Kaplan’s two-dimensional
semantics. In Kripkean semantics, as in anchored DRT, the way in which
rigid designators get their reference is purely metasemantic, in Kaplan’s the-
ory we get an extra level of semantic representation, the character, in which
the descriptive content is encoded, at least for indexicals like I.
Though it can be seen as a minimal repackaging of the anchoring seman-
tics, with a slightly higher dose of Kaplanian character theory, my account of
rigidity in LDRT eventually addresses all the above criticisms and then some,
viz. the Geurtsian critique of direct reference from a dynamic standpoint, but
part of it will have to wait until 3.3.3.
3.3.2.4 A two-dimensional semantics of the k layer
We’ve seen two attempts at bringing some measure of rigidity for proper
names and indexicals into DRT: wide scope (neo-)descriptivism and anchors.
Each turned out unsatisfactory (for different reasons, both empirical and
theoretical). I will currently show how LDRT can resolve the conflict between
descriptive and anchoring approaches.
The first step is to represent both intensional and rigid content uniformly
as descriptive conditions in a single LDRS, but at different layers:
(103) I am speaking
[
=(97a)
]
 ;
xk
speakerk(x)
speakfr(x)
On the surface, this already gives us a tangible difference between I and
the spelled out description the speaker, which was exactly what was missing
from the descriptivist accounts: I and the speaker each contribute the same
discourse referent+condition, but I puts it in the k layer, while the overt
description may put it in the fr layer:41
41As we’ve noted before (p. 49), definite descriptions may also be used referentially, in
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(104) The speaker is speaking
[
=(97b)
]
 ;
xfr
speakerfr(x)
speakfr(x)
But that’s just syntactic color, we need to show that we get different truth
conditions for (103) and (104), and moreover, the right ones. Just applying
the general LDRT semantics does not get us very far: J(104)Kfr = J(103)Kfr,k =
W , but crucially J(103)Kfr is undefined. To check the KK judgments, we
would like to compare the truth conditional, asserted contributions of the
two, i.e. the interpretations of their fr layer, but in (103) that layer is open. It
seems we’re going to need a more sophisticated way to compute the Fregean
contribution of an LDRS. We’ll define a notion of fr content against a k
background. The idea is we first compute the k layer’s contribution and
then use that to create an anchor, against which we’ll be able to interpret
the fr layer. By using anchors we will have incorporated the strong, classical
notion of rigidity, while still representing the lexical meaning of I in the LDRS
with a descriptive condition.
To get all this right however we need to go two-dimensional, for if we
want the k conditions to be interpreted, we have to make sure they’re inter-
preted with respect to a semantic context parameter distinct from the modal
evaluation world. So we add a domain of contexts to our models, this time
as a primitive, rather than using the traditional definition as triples, just for
convenience:
(105) M = 〈D,W,C, I〉
What distinguishes contexts and possible worlds is that contexts always have
a unique speaker, or rather ‘agent’ or ‘center’, because we will also consider
contexts of thought. In other words: For every context c ∈ C: JspeakerKc is
a singleton. And of course, just as in the standard formulation of Kaplanian
semantics, each context comes with a unique world, time, and place as well.
We sometimes use the familiar functions to pick out those coordinates: wc is
the world of c, tc the time of c, etc.
Next, we turn to the truth definition. From now on, let’s concentrate
on just the fr and k layers, for after that, generalizations to arbitrary layer
which case they behave like rigid designators. On the current proposal we can handle this
so-called referential/attributive distinction quite nicely by saying that definite descriptions
can put their content either on the fr or on the k layer of the DRS under construction,
the choice driven by global pragmatic constraints, perhaps. The difference with indexicals
is that those must always take the k layer.
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sets, if necessary, can be generated easily. We’ve said that LDRS conditions
always live on but a single layer, a complex label really abbreviates a number
of copies of the condition on different layers. Here, this pays off, for it
means a condition or discourse referent either carries a fr label, in which
case it’s interpreted with respect to a w ∈ W , or it’s in k and then it will be
evaluated in a c ∈ C: we don’t need to doubly relativize the interpretation
of LDRS conditions to w and c simultaneously. I refer the reader who’s
worried this constitutes an oversimplification to Zimmermann (1991; 2004).
In these papers, Zimmermann defends his (1991:164) “Hypothesis (L): lexical
items are always deictic or absolute”, i.e. an expression’s reference either
depends only on the context (and is intensionally rigid), or the expression has
intensional content but is contextually inert. The validity of this hypothesis
would obviously constitute good evidence for our simplifying assumption
about the fr/k distribution.
In any case, we need an LDRS condition’s truth in a model defined only
with respect to a layer, an embedding, and a world or a context. The first
option, |=fw,fr γ, is already taken care of in (88)-(89); for the second, |=fc,k γ,
just replace all fr’s with k’s and all w’s with c’s. Now we want to combine
these two into the desired content notion that turns k into an anchor. We
use the following auxiliary definition:
(106) ! JϕKfc,k is the smallest g ⊇Uk(ϕ) f with M |=gc,k ϕ
Note that ! JϕKc,k is only defined if there is a unique truthful embedding of
exactly the k universe into the context. If so, it outputs that embedding,
which we can then use as anchor to close the fr layer rigidly, giving us the
following notion of proposition expressed by ϕ in c:
(107) JϕKf,c = JϕK!JϕKfc,kfr
The right side of the equation is defined in basic LDRT, cf. (90). It models the
classical proposition expressed by the frege layer with the k labeled discourse
referents rigidly fixed in c. For mnemonic purposes, the idea behind my
notation is that layers and worlds to be evaluated as propositional content
are subscripted, while rigid, reference fixing materials are in superscript. For
further notational brevity, an empty embedding may be omitted, as always.
To see that this JϕKc really corresponds to the intuitive, classical notion
of propositional content that we were after, let’s compute it for some of our
earlier examples:
(108) Let c be a context where I utter the sentence in question
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a. J(82)Kc = J(82)K∅,c = J(82)K!J(82)K∅c,kfr = J(82)K[x 7→Emar]fr = the set
of worlds where at least one of my, Emar’s, friends owns a
donkey
[
cf. (91), p. 242
]
b. J(103)Kc = J(103)K!J(103)K∅c,kfr = J(103)K[x 7→Emar]fr = the set of
worlds where I, Emar, am (now) speaking 6= W = J(104)Kc
These demonstrations conclude my reconstruction of a good classical content
notion in LDRT. It wasn’t entirely trivial, and it may seem but a meagre
justification for adopting LDRT, but we are really going to need this if we
want to be able to even compare our results in report semantics with the
results of rival classical theories in the broadly Kaplanian paradigm, such as
Schlenker’s and von Stechow’s.
3.3.3 Presupposition and the two-stage architecture in
LDRT
Until now we have restricted ourselves to representing and interpreting fully
developed output contexts in LDRT. It’s time to worry about how to derive
such representation from input contexts and (English) sentences. We want
to stick with the Presupposition as Anaphora theory and its two-stage ar-
chitecture. This means we have to think about layer-sensitive extensions of
the Prel and Res algorithms. Geurts & Maier (2003) suggest we put pre-
suppositions in their own layer, and in 3.3.3.1 we’ll flesh out the suggestion
a little further to find out that it that cannot mean that triggered presup-
positions in preliminary LDRS are represented at a presupposition layer.
Instead, we keep the old ∂ operator/dashed box formalism for represent-
ing presuppositional material. In addition to this presupposition marking,
LDRT still labels every condition and discourse referent and the combination
of these independent markings has some very interesting consequences for the
analysis of proper names and indexicals, which will be explored in 3.3.3.2.
The analysis I propose there leads to a synthesis of neo-descriptivism and
k-anchored rigidity that can handle both the KK judgments and Geurts’s
(1997) tricky cases where these otherwise directly referential terms appear
to be used non-referentially.
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3.3.3.1 A layer for presuppositions?
Although Geurts & Maier (2003) are not too clear about it,42 they seem to
suggest that we represent unresolved presuppositions by putting them in a
pr layer, instead of using a ∂ operator, dashed box, or underlining to mark
certain material in a PrelDRS ‘to be resolved’. For example:
(109) The soup is warm
[
(Geurts & Maier 2003)
]

xpr
souppr(x)
warmfr(x)
¬imp hotimp(x)
The nice thing about this type of representation is the uniform treatment of
presuppositions with say rigidly referential material and assertoric informa-
tion. As a result, we can straightforwardly compute the presuppositional
contribution of the sentence in abstraction of the discourse context, viz.J(109)Kpr = the proposition that there is soup. Additionally we predict that
there is no purely fregean proposition expressed, because the fr layer depends
on pr, as does imp. It might be interesting to see what the anchoring trick
used to turn k into a background would yield if applied to pr, but not now.
On this view it’s reasonably clear what Prel has to do. Very roughly, it
parses the sentence into constituents and categorizes them as presupposition
triggers (e.g. definite descriptions), directly referential terms (e.g. indexicals),
descriptive predications (e.g. verbs) and terms that evoke readily computable
implicatures (e.g. scalar adjectives). Meanwhile it builds an LDRS in which
all conditions and discourse referents bear the labels corresponding to these
categories, e.g. fr, k, pr, or imp. The Res algorithm merges a PrelDRS
with an input context, looks at everything new in the pr layer and tries to
bind or accommodate it to suitable antecedents according to the preferences
described in 3.2.2. Obviously this is nowhere near a complete picture of
dynamic multilayered discourse interpretation; all layers considered so far
have some special properties of their own, so each in isolation already requires
extra work, not to mention the complicated interactions that occur between
different layers, or other layers that will need to be distinguished. We’ve spent
some time working on the semantics of the k layer in 3.3.2.4, and now we’ll
42To be honest, it looks suspiciously as if they are confusing two distinct notions of
presupposition: utterance presupposition () and lexically triggered presuppositional ma-
terial (∂), cf. 3.2.1.
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take a close look at pr, but take the imp layer: a proper description of what
goes on there must incorporate everything we know about the different kinds
of implicatures and their computation and cancellation properties. Obviously
I will not go into any of this; as it stands LDRT merely means to present
a general, logical tool to make it possible to semantically represent these
different types of information and their interaction.
Although I agree with the very general story sketched above, I do not
endorse the proposed representation of presuppositions (anymore). Let me
mention two objections against the pr layer before coming up with a better
solution, viz. a return to van der Sandtian presupposition boxes. In fact,
the strongest argument against pr will be the successful application of the
alternative to directly referential terms in the next subsection.
An immediate technical difficulty with pr would be the representation of
complex presuppositions for phrases like his donkey. The pr-style represen-
tation exemplified in (109) does not allow stacking of presuppositions in this
way. The reason we’ve been using recursively embeddable boxes in the first
place was to group together the material presupposed by a single trigger as
a unit. With just a single pr marked layer it will be difficult to properly
distinguish distinct presuppositions triggered in a single sentence. And the
other way around, a presupposition consisting of multiple conditions and a
discourse referent may end up scattered throughout the DRS in resolution
because Res has no way of knowing what parts of pr belong together. Al-
though Geurts (1999) gives some evidence that a presupposition’s discourse
referent may sometimes end up higher than its conditions, I’m unconvinced
that resolving all presupposed conditions and discourse referents completely
independently (essentially putting a lot of faith in the closure constraint)
will not overgenerate readings. And then there’s the lost feature of stacking
van der Sandtian dashed boxes to form complex presuppositions, which was
used primarily to mark the order of resolution for complex presuppositions.
Take his donkey; this triggers a complex presupposition in which the third
person pronoun denoting the owner is to be resolved before we can start to
think about the donkey. As it happens, in this simple case the resolution
order is not so important, because the owned donkey presupposition logi-
cally depends on the pronominal element anyway, but it’s unclear whether
complex presupposition embedding is always redundant in view of a global
access/closure constraint.
The second objection concerns the supposed advantage of the pr-layer ap-
proach, semantic interpretability of unresolved presuppositions. This turns
out to be a red herring if we ask ourselves, do we really need to interpret
PrelDRSs? And if so, are the proposed interpretations any good? As to the
first question, I’d have to say, probably, yes, interpreting PrelDRSs seman-
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tically would benefit the resolution process, for instance for checking consis-
tency and informativity, as discussed in 3.2.2. The second question however
must be answered negatively. What would be useful for Res is something
like ‘the preliminary proposition expressed’ by a sentence, and we could be
tempted to model this in LDRT as J. . .K{fr,pr}. Applied to the soup example:J(109)K{fr,pr} = the proposition that there’s warm soup. I guess that’s the
best we can expect, apart perhaps from rigidifying the presupposed soup a` la
3.3.2.4. If we look at PrelDRSs with embedded presuppositions this rigidifi-
cation option no longer makes sense, and the combined {fr, pr} content just
always represents the reading we’d otherwise get from locally accommodat-
ing the presupposition. But why would we get a useful notion of preliminary
proposition by local accommodation of all presuppositions? That doesn’t
even consistently correspond to either the weakest, or the strongest reading.
Instead of considering all the options here I’ll leave this an open question,
in order to save some space for my main argument against the pr layer, in
favor of boxes.
But before we zoom in on directly referential terms again, I’ll first present
my general alternative representation of van der Sandtian presuppositions in
LDRT. In short: if Prel encounters a presupposition trigger, it creates an
∂ marked LDRS with the presupposed material divided over a number of
layers according to the type or status of the conditions and referents to be
resolved. Proper names for instance trigger a presupposition with the name
condition and discourse referent in the k layer, while definite descriptions will
have presuppositions mostly in the fr layer. The presupposed discourse refer-
ent determines ‘the layer of the presupposition’, so proper names contribute
so-called k presuppositions, and definite descriptions trigger fr presupposi-
tions. The next logical step would seem to be the formulation of a binding
constraint that says that a presupposition needs to be bound to something
in its own layer. And that goes for accommodation as well: if binding fails,
drop presupposed content in the presupposition’s layer, at a suitable accom-
modation site.
Let’s see some examples. Here’s one with a proper name and a definite
description:
(110) Ligia doesn’t like the professor
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 ¬fr
likefr(x, y)
xk
ligiak(x)
yfr
proffr(y)
It’s true that this sentence can occur felicitously in a discourse context with
a salient Ligia and a given professor. Take for instance a context where Ligia,
a mutual acquaintance, is represented in the common ground’s k layer, and
a professor has just been brought up in the discussion, like so:
(111) [In Ligia’s group there’s a postdoc and a professor.]
Ligia doesn’t like the professor

xk yfr zfr
ligiak(x)
postdocfr(y)
proffr(z)
; ⊕(110);
xk yfr zfr
ligiak(x)
postdocfr(y)
proffr(z)
¬fr likefr(x, z)
Another example, this time with an indexical, triggered by a possessive con-
struction, so embedded inside a descriptive presupposition (recall how pre-
suppositional embedding was impossible with the pr layer approach). After
binding the first person possessive’s presupposition, we accommodate the de-
scriptive presupposition, to illustrate also the layer-faithfulness constraint on
accommodation.
(112) My best friend owns a donkey

z
ownfr(x, z)
xfr
best friendfr(x, y)
yk
speakerk(y)
donkeyfr(z)
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
wk
emark(w)
speakerk(w)
; . . .;
wk zfr
emark(w)
speakerk(w)
ownfr(x, z)
xfr
best friendfr(x, w)
donkeyfr(z)
;
wk zfr xfr
emark(w)
speakerk(w)
best friendfr(x, w)
ownfr(x, z)
donkeyfr(z)
These examples show the basic applications of the theory so far: a descriptive
presupposition triggered in fr and then bound (111) or accommodated (112)
in fr, and a proper name (111) or indexical (112) triggering a k presupposition
that gets bound in k.
The ‘layered presuppositions’ analysis makes for a nicely compositional
Prel, featuring a uniform treatment of all definites as presupposition triggers.
On the other hand we avoid the KK criticism by having all proper names
and indexical presuppositions end up in the k layer of the output, and then
giving that layer a semantically rigid interpretation through the anchoring
procedure of 3.3.2.4. But there’s more. By relaxing the layer-faithfulness
constraint somewhat we can do justice to a host of alleged counterexamples
to the classical theory of direct reference.
3.3.3.2 Cross-layer binding and non rigid proper names
Let’s take a closer look at layer-faithfulness and see if it really is empirically
justified. One possibility excluded is that fr-presupposition are bound by k-
antecedents. This means that once something is indexically identified in the
common ground we can never refer to that entity with a description anymore.
Note first that this seems to accord with the general observations in work on
the givenness hierarchy (Gundel et al. 1993), also known as the familiarity
(Prince 1981) or referential (Zeevat 2002) hierarchies.43 From these studies
43This hierarchy of NPs amounts to something like: indexical pronoun > 3rd person
pronoun > proper name > (complex) demonstrative > definite description > indefinite
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there emerges a production preference ranking of NPs according to which
indexicals and proper names are preferred over descriptive phrases. It seems
to follow that if something is available in the k-layer, and thus available to
be picked up by a demonstrative or higher, we can no longer use a definite
description or indefinite to refer to it. This would corroborate our prediction
that fr-presuppositions must be bound in fr.
However, there seem to be some counterexamples, like expressive descrip-
tions, or epithets (Jackendoff 1972; Schlenker 2005), that are well-known for
referring to entities evidently in the k-layer:
(113) I wanted Charlie to help me, but the bastard wouldn’t do it.[
(Jackendoff 1972:110)
]
Here, Charlie is first referred to by a totally rigid proper name, and then later
picked up by a definite description. Several theories have been put forth to
account for the special status of epithets, some claiming that they are to be
analyzed as a special type of pronouns, which leads us to the next problem
for strict layer-faithfulness: anaphoric pronouns.
Obviously a pronoun like he in (114) can take both fr- and k-antecedents:
(114)

Hek
Colbyk
That mank
The philosopherfr
A philosopherfr
 beats every donkey he doesn’t like
The question of course is, what label can we put on a pronoun’s presup-
position? Three options: none, both fr and k, allow cross-layer binding.
All three require substantial revisions to the basic LDRT framework. Cross-
layer binding for instance requires that we rethink most of the layered binding
constraints, e.g. what kind of layers do we consider in the computation of se-
mantic values for checking match or consistency? And then then there’s
accommodation to think about, but fortunately pronouns do not accommo-
date (specificity)—at least not fully, sometimes a pronoun can add new
information:
(115)
{
A famous professor
Prof. Rice
}
visited the department. She gave a talk.[≈(57)]
This discourse was meant to show how a presupposition is partially bound,
with some of its content accommodated to reveal the professor’s gender. In
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the context of the layered presupposition debate, the first variation shows
the pronoun bound in the fr layer dropping the accommodated part of its
content at that same fr layer, while the genderless proper name variation
arguably demonstrates a case of partial binding with accommodation into k.
At this point the simplest solution would be to just leave the layer of
pronominal presuppositions underspecified. We represent this by suppress-
ing the labels. The Res algorithm tries to match and bind such unlayered
presuppositions in each of the layers separately, eventually choosing the one
that gives the best output.44 The result:
(116) A famous professor visited the department. She gave a talk.
[≈(57)]

xfr yfr
famousfr(x)
proffr(x)
deptfr(y)
visitfr(x, y)
;
xfr yfr
famousfr(x)
proffr(x)
deptfr(y)
visitfr(x, y)
give talkfr(z)
z
female(z)
;
xfr yfr
famousfr(x)
proffr(x)
deptfr(y)
visitfr(x, y)
give talkfr(x)
femalefr(x)
Since we’re on the subject of pronouns, let’s take a moment and decide
what conditions to give them as content, because there is really more to she
than the fact that it must be bound by a female individual. In English,
the morphologically realized features of gender, number and person are all
semantically interpreted—in fr or k, that is. In other words, these features all
correspond to properties of individuals; 3rd person, for instance, means that
its (antecedent’s) reference must be distinct from both the speaker and her
audience. We can contrast such semantic features with formal features, like
(Romance) gender, which restricts resolution to referents derived from words
of the specified grammatical gender. Formal features would be stored in
another special layer, form, for the interpretation of which I refer the reader
to Geurts & Maier (2003), because in the current work we will consider only
semantic features in fr and k. Here’s the representation and semantics I
propose for pronouns (it works for all three persons and genders, though
only in the singular; I leave the semantics of plurals for future research):
44Technically this is easily accomplished, for instance by copying the presupposition
into the separate layers, resolving them independently and then checking which output is
optimal.
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(117) a. Prel: I 7→
xk
1.sgk(x)
I(1.sg)(w) = the set containing the center(s) (i.e. agent,
speaker, or thinker) of the world (or context) w
b. Prel: she 7→
x
fem.3.sg(x)
I(fem.3.sg)(w) = the set of d ∈ D which are female in w
and distinct from the center and the addressees (if any)
of w.
...
I assume the underspecified layering is necessary only for third person, the
other two are really indexical, so firmly in k. Or are they? At the end of the
section we’ll come back to the resolution of the indexical person pronouns.
Now, there is a third set of data that seem to involve presuppositions
changing layers, this time it’s k-presuppositions, triggered by proper names,
that seem to end up in fr. The examples are below are mostly taken from
Geurts (1997) who uses them to show that proper names exhibit all the
behavior typical of presuppositions. First, there’s global binding, and some-
times the antecedent is descriptively introduced new material, so in fr (the
DRSs below represent the observed rather than the currently predicted res-
olution):
(118) I have a poodle named ‘Horace’. Horace is three years old.[
(Geurts 1997:321)
]

xk yfr
speakerk(x)
ownfr(x, y)
poodlefr(y)
horacefr(y)
;
xk yfr
speakerk(x)
ownfr(x, y)
poodlefr(y)
horacefr(y)
3yrs oldfr(z)
zk
horacek(z)
; [z7→y] ;
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xk yfr
speakerk(x)
ownfr(x, y)
poodlefr(y)
horacefr(y)
3yrs oldfr(y)
The same kind of binding occurs non-globally:
(119) If a child is christened ‘Bambi’, then Disney will sue Bambi’s par-
ents.
[
(Geurts 1997:321)
]

xk
disneyk(x)
yfr
childfr(y)
bambifr(y)
⇒fr
suefr(x, z)
zfr
parentsfr(z, w)
wk
bambik(w)
; [w7→y]
;
xk
disneyk(x)
yfr zfr
childfr(y)
bambifr(y)
parentsfr(z, y)
⇒fr suefr(x, z)
A somewhat similar case of a proper name ending up in the restrictor’s fr-
layer:
(120) Every time we do our Beatles act, Ringo gets drunk afterwards.[
(Geurts 1997:322)
]
The observed resolution of the proper name could be classified either as
binding or as accommodation, but in any case it’s clear that Ringo in the
consequent does not refer to the actual Ringo Starr that may be available in
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the main context.
Actually, there are also clear cases of proper names being accommodated
in fr. For instance, if I want to introduce Colby to you, I might use a
construction like:
(121) This is Colby
But the most blatant violation of the theory of direct reference cited by
Geurts, is one where the proper name is accommodated locally in the fr-
layer:
The electoral process is under attack, and it is proposed, in light of
recent results, that alphabetical order would be a better method
of selection than the present one. Someone supposes that ‘Aaron
Aardvark’ might be the winning name and says, ’If that proce-
dure had been instituted, Ronald Reagan would still be doing TV
commercials, and [
(122) ]Aaron Aardvark might have been president[
(Bach 1987:146-7)
]
 3fr
presidentfr(x)
xk
a.aardvarkk(x)
; 3fr
xfr
presidentfr(x)
a.aardvarkfr(x)
45
This represents the intuitively optimal output: there might have been some
guy called ‘Aaron Aardvark’ and then he might have become president. The
utterance as a whole certainly does not commit the speaker to the exis-
tence of anyone named Aardvark, which in PA corresponds to a non-global
resolution of the presupposition. In this case, that must mean local accom-
modation. Further, it’s evident that the proper name is used descriptively,
i.e. the presupposition, triggered as k, ends up in fr, contributing someone
called Aaron Aardvark rather than the actual person. Moreover, what would
a 3fr-embedded k-layer mean anyway? If you think about it, there doesn’t
seem to be any sensible way of interpreting material in an embedded k-layer.
The current proposal in effect ignores a k-layer embedded in a fr-labeled
45Instead of, or in addition to, the 3, we might just as well have chosen to embed the
DRSs in a conditional’s consequent without it affecting the argument below.
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condition in the computation of propositional content (i.e. JϕKc, cf. (107)).
This is in accordance with what we’re trying to capture with k: stuff at
the main DRS can be interpreted as ‘contextually given’, but the k-labeled
part thereof is contextual in a stronger, Kaplanian, truly semantic sense.
However, if the analysis of attitude reports requires a context-manipulating
belief operator, as argued in the previous chapters, we might find a use for
embedded k-layers after all. We will take this up below and further in 3.3.4.
To sum up, proper names can be bound ((118), (119)) and accommodated
((121), (122)) in the fr-layer, though normally they end up in a k-layer in ac-
cordance with the theory of direct reference. Furthermore, these resolutions
can be non-global ((119), (120) and (122)). This last fact would be good
evidence for our view of proper names as presuppositions, if we could say
something about the observed layer-switching to fr. And what to say about
that really depends on how general the phenomenon is. In other words,
do other k-presuppositions (i.e. indexicals) exhibit the same layer-crossing
behavior?
Let’s take a closer look at indexicals and their possible layer-shiftiness.
Let me say first of all that I am not aware of any research in this specific
area and I cannot give conclusive evidence for the impossibility of Geurt-
sian de-rigidification for indexicals. That said, I can perhaps convince you
that examples parallel to the ones discussed above will not easily occur with
indexicals. I’ll go through them one by one. First up, the poodle named
‘Horace’ in (118). Here, a new object is introduced descriptively and then
picked up by the corresponding rigid term. Note that we cannot replicate this
situation with pure indexicals, because they can retrieve their own referents
from the external context (“automatically”, p. 40), the descriptive introduc-
tion doesn’t affect this. We do find similar constructions with this and that:
(123) Look, I’m pointing at something. That’s is a nice specimen.
On closer examination, the anaphoric use of these demonstratives seems to
go way beyond that of proper names. In fact, it’s well-known that inten-
tional indexicals have so-called discourse deictic and/or anaphoric uses in
which they can pick up just about any salient sound, word, object, clause,
property or proposition available from the surrounding discourse (Levinson
1983; Diessel 1999):
(124) Ligia has a poodle. I know this sounds crazy, but she loves that
dog.
For lack of space I cannot attempt a comprehensive overview, classification
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or analysis of all the different uses of demonstratives, nor of dedicated dis-
course deictics (like the former/the latter, the previous chapter). For now,
I tentatively conclude that global, cross-layer binding is impossible for pure
indexicals, but ubiquitous with demonstratives.
This pattern is confirmed when we go and look for non-global bindings
of indexicals in constructions like (119) and (120): pure indexicals cannot
be bound descriptively, cf. (125a), but other demonstratives can behave as
anaphoric pronouns, (125b).
(125) a. Every time someonei starts to speak, I*i forget what to say
b. Everybody who owns a donkey, likes that donkey the most
Local binding is no problem for such demonstratives either (Maybe one of the
donkeys was his favorite and that one escaped). Nor is accommodation, if we
heap enough content in the N-part of a complex demonstrative (Did you see
that Miike movie with Sho Aikawa last night?). I’m not so sure about local
accommodation, but the main observation should be that pure indexicals
can’t do any of these things.46 I think we have by now firmly established
that pure indexicals, proper names, demonstratives and 3rd person pronouns
all display distinct resolution behavior. It seems that demonstratives, like
3rd person pronouns, are free to bind or accommodate in fr or k. Their
content subsists in the opposition proximal (this) versus distal (that). The
exact semantics of these features requires further research, but for now, I
propose:47
(126) a. Prel: this 7→
x
prox(x)
46With the possible exception of global accommodation of indexicals?
(i) a. I am 33 years old with blond hair and hazel eyes. I enjoy music and going to
the movies.
b. Call me Ishmael
Imagine that these sentences start a new discourse/text. The context does not (yet)
provide any familiar individual that could serve as referent of the first person pronouns.
On the other hand, written text brings a load of complications to any account of direct
reference—think of the spatiotemporal separation between production and interpretation
of the indexical token, among other things.
47To capture textual, metalinguistic deixis (as in this chapter) we’d have to add a third,
formal layer: xfr,k,form . . .. And perhaps yet another layer for cases like He went like this
[strange facial expression/sounds]?
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b. Prel: that man 7→
x
dist(x)
man(x)
Proper names appear to be more tied in with the k-layer, lexically, but
they have been known to shift occasionally. One option would be to sim-
ply generate proper names as anaphors, lexically underspecified for k or fr,
but because of the exceptional nature of descriptive proper names, I think
this is not warranted. Instead I propose to analyze these cases as non-fatal
violations of the layer-faithfulness constraint.48 But then, how about pure
indexicals? Why are they always bound in the global k-layer.
Or are they? The term ‘shifting’ as applied to indexicals should ring
a bell: monsters, 2.4.3. And indeed there is a connection between these
two notions of shiftiness: monstrous shifting of indexical reference has been
analyzed as involving a de-rigidification of indexicals (in 2.4.3.1 and 2.4.3.5),
and the same goes for ‘bound variable readings’ of I in only constructions.
It seems a promising next step to try and analyze this de-rigidification as
layer-shifting from k to fr, so let’s see where that leads us.
First take Heim’s only I. We can derive both the sloppy (127a) and the
strict (127b) readings as follows:
(127) Only I did my homework
[
=(143), p. 164
]

xfr
x =fr y
yk
1.sgk(y)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
onlyfr
x
did homework offr(x, z)
zk
1.sgk(z)
a.  ;
wk
speakerk(w)
xfr
x =fr w
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
onlyfr
x did homework offr(x, x)
48Recall that all resolution constraints are violable, only some violations are more severe
than others. What this means is that we must ensure that the layer-faithfulness constraint
is not ranked too high in the final hierarchy of constraints. A possible refinement would
be to split layer-faithfulness into a family of distinct, subconstraints, ranked in such a way
that switching from k to fr comes out especially cheap.
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b.  ;
wk
speakerk(w)
xfr
x =fr w
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
onlyfr
x did homework offr(x, w)
No problem with the strict reading, as was to be expected, but for the sloppy
one we have bound the second indexical presupposition (my) to the fr-labeled,
quantified variable x. So, we’re binding a pure indexical into fr. There is
however a big difference with the Bambi case and that is the lack of purely
descriptive content associated with this xfr, all we know is that x = w where w
is the actual speaker in the global k-layer. Since equality between discourse
referents is a purely extensional affair ([x = w]↔ 2[x = w]), the content of
the quantified variable x is fully determined by the rigid reference of w in
the actual context, which licenses a match between x and the indexical first
person presupposition z. The semantics of only as a duplex condition thus
automatically handles this type of (pseudo-)layer-crossing.
The second case of apparent de-rigidification of pure indexicals was mon-
strous indexical shifting. Consider again our simplified shifted indexical pro-
totype:
(128) John says that I am a hero
‘John says that he’s a hero’
[
Pseudo-Amharic, =(50), p. 111
]
It’s obvious that the Amharic I does not refer to the speaker of the actual
context. This conspires with the previous result to make it absolutely clear
that we have to give up the assumption that pure indexicals always bind in
the global k-layer. What all analyses of monstrous indexical shifting from
2.4.3 have in common, is that they propose some kind of local binding, to
a representation of the center of the reported speech act or thought. In the
next section I provide a way to represent this embedded center of a belief in a
k-layer, so that layer-shifting is not required for local binding of a first person.
This move does require a special semantics of the bel operator, because with
the kind of operators we have seen so far, the LDRT semantics ignores k-
layers embedded within fr (as shown above, p. 265). The proposed extension
of bel and the admittance of belief-embedded k in effect amounts to a shift
from intensional report semantics to monsters, from worlds to contexts, and
from propositions to self-ascribed properties, just as we’ve seen before, in
chapter 2. We’ll eventually return to this very example in 3.4.4.
Before we get on with belief reports, let’s take stock. In LDRT, presup-
positions are labeled just like everything else. Apart from that, they are
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represented and resolved according to the standard PA augmented with a
layer-faithfulness constraint layer. We distinguish two (or three) kinds of
presuppositions: descriptive presuppositions are triggered, bound and ac-
commodated in fr, proper names and pure indexicals in k. In between, there
are demonstratives and third person pronouns, which are not tied to either fr
or k. Geurts’s (1997) observations are analyzed as cases of proper names vio-
lating layer, i.e. crossing over to fr and behaving like descriptive presuppo-
sitions. Pure indexicals differ from proper names in that they do not exhibit
the same kind of layer-shiftiness (which will ultimately need to be stipulated
somewhere). But there do appear to be cases of ‘bound’ pure indexicals:
only (and related focus phenomena) and monstrous indexical shifting. Both
of these however can be tackled without allowing indexicals to switch layers,
but they do show that indexicals can be bound non-globally.
3.3.4 Belief in LDRT
3.3.4.1 Syntax
As mentioned at the end of the previous section, we need a way to put some
more structure in our belief representations and semantics. The idea is that
an LDRS representation of an ascribed belief is more or less isomorphic to
the global LDRS, i.e. with a k-layer containing at least a center and then,
possibly, some other discourse referents and conditions in k or fr. To bring
out the uniformity I’ll use the predicate center as an abstraction of the first
person to cover the speaker or the thinker of a context depending on whether
it’s a context of utterance or a context of thought.
Take for instance a simple global context, representing the fact that the
context’s center is sick:
(129) 
xk
centerk(x)
sickfr(x)
[≈ I am sick]
Then, the fact that someone has a thought of the form I am sick (as rep-
resented in (129)) is represented simply by embedding the LDRS of (129)
under a belief operator:
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(130) 
wk
colbyk(w)
belwfr
xk
centerk(x)
sickfr(x)
[≈ Colby thinks: “I am sick”]
In other words, the global LDRS represents the context/world as seen
through the collective eyes of the current discourse participants, while a bel
embedded LDRS represents how it is perceived by a particular subject.
As remarked before, this kind of representation requires a hyperinten-
sional semantics of bel conditions, with contexts instead of possible worlds,
which is next on the agenda. Note how we are not dealing with report se-
mantics here; though we can paraphrase contexts with sentences, we will here
remain silent as to how to get from a sentence to its DRS representation. Not
until 3.4 will we return to natural language attitude reports and discuss how
to construct suitable PrelDRSs for simple de re/de se reports, and an ac-
companying extension of Res. The goal still is to give unified compositional
PrelDRSs for de re/de se reports based on a relational attitude analysis, in
order to ultimately derive proper, context-dependent truth conditions for all
the data discussed in chapter 2.
3.3.4.2 Semantics
Since 3.3.2.4 we have a two-dimensional semantics to interpret LDRSs with
k and fr, essentially providing us with Kaplanian characters. Unless stated
otherwise, I’ll be using such terms as semantic value or proposition expressed
as referring to the semantic evaluation of the fr-layer against rigidified k-
background in context c, i.e. 3.3.2.4’s JϕKc. As noted earlier, it would be
easy to abstract away from this particular choice of layers (fr vs k) and have
general L-layered content with K-layered background in a context: JϕKK,cL .
Given our 2D semantics for LDRT, we could follow Kaplan’s original anal-
ysis of belief as a relation between an individual and a full-blown character,
but, as argued at length in 1.2.4.3, we might as well restrict attention to
the diagonal. Remember, the diagonal was the set of contexts in which the
formula, or LDRS in this case, would be true, i.e. true when evaluating the
proposition expressed in context c, in the world of that c:
(131) \\ϕ\\f =
{
c ∈ C wc ∈ JϕKf,c}
One of the ways to think of diagonalization is as the inverse of the rigidifier
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dthat, i.e. as an operator that de-rigidifies all indexicals and proper names
in its scope. In LDRT that means a de-rigidification of the k-layer.49
Next, a person’s belief set becomes a set of contexts, instead of the classic
set of worlds, or, in the other extreme, the Kaplanian set of characters:
(132) Bel : D ×W → ℘(C)
These are the contexts that the belief subject considers actual, so, the
agent(s) of these contexts correspond to the subject’s self-image, i.e. the
person she believes to be.
The semantics of bel is now entirely straightforward: believing ϕ is to
think of yourself as living in one of the contexts specified by the context-
property \\ϕ\\:
(133) If ξ ∈ Dom(f):
M |=fw,L belξlϕ iff l 6∈ L or \\ϕ\\f ⊇ Bel(f(x), w)
And that’s all. Note that we have merely followed the very standard belief
semantics of self-ascribed diagonals discussed in 1.2.4.3. Later on in the
next section we’ll add acquaintance relations and an extended resolution
mechanism on top of this basic semantics of belief to get a handle on de
re/de se reporting.
To illustrate the theory so far, consider the interpretation of our sample
LDRSs (129)-(130):
(134) w ∈ J(130)Kc
iff there is a unique, smallest f ⊇Uk(ϕ) ∅ with M |=fc,k (130) and,
with that f , M |=fw,fr (130)
iff there is a unique f with Dom(f) = {w} andM |=fc,k colbyk(w)
and, with that f , M |=fw,fr belwfr(129)
iff there is a unique f with Dom(f) = {w} andM |=fc,k colbyk(w)
and, with that f , M |=fw,fr belwfr(129)
iff with f =
[
w7→the Colby of context c]: \\(129)\\f ⊇
49It may seem as if that could just as well have been achieved by exploiting the layers
of our layered framework and evaluating that k-layer on a par with fr, as in JϕKffr,k. There
are some differences, most notably JϕKffr,k is a set of possible worlds, while \\ϕ\\f is a
set of contexts. Additionally evaluating k and fr on a par we would lose the uniqueness
otherwise built into the contextual semantics of the k-layer (with the ‘!’ operator of (106),
p. 254). More precisely, if ϕ is an LDRS with a centerk condition, JϕKffr,k may contain
worlds with any number of speakers and thinkers, while every c in \\ϕ\\ffr,k has a unique
center.
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Bel(f(w), w)
iff \\(129)\\ ⊇ Bel(Colby, w)
iff for every c′ ∈ Bel(Colby, w): wc′ ∈ J(129)Kc′
iff for every c′ ∈ Bel(Colby, w) there is a unique center, ac′ and
M |=[x 7→ac′ ]fr,wc′ (129)
iff for every c′ ∈ Bel(Colby, w) ac′ ∈ I(sick)(wc′)
iff in all of Colby’s belief alternatives the center is sick
3.4 Belief reports in LDRT
At the end of the previous section we developed a way to represent the
Lewisian belief-as-context-property-ascription in LDRT. These representa-
tions will serve as the basis for our semantic analysis of belief reports. I focus
on de re/de se reports, because I have basically said all I have to say about
de dicto and the de dicto/de re ambiguity. Nonetheless, let’s take stock here,
picking up the report semantics where we left it in 3.2.3. In the meantime
we did fix the semantics of referential terms as k-layered presuppositions, so
let’s add that.
3.4.1 Recap: de dicto, de re, and de se reports in
LDRT
For unambiguously de dicto reports, e.g. reports without referential/
presuppositional terms in the embedded clause, I propose the following
straightforward representation:
(135) Ellsworth Kimmel believes pretty girls always win
[
=(61a), p. 220
]
 ;
xk
ellsworthk(x)
belxfr
yfr
prettyfr(y)
girlfr(y)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
everyfr
y winfr(y)
[
cf. (62), p. 220
]
For uniformity with the de re/de se representations below, a compositional
Prel might add an embedded center (〈uk, center(u)〉) to the belief represen-
tation. Semantically, that would make no difference, because all of a person’s
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belief contexts actually have a unique and salient belief center, only it’s ir-
relevant in the semantic interpretation of a truly de dicto belief report.50 Of
course, this fact corresponds exactly to Lewis’s (1979a) theoretical reduction
of de dicto belief to what he calls ‘de se’ (property self-ascription) by refor-
mulating a believed proposition p as the property of living in a world where
p holds, cf. 1.2.3, especially (44), p. 46.
The next example in the Ellsworth story was ambiguous between a de
dicto and a de re reading. In the scopal account this came out as a pragmatic
ambiguity, but after adding vivid names and acquaintance relations, we had
to give that up. At the end of 3.2.3.2 I tentatively suggested some ways to
re-unify the ensuing LF ambiguity, but these remained mere suggestions due
to lack of space, so here I’ll just accept the ambiguity and move on. So, two
preliminary structures, two readings; (136a), de dicto, following (135), and
(136b) de re, following the relational attitude analysis:
(136) Ellsworth believes the prettiest girl will win
[
=(61b), p. 220
]
a.  ;
xk
ellsworthk(x)
belxfr
yfr
prettiestfr(y)
winfr(y)
[
cf. (74a), p. 231
]
b.  ;
xk Rfr
ellsworthk(x)
Rfr(x, y)
yfr
prettiestfr(y)
belxfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
Rfr(u, v)
winfr(v)
;
50I think it’s safe to assume no individual can be so deluded as to imagine she is two
conscious centers at the exact same time, or none. We rely on this uniqueness of centers
in 3.4.4.2.
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xk Rfr yfr
ellsworthk(x)
Rfr(x, y)
prettiestfr(y)
belxfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
Rfr(u, v)
winfr(v)
[
cf. (74b), p. 231
]
In (136b), the de re representation, I opted for the relational attitude analysis
of 2.3.1 (applied to reports in 1.2.4.1 and adapted for DRT in 3.2.3.3), because
the scopal account is deficient with respect to Ortcutt (cf. 3.2.3.2) and the
original propositional vivid name fix was insufficient for capturing purely
indexical distinctions as in the beliefs of Lingens or Heimson (cf. 1.2.3). To
paraphrase the truth conditions of the proposed output context, there is
an acquaintance relation (R) between Ellsworth (x) and someone who’s the
prettiest (y), and in all contexts compatible with Ellsworth’s beliefs the center
(u) is R-acquainted with someone (v) who wins. As discussed before, there’s
a number of restrictions on R, such as uniqueness of the second argument
and vividness, but we’ll leave those out for readability. Note by the way that
in this particular resolution of the de re PrelDRS I chose to accommodate
the presupposition triggered by the prettiest, but if it was already salient
common ground that Ellsworth is the prettiest, we could have bound it to x
instead. On the other hand, if that were the case it would have been much
more efficient to just use a pronoun (138) and avoid the whole de dicto/de re
ambiguity. In any case, semantically speaking it doesn’t make any difference
whether we bind or accommodate, because in the actual, external contexts
of utterance that come with our scenarios Ellsworth = Arata = the prettiest.
The following de re report brings nothing new:
(137) Ellsworth believes of Arata Suggs that she’ll win
[
=(61c), p. 220
]
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 ;
xk Rfr
ellsworthk(x)
Rfr(x, y)
yk
aratak(y)
belxfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
Rfr(u, v)
winfr(y)
;
xk Rfr yk
ellsworthk(x)
Rfr(x, y)
aratak(y)
belxfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
Rfr(u, v)
winfr(y)
Again, if in the discourse context it was a known fact that Arata is Ellsworth
we have the option of binding, but then, why would I even use (137)? Why
confuse my audience by using two different proper names, where a simple
anaphoric pronoun would have sufficed? Surely that would fly in the face of
the conversational maxims, the hierarchy of referential/anaphoric expressions
of (5), p. 357 in particular. Another possibility, if this is the audience’s first
encounter with the name Arata, we might well consider a layer-switch to
fr, i.e. a kind of reinterpretation of this Arata as someone called Arata (cf.
3.3.3.2). So, depending on the broader conversational background there is
the choice to put y in either k or fr.
Now, the pronoun case, where things should get interesting:
(138) Ellsworth believes that she’s going to win
[
=(61d), p. 220
]
 ;
xk Rfr
ellsworthk(x)
Rfr(x, y)
y
3.sg.fem(y)
belxfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
Rfr(u, v)
winfr(v)
;
xk Rfr
ellsworthk(x)
Rfr(x, x)
belxfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
Rfr(u, v)
winfr(v)
[
cf. (75), p. 232
]
The big payoff of the relational attitude analysis: no de re/de se ambiguity
in co-referential pronoun reports. Note first that the representation above is
compatible with a mistaken identity de re belief of Ellsworth’s as in the TV
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scene B from (59), p. 219. To see that, take R to be the relation of ‘seeing
some Arata on TV’ then R holds between Ellsworth and herself (in cB), and
from her defeatist remark in cB we can deduce that she believes the person
she is acquainted with through that particular R will win. So, (138) is true in
cB. Taking R to be equality, we see it’s equally true in cC , where the belief is
purely de se, in accordance with the originally Lewisian claim that pure de se
is a subtype of de re, viz. de re under the acquaintance relation of equality.
Which brings us to our final Ellsworth-sentence, the unambiguously pure
de se belief report:
(139) Ellsworth believes PRO to be on the winning side
[
=(61e), p. 220
]
 ;
xk
ellsworthk(x)
belxfr
uk
centerk(u)
winfr(u)
[
cf. (76), p. 233
]
Its truth conditions require that Ellsworth has a belief corresponding to the
set of contexts whose center will win, i.e. the pure de se belief she expresses
as “I will win” in cC . There is an important connection between this LDRS
and the more complex relational one in (138) and that is that we can get from
(138) to (139) by substituting = for R, basically just applying the reasoning
that shows pure de se is relational de re belief under equality.
3.4.1.1 Known issues
I will not touch de dicto anymore, nor the de dicto/de re interface, which
ideally would deserve further attention, as pointed out above. I will only
consider the overlapping de re and de se modes. The proposed analysis
basically implements Cresswell & von Stechow’s (1982) relational analysis in
LDRT. It works for simple de re belief reports and Ortcutt cases, and it gives
us a nice reduction of pure de se as a special case of relational belief. On the
other hand, we also inherit the bugs that came to light in chapter 2. I here
list these issues briefly and then spend the rest of the thesis extending the
basic relational formalism described above.
The first issue discussed was context dependence. In 2.3.2 it was suggested
that existential quantification over acquaintance relations is inferior to an
account that selects a specific acquaintance relation from the context or at
least contextually restricts the acquaintance quantification. I criticized the
proposed contextual alternatives for their lack of a formal theory about this
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pragmatic restriction. The dynamic framework of DRT seems quite suited
to this task, so the first thing I’ll do, in 3.4.2, is to formulate an extension to
the resolution algorithm to handle the contextual resolution of second-order
variables like our R. I’ll illustrate how we get the benefits pointed out by Aloni
and Abusch but now properly integrated in a pragmasemantic framework
that takes context dependence as its starting point. Later, in 2.4.2, I showed
that certain quantified belief reports, with every and only, cause problems for
a strictly wide-scope account of contextualized acquaintance. I will propose a
remarkably simple extension to the LDRT variant of 3.4.2, henceforth known
as Acquaintance Resolution, in order to account for these data.
Second, in 2.3.3 we discussed how compositional the relational analysis
of de re/de se is. We saw that it minimally requires separating the res from
the ascribed predicate, thus preventing a fully Montagovian analysis of belief
embeddings. It was also remarked that contextualizing the acquaintance re-
lation makes things worse, compositionality-wise (though at first sight they
may seem slightly better). Transposed to LDRT, the first objection still
holds: we need to know which embedded elements are to be read de re, be-
cause only for those will we introduce an acquaintance variable.51 However,
the second observation, about contextuality, is no longer valid, since compo-
sitionality in this framework only applies to the construction of PrelDRSs,
not outputs. In (L)DRT+PA, no output is derived fully compositionally any-
way, but the use of underspecification in PrelDRSs makes it relatively easy
to formulate a highly compositional construction algorithm (Prel). It’ll be
easy to see how this is achieved in our basic analysis of 3.4.2 as well as in the
later extensions.
Finally, as discussed at length in 2.4 there is a strong anti-reductionist
movement advocating independent de re and pure de se LFs. It started with
Chierchia’s (1989) observation that there are ways to report just pure de se
beliefs, for instance with infinitival complements, as in (139). This was taken
as evidence that de re/de se is not a homogeneous class and that we should
distinguish separate LFs for de re/impure de se on the hand and pure de se
on the other. Chierchia himself even went so far as to claim that co-referential
pronoun reports like (138) are syntactically ambiguous in this respect. There
are some arguments involving elided reports, but these were shown to be
inconclusive at best, cf. 2.4.1.4. In 2.4.2.2 we considered a stronger argument
in favor of the Ambiguity Thesis. The main observation was that embedding
(138) under only allows a reading that doesn’t correspond to either narrow or
51Ultimately, the goal should be to put the creation of the acquaintance relation in
the resolution algorithm, so that we get a situation similar to the scopal account where
narrow resolution gives de dicto, wide scope de re. Such a solution would ipso facto solve
our problem with the de dicto/de re ambiguity too.
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wide scope quantification/resolution of an acquaintance relation, but which
is easily explained if we assume that there is a distinct, dedicated pure de se
LF. This poses one of the tougher challenges for our de re/de se unificationist
attempt, but it will be met, in 3.4.3.
An alternative, which I refer to as the hybrid account of de re/de se,
consists in assigning a dedicated pure de se LF to infinitival reports, while
keeping a general de re/de se relational LF for the pronoun reports. In fact,
this is more or less what we did in (139) above. As pointed out there, we
can still maintain a somewhat weakened version of the reductionist idea that
pure de se is just de re under the particular acquaintance of equality, if only
semantically. On the downside, since the acquaintance relation is precisely
not underspecified for infinitival reports, as it is for co-referential pronouns, it
seems we have to give up on the idea of a unified preliminary representation
for the two syntactic structures. This in turn means we can give up PRO,
which was recruited to unify the syntactic structures of the embedded clauses
(into the subject-predicate mold). Since I’m not a generative syntactician,
I can live with the loss of this invisible pronoun. All in all, it seems a fair
proposal.52
But then there’s other data, reports that are similarly interpreted purely
de se, but where the complement does contain an overt pronominal subject.
First, there are the logophors discussed in 2.4.1.2. These are a class of third
person pronouns whose effect is not simply co-reference with the matrix sub-
ject, but an unambiguously pure de se attitude ascription to that subject.
Now it seems there is a definite advantage to having an account of PRO’s
pure de se semantics, because if we did, we could use that as a semantics
of PRO and logophors uniformly. Finally, there’s the phenomenon of shifted
indexicality of which the Amharic first person has come to be the prime ex-
ample. It’s commonly assumed that the shifted reading of such an I, where
it refers not to the actual center, but to the center of the reported belief,
corresponds to a pure de se ascription. Following Schlenker and others I pro-
pose the obvious, viz. that in such cases the Amharic I, a k-presupposition,
is bound locally to the embedded center. The wide scope resolution should
correspond to the other, English-type, reading that is de re about the actual
speaker. The difficulty is to get these two distinct readings to come out just
by resolution from a single de re/de se PrelDRS. In 3.4.4 I have planned a
considerable overhaul of the system to achieve this feat. But once we have
it, we also have a way to represent PRO and logophors: just assign them the
52To be sure, we’d have to check some of the more subtle data involving ellip-
sis/anaphorization of report complements (2.4.1.4), but since I currently lack a sufficiently
precise theory of abstract anaphora in LDRT, we’ll leave that for another occasion.
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same, first person k-presupposition as Amharic I. Unfortunately this would
overgenerate wide scope readings, so in the end we are still left with some-
thing like Schlenker’s stipulative typology of indexicals to make sure that
PRO and logophors are always bound locally.
This concludes our schedule for the remainder of the thesis. If everything
goes according to plan, I will have provided the first de re/de se report se-
mantics that takes the context dependence of acquaintance relations seriously
and in doing so unifies the de re and pure de se modes of reporting belief.
More specifically, this semantics, formalized in LDRT, will be able to take
on any kind of de re or de se report of the form NP believes that NP VP, in-
cluding Ortcutt cases, co-referential pronoun reports and quantified versions
thereof—in mistaken-identity and mixed scenarios—, infinitival pure de se
reports, logophors, and shifted indexicals.
3.4.2 Acquaintance Resolution
In the previous section we saw logical forms with existentially quantified ac-
quaintance relations, i.e. x believes something de re of y iff there exists a
vivid acquaintance relation between x and y such that, etc.. As we have
argued elsewhere, it might be a good idea to restrict the search for acquain-
tance relations to the context: x believes de re of y iff the context provides
a salient acquaintance relation that holds between x and y, etc. There are a
number of ways to make this formally precise; the one I propose involves the
resolution of a second order variable, R, by unification of the R(x, y) condition
with the context represented in the input LDRS.
First, I’ll talk about unification and how we can use it to model the
context dependence of acquaintance, then we’ll illustrate Acquaintance Res-
olution with the Ortcutt example and the coreferential pronoun report about
Ellsworth.
3.4.2.1 Higher-order unification
So, what is unification exactly? In general, unification, applied to a set of
expressions, is the process of finding a unifying substitution for those expres-
sions, i.e. a substitution of terms for free variables that makes the expressions
equal. Take for example the first-order predicate logical expressions walk(x)
and walk(j). We’ll consider only unifications of two expressions, in which
case it makes sense to talk about unifying their equation. Obviously, though,
the equation in question cannot be the relation of equality commonly denoted
by the 2-place relation symbol = in first-order logic. Rather, it denotes a
kind of formal, syntactic equality between terms themselves. We’ll return
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to the exact interpretation of this ‘formal equality’ shortly, for now, we’ll
just use a different symbol,
.
=. Returning to the first-order example: (140)
shows how we’ll represent this unification problem, along with two possible
solutions:
(140) walk(x)
.
= walk(j)
a.
[
x7→j]
b.
[
x7→j
y7→z
]
The first, (140a), is indeed a unifier because applying it to (both sides of) the
unification problem yields a trivial truth (since walk(x)
[
x7→j] .= walk(j)).
The same holds for (140b), but this one is not minimal, so to speak, because
it contains the first unifier in the sense that in can be decomposed as the
composition of the unifier (140a) and
[
y7→z]. We say that (140a) is the
most general unifier of the equation. It is a well-known fact that first-order
unification problems that can be unified always have a unique most general
unifier. Moreover, there’s an algorithm for deciding whether unification is
possible and, if so, retrieving the most general unifier. In the following we’ll
consider only most general unifiers, and we often just use the terms ‘unifier’
or ‘solution’ for them.
Now, in a higher-order language, such as the typed lambda calculus of
2.B, we can formulate the same kind of unification problems, with higher-
order variables:
(141) X(j)
.
= walk(j)[
X7→walk]
Assuming X and walk are of type et (1-place predicates), this is the obvious
resolution. For details regarding higher-order unification I refer the reader
to Huet (1975).
But now consider again the question of what
.
= really means. As
we said, it’s not the purely semantic notion that requires the exten-
sions/intensions to be equal, for we don’t want to count walk(j) as equal
to walk(j) ∧ [rain ∨ ¬rain]. On the other hand, what we do count as equal
are walk, λx.walk(x), and λy.walk(y), for instance. In other words,
.
= stands
for the equivalence relation of αβγ-interconvertability of expressions, as de-
fined in 2.B.5. In words, two expressions of the same type are
.
=-equal if we
can get from one to the other by renaming bound variables, ‘λ-style’ function
application, and ‘dummy-abstraction’ (as exemplified by walk;λx.walk(x)).
Applied to (141), this means there is another solution:
[
X7→λx.walk(j)]. The
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lambda term denotes the pseudo-property that holds of someone iff John
walks, so when we substitute it for X and apply it (vacuously) to j, the result
is walk(j). This substitution is not equivalent to the one in (141), which
may now also written as
[
X7→λx.walk(x)], but it is no less general.
So, we’ve lost the uniqueness result for higher-order unification. How
about decidability? In general, we lose that too, but for specific subclasses,
decidability has been proven. Fortunately, we will be working in such a
well-behaved subclass, called second-order matching. In particular, we’re
interested in the resolution of second-order relation variables, acquaintance
relations, for which it’s actually very easy to enumerate all solutions.
3.4.2.2 The resolution of acquaintance
After this theoretical interlude we return to the problem of the contextual
resolution of acquaintance relations. My idea is to take the statement that
R holds between the subject and the res of the report and then search the
context for appropriate conditions relating these entities to form a second-
order unification problem. By unifying the formal equation we resolve the
variable R. Because this is higher-order, there’ll be more than one solution,
but the number will be finite and we can formulate a constraint to narrow
it down to one. Applying the optimal unifier to the entire LDRS under
construction gives the desired output.
An example will make this clear. Consider the following de re report,
uttered in a discourse context where Colby and Ligia are known to be neigh-
bors:
(142) Colby thinks Ligia is cool

xk yk
colbyk(x)
ligiak(y)
neighborfr(x, y)
;
xk yk
colbyk(x)
ligiak(y)
neighborfr(x, y)
R(x, z)
zk
ligiak(z)
belxfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
R(u, v)
coolfr(v)
;
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xk yk
colbyk(x)
ligiak(y)
neighborfr(x, y)
R(x, y)
belxfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
R(u, v)
coolfr(v)
At this point we want to formulate an appropriate unification problem, i.e.
we need to isolate a salient relation between x and y. Moreover, this relation
has to describe some kind of vivid link between x and y, because it will have
to serve as an acquaintance relation (cf. 1.2.2.4 for some discussion about
what constitutes a valid relation of acquaintance). It seems the neighbor
relation is the best candidate here (other options are considered below). Note
that, because simply being neighbors does not necessarily amount to any
vivid perceptual relations, we shall assume that in this case the condition
neighborfr(x, y) is really an abbreviation of the various interactions that
constitute the actual relationship between them. Next, let’s leave the layering
out of the equation, we’ll just unify bare DRS conditions and then later, when
applying the substitution, we’ll put everything at the designated layer. With
these preliminary simplifications in place, we get:
(143) R(x, y)
.
= neighborfr(x, y)
a.
[
R7→λsλt[neighborfr(s, t)]
]
b.
[
R7→λsλt[neighborfr(s, y)]
]
c.
[
R7→λsλt[neighborfr(x, t)]
]
d.
[
R7→λsλt[neighborfr(x, y)]
]
It’s easy to see that these are the only solutions. Now we have to pick one and
apply it to the LDRS under construction. Since both the first and the second
argument of R vary across the LDRS (Rfr(x, y)− Rfr(u, v)) it makes sense to
pick a solution that takes both arguments into account, i.e. (143a). If we took
(143b) for instance, the second argument, the t, would just be swallowed up
and replaced with a y. In (143d), both arguments are dummies, in the sense
that it would verify R(x, y)
.
= R(u, v), which would ultimately yield a totally
undesirable output. I thus propose a constraint on second-order acquaintance
resolutions to the effect that both arguments to the acquaintance relation are
relevant in the sense just described.
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So, (143a) it is. Continuing (142):
(144) ;
xk yk
colbyk(x)
ligiak(y)
neighborfr(x, y)
R(x, y)
belxfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
R(u, v)
coolfr(v)
[
R7→λsλt[neighborfr(s, t)]
]
;
xk yk
colbyk(x)
ligiak(y)
neighborfr(x, y)
(λsλt[neighborfr(s, t)])(x, y)
belxfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
(λsλt[neighborfr(s, t)])(u, v)
coolfr(v)
;
xk yk
colbyk(x)
ligiak(y)
neighborfr(x, y)
belxfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
neighborfr(u, v)
coolfr(v)
The reading we predict ascribes to Colby the belief that his neighbor’s cool,
which is true and seems like a plausible reading of the sentence in the given
context.
Perhaps, it would be even better if we took the property of being called
Ligia along with the neighbor relation, i.e. take (145) instead of (143):
(145) R(x, y)
.
= [ligiak(y) neighborfr(x, y)]
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a.
[
R7→λsλt[ligiak(t) neighborfr(s, t)]
]
b.
[
R7→λsλt[ligiak(t) neighborfr(s, y)]
]
...
h.
[
R7→λsλt[ligiak(y) neighborfr(x, y)]
]
If we take the non-trivial solution, (145a), we end up with a reading that
ascribes to Colby the belief that the neighbor he calls Ligia is cool. Depending
on the rest of the context I think this is probably a slightly more accurate
reading for most utterances of (142). After all, it makes sense, pragmatically,
to only use the name Ligia in a report to reflect part of the description that
played a role in the reported thought.
But what about just taking the proper name condition?
(146) R(x, y)
.
= ligiak(y)
a.
[
R7→λsλt[ligiak(t)]
]
b.
[
R7→λsλt[ligiak(y)]
]
The least trivial solution would be (146a), but does this still count as an
acquaintance relation? First, it doesn’t involve perception, and second, it’s
not even really a relation. On these grounds we can safely discard it as a
possible resolution of acquaintance. If we were to accept it, just for the sake of
argument, we’d get an output that says Colby believes the person called Ligia
is cool, i.e. a purely de dicto reading of the proper name (actually equivalent
to what we’d get from a narrow scope resolution in a simple scopal account
as in 3.2.3.1). This neatly echos the idea that de re belief requires a proper
relation of acquaintance. On the other hand, this kind of derivation might
eventually be exploited to unify de dicto and de re, though not here.
3.4.2.3 Applications: Ortcutt and mistaken identity
Let’s go through another example, 1.2.2’s version of Quine’s (1956) Ortcutt
case, in which Janell is acquainted with Ortcutt under two different guises.
The main aim of the derivation is to further clarify the workings of Acquain-
tance Resolution. At the same time it’s a demonstration of the system’s
flexibility, providing a novel solution to Quine’s puzzle of de re belief and
reports.
The scenario is as described in (70)-(71), p. 227, which gives a DRS
representation of an appropriate input context modeling the common ground
at the point of the report, as well as a description of the actual state of affairs
that the speaker is trying to report. We start with the input context and
see what happens if we first interpret (147) and then the opposite, though
286 Chapter 3. A semantics of attitude reports
crucially not inconsistent, ascription (147).
(147) Janell thinks Ortcutt is dumb
[
=(70a), p. 227
]

xk yk
janellk(x)
ortcuttk(y) famousfr(y)
admirefr(x, y)
write #042fr(y) refereefr(x, y)
;
xk yk
janellk(x)
ortcuttk(y) famousfr(y)
admirefr(x, y)
write #042fr(y) refereefr(x, y)
R(x, y)
belxfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
R(u, v)
dumbfr(v)
Once anaphora and other presuppositions are taken care of it’s time to re-
solve the free variable, R. We are looking for contextual information that
will eventually give us a real two-place relation for R, so we choose a set of
conditions from the context containing both an x and a y. This means we
consider only subsets of the conditions in the input LDRS containing either
admire(x, y) or referee(x, y). To further narrow it down there’s the global
resolution constraint requiring consistent and coherent outputs, i.e. prag-
matics. The obvious candidate gives the following unification problem and
solution:
(148) R(x, y)
.
= [write #042fr(y) refereefr(x, y)][
R7→λsλt[write #042fr(t) refereefr(s, t)]
]
I say this is the obvious unification because it yields a highly plausible output
if we apply it to (147):
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(149)  ;
xk yk
janellk(x)
ortcuttk(y) famousfr(y)
admirefr(x, y)
write #042fr(y) refereefr(x, y)
belxfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
write #042(v) refereefr(u, v)
dumbfr(v)
In other words: uttered in the context sketched above, the sentence in (147)
is predicted to mean that Janell had a thought of the form “the person who
wrote #042, which I refereed, is dumb.”
Now the conversation continues and at a certain point, most likely after it
has been brought up (again) that Janell is such a great admirer of Ortcutt’s
work, someone utters (150). We can continue the derivation as follows:
(150) Janell thinks Ortcutt is brilliant
[
=(70b), p. 227
]
 ;
xk yk
janellk(x)
ortcuttk(y) famousfr(y)
admirefr(x, y)
write #042fr(y) refereefr(x, y)
belxfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
write #042(v) refereefr(u, v)
dumbfr(v)
R(x, y)
belxfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
R(u, v)
brilliantfr(v)
; R(x, y) .= [ortcuttk(y) famousfr(y) admire(xfr, y)] ;[
R7→λsλt[ortcuttk(t) famousfr(t) admirefr(s, t)]
] ;
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xk yk
janellk(x)
ortcuttk(y) famousfr(y)
admirefr(x, y)
write #042fr(y) refereefr(x, y)
belxfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
write #042(v) refereefr(u, v)
dumbfr(v)
belxfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
ortcuttk(v) famousfr(v) admirefr(u, v)
brilliantfr(v)
We see how the second sentence’s acquaintance relation picks up the other
x, y-relation, the one that connects Janell to Ortcutt as the famous professor
she admires. This choice can be seen as driven by the consistency constraint,
for if we were to take the same relation as before we’d end up with contradic-
tory belief sets. By contrast, the reading derived above has Janell self-ascribe
a belief set in which the center admires someone named Ortcutt who’s famous
and brilliant.
In conclusion, by providing enough context and choosing the right condi-
tions resolving the Prel-generated acquaintance variables, we can derive the
proper non-contradictory readings for the reports of the Ortcutt example:
Janell believes the person who wrote abstract #042, which she refereed, is
dumb, while she also believes that the famous Ortcutt she admires is bril-
liant. In addition, the input and output LDRSs contain the information that
Ortcutt is both the author of #042 and the famous professor admired by
Janell.
We now return to the Ellsworth test cases. It should be pretty clear
how the derivations run under Acquaintance Resolution, so let’s skip to the
interesting case, (61d), the coreferential pronoun report in mistaken identity
and the pure de se contexts, B and C. We start with an utterance of (151)
in a mostly empty discourse context, containing just a salient Ellsworth, i.e.
the common ground component we’ve been using for dynamic interpretation
with respect to A and C:
(151) Ellsworth believes she’s going to win
[
=(61d), p. 220
]
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 xk
ellsworthk(x)
;
xk
ellsworthk(x)
R(x, y)
y
3.sg.fem(y)
belxfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
R(u, v)
winfr(v)
;
xk
ellsworthk(x)
R(x, x)
belxfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
R(u, v)
winfr(v)
[
cf. (138), p. 276
]
And then we need to find a relation between x and x in the context. But
there’s nothing in the context, except the unary predicate of being called
Ellsworth, which, we showed earlier will not do if we are to derive de re read-
ings. I propose to equate R(x, x) with x = x, or rather, to unify R with =,
the relation of equality. This should be allowed, for even if it is not explic-
itly represented, x = x nonetheless holds in every context. Also, I assume,
with e.g. Lewis (1979a) that equality counts as a relation of acquaintance,
capturing the idea that every individual is primarily acquainted with itself
as itself.
In any case, in the relational analysis that inspired our LDRT semantics
of de re, pure de se is de re under the acquaintance relation of equality. To
be sure, let’s verify that taking equality as the relation of acquaintance will
give us a first person de se belief:53
53the last step, getting rid of the v variable
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(152) ; R(x, x) .= x = x; [R7→λsλt[s = t]];
xk
ellsworthk(x)
x = x
belxfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
u = v
winfr(v)
;
xk
ellsworthk(x)
belxfr
uk
centerk(u)
winfr(u)
[
=(139)
]
Apparently, for coreferential reports (where the subject is reported to have
a de re belief about herself) we can always derive a pure de se reading, by
resolving R to equality. However, if the context provides other information
that presents the reportee to herself in a more indirect way, we may go with
that as well, leading to an impure de re belief about the subject herself.
This is what happens with the pronoun report (151) when uttered in B,
the mistaken identity scenario. Of course, the default equality option is still
there, but now the pure de se reading would be false, Ellsworth does not
think “I’ll win” in B, and therefore we search through the context a little
better and find the fact that x sees x on TV:
(153) Ellsworth believes she’s going to win
[
=(61d), p. 220
]

xk
ellsworthk(x)
aratak(x)
see on tvfr(x, x)
; ;
xk
ellsworthk(x)
aratak(x)
see on tvfr(x, x)
R(x, x)
belxfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
R(u, v)
winfr(v)
; R(x, x) .= [aratak(x) see on tvfr(x, x)]; [R7→λsλt[aratak(t) see on tvfr(s, t)]]
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;
xk
ellsworthk(x)
aratak(x)
see on tvfr(x, x)
belxfr
uk
centerk(u)
aratak(v)
see on tvfr(u, v)
winfr(v)
So, if we opt for this resolution of R we obtain a reading in which Ellsworth
believes something she’d paraphrase as: “the person called Arata I see on
TV will win”, which corresponds to the (true) de re reading that, following
Kaplan and others, we managed to squeeze out of pronoun reports like (61d),
p. 220 (repeated as (151) below).
The main point I want to make here is that our model can actually account
for the effort it takes to convince non-philosophers of the existence of this
mistaken-identity reading of reports with coreferential matrix and embedded
subjects. The only thing we need to add is that equality is the default
resolution of R if an R(x, x) is given. This means we always try equality,
i.e. the pure de se reading, first, and only if that yields an inconsistent or
otherwise pragmatically unfit output do we turn to the context. Assuming
that this pragmatic check and recalculation with additional context searching
somehow correlates with actual processing on the part of the hearer, we get at
least the first step towards an explanation of the perceived awkwardness of an
impure reading for such reports. It also follows that mistaken-identity de re
readings only occur if the indirect acquaintance (through mirror, picture, or
TV) is sufficiently salient in the discourse context of the report. This is very
much what we perceive to be the case: the pronoun report is not just true if
some acquaintance relation exists, as the classical relational analysis would
have it, rather, the default reading is pure de se, which may be overruled in
case of significant contextual pressure and the availability of an alternative
acquaintance. I consider this one of the major advantages of my LDRT
Acquaintance Resolution over the classical relational analysis (or the LDRT
version demonstrated in (138)).
Compared to pure de se separatist accounts, like Chierchia’s, the obvious
advantage of Acquaintance Resolution is that we do not require a syntactic
ambiguity. We assign a single, underspecified de re PrelDRS to (61d), and
the contextual, pragmasemantic resolution mechanism does the rest. Note
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that the pure and impure readings that come out of the resolution process
eventually are truth conditionally distinct, in fact there are infinitely many
distinct outputs, varying with the context, of which pure de se is but one,
though privileged, case.
So far, our account seems quite promising, a sound and elegant formal-
ization of 2.3.2’s suggestion of contextualizing acquaintance. In addition, we
retain a compositional PrelDRSs construction, at least as compositional as
any acquaintance-based theory can be (i.e. we still need to specify whether
the report is to be interpreted relationally, and which are the res). As pointed
out in chapter 2 however there are a number of examples where contextual-
ized acquaintance seems to give the wrong predictions. First, there is em-
bedding under quantifiers, where some data seems to point in the direction
of the classic quantified acquaintance framework, while other examples pose
problems for both contextualized and quantified acquaintance. I extend the
Acquaintance Resolution framework to capture all of these data in 3.4.3. A
more substantial extension is required for another set of data adduced against
de re/de se unification in general, those involving unambiguously pure de se
reports and shifted indexicals. We turn to these in 3.4.4.
3.4.3 Quantifiers
In this section we are concerned with two types of quantificational embedding,
first universal quantification, then quantification under only. When placed in
a mixed scenario where some have a pure and others an impure de se attitude
about themselves, these pose interesting challenges for our acquaintance-
based framework. We’ll take up the minimal mixed scenario of 2.4.2:
(154) cD Ellsworth, aka Arata: “That Arata person on TV is probably
going to win”; Shavonne: “I’m gonna win.”
[≈D., 1, p. 132]
ϕD
xk yk
ellsworthk(x)
aratak(x)
see on tvfr(x, x)
shavonnek(y)
We could follow the derivations of the previous section to show that Acquain-
tance Resolution gives the desired result for unquantified reports:
(155) a. Shavonne thinks she’s going to win
[
=(80a), p. 132
]
b. Ellsworth thinks she’s going to win
[
=(80b), p. 132
]
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Now let’s see what happens with quantifiers.
3.4.3.1 Universal quantification
Zimmermann’s argument in favor of of a unified de re/de se semantics (a`
la Kaplan (1989), but in this respect there’s no difference with the classical
relational analysis) is based on the following report he judges true in mixed
scene D:
(156) Both women think they’re going to win
[
=(80c), p. 132
]
What does Acquaintance Resolution predict? Well, using a duplex condi-
tion (3.1.4.1) for the quantifier, our compositional Prel assigns (157) as the
preliminary LDRS:
(157)  zfr
woman.plfr(z)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
bothfr
z
R(z, w)
w
3.pl(w)
belzfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
R(u, v)
winfr(v)
This is not entirely straightforward, first, how to interpret the plural morphol-
ogy of women (and they)? The quantified variable z is semantically singular,
ranging over individuals, not sets, so we’d expect women to be interpreted
as a singular. An in-depth treatment of this issue is Kamp & Reyle’s (1993)
analysis of dependent plurals.
My account is simpler. I’ll say that the plural morphology here is but a
surface phenomenon without a semantic correlate. This is corroborated by
the fact that other quantifiers can say the exact same thing with singulars,
evidently depending on some lexical feature of the particular quantifier. Take
a simpler example:
(158) a. Every student did his homework
b. All students did their homework
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The truth conditions surely are the same, it’s just that every is lexically
specified to take a singular, while all, like both in (156), demands a plural.
Now how about the morphology of the pronoun later in (156), or those
in (158)? How should we interpret and represent these? Obviously, in the
most salient readings of (156) and (158) the pronoun will be bound by the
quantifier, i.e. bound by the quantified variable in the restrictor’s universe.
Since we just decided to ignore the plurality of the quantifier’s restrictor, we
better also delete that particular feature from the pronoun or we’ll be unable
to derive the intended reading.
The situation seems to fall under the general phenomenon of feature dele-
tion (and consequent binding) under morphological agreement, cf. 2.4.3.4.
However, I will not adopt the extended feature deletion mechanism of Heim
(ms) or von Stechow (2002). Instead I intend to do as much as possible
with straightforward semantic and pragmatic mechanisms, simply interpret-
ing grammatical features as they appear on the surface. As a matter of
methodological principle I try to avoid morphosyntactic movement and dele-
tion at all costs, unless of course we have a phenomenon like this, where it’s
absolutely clear that there is no semantic explanation. In fact, one of my
main objectives was to show a way to interpret belief-embedded pronouns
pragmasemantically, without feature deletion.
Thus, I am forced to maintain that the apparent agreement phenomena
encountered in quantificational environments constitute a separate issue from
those in belief reports. As independent evidence in support of this claim
consider (159), which shows that the features of quantifier-bound pronouns
are subject to cross-linguistic variation without semantic consequences (save
that, for some, the feminine gender feature does add a domain restricting
presupposition):
(159) {Geen/ieder}
{none/each}
van
of
ons
us
heeft
has
{zijn/haar/*ons}
{his/her/our}
huiswerk
homework
gedaan
done
‘{None/each} of us did {?his/?her/our} homework’[
Dutch vs English
]
Apparently, the choice of bound pronoun forms differs not only from quanti-
fier to quantifier, but also from language to language (and dialect to dialect, if
you’d classify the non-sexist (and anti-sexist) varieties of English as such)—
-strong evidence for its a-semantic nature. Contrast this with the very strict
number, person and gender agreement between matrix subject and corefer-
ential embedded pronoun in pure de se reporting, even to the point where it
appears to contradict the semantics:
(160) John, a transsexual, wants to become a woman, and then he hopes
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to marry his true love
[
cf. (136), p. 161
]
The ‘paradox’ of (160) is the masculine feature of the embedded his which,
on the most natural reading (pure de se), refers to the belief center, who in
this context is a post-operative female. For de se separatists like Chierchia or
even Schlenker this is a problem that eventually leads to the introduction of
an across the board feature deletion under agreement mechanism. Acquain-
tance Resolution, or any other relational analysis of de re/de se, accounts
for this observed feature agreement semantically, by binding the anaphoric
pronoun globally, before resolving the acquaintance relation to equality. In
any case, pure de se readings of (third person) pronouns in reports co-occur
with strict feature agreement between the embedded pronoun and its global
‘antecedent’, independently of a particular choice of attitude verb, language
or dialect.
Another difference between quantificational and attitudinal pronominal
agreement is the first person. An I in a belief report obviously allows for pure
de se (‘bound’) readings in case of agreement with a matrix first person,
but, as noted before, bound readings of I are not so easy to obtain with
quantifiers. In fact, Schlenker (2003:90) claims that besides attitude reports,
only ellipsis constructions and focus-sensitive constructions like with only
seem to be able to bind I through feature deletion.54 Conclusion: despite
some prima facie similarities, there is enough reason for assuming a number of
distinct phenomena that create superficially similar binding under agreement
appearances. I’d assume up to four separate mechanisms: (i) For ellipsis, I’d
prefer Dalrymple et al.’s (1991) account based on higher-order unification
which has no need for feature deletion in the analysis of I did my homework,
and so did Janell. This unification-based approach was applied to focus
by Pulman (1997), and this would probably suffice to handle the first person
binding of Heim’s only I did my homework. However, (ii) as shown in 3.3.3.2,
my analysis of only as a quantifier in combination with I as a k-presupposition
already accounts for both the strict and the sloppy readings without feature
deletion or higher-order unification. (iii) For de re reports I use Acquaintance
Resolution, which incorporates a relational, wide scope analysis of embedded
pronouns that automatically derives the agreement with the matrix subject
on pure de se readings. What’s left is (iv) the class of pronouns bound by
quantifiers for which I’m forced to rely on some a-semantic feature deletion
rule for number features (possibly with a restricted extension to gender and
54Schlenker goes on to argue against Heim (ms) and von Stechow’s (2002) extended
feature deletion mechanisms by claiming that “[a]ttitude reports do not appear to form a
natural class with either [ellipsis] or [focus], and thus it is not obvious that a unification
can be achieved.”
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person). The upshot of this rather lengthy intermezzo on quantificational
feature agreement is that from now on my PrelDRSs will freely disregard
number features of pronouns in quantificational environments.
Back to our quantified belief report then. I assume the syntactic con-
struction algorithm has properly deleted the plural features by the time the
context is added. Resolution proceeds by first binding the pronoun to the
quantified variable z:
(161)  ϕD ;
xk yk
ellsworthk(x)
aratak(x)
see on tvfr(x, x)
shavonnek(y)
zfr
woman.plfr(z)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
bothfr
z
R(z, w)
w
3.pl(w)
belzfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
R(u, v)
winfr(v)
;
xk yk
ellsworthk(x)
aratak(x)
see on tvfr(x, x)
shavonnek(y)
zfr
womanfr(z)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
bothfr
z
R(z, z)
belzfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
R(u, v)
winfr(v)
At this point we want to single out an appropriate part of the context to
equate R(z, z) to. In cases of self-acquaintance such as this, we agreed that
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equality is the default. In fact, here it’s the only possibility, for the essential
ingredient z doesn’t even occur in the global LDRS. Equality it is then:
(162)  ; [R7→=];
xk yk
ellsworthk(x)
aratak(x)
see on tvfr(x, x)
shavonnek(y)
zfr
womanfr(z)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
bothfr
z
z = z
belzfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
u = v
winfr(v)
;
xk yk
ellsworthk(x)
aratak(x)
see on tvfr(x, x)
shavonnek(y)
zfr
womanfr(z)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
bothfr
z belzfr
uk
centerk(u)
winfr(u)
In paraphrase: both women have a pure de se belief, i.e. one they’d express
as “I will win”. But that is false in cD, Ellsworth would never express her
own state of mind in this way; her belief, narrowly construed, is about the
person she sees on TV. Because of the quantified z’s in R(z, z) there is no way
to go back and pick a different relation from the context (besides, picking the
relation of seeing someone on the TV would still give a false output). So if
Zimmermann’s intuition is accurate, which I believe it is, we have a problem.
Before tinkering with the system, it’s important to see that we’re really
not that far off the mark here. In fact, the truth conditions we predict
are defended by Chierchia (1989:10), who claims that “[t]he most plausible
interpretation of [a universally quantified report like (156)] claims that each
person [. . . ] has a certain [pure] de se attitude” (full quote on page 133). But
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then, Chierchia probably didn’t consider mixed de re/de se contexts that
would make his preferred reading false. Still, we might construe his remark
as supporting our analysis, but only as a default strategy, i.e. it is what would
happen in the absence of contextual pressure against it. What we’re looking
for is an extension of the pragmatics of Acquaintance Resolution that allows
us to derive a weaker meaning, true in mixed scenarios, while preserving the
universally pure de se reading of Chierchia as the default. Evidently, we shall
not resort to syntactic ambiguity.
Let’s think about the output that we want to get for (156). We have
already seen a good lf in 2.4.2.1, viz. (84), p. 134, the lf that is predicted by
simple (non-contextualized) relational and characterial analyses of de re/de
se. In words it comes down to saying that for each of the two women there
exists an acquaintance relation under which she has the proper relational
attitude. Following 3.2.3.3 and 3.4.1 we can easily translate that lf to an
LDRT output context:
(163)  ? ;
xk yk
ellsworthk(x)
aratak(x)
see on tvfr(x, x)
shavonnek(y)
zfr
womanfr(z)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
bothfr
z
Rfr
Rfr(z, z)
belzfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
R(u, v)
winfr(v)
How to derive this from a context plus a PrelDRS? My proposal, first
laid out in (Maier 2005b), is quite simple really, just think of R as a pre-
supposition that can be bound, yielding the Chierchian output of (162), or
accommodated, thus introducing an R in an appropriate universe, as in (163).
So, what exactly do the presupposition and consequently the PrelDRS look
like? How to resolve a second-order presupposition? If (163) is local accom-
modation, then how about global or even intermediate accommodation (and
binding) options? As to the make-up of the presupposition: the universe
must contain the second-order variable R, and since the contextual bind-
ing/unification of R in the current framework is constrained by the fact that
R should hold between believer and res, we will put that as the presuppo-
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sitional condition. The rest of PrelDRS construction is now self-evident, as
illustrated by the following example PrelDRS for the case at hand:
(164)  zfr
woman.plfr(z)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
bothfr
z
R
R(z, w)
w
3.pl(w)
belzfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
R(u, v)
winfr(v)
The next steps are as before, the context is added and the deepest presup-
position, the pronoun, is resolved:
(165)  ;
xk yk
ellsworthk(x)
aratak(x)
see on tvfr(x, x)
shavonnek(y)
zfr
womanfr(z)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
bothfr
z
R
R(z, z)
belzfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
R(u, v)
winfr(v)
Then, we want to bind R. How to bind a second-order presupposition? By
moving up the accessibility path, finding a place with appropriate material to
equate the presupposed condition to, and then use that equation to resolve
the presupposed variable through higher-order unification. If we add the pref-
erence for binding R to equality, we see that this presupposed acquaintance
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proposal is indeed a conservative extension of what we were doing before.
Let’s check that this is indeed the case by exploring the binding option in
the current example. Local binding is preferred over global, and though there
is nothing explicitly given in the local context, the default option of equal-
ity is available throughout the DRS, so we bind to that, i.e. we substitute
equality for R and get rid rid of the now superfluous presupposition box:
(166)  ; [R7→=] ;
xk yk
ellsworthk(x)
aratak(x)
see on tvfr(x, x)
shavonnek(y)
zfr
womanfr(z)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
bothfr
z belzfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
u = v
winfr(v)[
=(162)
]
The result is the strong Chierchian reading, exactly as before.
Now it turns out this is false, so we want to try a different resolution.
Let’s consider our options. (i) Binding in the restrictor: won’t make a differ-
ence, the only candidate is still equality. (ii) Binding globally: that’s where
we do find instantiations of proper acquaintance relations other than equal-
ity, but our presupposition cannot reach them because that would ‘unbind’
the z’s in its condition: a classic example of trapping (cf. 3.2.2), which not
only prevents global binding but global accommodation as well. The next
option (iv) would be the much debated intermediate or restrictor accommo-
dation. Now, we can assume that second-order accommodation proceeds,
technically speaking, exactly as first-order: just merge in the presupposed
DRS at the locus of accommodation. Just note that this creates second-
order DRSs, which are however no more exotic than second-order predicate
logic. Also, since the acquaintance presupposition is unlabeled we can basi-
cally choose the layer that gives the best output, which is probably fr here.
The intermediate accommodation output looks as follows:
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(167)  ;
xk yk
ellsworthk(x)
aratak(x)
see on tvfr(x, x)
shavonnek(y)
zfr Rfr
Rfr(z, z)
womanfr(z)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
bothfr
z belzfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
Rfr(u, v)
winfr(v)
This is a somewhat hard to interpret DRS, because of the unquantified R
appearing both in the restrictor and in the scope. It is however well-formed
according to our definitions of duplex conditions with selective binding, as
discussed in 3.1.4.1. The meaning we assign to this output can be translated
to the more familiar generalized quantifier idiom as:
(168) both(λz∃R[R(z, z) ∧ woman(z)])
(λz∃R[R(z, z) ∧ woman(z) ∧ belz∃u∃v[center(u) ∧ R(u, v) ∧ win(v)]])
And in words as: the two women, who are somehow self-acquainted, each
believe under some acquaintance relation that they’ll win. Since everybody,
we said is acquainted to themselves under equality, the restriction that they
are somehow self-acquainted is vacuous. This means that we have just ar-
rived at the desired weak reading: for both women there is an acquaintance
relation such that they believe they’ll win under that relation. Admittedly,
the LDRS representation is not very pretty, and if it weren’t for some par-
ticular decisions in the semantics of duplex conditions earlier on, we might
well have said it means something else or nothing at all. On top of that,
many dismiss the intermediate accommodation option tout court, so if this
was the final analysis I might lose some of my readers for relying on dubious,
perhaps even arbitrary assumptions. Fortunately, there’s a final resolution
option (v), local accommodation, yielding:
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(169)  ;
xk yk
ellsworthk(x)
aratak(x)
see on tvfr(x, x)
shavonnek(y)
zfr
womanfr(z)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
bothfr
z
Rfr
Rfr(z, z)
belzfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
Rfr(u, v)
winfr(v)
[
=(163)
]
Exactly the output we wanted! And completely independent of peripheral,
theory-laden decisions about unselective binding and intermediate accommo-
dation.
This concludes my story about de re/de se reports under quantification.
I’ve extended the Acquaintance Resolution account by making the acquain-
tance relation into a second-order presupposition-like entity that can project
out of embeddings and either bind (by higher-order unification with a prefer-
ence for equality) or accommodate. The resulting extension of Acquaintance
Resolution is conservative in that in most cases it will behave exactly the
same—the old system corresponds to the generally preferred binding option.
We’ve considered in considerable detail a quantified example due to Zimmer-
mann where this standard binding failed, and where local accommodation
of the acquaintance relation gave exactly the right truth-conditions. The
example is easily extended to other universal quantifiers, and to conservative
quantifiers in general, but there’s reason to believe that only might offer some
surprises, so we turn to that next.
3.4.3.2 Only
As previously discussed in 2.4.2.2, Percus & Sauerland (2003a) defend the
Chierchian de re/de se ambiguity thesis. For this, they put an only quantified
report in Zimmermann’s mixed scenario D, cf. (154). Their critical judgment
has it that (170) has a true reading:
(170) Only Shavonne thinks she will win
[
=(85), p. 135
]
They interpret this result as evidence that reports with co-referential pro-
nouns must have a pure de se LF so that embedding that LF under only
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suffices to derive the observed reading ‘Only Shavonne believes purely de se
that she will win’. We’ve also seen how classical relational analyses assign
the wrong reading, viz. only for Shavonne we can find some acquaintance
relation (or characterial mode of presentation if you will) under which she
holds the belief that she is winning. Contextualizing acquaintance seemed
promising at first, because it could perhaps generate a reading that only
Shavonne has the belief under her optimally salient acquaintance relation,
which would be equality, presumably. Now that we have developed a proper
dynamic framework for the resolution of acquaintance relations, let’s stop
and see if this is indeed what we get:
(171)  ϕD ;
xk yk
ellsworthk(x)
aratak(x)
see on tvfr(x, x)
shavonnek(y)
zfr
z =fr s
sk
shavonnek(s)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
onlyfr
z
R
R(z, w)
w
3.sg.fem(w)
belzfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
R(u, v)
winfr(v)
To refresh your memory of our particular only-quantifier, this is read as ‘Only
for those z’s that are equal to Shavonne (s) does it hold that z believes the
person she’s R-acquainted with will win.’ Now we resolve the presuppositions.
As for the pronoun, there’s two potential binding sites that match its content,
the global y and the quantified z (which is semantically equated to y thus
inheriting its semantic content).55 In such a case, the binding constraint
local enforces a preference for the most local option:
55Obviously, we assume that Ellsworth, x, is at this point unavailable—at least for the
unstressed anaphoric pronoun she.
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(172)  ;
xk yk
ellsworthk(x)
aratak(x)
see on tvfr(x, x)
shavonnek(y)
zfr
z =fr y
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
onlyfr
z
R
R(z, z)
belzfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
R(u, v)
winfr(v)
The choice between local (z) and global (y) resolution brings to mind our
earlier analysis of the sloppy/strict ambiguity with pronouns embedded under
only in 2.4.3.4 (i.e. Only John did his homework meaning (i) nobody else did
theirs, or (ii) nobody else did John’s). The narrow resolution above would
correspond to a sloppy reading, ‘Shavonne is the only member of the set
of people who believe they’ll win’, while the global option would yield a
strict reading, ‘Shavonne is the only member of the set of people that believe
of Shavonne that she’ll win’. It turns out that the way we’ve set up the
semantics of only and/or Acquaintance Resolution ultimately collapses the
strict reading into the sloppy, as the reader can easily verify, causing a slight
concern over how to still derive the (admittedly marginal) strict reading in
quantified coreferential de re belief. Further research needs to be done, but
for now we’ll just go ahead with the narrow resolution.
Time to resolve the acquaintance relation. Note there are no z’s in the
main DRS, so we can rule out global resolution by trapping. Our 2nd order
resolution strategy always checks the possibility of binding to equality first,
and in this case that already works, in fact, it’s the only option, since there’s
no other information available about the z’s:
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(173)  ; [R7→=] ;
xk yk
ellsworthk(x)
aratak(x)
see on tvfr(x, x)
shavonnek(y)
zfr
z =fr y
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
onlyfr
z belzfr
uk
centerk(u)
winfr(u)
This is the desired, true output: the only person with a pure de se ‘I’ll
win’ belief is Shavonne. Acquaintance Resolution’s prediction thus patterns
with that expected of a contextualized relational analysis, though on second
thought the exact derivation deviates from the intuitive idea of picking the
most salient relation ‘from the context’, due to the trapping effect mentioned
above. Below we’ll see the consequences of this discrepancy when we consider
a final, crucial piece of data.
In 2.4.2.2 we went on to discuss the Zeevat example, meant to bring out a
clear asymmetry between impure and pure de se. Zeevat’s observation is that,
although we can truly say of the unique pure de se participant Shavonne that
she is the only one who ‘believes she’ll win’, this is not true of the (equally
unique) impure candidate, Ellsworth. In other words, in mixed scene D (174)
is undeniably false:
(174) #Only Ellsworth thinks she’ll win
[
=(90), p. 138
]
Following the same reasoning as above, we’d let only quantify over de re be-
liefs under a fixed acquaintance relation determined from the context. Since
Ellsworth only has an impure de re belief about herself, we must take the
acquaintance relation to be ‘seeing some Arata on TV’. Thus, we predict that
(174) means the only person who believes that the ‘Arata’ she’s seeing on TV
will win is Ellsworth, which, counter to all judgments, would be true in D.
Chierchians might well construe this as a major argument against contex-
tualized acquaintance, and thus, combined with the Percus and Sauerland
argument against narrow scope relational analyses, against the unification
of de re/de se. Moreover, it’s easy to see that a straightforward separatist
analysis based on the ambiguity thesis does work: (174) comes out false on
both the general de re (‘Ellsworth is the only one who has any type of de
re/de se win-belief about herself’) and the pure de se LF (‘Elsworth is the
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only one with a pure de se belief in her own victory’).
High time to investigate if this line of argumentation holds against Ac-
quaintance Resolution as we’ve been developing it:
(175)  ϕD ;
xk yk
ellsworthk(x)
aratak(x)
see on tvfr(x, x)
shavonnek(y)
zfr
z =fr t
tk
ellsworthk(t)
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
onlyfr
z
R
R(z, w)
w
3.sg.fem(w)
belzfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
R(u, v)
winfr(v)
;
[
t7→x
w7→z
]
;
xk yk
ellsworthk(x)
aratak(x)
see on tvfr(x, x)
shavonnek(y)
zfr
z =fr x
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
onlyfr
z
R
R(z, z)
belzfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
R(u, v)
winfr(v)
The default would be to bind R to equality, but that gives a false reading:
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(176) ; [R7→=] ;
xk yk
ellsworthk(x)
aratak(x)
see on tvfr(x, x)
shavonnek(y)
zfr
z =fr x
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
onlyfr
z belzfr
uk
centerk(u)
winfr(u)
This is as it should be, but we still have to check whether other resolution
option might not make a true reading. What are the possibilities? Because
the z’s in the acquaintance presupposition trap R inside the quantifier, we
only have to consider local and intermediate resolutions, and then only ac-
commodation, since there’s nothing to bind to except equality. Intermediate
accommodation leads to the problematic only construction with an unquan-
tified discourse referent in the restrictor. We’ve discussed this form in some
detail in 3.1.4.2 where, lacking any clear clues as to an intuitively plausible
interpretation for it, we eventually decided to simply ignore them. Here,
under intermediate accommodation, we’d have a case of such a configuration
arising. Blindly applying the technical definition would trivialize the restric-
tor’s quantified acquaintance relation collapsing the intermediate output into
the local accommodation truth conditions, exactly as happened with the uni-
versal quantifier in (167) above. This local accommodation then seems the
only option:
(177) ;
xk yk
ellsworthk(x)
aratak(x)
see on tvfr(x, x)
shavonnek(y)
zfr
z =fr x
@
@@
 
  
@
@@ 
  
onlyfr
z
Rfr
Rfr(z, z)
belzfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
Rfr(u, v)
winfr(v)
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Or: ‘Ellsworth is the only person for which there is a possibly non-egocentric
acquaintance relation under which that person holds the belief that he or she
will win’, which is false in D, since Shavonne also believes she, Shavonne, will
win.
To sum up, Acquaintance Resolution beats Chierchian syntactic ambigu-
ity analyses, first methodologically, replacing a syntactic ambiguity with a
unified account of de re/de se belief reports (discussed in 3.4.2), and second,
empirically, as brought out by the quantified reports of mixed scenarios in
the current section. More specifically, allowing the acquaintance relation to
be accommodated like any other, first-order presupposition, as proposed in
this section, properly accounts for the ‘narrow scope’ reading observed when
reporting Zimmermann’s mixed scene reported with a universal quantifier,
while preserving the general preference for pure de se readings in the form
of a resolution preference for binding to equality whenever possible (i.e. in
coreferential reports). The examples with only then showed that our sys-
tem not only beats these separatist alternatives (countering explicitly the
pro-ambiguity argument of Percus & Sauerland (2003a)), but also the orig-
inal relational analysis and a straightforward contextualization thereof a` la
Abusch/Aloni. The last problem we have to face is that of the apparent
grammaticalization of pure de se reporting, which was the original moti-
vation for Chierchia’s proposal, and the related data involving monstrously
shifted first person indexicals.
3.4.4 Pure de se reports and shifted indexicals
Our argument in favor of a unified account of de re/de se is almost complete,
but we’ve saved the best counterarguments and data for last. We claim
that in belief report semantics, we should generate (compositionally) but one
logical form, one preliminary DRS that is, which is underspecified for de re/de
se, and then a general pragmasemantic resolution module will determine
whether, given this PrelDRS and a context, the output is going to be pure
de se, or de re under some particular relation of acquaintance. But then,
what to do with examples like (178) that are commonly taken to have only
pure de se truth conditions?
(178) Ellsworth believes to be on the winning side[
=(61e), p. 220, =(1c), p. 72
]
At this point, one may be tempted to cop out and adopt a kind of ‘hybrid
analysis’, i.e. an unified, contextualized de re/de se analysis of coreferential
pronoun reports built on Acquaintance Resolution, which assigns a separate
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pure de se DRS to report construction with infinitival and gerundial comple-
ments. In fact, this is exactly what was suggested in 3.2.3.3, see in particular
(76), p. 233. As an added bonus, perhaps, we could probably implement this
without having to postulate a silent PRO element that fills the complement’s
subject role. For sure, if this was all there was to the data, I’d be the first
to adopt this strategy.
Unfortunately, there’s more. First, there are logophoric pronouns, which,
glossing over some details and reservations spelled out in 2.4.1, also have the
effect of making a report exclusively pure de se (cf. Kusumoto’s (1998) (55),
p. 116), but now with a surface form that structurally matches the normal
de re/de se ambiguous embedded pronoun construction, i.e. with a clearly
realized pronoun (glossed LOG) as embedded subject:
(179) kofi
Kofi
be
say
ye`
LOG
-dzo
-leave
‘Kofi said that he left’ (Kofi: “I leave/left”)
[
Ewe, =(54), p. 116
]
To fit this into the hybrid account we’d have to assume that, despite ap-
pearances, a logophoric pronoun is something rather different than a third
person anaphoric pronoun; the logophor is not treated as a presupposition
trigger but rather as a marker that tells us to construe the whole comple-
ment as purely de se. Still, this can be, and has been, done, e.g. along the
lines of Chierchia’s proposal which actually needs some element (so, PRO
or LOG) to serve as a λ-abstractor/variable binder for deriving pure de se
truth conditions.
But there’s still more. The final argument against the kinds of unifi-
catory and hybrid approaches under discussion, which is due to Schlenker
(1999,2003), involves shifted indexicals and was discussed in detail in 2.4.3.
We focus on clear cases where a morphological first person, embedded un-
der a third person (attitude) reporting verb, is interpreted as a pure de se
pronoun:
(180) ˇon
John
ˇ@gna
hero
n@
be
-n˜n˜
-1.sg
y1l
say.3.sg
-all
-aux.3.sg
‘John says that he is a hero’
[
Amharic, =(50), p. 111, =(93), p. 141
]
This is just the regular Amharic first person pronoun, so, as argued in 2.4.3.1,
this does not fit the hybrid analysis originally proposed for infinitival reports.
There’s a clearly realized pronoun, an indexical even, in the complement and
I take it that any proper account of these data will have to treat it as such,
as a k-presupposition in our current framework.
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This will be my starting point, the Amharic first person, embedded or not,
is a real indexical and as such it triggers the corresponding k-presupposition.
If we get that working, it seems reasonable to extend the same mechanisms to
treat LOG and PRO as pronominal elements, similar to Amharic I (though,
as we shall see, each with its own particular resolution restrictions). In
this way I hope to do justice to my overall objective, which is to generate
PrelDRSs straightforwardly from the surface structure, and take the load off
syntax to do the work more effectively in the semantics-pragmatics interface,
but some concessions will have to be made in this area, on any account.
What I need to postulate is, first, a silent PRO for gerunds and infinitivals,
which functions rather like a first person indexical pronoun. Second, and
this is perhaps one of weakest points, I must assume that logophors too
are semantically first person. I will return to this point in 3.4.4.4 below to
suggest an alternative account that fixes this, at the cost of losing the overall
unification of the three ways of conveying unambiguously pure de se (PRO,
LOG, shifted I). Now we turn to the shifted first person.
3.4.4.1 Acquaintance with concepts?
To bring out the problems caused by shifted indexicality, let’s just see what
happens when we apply Acquaintance Resolution to a pseudo-Amharic report
with a shifted first person, treated as a regular indexical presupposition.
For uniformity I’ll switch from the well-known Amharic speech report to a
pseudo-Amharic gloss of a belief report. With some minor modification the
entire reasoning below will go through for speech reports, but we’ll return to
this matter in 3.4.4.2, where we also briefly consider other attitudes. Still,
I apologize for initially manipulating the data somewhat, especially since
it is as yet unclear what types of reporting verbs allow shifting in which
languages.56
(181) Johni thinks Ii am a hero
[
pseudo-Amharic, ≈ (180)]
56With logophors it has been noted that there seems to be language variation according
to a hierarchy of reporting verbs, cf. 2.4.1.2.
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
R
R(z, w)
zk
johnk(z)
wk
centerk(w)
belzfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
R(u, v)
herofr(v)
Assuming as always that the global context provides a John, and a speaker,
viz. the one who utters the report, this PrelDRS will only give us non-
monstrous de re readings:
(182) 
xk yk
johnk(x)
speakerk(y)
; ⊕ (181) ;
[
z7→x
w7→y
]
;
xk yk
johnk(x)
speakerk(y)
R
R(x, y)
belx
uk vfr
centerk(u)
R(u, v)
herofr(v)
If the context would further provide some kind of acquaintance link between
John and the actual speaker, me, we could bind R and finish the derivation
to get a nice de re output that reports John’s opinion of me, the utterer of
(181), rather than about himself.
Now, if we’d been dealing with English this would be just right and
completely in line with the Kaplanian prohibition on monsters, which posits
that indexicals are never shifted. Moreover, even the Amharic analogue can
be read in this way, as a report of what John thinks about me, so that’s
something at least. However, crucially, in languages like Amharic, Zazaki or
Ancient Greek, a second, pure de se, shifted, reading is observed. We can
easily represent this by now familiar desired output:
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(183)  ?;
xk yk
johnk(x)
speakerk(y)
belx
uk
centerk(u)
herofr(u)
The question becomes how do to derive this output. Obviously the first
resolution step in (182) was already wrong, for I am quite distinct from John,
which obviously blocks the possibility of binding the acquaintance relation
to equality. We must find a way to bind the first person presupposition to
John, but he’s a third person. The solution is to bind it to the embedded
attitude center u, which is first person and which is not quite John, but a
pretty good approximation of him, for it’s the center of his belief set, the
person he believes himself to be.
The first step then is to modify Prel so as to output a preliminary struc-
ture where the embedded subject’s presupposition is triggered within the
belief box. The easiest way to do this is to detach the presupposition pro-
viding w from the free variable w in (181)’s R(z, w) and put it inside the belief
box. At least then it seems that u is accessible to it, so we can proceed as
follows:
(184) 
R
R(z, w)
zk
johnk(z)
belzfr
uk vfr
centerk(u)
R(u, v)
herofr(v)
wk
centerk(w)
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(185) 
xk yk
johnk(x)
speakerk(y)
; ⊕(184) ;
[
z7→x
w7→u
]
;
xk yk
johnk(x)
speakerk(y)
R
R(x, u)
belx
uk vfr
centerk(u)
R(u, v)
herofr(v)
But this is a dead end too, for with a free variable u in the body of the
acquaintance presupposition we’ll never be able to bind or accommodate a
suitable acquaintance relation.57 Intuitively though, we’re not that far off: if
we think of u as x’s self-image, then what we want to bind R to is ‘the person
you believe to be’, the relation that holds between a person and her belief
center. To approximate this I follow a suggestion of Zimmermann (p.c.) to
allow individuals to be acquainted to (a certain restricted class of) intensional
objects, i.e. individual concepts. For John, one such concept could be John’s
self-concept, i.e. the function that maps each of John’s belief alternatives to
its center. The advantage of the self-concept over the extensional u is that
the concept can occur representationally outside the scope of John’s belief
DRS, which is where we’ll let Prel generate it. One last change concerns
the presupposition triggered by the embedded subject, which has yet to be
linked to this underspecified concept. The choice for linking the presupposed
referent to the extension of the concept will become clear in the course of the
computations below. Now, concretely:
57Actually, the free variable does not stop Maier (2005a) from proposing a somewhat
simpler, extensional alternative in which the free variable does not prevent singling out
a similarly open piece of context DRS to unify with, essentially assuming a purely for-
mal, symbolic notion of unification. An important difference between that proposal and
the current analysis is the fact that the former cannot be extended to incorporate the
presuppositional (=semantic) analysis of acquaintance needed for quantified reports.
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(186) 
c
R
R(z, c)
zk
johnk(z)
belzfr
uk d
centerk(u)
R(u, d)
herofr(
∨d)
wk
centerk(w)
w = ∨c
(187) 
xk yk
johnk(x)
speakerk(y)
; ⊕(186) ;
[
z7→x
w7→u
]
;
xk yk c
johnk(x)
speakerk(y)
R
R(x, c)
belx
uk d
centerk(u)
R(u, d)
herofr(
∨d)
u = ∨c
We see that I, w, is happily bound to the belief center u, without creating
an open DRS. Moreover, although we have given up on w being the object of
acquaintance directly, we do retain a rather close connection between them,
given by the w = ∨c clause in the second presupposition. It means that,
wherever w ends up, it gives the extension of the concept the subject is
acquainted with. Note here already that if the embedded presupposition had
floated up to top-level, it would restrict the acquainted concept to one that
actually denotes the current center, i.e. me. We return to this after we having
finished the monstrous reading, in order to ensure that the whole intensional
machinery proposed here preserves the earlier results.
3.4 Belief reports in LDRT 315
Back to the derivation, first let’s simplify our DRS by getting rid of the
u (obsoleted by the equation with ∨c):
(188)  ;
xk yk c
johnk(x)
speakerk(y)
R
R(x, c)
belx
d
centerk(
∨c)
R(∨c, d)
herofr(
∨d)
Then bind R. Obviously equality doesn’t fit anymore since x is an individual
and c is a concept. The strongest analogue of equality in such a case would
be necessary equality, i.e. when c denotes a rigid concept and x corefers
with its constant extension. But this does not apply here either, so we start
searching through the DRS for a suitable relation between x and c . To
further narrow down the search note that we’re looking for something given
by the input context already, not something newly contributed by the report.
Strictly speaking there is nothing suitable in our input, but part of what we
added with our new PrelDRS may safely be assumed given, and that’s exactly
the part that contains both the x and the c : the belief of John minus the
acquaintance relation and the complement’s asserted contribution (being a
hero).
(189)  ; R(x, c) .= belxfr centerk(∨c)
;
[
R7→λsλt
[
belsfr centerk(
∨t)
]]
What kind of acquaintance relation is this? Well, it’s the relation that holds
between an individual and a concept if that concept’s extension in the in-
dividual’s belief alternative denotes the center of that belief alternative, i.e.
iff the concept is the individual’s self-concept! Continuing the derivation by
binding R with the above substitution:
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(190)  ;
xk yk c
johnk(x)
speakerk(y)
belx
d
centerk(
∨c)
bel∨cfr centerk(
∨d)
herofr(
∨d)
Remember, we’re trying to show that Acquaintance Resolution, with the
intensional twist and the addition of the global concept, c , is going to output
the pure de se reading represented in (183). In the next subsection I’ll finish
the argument by showing how a well-known principle of belief logic can be
applied to derive (183) from (190).
3.4.4.2 Introspection: a rationality criterion
The thing to note in (190) is that there’s a belief-operator embedded under
another belief operator. For those familiar with the analysis of belief in modal
logic, this may ring a bell and remind them of the principles of introspection.
For a while, the aim of modal logic was to provide axiomatic characterizations
of different logics for different modalities (belief, necessity, knowledge, etc.)
and prove consistency and other logical properties of these systems. The most
famous ones are perhaps the minimal modal logic K, the basis of all others,
and S5, the logic commonly used for modeling knowledge and metaphysical
necessity. Belief is often modeled as S5 minus the principle of veridicality,2ϕ→ ϕ, which for the modality belief would amount to the claim that if ϕis
believed, it is true. What remains are the following axioms and rule:
(191) a. rule: if ` ϕ, then ` 2ϕ
b. axioms:
K 2[ϕ→ ψ]→ [2ϕ→ 2ψ] (distribution)
D 2ϕ→ ¬2¬ϕ (consistency)
(4) 2ϕ→ 22ϕ (positive introspection)
(5) ¬2ϕ→ 2¬2ϕ (negative introspection)
Adding these three axioms toK gives a reasonable logic of belief, one where a
person’s beliefs are closed under logical consequence, she believes all tautolo-
gies, has internally consistent beliefs, and is aware of the things she believes
and the things she does not believe. The closure property amounts to logical
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omniscience, but, as we discussed in 1.1.2, that simply cannot be helped in
modal logic. The consistency criterion seems reasonable enough, as does pos-
itive introspection. Some may feel that negative introspection is too strong,
that there may be propositions we do not believe without actually believing
that we do not believe them. Note then that we’re looking at a rather weak
notion of belief, as shown by the omniscience predictions discussed in chapter
1. In any case, let’s just go along and add it, for the sake of argument. The
resulting logic is called KD45 and it’s not hard to prove the following:
(192) D, (5) ` 22ϕ→ 2ϕ
Sketch of a proper derivation: First, by transposition and double negation
cancellation we see that axiom (5) is equivalent to ¬2¬2ϕ → 2ϕ. Now,
start with 22ϕ. Modus Ponens with axiom D gives ¬2¬2ϕ, which, with
the new form of (5), yields 2ϕ. QED.
So, if you believe that you believe something, you believe it. And the
other way around, as given by (4). Considering that our intensional systems
always capture a somewhat idealized notion of belief, this is not an implausi-
ble principle at all, and, apparently, it is valid in the widely used belief model
KD45. If we could formulate and add an analogue of this ‘reverse introspec-
tion’ principle to our DRT semantics of bel we could reduce the double
embedding of (190) and, hopefully, get a step closer to the desired output,
(183). There are two ways to go about this, syntactic or semantic. The first
means that we formulate DRS conversion rules or axioms to capture the idea
of reverse introspection. The second is to translate the syntactic property to
a property of the underlying models, or rather, of the accessibility relations
of the models’ interpretation of the modality. Let’s consider the syntactic
option.58
The representational, procedural view of interpretation in our formulation
of LDRT+PA, lends itself very well to the addition of symbolic operations
inspired by traditional axioms. The idea would be to add to the resolu-
tion process a subprocedure for simplifying complex belief embedded DRSs,
based on the classical introspection principles that say that multiple belief
embedding is equivalent to single belief embedding. Such procedures are
easily formulated, the only things we have to look at still are the subject
parameter x in belx and the fact that we are dealing with belief alternative
contexts with centers, rather than plain old worlds.
58As for the semantic option, we could enforce our reverse introspection principle (plus
positive introspection) by restricting attention to models where, if c ∈ Bel(a,w, t) and b is
the center of c, then Bel(a,w, t) = Bel(b, wc, tc) (the belief set of the center of one of your
belief alternative contexts is the same as your belief set).
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In classical doxastic predicate logic, the subject who has the belief is
often treated by parameterizing the modal operator with a term denoting
that individual, which is how we got our notation belx. What this means
is we have a whole bunch of distinct belief operators, one per individual,
each adhering to the axioms in (191). Reverse introspection, (192), then
amounts to the reducibility of two or more belief operators with the same
subject parameter in a row: belxbelxϕ→ belxϕ. Obviously we cannot sim-
ilarly reduce a statement expressing that x believes that y believes such and
such. But if we look at (190) again, we see that the indices denoting the
believers are distinct. Fortunately, the embedded believer ∨c is not really
that distinct from the first, x, since ∨c denotes the center of x’s belief al-
ternatives. If you think about it that seems exactly what’s needed, given
the context/property framework adopted since 1.2.3. We should adapt the
classical belxbelxϕ→ belxϕ (“if x believes that x believes that . . . ”) to
something like belxλu[beluλu
′[ϕ]]→ belxϕ (“if x self-ascribes the property
of self-ascribing . . . ” or “if x believes that he? believes that. . . ”). Actually,
I am not up to the task of properly reformulating the whole of KD45 into a
proper axiomatic proof system for modal predicate logic that takes essential
indexicality into account, so we’ll just concentrate on reverse introspection,
and on DRT. I propose the following introspective simplification rule for
(L)DRT:
(193)
. . .
...
belξ
. . .
center(η)
belηϕ
...
...
;
. . .
...
belξ

. . .
center(η)
...
⊕ ϕ

...
It should be evident how such a schema is to be read and applied to dou-
ble belief embeddings. Furthermore I take it that the above discussion has
provided ample justification for adding such a principle, which adequately
captures the idea that believing to believe something means that you believe
it. Applying it to (190) will make it even more clear. To do so, we take x for
ξ, ∨c for η and the most deeply embedded box for ϕ, and we get:
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(194)  ;
xk yk c
johnk(x)
speakerk(y)
belx
d
centerk(
∨c)
bel∨cfr centerk(
∨d)
herofr(
∨d)
;
xk yk c
johnk(x)
speakerk(y)
belx
d
centerk(
∨c)
centerk(
∨d)
herofr(
∨d)
On the further, rather uncontroversial, assumption that beliefs can have but
one center, we conclude that ∨c = ∨d. Now notice how the intensional
variables no longer play any role, so they might as well be replaced by the
more familiar extensional ones. With this, we reach our destination, (183):
(195)  ≡
xk yk c
johnk(x)
speakerk(y)
belx
d
centerk(
∨d)
herofr(
∨d)
≡
xk yk
johnk(x)
speakerk(y)
belx
u
centerk(u)
herofr(u)
[
=(183)
]
What we have shown so far is that going intensional plus a few other minor
adaptations to Prel, and the addition of a general introspection principle
of rational belief can give us the right output for Amharic, shifted I. The
important selling point of my account is that it does not rely on feature
deletion or de-rigidification of the indexical in the syntax. Everything is
done in the pragmasemantic resolution module. The difference between the
Amharic shifted and the English (or Amharic, for that matter) rigid I is
merely a matter of a resolution ambiguity of the same k-presupposition:
English I, apparently, must be bound globally (and yes, we have to stipulate
that in the lexicon somehow), while Amharic I can also be bound by a local
speaker or center in a k-layer. We’ll get back to this lexical difference in
resolution behavior between Amharic and English when we also consider the
other manifestations of pure de se reporting in 3.4.4.4.
One last point we will briefly discuss here concerns the other attitudes.
We’ve been focusing solely on belief in this thesis, but the idea behind that
was that the methods developed for de re and de se belief would naturally
extend to the other attitudes (know, hope, fear, etc.) and to speech reporting.
320 Chapter 3. A semantics of attitude reports
However it is not immediately clear that the addition of an introspection rule
is a sensible one for other attitudes than believe? Well, for the attitude of
knowing it’s intuitively OK, and for wanting and hoping too, but what about
doubt? “If I doubt that I doubt that ϕ then I doubt that ϕ”, seems absolutely
false, and the same goes for other ‘negative attitudes’, like fear and hate. It
seems that we can only account for shifted indexicality (and, by extension,
pure de se reporting, see 3.4.4.4) for ‘introspective attitudes’. The data show
no evidence for this generalization whatsoever, in fact, one of the things the
rather scarce data set does show is that shifted indexicality happily occurs at
least in speech reports, and I’m not convinced that indirect speech reporting
involves an introspective attitude—can one consistently say “I’m saying that
I’m saying that John is coming, I am not saying that he’s coming”?59
In any case, it seems unsatisfactory to restrict ourselves to introspective
attitudes, especially since we’re going to apply the same machinery to PRO
and LOG. There’s no denying that some negative attitudes allow pure de
se reports with PRO constructions, even in English (e.g. I hate doing/to
do this). For a way out, remember why we restricted ourselves to belief in
the first place: the asymmetric dependency between belief and the other
attitudes, which we described as necessarily rooted in an underlying belief
base (cf. p. 35).
It turns out that this complication with attitudes other than belief may
help us out of a jam here. The idea is as follows: Take a de re doubt,
say, Shavonne doubting of Ellsworth that she’ll win. Applying our rela-
tional explication of de re belief means that an acquaintance relation between
Shavonne and Ellsworth is presupposed and Shavonne doubts that the person
she’s so acquainted with will win. The second requirement highlights the at-
titude’s dependence on belief, since it cannot mean that in all doubted worlds
she is acquainted with a certain individual who then wins. Rather it’s the
person she believes to be so-and-so acquainted with that she fears will win.
The fear attitude only pertains to the new information, the predicate win;
the acquaintance relation and for instance the attitude’s center ‘float up’ to
a basic, implicit belief attitude. As I said before, I cannot offer any account
of this yet. Perhaps LDRT could help, dividing an attitude embedded DRS
into different layers—one for belief, to be evaluated in the belief alternative
59In the past tense, this sentence seems much more acceptable, especially when you
stress the second said:
(i) I said that I said that John’s coming, I didn’t say he’s coming
Part of the reason for this however is that the saying events are assumed to take place at
different times, which breaks the argument.
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contexts, another for hope, evaluated in the hope alternatives, etc.—so we
can at least adequately represent the interdependence of the different atti-
tudes, which often share their discourse referents, a prime characteristic of
LDRT.
In any case, assuming that in representations of de re attitudes everything
except the part about winning actually falls under a belief operator, we don’t
have to worry about the other attitudes anymore. Once we have ensured a
proper belief-fear hybrid representation, we need only assume introspection
for the belief part to properly reduce double embeddings of the type exem-
plified by DRSs like (190). The dependence on a basic belief layer, which is
assumed to be introspective, thus helps us extend our theory of belief to the
other attitudes, regardless of their logical properties.
3.4.4.3 Conservative?
Now that we have this nice Prel-extension, featuring acquaintance to con-
cepts instead of individuals, we have to show that all the previous results
(Ortcutt, the ambiguous de re/de se pronoun, English I, etc.) are retained.
Let’s recompute one representative example report from before, but now in
the extended intensional framework, to see what we come up against. Let’s
just take one half of the Ortcutt example from 3.4.2.3:
(196) Janell thinks Ortcutt is dumb
[
=(147), p. 286, =(70a), p. 227
]

c
R
R(z, c)
zk
janellk(z)
belzfr
uk d
centerk(u)
R(u, d)
dumbfr(
∨d)
wk
ortcuttk(w)
w = ∨c
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(197) 
xk yk
janellk(x)
ortcuttk(y) famousfr(y)
admirefr(x, y)
write #042fr(y) refereefr(x, y)
; ⊕(196)
;
[
z7→x
w7→y
]
;
xk yk c
janellk(x)
ortcuttk(y) famousfr(y)
admirefr(x, y)
write #042fr(y) refereefr(x, y)
y = ∨c
R
R(x, c)
belxfr
uk d
centerk(u)
R(u, d)
dumbfr(
∨d)
Let’s reconsider the intuitive motivation behind our shift to intensional ac-
quaintance. What does it mean to be acquainted with a concept? It seems a
rather rare occurrence, what kind of concepts do you really know, intimately,
preferably through the senses? The concept of yourself is one for sure, and
that’s the one we happily made use of before, but apart from that it may
be safe to assume that, if at all possible, we’ll be looking for acquaintance
relations that relate us to individuals, or rigid concepts, if you wish to retain
concepts formally. Time for the formulation of yet another violable con-
straint hidden in the definition of what it means to be a proper acquaintance
relation: avoid truly intensional acquaintance relations by considering rigid
concepts. Now a rigid concept, one that denotes the same individual in all
possible worlds, may safely be identified with its extension, i.e. if c were rigid,
we might as well replace it with its extension ∨c, and the same for d , while
replacing the intensional R with its extensional counterpart R′. At that point,
the intensional variables become redundant and a familiar, extensional DRS
starts to appear:
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(198)  ;
xk yk c
janellk(x)
ortcuttk(y) famousfr(y)
admirefr(x, y)
write #042fr(y) refereefr(x, y)
y = ∨c
R′
R′(x, ∨c)
belxfr
uk d
centerk(u)
R′(u, ∨d)
dumbfr(
∨d)
≡
xk yk
janellk(x)
ortcuttk(y) famousfr(y)
admirefr(x, y)
write #042fr(y) refereefr(x, y)
R′
R′(x, y)
belxfr
uk v
centerk(u)
R′(u, v)
dumbfr(v)
;
[
R′ 7→λsλt[write #042(t) referee(s, t)]]
;
xk yk
janellk(x)
ortcuttk(y) famousfr(y)
admirefr(x, y)
write #042fr(y) refereefr(x, y)
belxfr
uk v
centerk(u)
write #042(v) referee(u, v)
dumbfr(v)
[
cf. (147), p. 286
]
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This is the exact same acquaintance resolution and output we had computed
earlier on.
This example derivation concludes our demonstration of how the plain
acquaintance resolution strategy can be embedded as a special, default case
of the more general intensional system developed in this final section, viz. the
case where the acquainted concept is assumed to be rigid and the relation
extensional.
3.4.4.4 PRO and LOG again
Now, let’s extend our analysis of shifted indexicality to the remainder of the
pure de se data, involving PRO and LOG reports. We have just seen how an
embedded first person can be bound by a belief embedded center, leading,
through a slightly modified mechanism of Acquaintance Resolution, to a pure
de se reading. So, if we simply treat PRO and LOG as manifestations of a
first person presupposition, i.e. like Amharic I, we’re almost there. Take for
instance the PRO report about Ellsworth:
(199) Ellsworth believes PRO to be on the winning side
[
=(178)
]

c
R
R(z, c)
zk
ellsworthk(z)
belzfr
uk d
centerk(u)
R(u, d)
dumbfr(
∨d)
wk
centerk(w)
w = ∨c
Unfortunately, we’ve already shown that such an LDRS has two possible
outputs, corresponding to the pure de se (local binding of center presup-
position) and the Kaplanian de re reading (binding to global speaker, i.e.
Ellsworth thinks I, Emar, am winning). The second reading was desired for
Amharic I (and Zazaki, Ancient Greek and others), and for English I, where
it should really be the only possibility. Just as we simply stipulated that
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English I must take widest possible scope, so we can now stipulate that PRO
and LOG need to be bound locally, or rather, as von Stechow (2002) shows
with multiple belief embeddings, that PRO needs to be bound by the most
local center, while a logophor allows intermediate bindings as well, as long
as the global center is avoided.
The kind of stipulations we’re talking about here come from the lexi-
con, and need to be represented in the PrelDRS somehow, or be added as
resolution constraints (a bit like Montagovian meaning postulates). The im-
portant thing to note is that they are stipulations, but there’s no way to
get rid of them, because there clearly is a lexical difference between English
I, Amharic I, LOG, and PRO, and this difference has to be encoded some-
where. Schlenker calls it the typology of indexicals, and he captures it with
a so-called filtering mechanism that introduces the features ±actual and
±c(ontextual) (cf. p. 160). Our account differs in using resolution restric-
tions instead of the ±actual feature, and using a k label instead of +c
for marking indexicality, as illustrated in table 3.4 below. Another differ-
ence concerns the treatment of PRO and LOG’s features (are they 1st or 3rd
person?), to which we turn next.
Schlenker/von Stechow Acquaintance Resolution
IEng 1.sg +c +actual
xk
centerk(x)
global
IAmh 1.sg +c
xk
centerk(x)
LOG 3.sg +c −actual
xk
centerk(x)
avoid global
PRO 3.sg +c −actual
xk
centerk(x)
local
he 3.sg −c
x
3.sg.m(x)
Table 3.4: Typology of indexicals/pronouns
What about the features of LOG and PRO? We let Prel assign them a
first person representation merely because the semantics dictates that they
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be bound by a local center. On the other hand, there is evidence that, on
the surface, PRO and LOG are third person. Take (200):
(200) John hopes PRO to buy
{
*myself
himself
}
a car
[
=(135), p. 160
]
It’s clear that the reflexive has to be bound by the PRO element (c-
commanding it), which suggests strongly that PRO has third person features,
even if semantically it is first person. And for logophors it’s even clearer in
some languages, because logophoricity can be marked on the verb clearly
separated from some pronoun or morpheme denoting the embedded subject
and marked as a third person (cf. also (57), (58), p. 117):
(201) ae`
he
kO
said
ae`
he
dO
fell
-E`
-LOG
‘He said that he fell.’
[
Gokana, (Hyman & Comrie 1981:20)
]
For Schlenker and von Stechow-like systems there’s no problem; they can
resort to an agreement mechanism to delete an agreeing third person feature.
In (201), for example, John and PRO (as a third person) agree, so we delete
the third person of PRO at LF and get a pure de se interpretation, just as we
did when deriving the (preferred) pure de se interpretation of Ellsworth thinks
she’s going to win. We, however, decided to get rid of agreement/feature
deletion and interpret those third person pronouns as is, so for us this new
discrepancy between the outwardly third person PRO and LOG, and their
first person semantics is definitely a problem. And unfortunately a problem
for which I do not yet have a satisfactory solution. But let’s go through a
couple of half solutions, and one promising idea that deserves more attention.
For PRO, perhaps a possible reaction would be to deny that they are
really third person: they are first person and the form of the reflexive in
(200) needs an independent explanation. I simply don’t know if something
along these lines can be done and if so, if it would extend to logophors, so
this requires further research. A second possibility is to admit a limited form
of agreement to delete these surfacy features, just like we relied on a limited
agreement rule for quantifier binding (cf. 3.4.3.1). However, it remains to be
seen whether such a restricted agreement rule makes sense, i.e. whether we
can clearly demarcate just these cases so as not to be forced into implicitly
adopting the full feature agreement/deletion system used by Schlenker and
von Stechow.
As a final option, we could follow a more radical suggestion of Schlenker
(p.c.), which is to see PRO and LOG constructions not as first person pro-
nouns, but as the linguistic surface manifestations of the fact that the ac-
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quaintance relation is set to equality. To see how this could work, first take a
look at the realization of logophoricity in Eleme or Gokana, where the LOG
feature is realized separate from a third person pronoun, as in (201). The
current analysis as summed up in table 3.4 is committed to the claim that the
LOG feature on the verb combined with the third person pronoun introduces
a semantically first person presupposition. By contrast, we could also say
that the embedded subject really is just a third person pronoun, as in the
English translation, and that LOG restricts the resolution of acquaintance
to equality. A PrelDRS of the Gokana example (201) would look something
like this:
(202) he said he fell-LOG

R
R(x, y)
x
3.sg.masc(x)
y
3.sg.masc(y)
sayx
u v
center(u)
R(u, v)
fall(v)
[
R7→=]
This immediately accounts for the pure de se character of LOG reports, as
opposed to their natural English translations, which of course allow both
pure de se and other, contextually specified de re readings. Note also how
this new type of analysis obviates the intensionality hacks and the use of
introspection axioms described in the previous subsections. However, since I
don’t see how to extend this new idea to account for Amharic I in a sensible
way, those mechanisms still remain in place for handling shifted indexicals.
From Gokana’s 3.sg+verb+LOG-complements we can extend the new
analysis to logophoric pronouns, as in Ewe (cf. (54), p. 116), which are then
just special forms that introduce both a third person pronoun presupposition
plus the requirement that the acquaintance relation is equality. And exactly
the same holds for PRO.60 Although this is but a rough sketch, it seems a
60In fact, if you know beforehand that the acquaintance relation is going to be equality,
there’s really no need to resolve the embedded pronoun, so we could leave the whole
pronominal aspect out of the representation of PRO and Ewe-style LOG. A reason to
keep the presuppositional representation of the third person res is for uniformity with
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promising line of future research to determine if it will really solve our issues
with LOG and PRO within the Acquaintance Resolution framework.
the Gokana-style complements, and perhaps to account for the third person reflexives in
reports like (200).
Chapter 4
Conclusions and discussion
Through this thesis I have argued that the de se mode of believing and belief
reporting is not as special as it is often made out to be. I have shown that
pure and other de se beliefs and reports are best analyzed as instances of
relational de re belief. Combining this reduction of de se with the contextual
resolution of acquaintance relations eventually led to a new semantics of at-
titude reports. To recapitulate how we arrived at that point, let me highlight
the main contributions of each chapter. After that, I’ll point out some issues
left open for future research.
4.1 Conclusions
Besides laying the theoretical, methodological and terminological foundations
for this thesis, chapter 1’s main contribution was the discovery that, under
standard definitions, de re (=beliefs about actual objects) and de se (=beliefs
the subject could not have expressed without indexicals) characterize more
or less the same set of beliefs. So-called pure de se beliefs (about myself, here,
now) then form a special, proper subclass thereof. The unified analysis of de
re/de se as relational attitudes encountered in 1.2.4.1, a synthesis of Kaplan’s
‘vivid names’ with Lewis’ property self-ascription, accommodates this rather
well. A relational belief that x is P means that the believer is somehow
acquainted with the res x and that he or she self-ascribes the property of
being so acquainted with someone P . Different kinds of de re and de se
beliefs simply correlate with different kinds of acquaintance relations. This
is illustrated in table 1.1, p. 54, which shows among other things how pure
first person de se belief corresponds to the acquaintance relation of equality,
which receives a special status when we turn to attitude reports.
Comparing this relational account with its most popular and equally uni-
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fied rival analysis, Kaplan’s two-dimensional characterial belief semantics,
reveals that both analyze de re belief as belief ‘under a suitable description’,
and it’s the nature of that description that makes it a particular kind of
de re, like, say, pure de se belief. Also, the belief objects in both are more
fine-grained than classical propositions (sets of possible worlds): both eschew
full sententialism but they do use a notion of context, modeled as a situated
possible world, to incorporate point of view. In fact, by restricting attention
to the diagonal of a character it’s easily seen that both involve properties be-
ing self-ascribed. The difference between believing a character and believing
a proposition under a certain acquaintance relation becomes more apparent
once we transpose the belief semantics to a report semantics in the next
chapter.
In chapter 2 we looked at the semantics of de re and de se reports. The
relational semantics advocated in the first chapter works quite well when
interpreted as a semantics of reports, but it’s not flawless. A first minor
issue has to do with compositionality, but we concluded that that could
not be helped: we need to postulate a kind of movement that separates
the res from the content of the ascription. In line with this observation,
note that the popular compositional alternative, Kaplan’s character-based
analysis of indirect discourse and belief reports, was recently shown to be
entirely inadequate as a semantics of belief reports.
One very promising extension of the relational unified framework was the
pragmatic determination of acquaintance relations in the context. But even
that couldn’t help us with the main problem faced by unified de re/de se
analyses: the existence of unambiguously pure de se reports (e.g. comple-
ments with infinitives and logophors). Other arguments against unified de
re/de se semantics (contextualized or not) discussed in 2.4 involve belief re-
ports embedded under only, and monstrously shifted indexicals. The analyses
that have been proposed so far to account for these kinds of data all intro-
duce some form of syntactic ambiguity (Chierchia’s ambiguity thesis) into
de re/de se reports and/or an intricate morphosyntactic account of feature
deletion under agreement (Heim, Schlenker, von Stechow). One of the main
motivations behind this work was to do away with all this morphosyntactic
theory in favor of a more transparent pragmatic/semantic analysis. Thus,
my aim for chapter 3 is to further develop the contextualization idea for the
relational attitude analysis into a general, pragmatic/semantic account that
can deal with all the data considered so far.
Chapter 3 presented the dynamic framework needed for my contextual-
ized version of de re/de se as relational attitudes. The move from static to
dynamic semantics was inspired by the need for a sound and more subtle way
of determining acquaintance relations in a given context. It seemed that the
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representational framework of DRT with the powerful theory of presupposi-
tion as anaphora (PA) would fit the bill, so we defined the basic notions that
we’d be needing to accommodate a semantics for our reports (e.g. prelimi-
nary structures, intensional DRT semantics and duplex conditions). I went
beyond standard DRT+PA in adding layers, primarily to give a principled
account of referential terms such as indexicals and proper names. The idea
was that by separating rigid and ‘at issue’ content at different layers we can
give a proper two-dimensional semantics without relying on external anchors,
which I argue to be ad hoc devices, alien to the representational nature of
DRT. Combined with the anaphoric theory of presupposition, this layering
led to a distinction between rigid and descriptive presuppositions. This way
we were able to account for some recent data involving non-globally bound
and accommodated proper names. My main motivation for doing all this
here however has to do with indexicals, which I need to be both rigid and
bindable in order to account for their shifty behavior in e.g. Amharic and
Ancient Greek.
With the LDRT+PA framework in place we turned to de re/de se be-
lief reports. The idea was to generate a basic relational lf, i.e. a uniform
de re/de se preliminary DRS where all pronouns are interpreted directly as
they appear on the surface (no feature deletion). But instead of existentially
quantified, the acquaintance relation is marked as underspecified: it needs to
be resolved together with the sentence’s presuppositions when we combine
the sentence DRS with the context. This requires second-order resolution,
which we achieved by using higher-order unification. The resolution in effect
outputs either a pure de se or a particular, salient de re reading, according
to what fits best in the context. Under the natural assumption that equality
is always the first candidate resolution, only to be overruled under severe
contextual pressure, we get the observed preference for pure de se. Note how
this kind of strategy is formulated very naturally in DRT+PA’s pragmatic/
semantic account of resolution. The resulting system, dubbed Acquaintance
Resolution, can take care of simple de re/de se reports, including Ortcutt
cases and de re/pure de se ambiguities. What sets my account apart from
the rival accounts of Schlenker, von Stechow and others is that I have shifted
the burden of explanation onto the pragmasemantic module, keeping an en-
tirely straightforward syntax and a unified de re/de se PrelDRS where every
pronoun is interpreted according to its surface features. I believe to have
shown with this thesis that the problems of belief report semantics have a
more natural formulation and solution in such a semantic/pragmatic setting.
Zimmermann’s universally quantified report in a mixed scenario, and Per-
cus and Sauerland’s only report, in 3.4.3, led us to turn the underspecified
acquaintance relation into a real presupposition, thus allowing accommoda-
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tion when binding fails. Complements with infinitives, logophors, and shifted
indexicals formed the final obstacle (3.4.4). To overcome it, I proposed to an-
alyze PRO, LOG and Amharic I as regular first person indexicals, i.e. as rigid
presuppositions. These may be bound by the local belief center to give pure
de se outputs. Technically, this move involved an extension of acquaintance
to vivid concepts and the introduction of a logical principle of introspection.
4.2 Future research
Obviously, in the course of this study I have come across a number of issues
that deserve further attention. In some cases the discussion was cut short
because it was leading us too far off the main topic. In other cases the theory
itself arguably encountered some trouble, but for reasons of space and time I
could only offer a very rough sketch of an idea to improve the situation. Let
us here collect some of these loose ends as pointers to further research.
As for the first chapter, one area for future research concerns the two
proposals for a unified treatment of de re/de se in 1.2.3, to wit, the relational
account (Kaplan 1969; Lewis 1979a; Cresswell & von Stechow 1982) and the
two-dimensional belief characters of Kaplan (1989). It would be interesting
to take a closer look at the exact differences between these two rather similar
approaches and to see how these differences derive from the different ways
they divide up the de re belief’s content into a wide (actual res) and a narrow,
psychological part (cf. 1.2.4.4). Perhaps this could even shed new light on the
recently observed shortcomings of Kaplan’s character theory when it comes
to belief reporting (2.3.5).
In chapter 2 we’ve come across a number of issues that deserve further
research. One is the analysis of abstract anaphora and ellipsis, which, as we
saw in 2.4.1.4, give rise to strict/sloppy ambiguities that interact in inter-
esting ways with the de re/de se ambiguity. The abstract anaphora/ellipsis
data could then perhaps be connected more closely to the quantified reports
with every and only. A related issue is my analysis of only as a quantifier,
neglecting the contribution of focus and information structure. A last is-
sue deserving of further research is the connection between quotation and
attitude reports. So-called mixed quotation, discussed in 2.4.3.2, seems to
fall somewhere in between indirect reporting and direct quotation, as do the
Schlenkerian examples of attitude reports with shifted indexicals. It would
be interesting to see if perhaps indexical shifting can be accounted for in
terms of mixed quotation, or mixed quotation in terms of monstrous report-
ing, or that both are to be thought of as manifestations of a single underlying
mechanism.
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In the course of the third chapter there arose various, mostly technical,
issues on which I have simply chosen an easy formalization without consid-
ering all the alternatives in detail, thus bypassing a number of technical yet
interesting discussions. First, as I mentioned in 3.3, it might be possible
to simplify the syntax and semantics of LDRT by getting rid of the label-
ing of discourse referents. The problem with this is that we would assign
existentially closed interpretations to layers of LDRSs where we currently
do not assign any truth-conditional interpretation, i.e. cases where an l-
free occurrence of a discourse referent x (in an l-condition) has access to
a universe with an xl′ , i.e. in a different layer. Furthermore, if we aban-
don the labeling of discourse referents, it remains to be seen if we can still
talk about k- and fr- presuppositions. A second issue has to do with k-
presupposition, more specifically with proper names. As of yet, I don’t know
why exactly proper names seem more willing to cross over to a descriptive
layer than indexicals. As I mentioned in 3.3.3.2, I follow Zimmermann’s
(2004) Hypothesis L in that both are lexically specified as directly referential
devices, i.e. k-presuppositions. Turning proper names into layer-unspecific
anaphors is therefore not an option. As a matter of fact, this is what sets
apart my account of proper names (and indexicals) from mere scopal (neo-
)descriptivism as championed by Geurts (1997) and Hunter & Asher (2005).
Perhaps, though, there can be a compromise along the lines of pragmatically
instead of lexically assigned labels separating rigid and “at issue” content.
When we get to actual belief reporting in (L)DRT, the de dicto mode of
believing was somewhat neglected, especially the possibility of a unification
of de re and de dicto that analyzes de dicto belief as relational belief with
‘acquaintance’ relations to general concepts. In any case, as it stands we have
brought together de re and de se in a single PrelDRS, but there’s quite a
big gap between this and the current de dicto PrelDRSs. The final loose end
concerns my analysis of LOG and PRO on a par with Amharic and English
I, save for some resolution restrictions. I’ve already remarked in 3.4.4.4 that,
although I think my account is unique in doing full justice to shifted I as a
real semantic indexical, I find the generalization to logophors and PRO still
unsatisfactory, for morphological and syntactic evidence suggest that LOG
and PRO actually carry third person features. It would be worthwhile to in-
vestigate a suggestion of Schlenker’s to the effect that we might analyze those
forms not as first person indexicals, but rather as the grammaticalization of
the acquaintance relation of equality directly.
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Glossary of names
Essie Beard Essie (martellax@greekchat.com) is to appear on a game
show, Heavily made up and stressed out, she thinks she’s seeing her
opponent while actually looking at her own mirror image. She then
says: “I so hope you lose.”, 82
Ligia Faust Ligia Faust (pertras@mom2momlist.com) is kissed by Colby
Vogel who believes her to be a philosopher, 4, 9, 34
Avis Fish Avis (utrtppvkzajze@home-schooled.com) is a bitchy judge on
America’s Next Topmodel. She’s very confident about her own looks.
One time she’s looking through a portfolio, saying “She looks awful”.
Turns out, the other judges had put in some old photos of Avis herself.,
113, 114
Ellsworth Kimmel Ellsworth (iiicqvvi@doorworld.com) is the prettiest
candidate in an unspecified contest. She also believes that the prettiest
always win, though not that she herself is the prettiest. In an alter-
native scenario, B, she sees some ‘Arata Suggs’ on TV and becomes
convinced that that so-called Arata will win. In fact, Arata Suggs is a
nickname given to Ellsworth, and the person on TV is herself. In scene
C Ellsworth is more confident and she confidently utters: “I’m gonna
win this thing.”, 72, 91, 93, 119, 130, 132, 135, 219, 220, 225, 273
Shavonne McManus Shavonne (serafim@mickeyfan.com) is Ellsworth
Kimmel’s rival. When they’re at a party together, Ellsworth tells her,
“Seeems Arata Suggs is going to win” (without realizing she is the
one called Arata) to which Shavonne, brimming with self-confidence,
replies: “Fat chance, I’m gonna win”, 132, 135, 137
Prof. Ortcutt Professor Ortcutt is a famous professor, senior colleague of
Janell Ventress and Ligia Faust, and head of Department X. Janell
admires Ortcutt a lot. With Ortcutt’s imminent retirement, however,
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she hopes to succeed her as head of the department., 16, 17, 26–29,
31–34, 51, 53, 78, 86, 227, 229, 275, 285, 287, 288
Arata Suggs Nickname given to Ellsworth Kimmel behind her back. In
scenario B, Ellsworth/Arata overhears supporters of Arata who are
watching her speech on the TV, 72, 91, 93, 95, 119, 132, 219, 220, 224,
225, 275
Janell Ventress Janell Ventress (zorrel@religiousfollower.com) is part
of a conference review committee. She believes in fair and blind review-
ing. When she happens to get assigned her own submission, she doesn’t
recognize it, but gives it high marks, 15–19, 24–29, 31–35, 37, 51, 52,
58, 78, 86, 227, 229, 285, 287, 288
Colby Vogel Colby Vogel (emaier@phil.kun.nl) kisses Ligia Faust, be-
cause he believes her to be a philosopher, 4, 9, 20
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Summary
John, a real Coke fan, takes the Pepsi Challenge1. Before the test he is asked
what his Cola of choice is. He responds as in (1a), from which the host
concludes (1b).
(1) a. John: “Coca-Cola tastes best.”
b. John thinks that Coca-Cola tastes best
An utterance like (1b) is called a belief report. More precisely, a de dicto
belief report, since it presents John as believing the proposition expressed by
his own utterance in (1a). A belief report is a natural language construction
meant to ascribe a belief to an individual. Though some authors fail to make
a clear distinction, it clear that a theory of belief reports is something different
from a theory of belief, though the first arguably presupposes the latter to
some extent. So, first we have to say something about belief. Definition:
John believes a proposition de dicto iff he is disposed to assent to a linguistic
realization of that proposition. A de dicto belief report then is defined as a
sentence of the form NP believes that S that means that the subject believes
de dicto the proposition expressed by the complement, S.
John takes two sips and concludes that the drink labeled ‘M’ is the best.
The host then reveals that M is actually Pepsi and declares:
(2) John thinks that Pepsi tastes best
John might disagree at first, but the facts are that he said he preferred M
and that M = Pepsi, so (2) is true. This is what we call a de re belief report,
since the belief it reports is not about the word or concept Pepsi, but rather
about the actual object denoted by that phrase, the so-called res. What is
expressed is that John thinks that this actual drink here, which happens to
be known both as ‘Pepsi’ and as ‘M’, is the best. An important characteristic
of de re belief is that involves a subject who is vividly acquainted with an
external object, for without proper acquaintance it is impossible to have a
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pepsi Challenge.
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belief about an external object. This leads to the following definition of de
re belief (Kaplan 1969):
(3) x believes de re of y that y is P iff there is a relation R with:
a. R is a vivid relation of acquaintance
b. R(x, y) in the actual world
c. x believes the proposition that the object he is R-acquainted with
is P (i.e. P ( ιz[R(x, z)]))
Applying the definition to the example, we see that John has a de re belief
by taking: x = John; y = the Pepsi in the cup labeled M; P (x) iff x tastes
best; and R(x, y) iff x drinks a Cola y from the cup marked M.2
Besides de dicto and de re beliefs and reports, philosophers and linguists
have argued for a third mode: de se (Castan˜eda 1966; Perry 1977; Lewis
1979a; Kaplan 1989). Consider the following real life example.3 In an exper-
iment some male speakers of various sexual orientations were recorded after
they had first reported their sexual orientation. They were then asked to rate
all recorded passages, including their own, on a scale from gay to straight.
Frank is gay, he knows it and deliberately tries to sound gay. When ap-
proached for the experiment he said: “I sound gay.” Frank thereby expresses
a de re belief about himself, that he sounds gay. Chris, who would never
describe his own voice as gay, also participates in the experiment. Now he’s
listening to the recordings and when he gets to #12 he marks it as ‘very gay’,
not realizing that this is his own voice. Thus, Chris also expresses a de re
belief about himself, because listening carefully to recording #12 brings him
into a perceptual acquaintance relation with himself. The difference between
the beliefs is that Frank’s is not only de re about himself, but (pure) de se:
he believes he himself sounds gay from his own first person point of view,
while Chris’s belief is about himself from a third person perspective. More
specifically, beliefs that the believer would express with a first person index-
ical (I) correspond to 1st person pure de se beliefs, or simply de se beliefs
since we shall focus on the person domain exclusively in this summary.
The example brings out the importance of the indexical point of view in
the analysis of belief. At a propositional level Chris’ thought “#12 sounds
gay” is indistinguishable from “I sound gay”, though he might utter the
2Note by the way that de dicto and de re beliefs are not mutually exclusive. The de
dicto belief expressed in (1b) is also de re, since we may safely assume that John has had
various encounters with Coca-Cola in the (recent) past and has formed his belief on the
basis of those. On the other hand (2) interpreted de dicto is false: John would never say
or think “Pepsi tastes best.”
3http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/∼myl/languagelog/archives/001799.html
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former, but not the latter. This prompted Lewis (1979a) to change from
propositions as objects of belief, to properties that the believer self-ascribes:
Frank’s first person utterance means he self-ascribes the property of sounding
gay, while Chris self-ascribes the distinct property of listening to recording
#12, which sounds gay. We revise the last clause in the definition of de re
belief accordingly:
(3) c’. x self-ascribes the property of being R-acquainted with a z that
is P (i.e. x self-ascribes λx[P ( ιz[R(x, z)])])
Note how de se belief comes out as a special case of de re, viz. the case
where R is the relation of equality (substituting = for R above collapses
the complex property to the property of being P ) (Lewis 1979a:156). It
is easily verified that on this definition both Frank and Chris believe de
re of themselves that they sound gay, but only Frank does so under the
acquaintance relation of equality, i.e. de se. Chapter 1 of this dissertation is
largely an exposition and defense of the relational reduction of de se to de
re belief, and of Kaplan’s (1989) comparable reduction formulated in terms
of two-dimensional character semantics.
Chapter 2 is devoted to the semantics of de re and de se belief reports
in natural language. We can easily make a report semantics based on the
acquaintance-based, reductionist de re/de se belief semantics (Cresswell &
von Stechow 1982):
(4) JNP1 believes that NP2 VPK = 1 iff there is a relation R with:
a. R is a vivid relation of acquaintance
b. R(JNP1K , JNP2K) in the actual world
c. JNP1K self-ascribes the property of being R-acquainted with a z
that is JVPK
In cases where NP1 (the subject) and NP2 (the res) are co-referential, we
predict that the reported belief could be de se or (merely) de re. In other
words, since a report like (5) is linguistically underspecified for de re or de
se:
(5) Frank thinks he sounds gay
Applying (4) gives that (5) is true iff there is a vivid relation of acquaintance
between Frank and himself such that Frank self-ascribes being so acquainted
with a unique person that is gay. And this is true because Frank believes
himself to be gay, so we can take the relation of equality. But we would also
predict that (6) is true:
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(6) Chris thinks he sounds gay
Since Chris doesn’t even recognize his own voice, this prediction may seem
problematic at first, but I follow the (philosophers’) consensus that it is
nonetheless correct. Admittedly, it would be considered misleading to word
Chris’ predicament in this way if the circumstances of his mistaken identity
weren’t already mentioned or otherwise firmly established in the context (e.g.
if we qualify the report by adding “. . . , but he doesn’t realize it”, or visually,
as when the reporter and her audience are watching the whole mistaken
identity scene unfold).
One of the main selling points of this relational semantics is that for
sentences like (6) it can do without postulating any kind of ambiguity as a
linguistic correlate to the de re/de se distinction.4 The flip side is that such
unified theories cannot explain the obvious difference in acceptability between
(5) and (6) in the given context, even if they are both strictly speaking true.
A more serious drawback of unification is that we’re at a loss to deal with
reports that can only be read de se, as, for example, the English infinitival
complement construction:
(7) a. Frank believes to have a gay voice
b. #Chris believes to have a gay voice [*though he doesn’t realize it]5
Chierchia (1989) uses this contrast to argue for a dedicated de se LF, which
means that the construction in (6) is ambiguous between a de re and de se LF
while (7) isn’t.6 This ‘ambiguity thesis’ is compatible with syntactic theory
telling us that the reports in (6) and (7) share the same form, ‘NP believes
[NP VP]’, with the second NP slot filled by third person pronoun in (6), and
by an unpronounced PRO in (7). Chierchia analyzes this PRO as a de se
pronoun, i.e. an element that has to be bound by the belief center, forcing
the report into a de se LF, while an overt pronoun is only optionally bound
de se. Schlenker (2003) later argues that the so-called logophoric pronouns
found in many African languages can also be seen as de se pronouns.
4The same is true for Kaplan’s quantified character analysis, but von Stechow &
Zimmermann (2004) lay bare a fatal flaw in that account, as I show in my thesis, so I’ll
disregard it here.
5Terminology: ‘#’ denotes the semantic judgment that the sentence uttered in a given
context is false; ‘*’ denotes the syntactic judgment that a sentence (or continuation) is
ungrammatical.
6The so-called hybrid variant lets (5) and (6) keep their unified relational LF while
the reports in (7) receive a totally different syntactic and semantic analysis. The main
argument against this is that it does not extend to the arguably related phenomena of
logophoricity and shifted indexicality (see below).
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Another argument for the ambiguity thesis (against unification) is due to
Percus & Sauerland (2003a) and involves the following quantified report:
(8) Only Frank thinks he sounds gay
This report is commonly judged true in our mixed de re and de se scenario.
On a relational account it would come out false, because Frank is not the
only one who believes of himself, under some acquaintance relation, that he
sounds gay; he’s just the only one who has such a belief under the acquain-
tance relation of equality. Note that the simple fix of giving the quantified
acquaintance relation wide scope over the overt quantifier only will wrongly
predict that (9a) is true and (9b) is false:
(9) a. #Only Chris thinks he sounds gay
[
(Zeevat, p.c.)
]
b. Both guys think they sound gay
[
(Zimmermann, p.c.)
]
A final argument against the unified relational analysis originates in
Schlenker’s (2003) work on shifted indexicals. In many languages (includ-
ing Amharic, Ancient Greek and Zazaki), an unmistakably indexical first
person form embedded in a belief or speech report may refer not to the
actual speaker of the report, but to the subject of the attitude:
(10) ˇon
john
ˇ@gna
hero
n@
be
-n˜n˜
-1.sg
y1l
say.3.sg
-all
-aux.3.sg
‘Johni says that hei is a hero’
[
Amharic, (Schlenker 2003:68)
]
Schlenker builds a framework in which this kind of construction is semanti-
cally speaking the default way to report a de se attitude, but on the relational
account such a shifted first person is highly problematic. This is because de
se is then a relational, de re attitude. Applying (4) to (10) with NP1=John
and NP2=1.sg, it is obvious that the acquaintance relation can never be iden-
tity, because John is not the actual speaker, so we incorrectly predict that
(10) means the same as its literal English counterpart: John says that I am
a hero.
Despite all these apparent arguments against unification, I propose a new
unified semantics of de re/de se reports, built on the relational attitudes
framework, but incorporating the context-dependence of acquaintance. The
resulting theory, Acquaintance Resolution, handles a wide variety of data
including the Pepsi Challenge, de re/de se ambiguities, infinitival comple-
ments, logophors, quantified reports and shifted indexicals. Thus, the prob-
lems raised above are all solved, and we achieve a unification of de re and de
se attitude reports.
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The proposed account is based on the idea of acquaintance relations be-
ing provided by the context rather than existentially quantified over. Taking
this idea seriously, I decided to develop my theory in a dynamic, represen-
tational semantic framework: Discourse Representation Theory (DRT), a
framework designed to accommodate context-dependence. To account for
the kind of phenomena we’re interested in here, I propose a few extensions
to basic DRT. The first is standard, I incorporate van der Sandt’s (1992)
theory of Presupposition as Anaphora to analyze pronouns and other def-
inites uniformly. With that comes a two-stage interpretation architecture:
from the syntactic analysis of a sentence a preliminary DRS is constructed
fully compositionally, and then a pragmatic/semantic resolution mechanism
connects that preliminary structure with the context DRS by resolving its
presuppositions. Acquaintance Resolution will be compositional and unified
in the sense that the preliminary DRS is generated compositionally, and un-
derspecified for de re/de se. The final output DRS is of course determined
in part pragmatically, and in interaction with the context: it is neither fully
compositional (in the strong, Montagovian sense), nor unified, since a typical
de re acquaintance and a de se one give distinct truth-conditions.
Second, I apply a new version of Layered DRT (Geurts & Maier 2003)
to divide DRSs into two separate but interconnected layers. LDRT was
originally designed as a general framework for representing different types
of information within a single DRS. All conditions reside in a specific layer,
but these layers can all use the same discourse referents. I use it here to
separate descriptive, at issue content, from rigid, directly referential content.
Combined with the analysis of definites as presuppositions this leads to a
powerful new semantics of proper names and indexicals. The relevance to
the current undertaking lies primarily with the indexicals. In particular,
LDRT gives, to my knowledge, the first principled semantics of the first
person pronoun in DRT. A final addition to the standard DRT framework
is the switch from believed propositions to self-ascribed properties, which is
analogous to that in the classical framework.
With these preliminaries in place we turn to Acquaintance Resolution
proper. The idea of a context-dependent acquaintance relation can be for-
malized as a kind of presupposition. The preliminary DRS contains a free
relation variable R that stands for the acquaintance relation and thus for the
description under which the belief is held. In the resolution stage, this R is re-
solved by binding it to a suitable relation already present in the context DRS.
This binding is subject to the usual pragmatic and semantic presupposition
binding constraints (salience, accessibility, consistency etc.) and some new
ones: (i) the antecedent relation should hold between the report’s believer
and res, (ii) it should be a proper relation of acquaintance (e.g. a perceptual
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relation), and (iii) resolving to equality is the default. The last clause ensures
a preference for de se readings in co-referential reports, thus answering the
first objection against the relational framework mentioned above. Moreover,
it explains why people hesitate to accept (6) as a true report of our mis-
taken identity scenario, because we first resolve to equality, which leads to
an incoherent output DRS, after which we have to recompute and search the
context for a suitable acquaintance relation. The first additional constraint,
(i), will be built into the second-order binding mechanism, which I formalize
in terms of higher-order unification (Huet 1975; Dalrymple et al. 1991). This
means that we equate the DRS condition that R holds between believer and
res with a ‘suitably parallel’ condition from the context, and then find a uni-
fying substitution for this (higher-order) equation. The resolution consists
in applying this substitution (for R) to the whole DRS.
Let’s illustrate all this with an example resolution of (6). First, we con-
struct the preliminary DRS for the ambiguous (6), repeated below. Note
that the bel operator denotes the operation of property self-ascription, so
the embedded belief DRS denotes a set of contexts, of which center picks
out the agent/speaker parameter:
(11) Chris thinks he sounds gay
R(z, w)
z
chris(z)
w
3.sg.m(w)
belz
u v
center(u)
R(u, v)
sounds gay(v)
The free R represents the underspecified acquaintance relation, the dashed
boxes represent the presuppositions triggered by the subject (Chris) en res-
term (he) of the report. Next, we add this preliminary DRS to a context, in
this case a DRS where it is salient (to the reporter and her audience) that
Chris is hearing his own voice. After that we bind the two presuppositions:
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(12)
x
chris(x)
hear(x, x)
⊕ (11) ;
[
z7→x
w7→x
]
;
x
chris(x)
hear(x, x)
R(x, x)
belx
u v
center(u)
R(u, v)
sounds gay(v)
The last step is binding R by determining a substitution that unifies R(x, x)
with the contextually salient hear(x, x):
(13) ; R(x, x) .= hear(x, x) ; [R7→λsλt[hear(s, t)]]
;
x
chris(x)
hear(x, x)
belx
u v
center(u)
hear(u, v)
sounds gay(v)
In the resulting output Chris (x) thinks he (u) is hearing someone (v) who
sounds gay. Note that we only chose this resolution path because choosing
equality would have led to an output with u = v, a de se report requiring
that Chris thought “I sound gay”, which is inconsistent with the story. If it
had been Frank instead of Chris, that reading would have been possible and
thus preferred.
This basic framework is extended in two steps to account for all prob-
lematic report data discussed above. The first extension allows us to handle
the quantified data. As it stands, embedding a pronoun report like (5) un-
der a quantifier will only generate quantified de se readings, i.e. Both guys
think they sound gay is only true if both Chris and Frank have the right
de se attitude. This is because the subject parameter in the acquaintance
relation is a quantified variable, which does not figure in any contextual con-
dition, so we can only take the default de se resolution. As (9b) shows,
this prediction is not borne out. In order to solve this problem, we make
the resolution of R more flexible by allowing projection and accommodation,
in other words: make it a real second-order presupposition. Zimmermann’s
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judgment comes out as a case of local accommodation of R. Again, this op-
tion is only available because the default de se resolution is inconsistent with
the mixed context. Percus & Sauerland’s (2003a) judgment about (8) cor-
responds rather straightforwardly to the default resolution (given that only
is still treated as a quantifier). With Zeevat’s (9a) indeed all possible reso-
lution options (binding and accommodation, global and non-global) fail to
produce a true output, mainly because the R-presupposition is trapped inside
the duplex condition representing the quantifier. So this problem is solved
as well.
The second and last extension is somewhat more involved. It concerns
the unambiguous de se reports with infinitives and logophors, and the shifted
first person indexicals. My solution starts with the latter and applies that to
the former. Basically, the reason Acquaintance Resolution as it stands has
trouble with shifted I is precisely because it treats de se as a subspecies of
de re. The res is logically represented outside the belief context, so a first
person pronoun syntactically embedded as res will always refer to the ac-
tual speaker. This corresponds to Kaplan’s (1989) well-known ‘prohibition
of monsters’, which works fine for English he and I, but fails for Amharic and
other languages that allow shifted indexicals. The first step towards a solu-
tion is to generate the embedded subject presupposition in situ, i.e. within
the belief box of the preliminary DRS, and rely on the general preference for
wide scope resolution, aided by the k layering, to ensure that referential terms
and other definites end up in the main context. This leaves open the possi-
bility of a local binding, and that is exactly what happens with the shifted
reading of an Amharic belief embedded I: the belief center, sharing the first
person content and the k layer of indexicality, binds the res presupposition:
(14) John says that I am a hero
[
Amharic
]
;
x
john(x)
R(x, w)
belx
u v
center(u)
R(u, v)
hero(v)
w
1.sg(w)
; [w7→u] ;
x
john(x)
R(x, u)
belx
u v
center(u)
R(u, v)
hero(v)
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From here we need to eventually arrive at a de se output. But, since x is
not equal to u (not to mention the fact that this u occurs here as a free
variable), how can we bind R to equality? A closer look reveals that x may
not be equal to u, but they are rather intimately connected: u is the center
of x’s belief. The next step is to generalize the notion of acquaintance to
allow for the possibility of acquaintance to concepts (intensional discourse
referents). If we do that, we can safely close off the free (now intensional)
variable in the main context when x is acquainted with his self-concept,
the function mapping each of his belief alternatives to its center, in other
words: the person he believes to be. In order to uphold a de dicto/de re
distinction, we must be cautious in admitting de re acquaintance with a
mere concept, but it seems reasonable to say that the self-concept at least
is a viable candidate res. Binding to his acquaintance with the self-concept
gives a DRS in which John’s belief center’s belief center is believed to be a
hero. I invoke a rather uncontroversial introspection principle from doxastic
logic to reduce the double belief embedding, by which we derive the proper
de se reading. It’s now also obvious what to do with PRO and logophors:
represent them semantically as first person pronouns.
The end result is still a truly unified analysis of de re and de se reports,
in the sense that we generate fully compositional but highly underspecified
preliminary structures. I’ve collected the evidence against de re/de se unifi-
cation, and showed how my account can deal with all the alleged counterex-
amples and more. The account uses a couple of independently motivated
semantic and pragmatic tools (e.g. higher-order unification, presupposition
resolution, two-dimensional semantics, and introspection) while keeping the
syntax entirely straightforward (e.g. no movements, (almost) no feature dele-
tion under agreement, and (almost) no invisible items). One of the extended
aims of this work was to interpret all pronouns and other lexical items in a
report as they appeared on the surface. I’ll let the reader decide if I have
succeeded in that and thus made a convincing case for the unification of de
re and de se through Acquaintance Resolution.
Geloof in Context
Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift gaat over attitude toeschrijvingen. Meer in het bijzonder zal
ik een uniforme semantiek van de re en de se geloofstoeschrijvingen geven.
Een de re geloof is een geloof dat een individu heeft over een bepaald extern
object in haar onmiddelijke omgeving, bijvoorbeeld mijn geloof dat deze trein
waar ik nu in zit naar Amsterdam gaat. Ik denk namelijk dat ik in de trein
van 10:50 van Nijmegen naar Amsterdam en verder zit. Maar stel nu eens
dat ik per ongeluk in the 10:56 naar Zwolle ben gestapt. Als ik nu tegen
een onzekere medereiziger zou zeggen: “Deze trein gaat naar Amsterdam”,
dan zou ik daarmee dus eigenlijk een de re geloof uitdrukken over de 10:56
trein, nl. dat hij naar Amsterdam gaat. En dit ondanks het feit dat ik zelf
nooit zou zeggen: “De trein van 10:56 gaat naar Amsterdam”. Dit is een
van de fundamentele puzzels met betrekking tot de re geloof, en een die in
dit proefschrift ook een grote rol speelt.
De se geloof is gedefinieerd als iets wat de gelover zelf met context af-
hankelijke uitdrukkingen zoals ik, jij, hier onder woorden kan brengen. Bij-
voorbeeld Jan’s geloof dat hij er goed uit ziet, door hemzelf uitgedrukt als
“ik zie er nog goed uit”. De uitdrukking ik is essentieel voor dit geloof, het
is immers niet hetzelfde als het geloof dat Jan uitdrukt met “Jan ziet er nog
goed uit”, aangezien Jan best zijn naam kan zijn vergeten, bijvoorbeeld door
geheugenverlies, en dan met beide zinnen duidelijk iets anders bedoelt. En
idem als hij zou zeggen “die ziet er nog goed uit” wijzend naar een live video
opname van zichzelf. Hij drukt daarmee weliswaar dezelfde propositie uit,
dat Jan er nog goed uit ziet, maar het onderliggende geloof is anders, want
hij zou het laatste bijvoorbeeld kunnen denken zonder zichzelf op het scherm
te herkennen en dus zonder meteen te denken “ik zie er nog goed uit”. In
alle drie de gevallen drukt Jan een de re geloof uit over zichzelf, maar alleen
die met ik noemen we (puur) de se.
In hoofdstuk 1 laat ik zien dat de se inderdaad altijd gezien kan worden
als een speciaal geval van de re. Vervolgens richten we ons in hoofdstuk
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2 en 3 op geloofstoeschrijvingen. Dat zijn zinnen als “Emar denkt dat deze
trein naar Amsterdam gaat”, die zeggen dat iemand een bepaald geloof heeft.
Een de re of de se toeschrijving is dan een zin die zegt dat iemand een de re
respectievelijk de se geloof heeft. Mijn centrale stelling is dat de reductie van
de se als een speciaal gevaal van de re ook voor toeschrijvingen geldt. Er is
echter zeker geen ’e’en op ’e’en correspondentie tussen de re en de se geloof
en geloofstoeschrijvingen in natuurlijke taal. Veel zinnen zijn bijvoorbeeld
ambigu of ondergespecificeerd wat betreft het geloofstype:
(1) Jan denkt dat hij er nog goed uitziet
Deze zin is natuurlijk waar als Jan denkt “ik zie er nog goed uit” (de se),
maar, met enige moeite willen we ook nog wel toegeven dat hij waar is in
een situatie waarin we zien dat Jan denkt “hij daar op die video ziet er goed
uit” zonder het door te hebben kijkend naar zichzelf (de re).1
Dit volgt mooi uit de analyse van de se als de re maar er zijn ook toe-
schrijvingen die alleen de se te lezen zijn:
(2) Jan denkt er nog goed uit te zien
Deze zin is duidelijk onwaar als Jan denkt dat hij het over iemand anders
heeft. En er zijn nog meer constructies in natuurlijke talen die tegen de
uniforme behandeling van de re en de se spreken. Zin (3) bijvoorbeeld lijkt
zoiets te betekenen als: Jan is de enige die denkt, “ik zie er nog goed uit”:
(3) Alleen Jan denkt dat hij er nog goed uit ziet
In andere talen komen we nog meer toeschrijvingen tegen die uitsluitend de
se te lezen zijn, bijvoorbeeld de zogenaamde logophoren in veel Afrikaanse
talen. In weer andere talen vinden we toeschrijvingen met een ingebedde ik
die niet naar de feitelijke spreker verwijst (‘monstrously shifted indexicals’ in
o.a. het Amhaars, Zazaki en Oud-Grieks), hetgeen eveneens in strijd is met
de uniforme de re/de se analyses. In hoofdstuk 2 bespreek ik al deze data
en en andere argumenten tegen de uniforme benadering van de re en de se
toeschrijvingen.
Tenslotte laat ik in hoofdstuk 3 zien hoe we de uniforme de re/de se ana-
lyse kunnen redden: door over te stappen op een dynamische semantiek. Ik
ontwikkel een systeem waarin uit een toeschrijving ondergespecificeerde logi-
sche vormen worden gegenereerd, waarna de context bepaalt wat voor de re
geloof het precies wordt, met de se als default. Det basis systeem maakt ge-
bruik van enkele onafhankelijk gemotiveerde semantisch-pragmatische tools
1Voeg bijvoorbeeld “. . . , maar hij heeft het zelf niet door!” toe aan (1).
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zoals presupposities, een uitbreiding van DRT (‘Layered DRT’) met twee-
dimensionale semantiek, en tweede orde unificatie. Dan volgen nog twee
technische uitbreidingen om echt alle eerder besproken problemen tegen de
unificatie te weerleggen. Het eind resultaat is een uniforme, dynamische ana-
lyse die recht doet aan een zeer breed scala aan de re en de se puzzels en
probleemgevallen voor eerdere analyses.
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